The Work of Authorship by unknown
The Work of Authorship 
Edited by Mireille van Eechoud
A
The Work of Authorship





This book is published in print and online through the online OAPEN library (www.oapen.org).
OAPEN (Open Access Publishing in European Networks) is a collaborative initiative to 
develop and implement a sustainable Open Access publication model for academic books 
in the Humanities and Social Sciences. The OAPEN Library aims to improve the visibility 
and usability of high quality academic research by aggregating peer reviewed Open Access 
publications from across Europe.
Amsterdam University Press English-language titles are distributed in the US and Canada by 
the University of Chicago Press.
isbn 978 90 8964 635 4
e-isbn 978 90 4852 300 9
nur 820 / 823
Creative Commons License CC BY NC ND
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0)
 All authors / Amsterdam University Press B.V., Amsterdam, 2014
The authors assert their moral rights, including the right to be identif ied as the author of 
their respective contributions to The Work of Authorship.
Some rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, any part of 
this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, 
in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise), 
for non-commercial purposes.
 Contents
Voices near and far  7
Introduction
Mireille van Eechoud
Creative work and communicative norms  19
Perspectives from legal philosophy
Laura Biron
Romantic authorship in copyright law and the uses of aesthetics  45
Erlend Lavik
Creativity, autonomy and personal touch  95
A critical appraisal of the CJEU’s originality test for copyright
Stef van Gompel
Adapting the work  145
Mireille van Eechoud
Reassessing the challenge of the digital  175
An empirical perspective on authorship and copyright
Elena Cooper
Creativity and the sense of collective ownership in theatre and 
popular music  215
Jostein Gripsrud
 Discontinuities between legal conceptions of authorship and 
social practices  237
What, if anything, is to be done?
Lionel Bently and Laura Biron
About the authors  277

 Voices near and far
Introduction
Mireille van Eechoud
Copyright laws are important regulators of cultural expression, because 
they grant extensive rights to control the reproduction, adaptation and 
communication of ‘literary’ and ‘artistic’ works. The twin concepts of 
authorship and original work are central to copyright laws the world over. 
They might not be clearly def ined, and certainly not uniformly, but they 
enjoy global recognition. That is evident f irst and foremost by the fact that 
the Grande Dame of international copyright law, the Berne Convention 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886/1971), has over 180 
contracting states.
One might be forgiven to think that, being concerned with (the study 
of) regulating creative practices, legal scholars of copyright as well as 
policymakers are deeply interested in how works get made, how authors 
operate.
But there is remarkably little in the way of academic publications and 
policy documents to show that this is in fact so. In the past decade or so, 
empirical studies of creative and innovation industries are on the rise. 
They tend to foreground technological and economic aspects of production 
and use, tracking in a sense the predominant outlook of IP policy makers. 
That is at least the image that arises when one browses the articles in the 
e-journal Intellectual Property: Empirical studies at the Social Sciences 
Research Network. It is devoted entirely to quantative research, with a 
strong orientation towards patents and litigation studies. In the copyright 
domain, there is a growing body of work on income effects and working 
conditions for creators in the media and entertainment industries (see 
e.g. Poort et al., 2013, Kretschmer et al., 2011). Other popular topics include 
the economic effects of music sampling, or f ile-sharing on markets for 
copyright works, or spelling out what it is we do not know (Towse, 2011). 
More concerned with actual practices, power relations and institutional 
dimensions are sociologists and anthropologists, for example, the work of 
Kelty (2008) queries collaborative practices in free and open source software 
development, including community copyright strategies and norms. Reagle 
(2010) studied attitudes to ‘ownership’ and collaboration in Wikipedia com-
munities.
8 Mireille vAn eechoud 
The authors of this volume set themselves the challenge of identifying 
how insights from a variety of humanities disciplines can help inform the 
interpretation and construction of copyright law. We considered that legal 
scholars – especially ones close to legal practices and policymaking – would 
do well to take note of the accumulated knowledge of the arts and hu-
manities as students of how and why works, pieces, performances get made, 
what their signif icance is, how they are read, received, used. For reasons 
detailed below, we choose to focus on two core concepts in copyright law: 
the original work and authorship.
We embarked on a three-year research project entitled Of Authorship and 
Originality. It was funded by a grant from the Humanities in the European 
Research Area programme ‘HERA’, a joint effort of national research 
councils and the EU, managed by the European Science Foundation.1 
One of the principal objectives of the HERA programme is to bring the 
humanities into the European Research Area and promote humanities 
research in the EU framework Programmes (the latest one being ‘Horizon 
2020’, with an estimate budget of 70 billion euro). EU programmes have 
until now had an overwhelming focus on (hard) scientif ic and techno-
logical progress and the development of businesses: an orientation that 
dominates copyright policy also. Our effort thus mirrored, albeit in a very 
small corner, HERA’s ambition to raise the contribution of humanities 
research to help ‘address social, cultural, and political challenges facing 
Europe’ (HERA 2009).
The goal of this introduction is to ‘set the stage’ so to speak for the 
various explorations that follow, of notions of collaborative authorship 
and original works in academic thought, societal practice and as legal 
norms. To provide especially the readership not familiar with copyright 
lawmaking with a useful backdrop, what follows is a characterisation of 
the current state of copyright law in Europe. I shall briefly describe the role 
of the EU as primary actor in copyright reform. We can then sketch what 
the pertinent questions are on authorship and copyright subject-matter, 
a.k.a. original intellectual creations, and how the authors of each chapter 
have addressed these. The contributions in this volume all borrow from 
different disciplines. This introduction concludes with some observations 
on the many voices in academia that speak on creative practices, and on 
their relative proximity to copyright scholarship. Although technology and 
economics will continue to drive developments in intellectual property law, 
humanities research can (and should) have real impact on the quality of 
law and legal interpretation.
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Copyright reform EU style
In Europe, two major forces drive copyright reform: the realisation of the 
internal EU market for goods and services, and technological change. The 
workings of national copyright laws affect the operation of the internal 
market and therefore in the past twenty years or so the EU institutions 
have legislated harmonised norms piece by piece, in different parts of the 
copyright and related rights domains. Directives have been the preferred 
instrument.2 To date, most of the harmonisation effort has been in areas 
where technological change was thought likely to result in diverging legisla-
tive responses by Member States.
The first-ever copyright directive was the 1991 Computer Programs Direc-
tive, aimed at ensuring that software was treated as a ‘literary work’ under 
national copyright laws, at a common originality standard. To unequivo-
cally bring computer programmes into the copyright domain was seen as 
necessary for the development of software industries. Subsequent directives 
also responded to exploitation models made possible by ‘new’ technologies, 
e.g. on the right to control rental of copies on video, CDs and other media 
(1992/2006)3, the right to control satellite broadcasts (1993) and of course the 
dissemination of works over the internet (2001). The most recent directive, 
on orphan works (2012), and the proposed Collective Management Direc-
tive (2012) also are direct responses to the impact of digital technology. 
There are only two directives which we can safely say are not technology 
driven. One is the Term Directive (1993/2006), which lays down rules for 
(near) uniform duration of copyright and of the related rights of performers, 
broadcasting organisations, f ilm producers and record producers. The other 
is the Resale Right Directive, which gives authors of art works (sculpture, 
painting, photography, installations, and so on) a claim to share in the 
proceeds of the resale of their work.
A much criticised effect of EU harmonisation is that all initiatives have 
led to higher levels of protection, for more types of subject-matter, for a 
longer period of time (Van Eechoud et al., 2009). It has proven to be nearly 
impossible to harmonise ‘down’ to the level of protection in the most liberal 
Member States. This is caused by the mechanics of policymaking at EU level 
combined with the status of copyright as a quasi-property right in national 
traditions and under the EU’s charter of fundamental rights. Harmonisation 
is thus mostly upward. The focus on technological and economic concerns 
does not of and in itself dictate certain outcomes of harmonisation processes. 
Much is to be said and has been said about the intransparency of agenda 
setting, the lobbying power of established stakeholders in the cultural and 
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IT industries, and the quality of evidence on which changes to copyright 
laws are ‘sold’. But that is not the topic of this book. The harmonisation 
project continues, but especially with respect to author prerogatives – be it 
exclusive rights to authorise, or merely claims for remuneration for certain 
uses – harmonisation is by now fairly complete. Our interest is how all the 
years of piecemeal harmonisation have influenced notions of authorship 
and work.
Intellectual creations and their authors
Until a few years ago, the obvious impact of EU law on the issue of copyright 
subject-matter seemed to be limited to computer programmes and data-
bases. On both topics directives prescribed the standards for and scope of 
protection. It was widely assumed that there was not a truly harmonised 
notion of what qualif ies as an original work in other areas of copyright. 
Some countries operate stricter standards than others, and there is no 
uniformity as to the types of productions that are eligible for protection. 
Many genres are generally recognised as falling in the copyright domain. 
These include for example all types of texts whether f iction or non-f iction, 
practical or for entertainment; music, f ilm, photography, visual arts, maps, 
and applied arts. But there are also categories whose inclusion in copyright 
is controversial, they may be recognised in some countries but not in others. 
Examples include perfume, fashion shows, cookery recipes but also certain 
forms of ex tempore speech.
On the topic of ‘work’ developments in copyright law have become 
volatile with the Court of Justice of the EU’s judgment in the landmark 
Infopaq case and subsequent judgments (BSA, Painer, Football Dataco). 
The Court has started to construct an autonomous work concept based 
on the notion of a work being ‘the author’s own intellectual creation’. The 
terminology is borrowed from the Computer Programs Directive but can 
be traced back to the Berne Convention’s article on the protection of col-
lections, like anthologies for example, as literary works in their own right. 
The judgments have sparked much controversy and have far-reaching 
impacts on the legal systems of some EU Member States (Van Eechoud, 
2012). Drawing upon the above cases, in the eyes of the Court a work is an 
original intellectual creation of the author on condition that it is ‘reflecting 
his personality and expressing his free and creative choices in its produc-
tion’. In his contribution to this book Stef van Gompel critically examines 
what the EU court could mean by ‘free and creative choices’ and what we 
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can learn about constraints to creativity as identif ied in art studies and 
other disciplines.
What seems clear from the Court of Justice’s case law is that an intellec-
tual creation easily qualif ies as original. In that respect, the judgments are 
not exactly earth-shaking. In many copyright laws, the work of authorship 
had already become a vessel that accommodated a very broad array of 
works of the mind, from ‘high art’ to ‘low art’, from the purely aesthetic to 
the predominantly functional or technical. The standard for protection 
in many jurisdictions had evolved to the point where ‘original’ and ‘crea-
tive’ seemed to be synonymous terms, both meaning little more than ‘not 
directly copied’ or ‘resulting from a modicum of freedom of choice’. Coupled 
with a the ever-expanding scope of the reproduction right, what does this 
imply for the linked legal concepts of ‘work’, ‘copy’ and ‘adaptation’? How 
can we meaningfully interpret these terms in the digitally networked age, 
with its possibilities of borrowing, sampling, reworking, appropriation at 
unprecedented scale? These are questions raised in my chapter on Adapting 
the work.
Equally important is the question: If everything is a work, does that 
make everyone an author? The EU directives have little to say on exactly 
who qualif ies as (co) author or initial owner of copyright, beyond some 
provisions for software, databases and f ilm. There are shared notions of 
authorship in national laws of course. At present, by and large, national 
rules on authorship and copyright ownership are still based on the author 
as an individual autonomous agent operating in relative isolation. This 
model continues to work well for small-scale production, but is much more 
problematic in other areas. Three of the chapters in this book are the fruits 
of contrasting legal notions of authorship with those circulating in creative 
communities.
How authorship status is attained in law, and viewed in the practices 
of scientif ic publishing, literary editing and conceptual art is the topic of 
Lionel Bently and Laura Biron’s contribution. Drawing on sources from 
literary studies, and the history of science and art, they analyse discrepan-
cies for these sectors between who copyright law recognises as author 
(and therefore typically owner of rights) and who has authorship status in 
social practice. As it turns out, copyright, they show ‘makes authors-in-law 
out of social “non-authors”’ (and vice versa). In the domain of ‘digital’ arts, 
Elena Cooper also explores the diverse ways in which relations between 
contributors are perceived within creative communities. She does so on 
the basis of interviews conducted with sixteen artists and poets who use 
digital technology, considering how and why ‘authorship’ is attributed to 
12 Mireille vAn eechoud 
some contributors but denied to others. Cooper’s f ieldwork testif ies to the 
wide range of practices and notions of authorship among ‘digital’ artists 
and their collaborators. It also brings out how technological change can 
engender collaborations – as when digital technologies require highly 
specialised skills – but also return work from collaborative to solitary when 
technologies become ubiquitous and easy to use.
Collective production processes in the arts hardly began with digital 
media and the world wide web. They have existed in key artforms such as 
theatre, dance and music since the dawn of civilization. To contrast the 
analogue and the digital, Jostein Gripsrud studied a theatrical production 
at a national repertory theatre in Norway and in his contribution to this 
volume compares the f indings with those of f ieldwork among younger 
musicians/producers involved in professional and semi-professional digital 
production of popular music. In historical work for the project Elena Cooper 
uncovered how large-scale collaboration in the analogue age of print took 
place, in a case study of the Oxford English Dictionary. Its early making 
relied heavily on volunteer contributions, a Wikipedia model avant la lettre 
in certain respects.
Many voices, confusing sounds
To ask how ‘humanities’ research can inform the construction and inter-
pretation of copyright norms and concepts is in a way an absurdly broad 
question: An additional reason for us to focus on notions of authorship, 
originality and work, since these are areas where it is reasonable to expect 
a rich body of relevant work within the humanities. Even so, a veritable mer 
à boire remains. What then, are the disciplines that seem to hold particular 
promise? Art history is one, albeit not for its traditional focus on artist 
monographs. Instead, Laura Biron and Elena Cooper have considered 
multiple authorship in copyright through the looking glass of institutional 
theories of art (2014).
The ever-burgeoning fields of ‘creativity studies’ are not the predominant 
ones we have drawn upon. This is because much of the research that at-
tempts to model and describe forms of creativity and the circumstances 
that support creative activity takes the perspective place of (cognitive) 
psychology, education, or business studies, or sociology (e.g. Uzzi and Spiro, 
2005) i.e. social sciences. Theories of creativity tend to focus on one of four 
‘p’s: person, process, product, and press, that is external factors like the 
environment (Torrance, 1993). Interesting for copyright is the well-known 
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model of person-oriented creativity that distinguishes between big-C (the 
creativity of a recognised genius), pro-C (expert-level creativity but not of 
the kind that has legendary status), little-C (normal day- to- day creativity), 
and mini-C, i.e. novel and meaningful discoveries each person has as part 
of learning processes (J.C. Kaufman and R.J. Sternberg, 2010; Kaufman and 
Beghetto, 2013). Stef van Gompel does consider a number of insights from 
these perspectives in his analysis of the notion of ‘free creative choices’, 
bedrock of the originality standard in copyright law.
Genius, or big-C creativity, is one topic where literary studies, history and 
legal scholarship have met. The purported influence of Romantic notions 
of authorship on copyright law has been a topic of rich debate in the US. 
Twenty years ago, Coombe was happy to report that due largely to the 
historical work ‘intellectual property law has at long last become a f ield 
of engaged interdisciplinary inquiry’ (Coombe, 1994). In Europe too, the 
history of copyright and intellectual property law more generally is going 
mainstream. The recent establishment of the International Society for the 
History of Intellectual Property (ISHTIP), whose annual conferences are 
well attended, is testimony to the growing interest. Our understanding of 
the historical trajectories of copyright laws will undoubtedly also grow as 
a result of projects that bring together primary sources for academic use, 
such as the Primary Sources on Copyright (1450–1900) project curated by 
Lionel Bently and Martin Kretschmer (www.copyrighthistory.org).
That the meeting of literature, law and history leads to insights that can 
actually help reform copyright is not a given. After reviewing the efforts 
made in literary studies to reassess the Romantic image of the author, 
historian Haynes (2005) concludes ‘… the historicist turn in literary studies 
has done little to advance our understanding of the history of authorship 
but has, in fact, often served to perpetuate the Romantic notion of genius 
it purports to critique’. But even where the Romantic notion of genius has 
been supplanted, the results do not readily translate into useful insights 
for lawmaking. Erlend Lavik in his contribution critically examines how 
literary discourse might have inf luenced legal discourse and sets out 
the methodological diff iculties involved in unpacking the interplay. He 
also argues that the Myth of romantic authorship in copyright itself has 
characteristics of a myth.
The critique of Romantic authorship is argued not just on historical 
grounds, but also with reference to theories on intertextuality. Here literary 
studies serve not just to deconstruct ideas of (original) authorship, but of 
course even more the idea of a stable work itself. Musicology and popular 
music studies are likewise domains in which critiques of the idea of music 
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as a ‘work’ abound. In the chapter on Adapting the work, insights about 
the artif iciality of distinguishing the work (composition) from musical 
performances are applied to other contemporary instances of ‘versioning’, 
notably the process of constant rewriting (versioning) that characterises 
wiki-style and open source software production. Also, genre studies are 
brought to bear on the question of when law does (or should) consider a text 
to be an adaptation rather than a copy, an important difference between 
the two being that adaptations typically qualify as works in their own right 
while mere copies do not.
It is near impossible to treat copyright’s notion of original creation 
without turning to aesthetics. Drawing upon both history and aesthetics, 
Stef van Gompel and Erlend Lavik in earlier work critically examine the 
conventional wisdom among legal scholars and practitioners alike that the 
legal concept of ‘original work of authorship’ must in no circumstances be 
informed by an assessment of quality, merit or purpose (Van Gompel & 
Lavik, 2013). Lavik’s contribution to this volume maps the confusion that 
shows up in academic texts and court decisions on the role that aesthetics 
does, can or ought to play in copyright law. He identif ies where aesthet-
ics and legal reasoning overlap, and what kind of contributions we could 
expect humanities to make especially to the interpretation of standards 
of originality and work.
It sometimes seems that no PhD thesis on copyright can do without a 
chapter on philosophical justif ications for intellectual property. Usually 
Locke beats Kant and Hegel as the thinker whose work lends itself best for 
a justif ication of copyright, especially in Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions. In her 
chapter Laura Biron convincingly argues that many of the more popular 
readings of these philosophers are askew, and that if one seeks to address 
copyright expansionism, there is promise in the effort to distill from labour, 
personality, and communicative accounts of intellectual property elements 
‘that support the idea of authorship as an internally constraining process’.
From the above it is clear that the HERA project has brought together 
more disciplines than law, literature and history. It has also brought 
home just how diff icult it is to translate insights from one discipline into 
another. There is a growing openness in international communities of legal 
scholars to perspectives from other disciplines beyond economics and 
technology. The 2012 ATRIP (Association of Teachers and Researchers in 
Intellectual Property) for example was devoted to methods and perspec-
tives in intellectual property and featured contributions from cultural 
studies, ethics and political science (Dinwoodie, 2014). No doubt the trend 
towards multidisciplinary research that is evident across academia plays 
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a role. Especially the disciplines oriented towards empirical studies are 
the more likely ones to be able to exert influence on the interpretation 
and construction of law.
In our day, copyright has spread its tentacles into every nook and cranny 
of human production or as the modern critique would have it: all culture is 
copyrighted. Lawmaking and interpretation are practices characterised by 
constructing the general from the specif ic. It may prove to be of great value 
to have insights in how cultural productions are created and circulated 
across all copyright domains. Which actors are involved, what are their 
relations, roles, authority, how do creative processes work, how do ideas, 
styles travel? The developing f ield of ‘production studies’, a recent offspring 
in the f ield of f ilm/audiovisual studies, holds promise here. The growing 
room for empirical studies in various other disciplines such as music studies 
will yield useful insights too. What complicates matters immensely is that 
the entire copyright system leans strongly towards generalised norms for 
a broad range of cultural production types and practices, using ‘creative’ 
effort as a catch-all. It is non-discriminatory in that sense. Still, the transi-
tion to digital humanities might lead to just the mix of in-depth analysis 
of individual instances of production and trend studies that would allow 
enriched legal reasoning.
Notes
1. The project Of Authorship and Originality was financially supported by the 
HERA Joint Research Programme (www.heranet.info) which is co-funded 
by AHRC, AKA, DASTI, ETF, FNR, FWF, HAZU, IRCHSS, MHEST, NWO, 
RANNIS, RCN, VR and the European Community FP7 2007–-2013, under the 
Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities programme. 
2. In the arsenal of EU legislative instruments, ‘directives’ are laws that oblige 
EU Member States to adapt their internal law to meet the directive’s legal 
norms. It is a result-oriented instrument, and is not necessarily aimed at 
achieving complete identical legal treatment of issues throughout the EU. 
A Directive might just set a minimum standard, or present a catalogue of 
options. For example, the Computer Programs Directive of 1991 obliges 
Member States to accord copyright protection to computer programmes as 
literary works at a unified originality standard, but leaves Member States 
the freedom to accord software producers additional protection under 
unfair competition law or other norms. Another example: the Information 
Society Directive (2001) contains a catalogue of some twenty permitted uses 
of copyrighted materials (limitations and exceptions), but only one of them 
is mandatory for all Member States. 
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3. Where two dates are given for Directives, the first is for the year in which a 
directive was first adopted, and the second for the latest version. Substantial 
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 Creative work and communicative 
norms
Perspectives from legal philosophy
Laura Biron
In consideration of the application of insights from the humanities to the 
interpretation of core legal concepts in copyright, this chapter examines 
three questions: f irst, what is a ‘work of authorship’, and why does copyright 
law place such a strong emphasis on originality for determining what counts 
as a work? Second, can and should we modify ‘romantic’ conceptions of au-
thorship, to take into account the various ways in which authorial practices 
seem to conflict with their highly individualistic and creator-centred focus? 
Finally, how might copyright law make sense of the various ways in which 
authorship is collaborative, in light of its somewhat restrictive def initions 
of co-authorship?
This chapter will consider the contribution that existing philosophical 
literature on the justif ication of copyright might have to these questions. It 
begins by outlining three categories that have application to questions about 
authorship – labour, personality and communication – and explaining a 
deeper distinction between proprietary and non-proprietary accounts of 
authorship which underlies these categories. It goes on to illustrate how 
these differing approaches to authorship can be applied to the three ques-
tions under consideration. For reasons of space and practicality, the focus of 
this chapter will reflect my expertise in Anglo-American copyright theory 
and doctrine.
Philosophical accounts of ‘authorship’
Leaving aside utilitarian or consequentialist justif ications for copyright, 
which tend to focus more on incentivising acts of authorship than the nature 
of authorship per se, there are, broadly speaking, three different theories 
distinguished in the literature: labour theories, associated with John Locke; 
personality theories, often thought to be linked to the writings of Hegel; 
and communicative theories, taking inspiration from Kant’s writings on 
intellectual property.
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It should be noted at the outset that these justif icatory theories are not 
usually directly applied to questions about authorship; indeed, the labour 
and personality accounts are more conventionally viewed as theories of 
property, rather than theories of authorship as such. The Kantian approach 
may seem more directly linked to authorship, through its focus on com-
munication and explicit rejection of proprietary language, but it is still at 
an early stage of development in the philosophical literature. Thus, a central 
question explored by this chapter is the extent to which communicative 
accounts of copyright have more direct application to questions about 
authorship than labour or personality theories. The chapter argues that 
we should not fall into the trap of assuming that one set of theories (based, 
for example, on communicative norms) can provide a complete answer to 
the complex questions at stake, but rather that we should be aware of the 
need to develop ‘hybrid’ theories of authorship, drawing together the key 
premises from communicative, labour and personality theories which have 
application to the questions at stake.
Before moving on to discuss the three sets of theories in more depth, a 
further observation is needed about the role of the concept of authorship 
in philosophical discussions. Although it might seem as though authorship 
is one of copyright law’s most central concepts, Waldron points out that 
policy defences of copyright are ‘seldom cast in purely individualistic terms. 
Off icially, the justif ication is supposed to have more to do with the social 
good than with the individual rights of authors’ (Waldron, 1993, p. 848). 
Why, then, does there seem to be such a strong focus on authors’ rights in 
debates about the justif ication of copyright? Waldron draws attention to 
many ways in which social defences of intellectual property become cast 
in individualistic terms, and notes that ‘social policy, judicial and scholarly 
rhetoric on the topic retains many of the characteristics of natural rights 
talk’ (ibid., p. 849). Another explanation is given by Peter Jaszi, who argues 
that theorists of copyright have become entranced by a ‘mythologised’ 
conception of authorship, viewing it as a privileged category of intellectual 
activity, tied up with notions of self-ownership, personality and original-
ity (Jaszi, 1991, p. 455). At the same time, Jaszi draws attention to the fact 
that authorship is anything but a unif ied or f ixed category of aesthetic 
experience, something which could provide a ‘stable foundation for the 
structure of copyright doctrine’; rather, he seems to agree with Waldron’s 
observation that authors’ rights lie at the centre of a tension between social 
and individualistic defences of intellectual property, describing authorship 
as ‘the locus of a basic contradiction between public access to and private 
control over imaginative creations’ (ibid., p. 457).
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What are the implications of these observations for philosophical concep-
tions of authorship? It seems fair to say that, in the philosophical literature 
on authors’ rights, a similar tension exists between individualistic and social 
theories of authorship. On the one hand, there is a tendency to assume that 
the relationship between an author and their work can be viewed analo-
gously to the relationship between an individual owner and an object of 
property. Certainly, this is the assumption underlying most interpretations 
of the labour theory of authorship, as we shall see below. This means that 
authorship and ownership become intertwined categories, and authorship 
is often cast as a matter of individual entitlement. Nonetheless, there are 
justif icatory theories of copyright that focus less on individual authors (qua 
individual owners), and more on the social goals that acts of authorship 
can promote – in particular, goals associated with communication and 
public knowledge. This distinction between proprietary and non-proprietary 
conceptions of authorship will emerge as we unpack some of the different 
theories of authorship that have been said to be associated with labour, 
personality and communicative theories.
Authorship and labour
Judges often appeal to labour in intellectual property rulings. A well-known 
example is Justice Potter Stewart’s observation that: ‘The immediate effect 
of our copyright law is to stimulate a fair return for an author’s creative 
labour’ (Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 1975, para. 156). In UK law, 
copyright’s originality requirement is even specif ied by reference to labour 
(Bently and Sherman, 2005, p. 94). This has led to discussion about whether 
such appeals could be grounded in philosophical theories of property based 
on labour, and in particular the work of John Locke, whose account of 
property will be considered in this section.
Locke’s theory of property has three central components: an initial com-
mitment to common ownership, arguments for privatising the commons, 
and a specif ication of some provisos that must be in place before ownership 
is fully justif ied. The implications for Lockean accounts of authorship and 
author entitlement vary, depending on which component of his theory we 
emphasise. Indeed, a brief look at the literature on Lockean theories of 
intellectual property reveals a divergence of views about the implications 
of Locke’s theory for the justif ication of authors’ rights. According to Nozick 
(1968, pp. 178–181), Hughes (1988, p. 291) and Becker (1993, pp. 610–612), Lock-
ean arguments can be used to support strong intellectual property rights, 
assigning authors expansive rights to control uses of their intangible assets 
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by others. On the other hand, commentators such as Gordon (1993), Shiffrin 
(2001), Damstedt (2003) and Hull (2009) stress the various limitations on 
ownership of intellectual property that follow from Locke’s account, arguing 
that his justif ications for intellectual property would be weaker than his 
justif ications for tangible property. Although it is not necessary to choose 
between these different interpretations, it is important to be aware that 
there is no one definitive ‘labour’ account of authorship. In the remainder 
of this section, I outline the four most popular interpretations of Locke’s 
theory in the literature.
Interpretations of Locke’s account of copyright often begin with Locke’s 
famous ‘labour mixing’ argument for the justif ication of property, according 
to which ‘every man has a property in his own person’ and in ‘the labour 
of his body and the work of his hands’ (Locke, 1689, book II: sec. 27). When 
a person removes a thing from its natural state, he has:
[…] mixed his labour with it and joined it to something that is his own … 
and thereby makes it his property … For this labour being the unquestion-
able property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that 
is once joined to (ibid., II: sec. 27).
The idea behind this argument is that, through mixing our labour with 
what is available in the common for appropriation, we extend our natural 
property in our persons to that which is available, thereby grounding 
property rights in particular resources. If another person takes what you 
have mixed your labour with, that person also takes your labour ‘which 
another had no title to’ (Locke, 1689, Book II: sec. 32). Locke describes this 
argument as providing the ‘great foundation’ of his theory of property (ibid., 
II: sec. 44). What are its implications for Lockean theories of authorship?
Although some commentators have been sceptical about the application 
of labour-based arguments to copyright, arguing that labour ‘generates too 
many indeterminacies and problems to provide a justif ication for intel-
lectual property’ (Drahos, 1996, p. 54), others have been keen to ground 
defences of authors’ rights on the basis of Locke’s labour-mixing argu-
ment. The f irst, most popular description of Locke’s theory is known as the 
labour-desert theory. This suggestion is made explicitly by Becker (1993, 
p. 620), Hughes (1988, p. 305) and Tavani (2005, p. 88), and even when not 
explicitly made it is implied by the comment very often made that Locke’s 
theory of intellectual property is a matter of rewarding authors for the 
fruits of their labour. And the idea of intellectual property rights being a 
‘reward’ for authorial labour has certainly been influential in the courts, for 
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example: ‘Sacrif icial days devoted to … creative activities deserve rewards 
commensurate for the services rendered’ (Mazer v. Stein, 1954, p. 219). But 
it is important to note that desert-based interpretations of Locke’s account 
of authorship do not f it neatly with the spirit of Locke’s own discussion of 
the justif ication of property through labour.
Indeed, Locke’s discussion of the relationship between a subject and 
their labour seems to preclude it being wholly framed in terms of desert. 
For example, he admits that the productivity of one’s labour can depend 
on luck and other conditions that are independent of the labourer’s ef-
forts whereas, of course, whether or not a person deserves a reward for a 
particular action should depend on the effort they put in. The same can 
be said – perhaps to an even greater extent – for the case of authors; after 
all, authors benefit from talents that are in many respects dependent on 
natural endowments (over which they have no control, and hence cannot 
be said to deserve) and also on various social factors that reward certain 
kinds of talents over others, depending on the context. In Rawlsian terms, 
it would be ‘morally arbitrary’ for individuals to be rewarded for the fruits 
of their talents because the natural and social factors that determine their 
value lie outside of their control (Rawls, 1971, p. 74). It follows that it makes 
little sense to ground a labour theory of authorship in a theory of desert. 
This means that, whatever emphasis might be placed on the connection 
between authorship and desert in judicial settings, such an emphasis cannot 
f ind philosophical support in labour theories of property.
Setting aside desert-based labour theories of authorship, a second ac-
count of Lockean authorship can be termed the creationist account. Taking 
its inspiration from interpretations of Lockean labour as God-like, ex nihilo 
activity that does not depend on what comes before it (Tully, 1980, pp. 108–9), 
the creationist account supports the view that Lockean natural rights to 
intellectual property can be easily derived, since ‘it seems as though people 
do work to produce ideas and that the value of these ideas … depends solely 
upon the individual’s mental work’ (Hughes, 1988, p. 291).
Even though the creationist account of Lockean labour has been 
criticised as limited in its application to tangible property (Simmons, 1991, 
p. 259; Waldron, 1988, p. 199), it might nonetheless apply to questions about 
authorship and intellectual property. After all, when Locke considered the 
material common, he was thinking about an expanse of resources that was 
‘given’ to mankind by God to be used and enjoyed by all, which makes it 
diff icult to see how individuals could labour ex nihilo without building 
on pre-existing raw materials. But, arguably, the intellectual common is 
not always construed as a given set of raw materials, because it depends 
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crucially on activities by human beings over time, and this points to a 
difference between resources that are given to us by nature and intellectual 
resources that are given to us as a result of individuals creating, producing 
and inventing them. If such a distinction can be maintained1, it follows that 
creationist interpretations of Lockean labour – which focus on labour as 
something not dependent on the prior labour of others – lead one toward 
strong, creator-centred theories of authorship. The implications of this 
account for the broader questions considered by this chapter are made 
clear below.
A third interpretation of Lockean labour, which I have termed the intel-
lectualist account, leads to a more balanced picture of Lockean rights of 
authorship than is suggested by the creationist account. The f irst point to 
note about this interpretation is that it views Lockean labour not in physical 
terms, but as connected to Locke’s remarks on personhood. Indeed, Locke 
speaks of an individual having property in their ‘person’, not their body, 
which provides reason for thinking that labour should be understood as 
fundamentally connected to our nature as persons – rational, reflective 
beings capable of choice and self-awareness. This also connects Lockean 
labour to the more general right to self-government – a ‘right of freedom 
to his person’ (Locke, 1689, Book II: sec. 190) – which underlies his theory 
of rights. If we understand Lockean labour as intellectual activity broadly 
construed – or, in Simmons’ phrase, ‘purposive activity aimed at satisfying 
needs or supplying the conveniences of life’ (Simmons, 1992, p. 273) – it 
follows that, when a person mixes their labour with an object they do not 
literally change that object, but the object becomes part of their labour 
through being brought within their purposes, aims and actions. Provided 
such labouring does not encroach upon others’ rights to self-government, 
the object cannot be removed from the labourer without interfering with 
their labour and thereby violating their right to self-government.
What are the implications of the ‘intellectualist’ account of labour for 
Lockean theories of authorship? One interesting observation is that, through 
connecting labour to personhood in this way, we actually move towards a 
Lockean theory of authorship that has much in common with personality 
theories (see below). This makes it possible to discuss ‘hybrid’ theories of au-
thorship that blend elements of both labour and personality theories together, 
and may be able to give us a more comprehensive theory of authorship than 
when these theories are considered separately. A further, important element 
of the Lockean intellectualist account is that, through grounding authors’ 
rights in rights of self-government, authorship (like ownership) becomes a 
category that generates internal constraints on its scope and extent.
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That is to say, the intellectualist account of authorship states that authors 
should be given opportunities to originate and control their works provided 
that they do not violate others’ rights to self-government – by pretending 
a work by another author is really the product of their own labour, or by 
merely copying another author’s work without investing any new labour of 
their own, for example.2 From the perspective of the intellectualist account, 
limitations on the extent of appropriation are considered part and parcel 
of what it means for an individual to mix their labour with an object, and 
not external constraints on the activities of owners (or authors).
The three interpretations of the labour theory of authorship considered 
above make use of an analogy between individual owners and individual 
authors. The fourth, and f inal account, found in the work of Seana Shiffrin 
(2001), is more radical, and attempts to move away from the proprietary 
framework offered by labour theories. The key difference between Shiffrin’s 
non-proprietary account and most other interpreters of Locke is that she 
does not place a great emphasis on Locke’s argument that private property is 
justif ied through individuals mixing their labour with unowned resources. 
In her view, conceptions of authorship which focus on the importance of 
labour give authors rights to their works that are too strong to be justif ied 
on other Lockean grounds, such as material survival and subsistence, not to 
mention Locke’s basic commitment to equality. Shiffrin argues that access 
to intellectual products is not necessary for survival or subsistence and, due 
to their non-rivalrous, inexhaustible nature, they can be used by an infinite 
number of people without being used up. As she puts it: ‘The fully effective 
use of an idea, proposition, concept, expression, invention, melody, picture 
or sculpture generally does not require prolonged exclusive use’ (Shiffrin, 
2001, p. 156). According to Shiffrin, this feature of intellectual products 
precludes their privatisation from the common on Lockean grounds.
Shiffrin’s interpretation seems to give us a highly limited Lockean ac-
count of author entitlement: on her account, many of the property rights 
that authors have in their works under the current copyright system are 
unjustif ied. Her interpretation of Locke would favour systems of copyright 
that provided very little proprietary protection for authors – authorship 
would be seen as a shared endeavour, and most intellectual works would 
be viewed as existing in a kind of permanent common, outside the scope 
of propertisation. This view might be gaining support in certain ‘Copyleft’ 
movements, but it is not usually one that is seen as having philosophical 
support from Lockean accounts. Shiffrin’s interpretation of Locke goes 
against the grain of some standard accounts of Lockean authorship, then, 
and this is largely because she chooses not to give Locke’s labour-mixing 
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argument for the justif ication of property much prominence. In Shiffrin’s 
view, labour plays a ‘subsidiary’ role in Locke’s account of appropriation, 
‘justifying the appropriation by one individual rather than another once 
private appropriation of the given sort of property is antecedently valid’ 
(2001, p. 144). Even if controversial as an interpretation of Locke, it might 
nonetheless have interesting implications for copyright law’s definitions of 
authorship and, in particular, it provides a way of bringing Lockean insights 
into the burgeoning literature on non-proprietary accounts of copyright 
(discussed below).
Authorship and personality
A different set of philosophical theories has been developed to support the 
proposition that an author’s right to their work is justif ied on grounds that 
it expresses their personality. Applied to tangible property, Radin (1982, 
p. 957) has described this as the ‘personhood perspective’, noting that ‘to 
achieve proper self-development – to be a person – an individual needs 
some control over resources in the external environment’ (in the form of 
property rights). In the context of intellectual property, the personality 
theory requires that we grant creative works strong legal protection (against 
misattribution, for example, or other actions which inhibit the author’s 
control over their work). Not only is the personality theory said to be a 
creator-centred theory, elevating the importance of the individual author 
at the expense of both copiers and the public domain, but it is also assumed 
to lead to stronger protection for copyright owners than other justif ications 
for copyright (Bently and Sherman, 2005, p. 39).
When we look further into the roots of the personality theory, however, 
we f ind a confused and under-analysed picture of its philosophical lineage. 
As Fisher notes, personality theories of intellectual property are thought 
to be ‘loosely derived from the writings of Kant and Hegel’ (2001, p. 171). 
However, such theories may turn out to be very ‘loosely’ derived from the 
writings of these philosophers, and there is little scholarly work on personal-
ity theories in Anglo-American philosophical literature on copyright.3 As 
Wendy Gordon notes:
[…] for investigation of whether and how the “personal” element [of intel-
lectual property] should be important, we should probably look to sources 
such as Kantian and Hegelian philosophy. At least in the English-speaking 
world, although some valuable work has been done, application of those 
schools of thought to IP is still at an early stage (Gordon, 2003, p. 10).
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Legal discussions of the personality theory so far have looked more to Hegel’s 
theory of property for support and clarification than to Kant’s (Hughes, 1988; 
Fisher, 2001; Netanel, 1993; Palmer, 1990). In this section, I consider whether 
Hegel’s discussion of intellectual property justif ies such a connection.
The personality theory of intellectual property is often said to apply 
particularly well to the legal protection of artistic work. Indeed, it seems 
especially well suited to support systems of ‘moral rights’ which include 
artists’ rights to ‘control the public disclosure of their works, to withdraw 
their works from public circulation, to receive appropriate credit for their 
creations, and above all to protect their works against mutilation or destruc-
tion’ (Fisher, 2001, p. 174). These rights are said to be ‘perpetual, inalienable 
and imprescriptible’, as is stated in Article L121-1 of the French Act on intel-
lectual property (Code de la propriété intellectuelle). The personality theory 
that underlies these legal protections, then, has two features: f irst, it gives 
philosophical grounding to copyright law’s acknowledgement that some 
intellectual property rights are inalienable. Second, it is a creator-centred 
justif ication for intellectual property (Spence, 2007, p. 45). That is, the theory 
is used to justify legislation that protects creators of intellectual works 
against those who use, copy or modify their works.
Let us consider the f irst feature of personality theories – their focus on 
the inalienability of an author’s personality. Hegel’s account offers a nu-
anced and complex perspective on this issue. His discussion of Entaußerung 
(‘alienation’) at paragraphs 65-71 in the Philosophy of Right contains his most 
extensive remarks on intellectual property. On the one hand, his comments 
on the status of personality and mental traits such as ideas supports the view 
that they are inalienable: ‘… those goods, or rather substantive characteris-
tics which constitute my own private personality and the universal essence 
of my self-consciousness are inalienable’ (§ 66). This seems to align closely 
with the personality theory’s recognition of inalienable authors’ rights. On 
the other hand, Hegel was prepared to view authors’ works as alienable 
‘things’, despite the ‘internal’ or mental nature of intellectual production:
The distinctive quality of intellectual production may, by virtue of 
the way in which it is expressed, be immediately transformed into the 
external quality of a thing [Sache], which may in turn be produced by 
others (§ 68).
Although it might seem that alienation of an author’s work is ‘alienation 
of personality – a prohibited act in Hegel’s system’ (Hughes, 1988, p. 347), 
Hegel goes on to argue that the author nonetheless remains the ‘owner of 
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the universal ways and means of reproducing such products and things’ (§ 
68) suggesting that the author has a stronger right than the person to whom 
they have alienated the external use of the object – a right to control the 
various external uses of the work by others, in keeping with the personality 
theory’s support of moral rights. This means that there is some support for 
the notion of inalienable moral rights within Hegel’s account; however, 
this is not because there is anything internal to the work which ‘embodies’ 
the author’s personality – the work is external, alienable property, unlike 
personality which is inalienable – but rather because the author’s personal-
ity is inalienably connected to the work through the author’s control and 
choice over the way it is used by others. The implications of this view for 
copyright’s notion of the work are considered in more detail later below.
As regards the second feature of the personality theory – its creator-
centred focus – Hegel’s discussion begins by focusing on the legal protection 
intellectual property offers to individual authors or creators:
The purely negative, but most basic, means of furthering the sciences and 
arts is to protect those who work in them against theft and to provide 
them with security for their property …(§ 69).
This suggests that Hegel viewed intellectual property as a system that 
secured individual creators rights to their property; in keeping with the 
standard personality theory, he viewed its purpose and goals from the 
perspective of individual creators. Nonetheless, it soon becomes clear that 
the central focus of Hegel’s account is the social nature of authorship:
The purpose of a product of the intellect is to be apprehended by other 
individuals and appropriated by their representational thinking, memory, 
thought, etc. Hence the mode of expression whereby these individu-
als in turn make what they have learned (for learning means not just 
memorising or learning words by heart – the thoughts of others can be 
apprehended only by thinking, and rethinking is also a kind of learning) 
into an alienable thing, will always tend to have some distinctive form, so 
that they can regard the resources which flow from it as their property, 
and may assert their right to reproduce it (§ 69).
Hegel is implying here that individuals who ‘apprehend’ or ‘appropriate’ 
existing intellectual products can build upon them in such a way that it 
might become very diff icult to determine when repetition of ideas becomes 
a special property of an individual, rather than part of the common pool of 
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ideas. As such, his focus seems more balanced than standard interpretations 
of personality theories would allow.
We should not be surprised that Hegel’s discussion moves away from a 
purely creator-centred or individualistic account of authorship, since the 
need for individuals to supersede or transcend subjectivity is crucial to his 
philosophy. Hegel argues that the development of individual personality 
involves some sort of ‘transition’ from the inner subjective world to the 
external objective world, and that property is an important part of this 
transition:
Abstract property contains the arbitrary moment of the particular need of 
the single individual; this here is transformed … into care and acquisition 
for a communal purpose, i.e. into an ethical quality (§ 179).
More generally, as the Philosophy of Right develops from abstract right to 
Sittlichkeit, Hegel ceases to draw any distinction between the collective 
interest of a community and the individual interests of the members of that 
community. Hegel’s communitarianism and his developmental model of 
personality mean that we should be cautious about describing his theory 
of authorship as creator-centred and individualistic, along the lines of the 
personality theory.
Authorship and communication
Before moving on to address the specif ic questions about authorship at 
stake in this chapter, I shall briefly outline the f inal set of theories under 
consideration: those rooted in a desire to steer discussions of copyright 
away from proprietary frameworks, focusing instead on communicative 
norms. In recent years, philosophers have engaged with some conceptual 
issues raised by the very idea of intellectual ‘property’.4 Although some have 
argued that it is perfectly coherent to treat works of authorship as works 
of property (Biron, 2010), others have attempted to move the debate in a 
more radical direction, seeking alternative (or supplementary) conceptual 
frameworks for justifying copyright. Most theories of this sort are united in 
the claim that works of authorship should be viewed not as commodities to 
be owned but as vehicles of authorial communication. Often taking inspira-
tion from Kant’s writings on copyright and linking them to his discussion of 
public reason (Barron, 2012; Biron, 2012; Borghi, 2011; Capurro, 2000; Chiara 
Pievatolo, 2008 and Johns, 2010) communicative approaches to copyright 
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attempt to put forward principles of communication that can be drawn on 
to distinguish an author’s legitimate communication ‘in their own name’ 
from their derivative communication in another’s name.
I have engaged with Kant’s writings on copyright, autonomy and public 
reason in depth in previous work, so for the purposes of this piece I shall 
provide only a brief summary of the communicative approach I  have 
defended elsewhere (Biron, 2012). Kant puts forward three principles of 
communication in the Critique of Judgement (Guyer, ed., 2000, p. 173) – 
principles I have termed authority, intelligibility and consistency – and they 
can be applied to questions about authors’ rights in the following ways. First, 
the principle of authority – to ‘think for oneself’ – points to the need for an 
author’s speech to be non-derivative: the authority of the author’s speech 
must not be derived from another person’s speech; rather, it must be carried 
out in their own name. Second, the principle of intelligibility – to think from 
the standpoint of everyone else – can be read as a necessary condition for 
authorship that aims at public communication, not just self-expression. 
Third, the principle ‘always to think consistently’ can be read as a demand 
that authors adjust their communications to meet the requirements of 
intelligibility consistently, depending on the interaction with and also the 
scope of their possible audiences. As Garrath Williams puts it, this condition 
entails ‘regarding oneself, f irst, as the genuine author of one’s judgments, 
and second, as [epistemically] accountable to others’ (Williams, 2009, sec. 
3:2). If principle [3] is in some sense regulative of [1] and [2], we can see that 
public reasoning is not static but, just like all communication, dependent on 
its audience, its interlocutors and the willingness of authors to reconsider 
and re-evaluate their communications in light of the testing and mutual 
questioning of their writings.
The above principles of public reason provide a way for copyright scholars 
to engage with questions about the relationship between authorship, copy-
right and freedom of expression, but with some important modif ications. 
Indeed, Kant’s approach does not really warrant the label ‘expressive au-
tonomy’ or ‘autonomy of expression’ (Treiger-Bar-Am, 2008, p. 1075), at least 
to the extent that such labels emphasise a somewhat individualistic and 
creator-centred approach to authorship. When we focus not on individual 
acts of expression but more broadly on principles of communication – such 
as intelligibility or consistency – we appreciate Onora O’Neill’s point that 
‘freedom of expression can provide only one part of an adequate ethics of 
communication’ (O’Neill, 2007, p. 169), because rights of self-expression 
can be exercised without meeting other important principles of public 
communication.
creATive Work And coMMunicATive norMs 31
We have now outlined three philosophical accounts of the justif ication 
of copyright: based on labour, personality and communication respectively. 
Interestingly, the extensive literature on labour theories has provided 
room for a discussion of non-proprietary Lockean accounts of copyright; 
the literature on the personality theory is at a less developed stage, in the 
Anglo-American sphere at least, and still seems f irmly rooted in a propri-
etary framework even if, as we have seen, Hegel’s writings do not support 
the creator-centred standpoint that it is often taken to justify. Finally, a 
Kantian approached based on principles of communication is explicitly 
non-proprietary, and may seem to have more direct relevance to questions 
about authorship; however, to fully appreciate the implications of these 
theories, we can now apply them to the questions under consideration in 
this chapter.
Author, work and originality
Let us begin with the question about originality and the ‘work’. Taking 
the overarching distinction between proprietary and non-proprietary 
conceptions of authorship, it has been argued that proprietary conceptions 
of authorship are more committed to a notion of a ‘f ixed’ work of author-
ship, understood analogously to a tangible object of property, and with 
the concept of originality invoked to draw boundaries around it (Litman, 
1990). Non-proprietary conceptions of authorship seem less focused on the 
work as a f ixed object and more focused on viewing the work as a process 
of communication or a means to promote valuable social goals.
Let us now consider the above theories in more depth, starting with 
Lockean conceptions of authorship. It is interesting that Shiffrin’s non-
proprietary theory is the most ‘work-centred’ Lockean account, because 
she begins her analysis with a discussion of possible objects of ownership 
(or authorship), and then considers whether their nature is such as to justify 
rights of ownership on Lockean grounds. Since she severs the connection 
between labourer and product, she also seems to sever the connection 
(important as it is to copyright law) between authorial originality (under-
stood as origination) and the work. Once ‘the work’ is allowed to float free 
of any connotations of authorial labour, Shiffrin is able to consider it more 
in terms of its social value – the ways in which works of authorship might 
stimulate others, be read or accessed by a range of different individuals and, 
thereby, transformed and used in a variety of ways that promote valuable 
social goals such as freedom of speech.
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The creationist labour account of authorship, on the other hand, would 
seem to support a strong and intimate connection between authorial origi-
nality and the work. Indeed, it would support attempts to define originality 
in value-laden ways – viewing works of authorship as shot through with 
creativity and novelty. Of course, viewing originality in terms of ‘novelty’ 
is not at all in keeping with how copyright law defines the term: a work 
of authorship ‘… need not be … novel or unique’ (CCH Canadian Ltd. v. 
Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004, SCC 13) to count as original and thus 
protected by copyright. But there have been some recent attempts in US 
courts to specify copyright law’s originality requirement in terms of creativ-
ity as opposed to mere ‘sweat of the brow’ (most notably, the ruling in 
Feist v. Rural Publications Inc., 1991). It might be argued that such appeals 
to creativity have shifted the focus of copyright’s originality requirement 
towards ‘the gospel of Romantic “authorship”’ (Jaszi, 1994, p. 34).5 That is 
to say, appeals to creativity move beyond a fairly neutral specif ication of 
originality in terms of origination and towards a more normatively loaded 
conception of originality which could imply artistic merit, even genius, 
thereby elevating the status of individual authors, and according them 
stronger rights to control their works. Creationist conceptions of Lockean 
authorship might indeed be invoked to support these more value-laden 
conceptions of originality, though it must be noted that they offer just one 
particular interpretation of Locke, and are by no means fully representative.
Finally, on the intellectualist labour account of authorship, there does 
not seem to be a presumption that works of authorship are original in the 
sense of being ‘novel or ‘creative’, even though there is still an important 
connection to be drawn between an author’s labour and their work (unlike 
Shiffrin’s non-proprietary account, which severs this connection). Accord-
ing to the intellectualist account, we should look at the author’s intellectual 
input – such as judgement or choice in bringing raw materials within their 
plans and purposes6 – to determine what counts as a work, and thus leave 
room for a definition of originality that is more neutral than the creationist 
focus on ‘novelty’ or ‘creativity’. How expansive this definition of originality 
should be – and hence how extensively we might grant rights over works 
of authorship – would be determined by considerations of the contours of 
more general rights to self-government, held equally by authors and users 
of works. Overall, then, labour theories of authorship offer a variety of 
answers to the question of how copyright law could understand the ‘work’ 
and ‘originality’, and the most promising theories for addressing questions 
about internal constraints on the scope of authorship are Shiffrin’s non-
proprietary account and the intellectualist account outlined above.
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What are the implications of Hegel’s personality theory for copyright 
law’s category of ‘the work’? We have seen that, far from there being an 
intimate connection between an author’s personality and the work in which 
personality is expressed, Hegel seems to sever the connection between 
‘personality’ and ‘work’. As Netanel puts it: ‘Hegel regarded intellectual 
works as external things rather than as extensions of personality’ (Netanel, 
1993, p. 377). This goes against copyright law’s suggestion that works of 
authorship can be delineated by looking for a ‘stamp of personality’ or 
individuality as evidence for authorial originality. Hegel’s focus seems to 
be not on the work itself, and the extent to which it displays the author’s 
personality, but rather on the ways in which an author’s personality can 
be expressed through various aspects of control and choice over how their 
work is used. This means, of course, that Hegel’s account supports the idea 
that authors’ works should be protected from mutilation, destruction or 
misattribution, if so desired by the author. But that is not to say that there 
is anything inherent to ‘the work’ that need display or contain the author’s 
personality, and that personality is somehow ontologically built into a work 
of authorship; personality, rather, is a category associated with choice and 
control over how a work is used by others.
Finally, as I have argued elsewhere, copyright law’s originality require-
ment harmonises with the f irst principle of Kantian public reason outlined 
above – the principle of authority. Copyright’s originality requirement applies 
to both new and transformative work and, in both cases, the key to determin-
ing originality rests on the question of the source of the work: to count as 
original for the purposes of copyright it ‘… must not be copied from another 
work … it should originate from the author’.7 Understanding originality in 
this sense as origination, we can revisit the distinction between derivative 
and non-derivative forms of communication, which underlies the principle 
of authority. A transformative work of authorship whose authority is actually 
derived from a primary work cannot be classed as having ‘originated’ from 
the transformative author – in this sense, works of authorship that count 
as ‘derivative’ under the principle of authority would likewise not count 
as ‘original’ for the purposes of copyright protection. On the other hand, 
provided the transformative work’s authority is derived from the transforma-
tive author’s own communication, the transformative work would count as 
‘non-derivative’ under the principle of authority – and, for the purposes of 
copyright protection, it would count as original. Although a lot more needs 
to be said about exactly how the contours of originality might be drawn, this 
approach indicates that copyright need not base its conception of authorial 
originality on a proprietary model, as is so often assumed to be the case.
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Romantic authorship
Let us now turn to some questions about romantic authorship, and the 
extent to which the theories outlined above either reinforce or challenge it. 
Exactly what copyright scholars mean by ‘romantic authorship’ is, of course, 
a complex question to address. As Erlend Lavik notes in his contribution to 
this book, the so-called ‘myth’ of romantic authorship, and its impact on 
copyright law, requires detailed examination and is by no means settled. 
For the purposes of this section, I draw on the interpretation of romantic 
authorship offered by Martha Woodmansee, according to which authors 
are solitary geniuses who, ‘blessed with unique insight, bring forth new 
and original works of art into the world’ (Woodmansee, 1984, pp. 429–31). 
There has been a tendency to view some Lockean accounts of property as 
giving support to theories of this sort. As Netanel puts it, ‘drawing upon 
a combination of Lockean labor-desert theory and nineteenth-century 
romanticism … [it is argued that] copyright should be immune from excep-
tions and limitations’ (Netanel, 2008, p. 21). However, we have already seen 
that the labour-desert theory of property, let alone authorship, is conceptu-
ally confused. And Shiffrin’s account – focused as it is on the maximal 
use of intellectual products or works, rather than the labour of individual 
authors – seems far removed from anything like a romantic conception 
of authorship. Might the other interpretations of Locke – the creationist 
or the intellectualist accounts – nonetheless be connected to romantic 
conceptions of authorship?
To answer this question, we must return to the issue of the extent to 
which we might view an author’s labour as dependent upon the prior labour 
of others; according to the definition of romantic authorship outlined above, 
a strong emphasis is placed on the input of the author as having created 
something new and unique, unencumbered by external influences. And 
this sort of view is not uncommon in discussions of authorship. Lawrence 
Becker, for example, defines authorship as an activity in which the author’s 
labour is ‘the beginning of the causal account of the product’ (Becker, 1993, 
p. 614). Jeremy Waldron also makes a similar point:
What copyright appears to uphold are rights of pure agency, rights in 
something that literally did not exist in any form before the author put 
his mind to work (Waldron, 1993, p. 879).
The idea behind both of these claims is that holders of intellectual property 
rights have rights to objects that might not have come into existence at 
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all without their efforts. And this means that we can ask various ques-
tions about the ways in which they were invented or created, and imagine 
that they might never have existed in the f irst place. If we simply left our 
analysis of authorial labour at this, the most suitable Lockean theory of 
authorship to support it might be the creationist accounts which focuses 
on unencumbered acts of authorial creative labour, harmonising well with 
romantic conceptions of authorship.
However, although the above interpretation of authorial labour as 
essential to the formation of intellectual products might be an accurate 
description of the ways in which authors labour to produce their works, 
this is not to say that we should leave our analysis at that. Indeed, the two 
quotations by Becker and Waldron leave open the (highly likely) possibility 
that authors often mix their labour in ways that are dependent upon the 
prior labour of others. Thus, we can acknowledge that authors do indeed 
exercise ‘agency’ in producing their works, without sliding into a seemingly 
strong proposition that they do so entirely unencumbered by external 
influences. As Hettinger argues:
Invention, writing and thought in general do not operate in a vacuum; 
intellectual creation is not creation ex nihilo. Given this vital depend-
ence of a person’s thoughts on the ideas of those who came before her, 
intellectual products are fundamentally social products (Hettinger, 1989, 
p. 38).
Even so-called ‘primary’ authors are said to be transformative authors of a 
kind, on this view, because their writings are nonetheless dependent on a 
number of different background conditions, including works of authorship 
that might have inspired and influenced them in their writing. It is still 
important to have some way of recognising the extent to which a particular 
act of labouring has transformed some previously existing idea or ideas 
into something different – thereby enabling us to give recognition to that 
author’s effort – but this is not to say that even the labour of primary authors 
can be separated entirely from the prior labour of others. The intellectualist 
account, as opposed to the creationist account, can leave room for this sense 
of the ‘intertextuality’ of authorship, since it does not focus on the nature of 
the work – i.e. whether it was created from nothing or from some previously 
existing thing – but focuses instead on the author’s use of the work, and the 
author’s labouring on it in the sense of bringing it within their legitimate 
plans and purposes. As such, the intellectualist account can fit a wider range 
of cases of authorship, and does not automatically support the questionable 
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view – associated with some forms of romantic authorship – that authors 
work in a kind of a vacuum, independently of the labour of others.
Turning now to personality theories, much of the literature assumes that 
they are closely allied with romantic conceptions of authorship. Palmer, 
for example, suggests that the traditional personality theory errs in its 
excessive focus on the personality of the author and in its appeal to romantic 
notions of creativity, which stress subjective experience and its expres-
sion, emphasising the sublime experience of the artist as opposed to the 
experience of the user or copier (Palmer, 1990). However, our above outline 
of Hegel’s theory revealed a more complex picture: although Hegel argued 
that personality is an inalienable part of the self, he also thought that acts 
of expression could transform inner personality into external, alienable 
property. Moreover, he viewed the alienation of property as crucial for the 
development of personality. This has the result that Hegel’s own account of 
authorship is not individualistic or creator-centred, but thoroughly com-
munitarian in its outlook. As noted above, Hegel argued that ‘the purpose 
[Bestimmung] of a product of the intellect is to be apprehended by other 
individuals and appropriated by their representation, thinking, memory, 
thought, etc.’ (§ 69), expressing concern for the common pool of ideas, 
not the legal protection of any one particular author or creator. As such, 
the conception of authorship we should associate with Hegel is neither 
‘romantic’ nor ‘individualistic’, but leaves room for the various senses in 
which we might speak of authorship as collective, even when understood 
within some kind of personality-based framework. It should be clear, then, 
that Hegel’s writings cannot be used to give strong philosophical support to 
romantic conceptions of authorship. This is a view echoed by Schroeder, who 
argues that ‘the personality theory of intellectual property that dominates 
American intellectual property scholarship is imbued by a romanticism 
that is completely antithetical to Hegel’s project’ (Schroeder, 2005, p. 454).
A closer reading of Hegel’s account of intellectual property might also 
challenge scholars to rethink the ways in which the personality theory 
should be applied as a theory of authorship. Returning to Waldron and 
Jaszi’s separate observations about authorship being at the nexus between 
individual and social defences of copyright, Hegel makes some important 
observations about the social goals that copyright can promote – for 
example, his comment that legitimate copying can be a way of learning 
or acquiring knowledge brings out a connection between copyright and 
valuable social goals such as education. As Hegel notes, the ‘purpose 
[Bestimmung] of a product of the intellect is to be apprehended by other 
individuals … for learning means not just memorising or learning words by 
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heart – the thoughts of others can be apprehended only by thinking, and 
rethinking is also a kind of learning’ (§ 69). And Stillman points out that 
people take possession of themselves, on Hegel’s account, through Bildung 
(education), ‘acquiring the capacity to think of ourselves as persons by 
regarding ourselves as members of a community of persons, a universal self-
consciousness’ (Stillman, 1991, p. 219). Theorists looking to strengthen the 
connection between promoting authorship and encouraging desirable social 
goals such as education might therefore f ind support in Hegel’s writings.
Finally, does a Kantian approach help to unpack and challenge copyright’s 
alleged appeal to romantic conceptions of authorship? Kant’s writings on 
copyright illustrate that he was committed to the view that the creative 
process is in fact transformative; authors often use, copy and transform 
existing materials in order to exercise their own communicative abilities. 
This seems quite a different conception of authorship from the romantic 
conception considered above. Moreover, in contrast to the emphasis on 
‘authorial genius’ we often f ind connected to romantic accounts of author-
ship, Kant mentions the role of genius in his work on public reason as an 
example of how genius must be independently governed and constrained 
by the norms of reason. Rather than being a solitary exercise of individual 
expression, that is, even the operations of genius must be constrained by 
standards and principles. This is a far cry from the traditional ideal of the 
romantic author-genius, sometimes thought to be responsible for so much 
of the rhetoric surrounding the expansion of authors’ rights. Thus, neither 
personality nor communicative approaches to copyright provide support 
for romantic conceptions of authorship, and only one particular and limited 
interpretation of the labour theory does so.
Collective authorship
Finally, we can turn to some questions about collective authorship. It is 
important to keep in mind three different models of collective authorship 
as we reflect on the extent to which these different justif icatory frameworks 
might be relevant to questions about multiple authorship:
i. transformative authorship, where an author or composer takes an exist-
ing work and transforms it into something else;
ii. multiple authorship, where a work might be divided into separate but 
multiple contributions by different authors (such as an encyclopaedia, 
classif ied in copyright law as a ‘collective work’); and
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iii. collaborative authorship, where it is not possible to distinguish ‘isolated’ 
contributions, and there is joint collaboration between authors towards 
some shared end (in copyright law terms, a work of ‘co-authorship’).
The discussion of romantic authorship above has already addressed ques-
tions about transformative authorship; the focus in this section will be on 
collective authorship as either ‘multiple’ or ‘collaborative’ authorship.
At f irst sight, it might seem that non-proprietary accounts of authorship 
would apply well to collective models of authorship. But it would be a 
mistake to equate ‘single author’ with ‘proprietary author’. After all, prop-
erty rights can be held by groups and collectives – such as corporations 
or co-operatives – as well as by individuals. In the case of a collaborative 
work of authorship, why should we assume the authors in question would 
be any less likely than single authors to view their efforts as requiring some 
kind of proprietary protection? And there may be even more of a case for 
allocating proprietary rights to multiple authors of the same work, since 
boundaries would need to be drawn up making clear which elements of 
the work belonged to whom, to ensure certain authors were not given 
undue credit, or vice versa. With cases of transformative authorship, we 
could see Shiffrin’s non-proprietary account having some application, but 
it would still be important to analyse the sort of transformation involved, 
and the challenge is to offer an appropriate theoretical framework for 
doing this, if we assume that the primary author is not the ‘owner’ of the 
primary work.
On the creationist account of labour, it would seem that any attempt to 
make sense of collective authorship would be done with a strong presump-
tion of proprietary control to the primary author. However, with the case of 
a collaborative work, there is a sense in which the different authors of the 
work together form one ‘single’ author. It is conceivable that such a group 
of this kind could be viewed under the lens of romantic authorship – after 
all, we might describe their work as creative, and we might assume that as 
a group they worked together in a solitary way, in the sense that they were 
unencumbered by the influences of others except themselves. With cases 
of multiple authorship, however, the creationist account would analyse 
the distinct contributions of each author in a particularly slanted way: 
it would be unlikely to allocate a share of proprietary protection to each 
author equally, but would instead look to give priority to the ‘star’ or ‘lead’ 
author, understood as having had the truly original idea which the other 
contributors were merely embellishing or developing in some way. The 
same would apply for cases of transformative authorship, as we have seen.
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According to the intellectualist account of labour, there would be no 
problem arguing that intellectual production was a shared enterprise, as 
with the case of collaborative authorship: a group could be given similar 
rights of self-government to individuals. But there would be no need to 
view groups as having produced their works ‘romantically’ or in a solitary 
or unencumbered fashion. With the case of multiple authorship, there 
would be no obvious need to prioritise the ‘lead’ or ‘parent’ author as with 
the creationist account, but each would depend more quantitatively on 
the extent of the labour involved. Finally, with regards to transformative 
authorship, we would consider the extent to which the transformative 
author had brought the (transformed) work within their own legitimate 
plans and purposes, rather than merely ‘free-riding’ on the labour of the 
primary author, thereby violating their right to self-government.
Turning now to Hegel’s account, it might seem as though the notion of 
personality is strongly tied to particular individuals, which makes it difficult 
at f irst sight to see how an individual’s personality could be ‘merged’ with 
a group or collective, whilst still retaining its personal quality. However, 
Hegel’s own developmental model of personality, which I discussed above, 
draws a connection between embodiment of personality in external objects 
and the development of individual personality. As Charles Taylor puts it:
[…] personhood involves recognition – that space of evaluation of the 
person’s existence is intrinsically and inseparably a public space … The 
very struggle to gain recognition is fated to self-frustration because it 
can never be properly achieved until we achieve the kind of community 
described in the passage which ends this section [§ 195] in the Phenom-
enology: a society where the I is a we and we is an I (Taylor, 1991, p. 68).
Thus, Hegel’s developmental model of personality provides an interesting 
basis for personality theories of authorship to be applied to cases of joint 
or group communication.
Finally, Kantian standards of public reason might be applied to groups 
as well as to individuals – at least, there is no conceptual problem with 
the idea of ‘group’ communication, and no obvious bias towards individual 
communicators. Indeed, the point of grounding Kantian theories in prin-
ciples of communication rather than individual autonomy is precisely to 
guard against ‘individualistic’ readings of communications as ‘expression’. 
For example, in cases of contested joint authorship – where one party 
claims authorship and another denies it – standards of public reason might 
be drawn upon to adjudicate between the claims. After all, copyright 
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requires that a contribution of joint authorship be original – and, as we 
have seen, this harmonises with the principle of public reason called the 
principle of authority. Copyright also requires there to be collaboration in 
the sense of a shared purpose of some kind: and this might be spelled out 
using the principle of consistency, which focuses on the dynamic nature 
of communication, and the need for an author’s communication to be 
adjusted in light of input from others. In some cases, individuals who 
enable communication to be adjusted might not be ‘authors’ as such but 
rather assistants or aids to authorship. But in other cases, the input could 
be signif icant enough that two such individuals share a common design 
for the work, and thereby become joint authors. Thus, communicative 
models of authorship enable us to broaden our inquiry about authorship 
beyond a proprietary focus on the f ixed ‘work’ and an exclusive focus on 
the ‘creator’s’ role in its production.
Of course, further refinement would be needed to address fully the ques-
tions about which forms of communication are authorial and which are not, 
short of very broad principles of public reason, but the brief sketch above 
indicates that the communicative approach has resources at its disposal 
for such a project.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined some different interpretations of the writings 
of Locke, Hegel and Kant, under the headings ‘labour’, ‘personality’ and 
‘communication’ respectively. It has considered the extent to which they 
have application to three important questions about copyright’s conception 
of authorship: originality, the work and collective authorship in copyright 
law. We have seen that, under these broad headings, various conceptions 
of authorship seem to follow: neither the labour nor personality theories 
are unif ied, complete theories of authorship, but might be interpreted in 
a variety of ways; even the communicative account I have outlined is just 
one amongst many explanations for how copyright might be grounded in 
communicative norms.
Thus, as scholars from law and humanities continue to grapple with 
categories of ‘authorship’ and ‘the work’, they should be prepared to 
challenge the traditional bifurcations we tend to create in philosophi-
cal accounts of copyright. Indeed, one important overarching question 
to consider is whether scholarship on authorship in the humanities has 
anything to say about authorship as a category that can generate its own 
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internal constraints against so-called copyright ‘expansionism’, rather 
than these constraints being imposed from outside (by focusing on user 
privileges, for example). This article has argued that certain components 
of labour, personality and communication do indeed support the idea of 
authorship as an internally constraining process – one that may contain 
within its very def inition the power to generate limitations on the legal 
rights that attach to its products. The next stage forward for researchers 
in philosophy is to work through the issue of how we might blend together 
these theoretical approaches which are so often wrongly presented as in 
theoretical opposition.
Notes
1. The distinction could be challenged on the basis that the material common 
is not completely static; people labour on land and raw materials to change 
and ‘cultivate’ it. But there does seem to be a difference between resources 
that are given to us by nature and intellectual resources that are given to 
us as a result of individuals creating, producing and inventing them; the 
difference lies, as Shiffrin notes, in the fact that the initial expanse of mate-
rial resources exists ‘independently of human efforts’ (Shiffrin, 2001, p. 158). 
Nonetheless, it must still be noted that this construal of the common does 
not really explain the shared basis upon which individuals create (such as 
linguistic conventions and ideas), and is silent on questions about how to 
isolate one person’s labour from the shared basis upon which it depends. 
I am grateful to Mireille van Eechoud for clarifying this point.
2. I am aware that these examples only relate to individual acts of authorship: 
I discuss the implications for collective authorship further in the section 
Collective authorship.
3. Although the personality perspective has obvious application to continen-
tal systems of copyright, here I consider their application to Anglo-Ameri-
can copyright doctrine and their discussion in Anglo-American copyright 
theory. I am aware that personality theories have been discussed extensively 
outside of the Anglo-American context, and regret that there is not scope in 
this chapter to explore this literature.
4. See, for example, the collection of essays in the 2010 edition of The Monist 
(93c: 3).
5. It is not clear that courts have in fact adopted this approach (Lavik and Van 
Gompel, 2013). See also Lavik’s contribution in this book, especially the sec-
tion entitled ‘A lack of interpretative constraint’. Regardless of its practical 
implementation, I mention it here it to illustrate the theoretical possibility 
of Lockean accounts being used to support such a position.
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6. For discussion of the ways in which an approach of this kind is adopted by 
EU and Dutch Courts, see the chapter on ‘Creativity, Autonomy and Per-
sonal Touch’ elsewhere in this collection by Van Gompel.
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 Romantic authorship in copyright law 
and the uses of aesthetics
Erlend Lavik
Every writer, as Jose Luis Borges says, creates his own precursors (an elegant 
way of saying, amongst other things, that all intellectual history is post factum). 
(Seán Burke, 2008, p. 8)
Scholars of the arts as well as scholars of copyright law – especially in the 
US1 – have for decades struggled to kill off the ideology of Romantic author-
ship, though it is far from clear precisely what it consists of, or why and to 
whom it poses such danger. The situation brings to mind film historian Tom 
Gunning’s memorable observation in a different context that the persistent 
attacks ‘begin to take on something of the obsessive and possibly necrophilic 
pleasure of beating a dead horse’ (1998, p. xiii).
This chapter is divided into two main parts. The f irst part critically 
examines the idea that the myth of Romantic authorship is deeply ingrained 
in copyright law and has propelled its expansion. The second part explores 
the broader but related issue of how insights from the humanities can 
usefully inform copyright scholarship. Taking as its starting point Roland 
Barthes’ famous essay ‘The Death of the Author’ it argues that it is extremely 
demanding to f ind common ground, for even though the disciplines overlap 
conceptually they are fundamentally at cross-purposes epistemologically. 
I maintain that we must f irst identify where the aims and practices of 
aesthetics and law actually converge, and deem it to be in the area of 
interpretation and evaluation, which is obviously one of the core compe-
tences of scholars of the arts, and also something that courts resort to at 
the infringement stage.
Part I
It is widely held that the ideas of Romantic authorship that took hold in 
the late 18th century placed high poetic value on novelty and traced the 
source of originality to the mind of the author. What was new about this 
ideology was the degree of independence from tradition attributed to writ-
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ers. The Romantic era overflows with depictions that – at least when taken 
in isolation – suggest that the highest forms of poetry emanate singularly 
from the mind or soul of the author-genius. Thus Edward Young writes in 
Conjectures on Original Composition (1759), one of the founding texts of the 
new ideology of the Romantic author, that ‘The pen of an original writer, like 
Armida’s wand, out of a barren waste calls a blooming spring’ (1918, p. 7).
It is also conventional wisdom that the rhetoric of Romantic authorship 
both contained and came to blend with notions of ownership and claims to 
rights, and that it gradually entered copyright law. How literary discourse 
found its way into legal discourse is a more contentious matter. On the 
one hand, causality is simply unspecif ied or abstracted: the texts of the 
Romantic poets are treated as a kind of conceptual incubator that somehow 
spread and took hold in other spheres. On the other hand, the discourse of 
Romantic authorship is posited as a tool strategically conceived by writers 
specif ically in order to acquire legal recognition for, and thus profits from, 
the fruits of their labour. Martha Woodmansee, for example, writes that 
the modern concept of the author:
[…] is the product of the rise in the eighteenth century of a new group 
of individuals: writers who sought to earn their livelihood from the sale 
of their writings to the new and rapidly expanding reading public. In 
Germany this new group of individuals found itself without any of the 
safeguards for its labors that today are codif ied in copyright laws. In 
response to this problem, and in an effort to establish the economic 
viability of living by the pen, these writers set about redefining the nature 
of writing (1984, p. 426).
There is evidence to suggest that the latter instrumentalist account is some-
what overstated, as the ideology of Romantic authorship arose in response 
also, or even predominantly, to non-legal developments. Jessica Millen, 
for example, notes that it was also a reaction against the advent of mass 
production. Industrialisation and commodification brought on mechanical 
reproduction as an extreme form of standardised and automated imitation 
against which the uniqueness and authenticity of human creativity stood 
out (2010, p. 93).
A much challenged influence
The extent to which the ideology of Romantic authorship actually informed 
copyright doctrine has also been challenged. Trevor Ross argues that the 
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1774 decision to reject the booksellers’ claim for perpetual copyright rep-
resented a rejection of Romantic theories, and that it represents ‘a growing 
awareness of the status of English literature as a ‘tradition’, one whose 
artistic vitality, it was felt at the time, could only be maintained by restrict-
ing the material privileges of authors’ (1992, p. 3). Similarly, Simon Stern 
notes that: ‘Although some commentators on aesthetics treated literary 
creativity and ownership as intertwined concepts, that linkage f inds no 
corollary in contemporaneous legal doctrine’ (2009, p. 69), and that: ‘Once 
one looks for evidence of a link between aesthetic theories of creativity and 
legal theories of literary property, it is striking how rarely anyone invoked 
the concept of aesthetic originality during the eighteenth-century copyright 
debates’ (ibid., p. 83).
For Oren Bracha the conventional wisdom that copyright law absorbed 
the literary concept of authorship has a grain of truth, but such accounts 
tend to be ‘incomplete or f lawed’ (2008, p. 192). Examining the period in 
the 19th century in which the concept of originality was embedded in US 
copyright law, he f inds that it was mobilised in highly contradictory ways. 
One line of cases treated it as a substantial threshold requiring novelty or 
merit. Another line of cases treated originality as a minimal requirement 
on the anti-Romantic grounds that culture is inevitably cumulative in 
nature (ibid., pp. 200–208).
Moreover, just as the literary notion of originality was shaped by develop-
ments outside of aesthetics, so the notion of originality in copyright was 
shaped by developments outside the legal sphere. Bracha convincingly 
argues that economic interests, especially, exerted a constant force against 
demanding originality restrictions, but also that changing notions of the 
legitimate role of government and the appearance of a market conception 
of value played their part.
More contentious still is the assertion that Romantic authorship ideology 
has continued to dominate copyright doctrine to this very day, and has 
been a, possibly even the, driving force in the expansion of copyright ever 
since.2 It is even more vulnerable to the same two main objections that 
have been raised against the claim that copyright law adopted key tenets 
of the ideology of Romantic authorship in the 18th and 19th century: First, 
that important doctrinal structures of contemporary copyright law simply 
are at odds with Romantic authorship, and second, that there are other and 
better explanations for copyright’s expansion.
The f irst critique has been put forward by Mark A. Lemley, who points 
out that the rules regarding the ownership of intellectual property rights 
frequently privilege the interests of corporations rather than individual 
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authors. The US work-for-hire-doctrine, according to which the commis-
sioner rather than the creator of the work is deemed the author, is the most 
obvious example,3 but doctrines of assignment and transfer too serve to 
steer copyright from individuals to corporations (1997, pp. 882–883). He 
also points to the idea-expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine to 
make the more general observation that ‘many of the fundamental issues in 
intellectual property law are shaped not by romantic authorship, but by the 
desire to protect intellectual property adequately without overprotecting 
it’ (ibid., p. 890).
The second objection has been most forcefully raised by Lionel Bently, 
who injects a heavy dose of realpolitik into the claim that Romantic author-
ship has been the prime mover in copyright’s expansion. The most obvious 
alternative explanation for Bently is the lobbying efforts of corporate 
interest groups to gain copyright protection for new categories of works, 
and to obtain stronger protection for works that are already eligible for 
protection (2008a, pp. 26–41). Moreover, he notes that internationalisation, 
particularly the establishment and enforcement of international norms 
through treaties such as the Berne Treaty, and regional harmonisation, such 
as the effort to create a European internal market, have played a key role 
on the extension of copyright law (ibid., pp. 45–57). While there is nothing 
intrinsic about either process that requires copyright protection to expand 
rather than decrease, Bently lists a number of practical and political reasons 
why internationalisation and regional harmonisation very clearly tend to 
pull in just that direction.
Bently also breaks down how national economic and trade interests 
and the rise of neo-liberal economic theory have given rise to stronger 
copyright protection (ibid., pp. 57–62), and mentions other likely aiders 
and abettors, such as resistance to unfair competition law, commitments 
to natural rights conceptions, and the inclination to equate labour or value 
with property (ibid., pp. 62–63). Finally, Bently offers several historical 
case studies of copyright expansion, and f inds that even at its height in 
the 19th century the rhetoric of Romantic authorship was counterbalanced 
by an awareness of the cumulativeness of culture and concerns for the 
public good, and hence ‘did not carry suff icient persuasive power to win 
the day’ (ibid., p. 78). In the 20th century, he argues, the main reasons 
for copyright’s expansion largely lie elsewhere, as the inf luence of the 
ideology of Romantic authorship seems to have been increasingly marginal. 
Bently thus persuasively concludes that among the causes that have lead 
to copyright’s overbreadth ‘The romantic author was, at most, a minor 
accomplice’ (ibid., p. 21).
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In the following, I turn to the methodological diff iculties that ensue from 
the proposition that we can construct historical explanations by tracing 
the influence of prevalent ideas as they somehow wander from one domain 
(like the literary) to another (like the legal). I will call the argument that 
copyright law has become infused with, or come to mirror, the ideas of 
Romantic authorship propounded in the 18th century the ‘ref lectionist 
hypothesis’.
‘Influence’ as historical explanation
Philosopher Quentin Skinner has pointed out that the enterprise of ‘isolating 
leading influences and tracing out connection in terms of them … seems a 
good means of abridging the enormous range of facts with which a histo-
rian … is typically confronted’, but that the logical form of the proposition 
that one idea influenced another idea or event is nevertheless ‘somewhat 
peculiar’ (1966, pp. 203–204). On the one hand, the historian must establish 
a relationship close enough to dissociate similarities from pure chance 
and, on the other, loose-limbed enough to separate the connection from 
brute causality:
The historian is not expected to provide a totally determined account of 
any situation, but to allow both that his assessment of the influences at 
work could always be disputed by the interpretation of another historian, 
and that his own explanation could always in principle be upset by 
the discovery of new facts. It seems, then, to be intended to point out 
something at once rather obvious and yet curiously diff icult to grasp 
– that one idea or event is in some sense dependent on another yet not 
entirely dependent; and that they are thus alike yet not exactly alike 
(ibid., p. 204).
This is a challenge that faces all historical explanations, but it is one that 
seems to be particularly acute in the case of Romantic authorship’s migra-
tion from aesthetics to law. Skinner notes that: ‘The judgment that [one 
idea or event] P1 influenced [some other idea or event] P2 seems in effect 
to entail that we see repeated in P2 the elements which also give to P1 its 
characteristic form’ (ibid., p. 207). One obvious problem facing the claim 
that the Romantic ideology of authorship has influenced copyright law is 
the glaring divergence between literary and legal conceptions of originality. 
Fundamental tenets of the Romantic era – for example that originality is 
tied to aesthetic novelty and genius; to individual sincerity, to the ‘spontane-
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ous overflow of powerful feelings’, in Wordsworth’s famous phrase; that 
the poetic gift is possessed only by a select number of individuals; and that 
the poet is merely a vessel for creative energies beyond his control – are 
simply absent from the legal discourse. This begs the question: Exactly what 
are the core characteristics of Romantic authorship that have manifested 
themselves in copyright law?
Skinner notes that the commonsense view assumes that it is a fairly 
straightforward and uncontentious task to identify the key features or 
doctrines of idea P1, but that:
[…] there is an obvious though apparently elusive sense in which such an 
assumption is bound to be false. To see historical relationships in terms of 
repeated patterns of thought or action is to imply not merely that thinking 
or acting are uniformly purposive, but that they do characteristically 
result in patterns. There is thus a very strong predisposition, particularly 
evident in histories of thought, to ignore the diff iculties about proper 
emphasis and tone which must arise in making any sort of paraphrase 
of a work, and to assume instead that its author must have had some 
doctrine, or a ‘message’, which can be readily abstracted and more simply 
put (ibid., p. 209).
As the f inal sentence suggests, Skinner thinks that the problem persists 
even when the historian sets out to explain how the ideas of a single 
individual influenced those of another, and even when they are engaged 
in the same enterprise in the same domain: ‘The proposition that P2 was 
inf luenced by P1, based on corroborating their characteristics, cannot 
in principle explain P2 with any degree of proof. It will always remain 
open to the sceptic […] to claim that the correlations are random, that the 
features of P1 have been repeated in P2 by chance, that no necessary inner 
connection has been demonstrated at all’ (ibid., p. 208). The historian is 
ultimately ‘committed irreducibly to the language of betting and guessing’ 
(ibid., p. 211).
The problems Skinner highlights are compounded manifold in the 
reflectionist hypothesis, as it is pitched at such a high level of generality. 
It concerns not the influence of one thinker upon another, but rather a 
whole group of thinkers upon another group of thinkers, who are, moreover, 
engaged in a rather different enterprise, that of ruling in matters of the law 
as opposed to investigating the origins and nature of poetic originality. 
Accordingly, it is even more awkward to extrapolate the core characteristics 
of P1, the doctrine or message that exerts some influence on P2, for the 
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core ‘theory’ they allegedly share is buried under so much multeity. There 
is always a danger that the historian not merely extracts the essence of 
some coherent and pre-existing intellectual position ‘out there’, merely 
awaiting discovery, but actively constructs it through the careful selection 
and arrangement of compatible parts.
There are also tensions between various conceptions of Romantic author-
ship. For example, the presumption that poetic originality emanates from 
within the author is hard to fully reconcile with notions of divine inspira-
tion, yet these ideas coexisted in the Romantic period. Moreover, whenever 
the writings of individual Romantic poets or philosophers are analysed 
in greater detail, much more complex, contradictory, and idiosyncratic 
points of view tend to appear. For example, Mario Biagioli argues that the 
influential German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s concept of genius 
focused on general processes of thought rather than on singularly original 
textual objects. He thus uncoupled genius from notions of aesthetic quality 
and novelty, and conceived of it as a trait shared by all. Fichte’s position is 
quite similar to the modern notion of ‘personal expression’ in copyright 
law, except that he attributed personal expression not just to authors, but 
also to readers.
Thomas McFarland, meanwhile, writes that: ‘It is not the case, as one 
sometimes hears, that earlier writers [i.e. before Romanticism] were not 
concerned with originality; they were concerned, but not so deeply and not 
so insistently as were the Romantics. It is merely a note of special intensity 
that is sounded, not one without any cultural precedent whatever’ (1974, 
p. 450). And though he f inds that Conjectures on Original Composition most 
unmistakably signalises this shift in emphasis, even for Edward Young 
originality ‘is not an isolated conception, but one that occupies a place in 
the relationship of individual to tradition. Originality is seen in fact as a 
variant of imitation’ (ibid., p. 452).
Indeed, an awareness that pure originality is inconceivable, that to rob 
and borrow is not only fair, but inevitable, surfaces throughout history, 
among theorists as well as artists. In the 16th century, Italian poet Marco 
Girolamo Vida called:
Come then all ye youths and, careless of censure, give yourselves up to 
STEAL and drive the spoil from every source! Unhappy is he […] who, 
rashly trusting to his own strength and art, as though in need of no 
external help, in his audacity refuses to follow the trustworthy footsteps 
of the ancients, abstaining, alas! unwisely from plunder, and thinking to 
spare others (quoted in McFarland, 1974, p. 472).
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In his conversations with Eckermann, Goethe said that:
People are always talking about originality; but what do they mean? As 
soon as we are born, the world begins to work upon us, and keeps on to 
the end. What can we call ours except energy, strength, will? If I could 
give an account of what I owe to great predecessors and contemporaries, 
there would be but a small remainder (Eckmann, 1839, p. 147).
Thus he found the effort to trace the sources of a poet’s originality absurd, 
for ‘we might as well inquire, when we see a strong man, about the oxen, 
sheep, and swine, which he has eaten, and which has contributed to his 
strength’ (ibid., p. 266).
Henry Fielding wrote in 1749 that ‘the ancients may be considered as 
a rich commons, where every person […] hath a free right to fatten his 
muse’ (Fielding, 1832, p. 275); Emerson in the 1830s that ‘There never was an 
original writer. Each is a link in an endless chain. To receive and to impart 
are the talents of the poet and he ought to possess both in equal degrees 
(Emerson, 1959, p. 284); Mark Twain in 1903 that ‘substantially all ideas are 
second-hand, consciously and unconsciously drawn from a million outside 
sources, and daily used by the garnerer with a pride and satisfaction born 
of the superstition that he originated them; whereas there is not a rag of 
originality about them anywhere except the little discoloration they get from 
his mental and moral calibre and his temperament, and which is revealed 
in characteristics of phrasing’ (quoted in Vaidhyanathan, 2001, p. 64).
These sentiments are of course prevalent among contemporary artists 
as well. In 2005 f ilmmaker Jim Jarmusch noted that:
Nothing is original. Steal from anywhere that resonates with inspiration 
or fuels your imagination. Devour old f ilms, new f ilms, music, books, 
paintings, photographs, poems, dreams, random conversations, archi-
tecture, bridges, street signs, trees, clouds, bodies of water, light and 
shadows. Select only things to steal from that speak directly to your soul. 
If you do this, your work (and theft) will be authentic. Authenticity is 
invaluable; originality is nonexistent. And don’t bother concealing your 
thievery – celebrate it if you feel like it. In any case, always remember 
what Jean-Luc Godard said: ‘It’s not where you take things from – it’s 
where you take them to (2004, n.p.).
It would be possible to put together a sizable volume of quotes from artists, 
critics and theorists expressing similar sentiments. When the ideology of 
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Romantic authorship is such a popular and easy target of criticism, then, 
it is in large part because its detractors tend to attack a caricature or, as 
Andrew Bennett calls it ‘a f iction of subsequent critical reception, a fantasy, 
a back-formation or ‘retrojection’ produced through a partial reading of 
Romantic poetics since in fact Romantic thinking around authorship is 
precisely constituted in and by conflict, paradox, instability’ (2005, p. 71). 
There is no reason to think that the Romantics believed that poets literally 
created ex nihilo, or had made a clean break with art history, with generic 
and linguistic conventions and traditions. Neither is there any reason to 
think that such ideas have literally taken root in copyright law. As Oren 
Bracha points out, to say, as Martha Woodmansee does, that ‘today a piece 
of writing or other creative product may claim legal protection only insofar 
as it is determined to be a unique, original product of the intellection of a 
unique individual’ is ‘simply dead wrong’ (2008, p. 195).4
Here the present discussion too comes up against the ‘diff iculties about 
proper emphasis and tone which must arise in making any sort of para-
phrase’ that Skinner perceived, for it is certainly the case that the copyright 
historians who claim that the ideology of Romantic authorship has found its 
way into legal doctrine are also aware of these tensions and contradictions. 
Consequently, in order not to create a straw man version of the reflectionist 
hypothesis, we must acknowledge that its advocates also do not consistently 
construct a straw man’s version of the Romantic author. They do seem 
to do so on occasion, however, but the more deep-rooted problem is the 
rhetorical contortions that ensue when they do not. For example, Peter 
Jaszi’s commitment to the notion that ‘British and American copyright 
presents myriad reflections of the Romantic conception of “authorship”’ 
leads him to admit that these reflections do at times ‘remind one of images 
in fun-house mirrors’ (1991, p. 456). What Jaszi strives to come to grips with 
here is of course the discrepancies between legal and aesthetic conceptions 
of originality that threaten to undermine his account. Clearly, the obvi-
ous objection to his theory is this: If copyright law has adopted an idea of 
originality premised on notions of poetic creativity as a gift bestowed on a 
few geniuses, then surely we would expect it to be exceedingly diff icult to 
obtain copyright protection, yet the problem is precisely the opposite: it is 
granted remarkably easily.
As Skinner points out: ‘There is a tendency in all historical discourse for 
coincidences to be raised to the level of positive connections at any point 
where explanations seem hard to f ind. When it is known in advance that 
particular events did happen, or that particular ideas were cherished, it is 
always easy to think of many possible connections to explain them’ (1966, 
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p. 208). This observation is especially pertinent to the present analysis, 
as contradictory notions of authorship and originality have coexisted for 
centuries. Indeed, the concept of originality only acquires meaning when it 
is understood in relation to some norm, to tradition, to imitation; similarly, 
we cannot think of conventions as conventions absent an awareness that 
it is possible to bend or break them, at least to some extent. McFarland 
comes at what he calls ‘the originality paradox’ from a similar angle when 
he notes that:
We cannot think of man except by invoking simultaneously the opposed 
categories of individual and society. The ‘pivotal point’, insists Simmel, of 
the ‘concept of individuality’ is that ‘when man is freed from everything 
that is not wholly himself, what remains as the actual substance of his 
being is man in general, mankind, which lives in him and in everyone 
else (1974, p. 447).
The point is that authorship necessarily straddles both halves of the equa-
tion, and I want to argue that the writings of the Romantics could just 
as easily, and possibly more easily, serve to explain a radically different, 
severely restrictive, copyright doctrine. This begs the question: What parts 
of the ideology of Romantic authorship are ref lected in copyright law? 
It is in trying to answer this question that the cracks in the reflectionist 
hypothesis really come to the fore.
Unsurprisingly, moral rights are offered as an example of the Romantic 
ideal’s presence in copyright law, especially the right of integrity, which 
quite explicitly treats artworks as extensions of the creator’s innermost 
being (Jaszi 1991, p. 497). However, when the notion of personal expression 
is dissociated from genius and applied to trivial works, scholars disagree 
whether or not to see it as an instance of Romantic authorship. Jaszi f inds 
that the decision in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Company (1903) 
plays down the author’s creative input when it posits that: ‘Personality 
always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even in 
handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreduc-
ible, which is one man’s alone’ (quoted in Jaszi, 1991, p. 483). This line of 
reasoning, for Jaszi, both eradicates and generalises authorship, draining 
the concept of meaningful content and of its traditional connotations, and 
in effect sanctions copyright’s subsequent overbreadth (ibid., p. 483). Jaszi 
actually seems to suggest, then, somewhat counter to his main thesis, that 
copyright’s expansion resulted from a rejection of Romantic authorship. He 
does recognise, however, that other scholars may take the facts to mean 
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something rather different; for example, he refers to ‘a contrary interpreta-
tion’ by Benjamin Kaplan, for whom Holmes’s insistence on individuality 
and personality has ‘an echo in it of the Romantic gospel’ (ibid., p. 483).
The confusion is most pronounced in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine 
Arts (1951), which pushed the idea of the author’s irreducible individuality 
to its very limit. The case concerned the copyrightability of reproductions of 
various 18th and 19th century paintings in the form of mezzotint engravings. 
Even though the author merely tried to faithfully replicate old masterpieces, 
the court found that there was still a distinguishable variation from the 
underlying works attributable to human agency. Judge Frank reasoned that 
even if the discrepancy had been accidental, it would still bear the imprint 
of the author’s personality and hence be eligible for copyright. For Jaszi, this 
opinion is work-centred because it highlights material variation, not the 
author’s substantive creative contribution, and hence it ‘implicitly rejected 
the traditional vision of “authorship”’ (1991, p. 483). Ryan Littrell, by contrast, 
identif ies a different strand of scholarship, which sees Catalda as perfectly 
in line with Romantic subjectivity, because the notion of a distinguishable 
variation does not really focus on the work as such, but on the physical 
manifestations of the author’s singularity (2002, p. 220).
Because they latch on to different parts of the myth, different scholars 
also come to very different conclusions on whether the famous case of Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. (1991) represents a return to 
or a rejection of Romantic authorship. Jaszi sees the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion to deny copyright to a white pages book of residential phone numbers 
arranged alphabetically by surname as a resurrection of Romanticism. He 
f inds that the court’s rhetoric ‘proceeds from unreconstructed faith in the 
gospel of Romantic “authorship”’ (1994, p. 38). Similarly, Elton Fukumoto 
considers Feist ‘the high water mark for the author ideology in American 
case law’ (1997, p. 908). Littrell, however, sees it as a critique of the Romantic 
ideology’s faith in pure authorial subjectivity, and as a gradual acceptance of 
modern literary theories’ view of authorship as a more modest achievement 
(2002, pp. 222–223).
The fundamental disagreement about where and how the myth of 
Romantic authorship manifests itself in copyright law should lead us to 
take the conclusions with a pinch of salt and, more generally, to look with 
some suspicion upon historical investigations based largely on analogy. 
The main problem is that there is a huge gap in these copyright scholars’ 
accounts in that they do not seek to spell out the mechanisms by which 
aesthetic thinking about authorship f inds its way into legal thinking about 
authorship. The evasion of this issue means that the nature of the connec-
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tion between the two is highly elusive. As we have seen, there seems at 
times to be an implication that there is a causal relationship of some sort, as 
when Jaszi and Woodmansee describe the Romantic authorship construct 
as ‘the chief engine’ of copyright expansion (1995, p. 772). At other times, 
the connection appears to be considerably less strict, so that the aim of the 
analyses is rather to trace terminological reverberations and reflections. 
Thus Jaszi writes that he seeks to ‘draw out homologous relationships in 
law and developments in literary culture – without insisting that one is 
somehow determined by the other’ (1991, p. 457).
However, there is no way to convert observations about conceptual analo-
gies between literature and law into evidence about causal connections or 
influences. And the looser formulation, the suggestion that ‘the relation 
between P1 and P2 is one of vague hints, echoes, reminiscences’ as Skinner 
puts it, is ‘simply without content’ (1966, p. 211). To let go of the insistence 
that P1 is a necessary source of influence on P2 is to concede that the simi-
larities may just as well be down to chance. After all, an inf inite number of 
similarities hold between different phenomena, and it is hardly surprising 
that from the fabric of historical facts and discourses can be woven all kinds 
of symmetries and stories. But to privilege one selection of semblances is 
arbitrary, and as Skinner writes, merely demonstrates ‘something that the 
historian must already have known: that similar situations or interests tend 
to presuppose similar language or directions of effort, and that apparent but 
perhaps quite illusory historical patterns will tend in consequence to arise’ 
(ibid., p. 212). Consequently, ‘the claim to have discovered an influence of P1 
on P2 becomes […] a remark neither about P1 or P2, but about the observer 
himself. The observer in effect asserts that in studying P2 he is sometimes 
reminded of P1’ (ibid., p. 212).
This seems to be an apt description of what is going on in the reflection-
ists’ accounts, especially seeing as the authorship arguments in aesthetics 
and in copyright law are not actually all that similar, but require a certain 
degree of abstraction, stretching, and paraphrase to appear analogous. 
It is also worth noting here that Skinner’s scepticism towards historical 
explanations based on notions of intellectual influence is largely related 
to its tendency to overemphasise biography. Thus in addition to demon-
strating that the most central ideas of philosopher A appear to show up in 
the writings of philosopher B, historians will strive to pile up ever more 
proof of the influence. They will, for example, seek to provide independent 
testimony, or to show that philosopher A owned the works of philosopher 
B, and read them, and talked frequently about them, and so on, in the hope 
that the account sooner or later reaches a point at which the amount of 
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circumstantial evidence renders the influence self-evident and its denial 
absurd (ibid., pp. 208–209). Though Skinner f inds this claim far from obvi-
ous, what is interesting for our purposes is the virtually complete absence 
of such corroborating evidence in the studies of the influence of Romantic 
authorship ideas on legal doctrine. They rely exclusively on analogy, on 
tracing in P2 (copyright law) the most characteristic features of P1 (the 
ideology of Romantic authorship) – often in severely distorted form.
The constructedness of authorship
Because the nature of the relationship is unspecified it is also rather ambigu-
ous what problem is posed by the law’s adoption or acceptance of Romantic 
authorship ideas. On the one hand, it seems to throw up certain practical 
diff iculties, as copyright’s notion of authorship fails to accommodate non-
individualistic creative efforts, such as folkloric works without identif iable 
authors and serial collaborations (Jaszi, 1994, pp. 38–40). On the other, it 
is implied that the Romantic authorship ideology somehow misrepresents 
and misleads, because it provides an inaccurate account of how cultural 
creation typically comes about. A recurring aim of the studies of Romantic 
authorship is to show that it is a social and rhetorical construct, and hence 
historically contingent, rather than some neutral, natural category (Boyle, 
1996, p. 114; Jaszi, 1991, p. 459).
The point of historicising the concept of authorship is in other words to 
de-naturalise it in order to enable change. When we come to realise that very 
different notions of authorship have existed in different places and at different 
points in time, it becomes clear that our current conceptions are not inevitable 
and immutable, but dependent on the context we inhabit, on the presumptions 
we carry, and on the perspectives we bring to bear on authorship practices. 
Once we become aware of these contingencies, any inclination to think that 
our beliefs about authorship conform to its true nature loses its grip.
I f ind this argument indisputable, but I am not sure who needs convincing 
that authorship does not possess some timeless quintessence independent 
of human perspectives and purposes. It is no doubt the case that copyright 
law is full of inconsistencies and paradoxes, and ‘fails to achieve a stable 
vision of authorship’ as Jaszi puts it (1991, p. 463). But scholars of literature 
are no closer to such stability, so it is hardly surprising that everything does 
not add up neatly in a system that is supposed to encompass poetry and 
emails, paintings and computer code, movies and maps.
I also f ind the implication that courts and copyright scholars fail to 
recognise the authorship construct’s ‘constructedness’, and mistake it for 
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‘a real or natural [category]’ (Jaszi, 1991, p. 459) dubious. In fact, it is hard 
to think of a better cure for the inclination to think that language cuts the 
world at the joints (to borrow Richard Rorty’s phrase) than to engage in the 
enterprise of trying to apply the same conceptual framework – specif ically 
the terms author, originality, and work – to everything from newspaper 
headlines to mobile phone design to f ilm screenplays to photography.
Moreover, the fact that the categories of works that fall within copyright’s 
sphere of influence keep changing over time, and that some categories 
– databases, say – are copyright-protected in some countries yet not in 
others, are unambiguous signs that copyright law clearly has not hit upon 
the true nature of authorship. And the legal procedures that come into 
play at the infringement stage are liable to call further attention to the 
artif ice and arbitrariness of copyright’s notion of authorship. After all, 
it seems reasonable to think that those who are charged with the task of 
operationalising copyright’s key concepts and distinctions – to separate 
idea from expression, say, or creativity from know-how, or functional from 
expressive elements – in numerous diff icult limit cases, will develop an 
acute awareness of just how intensely pragmatic and non-natural these 
borders are. I see no reason to doubt Judge Hand’s pronouncement on behalf 
of copyright’s custodians in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. (1930) that 
‘we are as aware as anyone that the line [between idea and expression], 
wherever it is drawn, will seem arbitrary’ (quoted in Cohen, 1990, p. 221).
As I will argue in part II, though it does resemble one in certain respects, 
copyright doctrine is not a philosophical treatise, as it also aims to ac-
complish specif ic objectives. While there is little agreement on copyright’s 
main objective – as Diane Leenheer Zimmerman notes, some see it ‘as 
an acknowledgement of the value of human authorship as an endeavor’; 
others f ind that it is ‘to structure a sector of the economy’; and still others 
give emphasis to copyright’s social benefit, that of ‘providing an adequate 
supply of new works to the public’ (2005, pp. 189–190) – it is decidedly not 
to capture the f iner nuances of authorship in a philosophical sense. This 
means that copyright policy is not necessarily an accurate or appropriate 
reflection of actual theoretical propositions and beliefs.
Personally, for example, I f ind that copyright law’s originality require-
ment,5 especially the idea that authors leave some unique personal imprint 
even on trivial works, quite dubious from a philosophical perspective. 
Nevertheless, I think the originality criterion makes sense from a legal 
perspective – not because it is anywhere close to perfect even from a purely 
pragmatic point of view, but because I think alternative standards would 
create even greater difficulties.6 The fact that I largely agree with the current 
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originality requirement – and so assume a position that can be made to 
look somewhat analogous to parts of the ideology of Romantic authorship, 
for example through selective interpretations of Fichte – is merely a sign 
that I consider it the lesser of several evils, and not a reflection of some 
philosophy that exists outside of the legal context.
Copyright law simply covers so many radically divergent types of works 
and authorial practices that we are never going to come even remotely 
close to f inding an ontological framework that accommodates all equally 
satisfactorily. Moreover, it is calibrated to serve several purposes at once, so 
it is hardly surprising that copyright’s vision of authorship is unstable. The 
problem is that whenever we try to recalibrate copyright doctrine so that it 
redresses an imbalance, it tends to create a new one somewhere else. Thus 
the inconsistencies that look like flaws from a philosophical perspective 
might, from a legal perspective, simply be the wriggling room courts need 
to align copyright law with its diverse set of practices and purposes.
This is not to say that there is no room for improvement, of course. We 
should seek to make copyright as coherent and predictable as possible, 
and continually discuss and analyse its philosophical underpinnings as 
well as the usefulness of its purposes. Consequently, I am not suggesting 
that there is – or ought to be – no traff ic at all between legal and literary 
thinking about authorship. I will return to this complex issue in part II, but 
f irst highlight some further problems with the reflectionist hypothesis by 
trying to unpack just how ideas from literature might find their way into law.
A lack of interpretive constraints
As we have seen, the studies which maintain that Romantic notions of 
authorship have shaped, and continue to shape, legal attitudes to authorship 
do not seek to trace the steps of the ideology’s migration in specif ic cases, 
except by analogy: Typically, some copyright decision is shown (or made) 
to resemble some aspect of Romantic authorship, which is taken to suggest 
some indefinable form of influence.
However, as long as the evidence of the influence remains at the level of 
structural homologies there are hardly any interpretive constraints on the 
enterprise. It is possible to identify resemblances between many things, but 
that does not necessarily entail any kind of influence. When f ilm scholars 
talk about ‘Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho’ it might suggest some Romantic 
inclination, but not necessarily. Even f ilm historians who flatly reject the 
auteur theory and insist that f ilm is a thoroughly collaborative art form 
are liable to talk like that, either as a form of shorthand or simply by habit 
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or convention. When political commentators speak of ‘President Obama’s 
health care reform’ they are certainly not implying that it was his idea 
alone. One reason the Romantic author appears to be such a powerful and 
persistent foe is that once one starts looking for signs of his reflection at the 
level of analogy, his mirror image will inevitably crop up all over the place.
Now, no one has alleged that there is a straightforward causal connection 
between literary and legal discourses; the argument seems to be that the 
nature of the influence is rather like that of a Zeitgeist, and that certain 
ideas and beliefs emerge and catch on in one area, and then gradually seep 
into others as they begin to resonate and persuade. In a more recent article 
which speculates that the ideology of Romantic authorship is f inally starting 
to give way to postmodern ideas of authorship in US copyright law, Jaszi 
emphasises that while lawyers and judges who work on copyright are not 
‘literally disciples of Lyotard’ or ‘self-conscious trend followers’, they are 
still ‘participants in a larger cultural conversation, and what they derive 
from it ends up influencing copyright discourse in various ways’ (2009, 
p. 106). Clearly, it is practically impossible to reconstruct who says and 
hears what, and to weigh the relative importance of all the contradictory 
and crisscrossing voices in order to explain the nature of the influence. Still, 
the typical procedure – to extract from the cacophony a few legal decisions, 
and then to read them either as synchronic symptoms of collective beliefs 
or as diachronic signs of the conversation’s general direction – seems to 
me especially problematical. It examines copyright through a very narrow 
prism that, despite cautious qualif ications, constantly risks bringing to 
light spurious correlations, and it is easy to f ind support for any number of 
contradictory hypotheses.
There is something awkward about an explanatory framework with a 
striking gap we are not supposed to contemplate or describe in any detail. 
Jaszi’s observations on Judge Posner’s much-maligned decision in Gracen v. 
Bradford Exchange is interesting in that they go beyond the mere identif ica-
tion of similarities between the decision and the ideology of Romantic 
authorship to include also a little bit of context. In Gracen Judge Posner 
rejected the copyright claims of an artist who painted porcelain plate 
images drawn from still images from the f ilm The Wizard of Oz on the 
grounds that they were not original. Jaszi sets up his analysis by quoting 
Jessica Litman’s contention that ‘To say that every new work is in some sense 
based on the works that preceded it is such a truism that it has long been a 
cliché, invoked but not examined’ (1991, p. 460). The point, it seems, is to hint 
that even though we moderns think we have come to recognise culture’s 
cumulative nature, this is not quite the case. Jaszi goes on to analyse possible 
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justif ications for the decision and f inds that none of them really hold up, 
but concludes that it ‘does make sense, however, when viewed in light of the 
Romantic “authorship” construct, with its implicit recognition of a hierarchy 
of artistic productions’ (1991, p. 462), which leads him to conclude that 
Romanticism ‘has a continuing grip on the legal imagination’ (ibid., p. 463).
While I agree with Jaszi’s misgivings about the decision, I f ind the effort to 
link it to Romantic authorship troublesome. First, the ideology is abstracted 
to the extent that it comes to equate simply the recognition of an artistic 
hierarchy. This seems to me such a basic notion that it is an exaggeration 
to take it as a clear manifestation of Romantic authorship ideology. I do not 
think that the assumption that some works of authorship are either more 
original or more derivative than others automatically implies some kind 
of endorsement of Romantic authorship. It is only from the point of view of 
poststructuralist theory – which radically challenges the very concept of 
originality, and which Jaszi explicitly invokes – that such a commonsensical 
claim appears disturbing, a position I will return to in part II.
Second, it is interesting to consider how Jaszi’s analysis deals with 
biographical evidence that does not match the hypothesis. Jaszi concedes 
that Judge Posner elsewhere has spoken out against the Romantic notion of 
authorship, but merely remarks that Posner’s failure to practise in Gracen 
what he preaches ‘reflects the inability of the law to achieve a stable vision 
of “authorship”’ (ibid., p. 463). Thus he does not try to rationalise the incon-
sistencies in the judge’s thinking, probably because the only explanation 
available when a court decision is viewed through the optic of Romantic 
authorship ideology is the awkward one that Posner is somehow – against 
his own better judgment – beholden to or misled by the myth of Romantic 
authorship. I take this to be an indication that the persuasiveness of the 
hypothesis calls for an absence of reflection upon the nature of the influ-
ence; once we try to flesh out the gap between analogies, the premise comes 
to seem vaguely conspiratorial and not-so-vaguely improbable.
We should also note that the reflectionist hypothesis – the idea that the 
myth of the Romantic author was so to speak inscribed into copyright’s DNA 
from the start – tends to function as a self-fulf illing prophesy. The reason is 
that mere basic assumptions about authorship – for example that it involves 
creativity, and that it is possible to identify the efforts of the individual or 
individuals who exert the most control over the f inal product – are seen as 
evidence of Romantic authorship’s persistence.7
The problem here is that the very premise of the hypothesis – that Roman-
tic authorship ideology lies at the core of copyright, and subsequently shows 
up in ‘curiously distorted’ versions, as Jaszi puts it (1991, p. 488) – makes 
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virtually any reference to authors and authorship a vestige of Romanticism. 
In other words, the analytical framework evens out the difference between 
Romantic authorship and authorship per se, and thus leaves very little, if any, 
room for positions that seek to heed both sides of the originality paradox, 
i.e. to be sensitive both to the contributions of individuals and to their debt 
to tradition. Elsewhere, after all, it is quite possible to hold that authors do 
innovate even as nothing comes from nothing; from within the reflectionist 
point of view, however, signs of the f irst part of the equation are taken, by 
a kind of hermeneutics of suspicion, as misshapen surface manifestations 
of copyright’s primordial essence: Romantic authorship.
Of course, if one accepts that the rhetoric of the literary property de-
bates that began in the 1730s were Romantic, it could be argued that the 
ideology of Romantic authorship has shaped copyright ever since, in the 
more modest sense that it handed down a conceptual and terminologi-
cal framework within which subsequent developments have played out. 
However, the existence of such a framework would not by itself compel 
legal doctrine to change in any particular way, or even to change at all, 
which leaves us no particular reason to think that Romantic authorship 
has been a factor in copyright’s expansion. Consequently, the reflectionist 
must commit to the stronger view – however cagily put – that we somehow 
believe in, and are in some sense deceived by, the ideology of Romantic 
authorship. Thus Jaszi is keen to stress that ‘law is derivative of cultural 
attitudes’ (2009, p. 109) while Boyle insists that ‘the idea of the original, 
transformative creator is coded deep into our speechways and our patterns 
of thought’ (1996, p. 158).
Now, it would be pure folly to insist that the law exists in some kind of 
vacuum, and remains completely unaffected by surrounding dispositions 
and discourses. But to concede that copyright necessarily interacts with 
other conversations in some way, and that some notion of authorship is 
ingrained in the way we think about culture, art, and communication, is 
not to consent to the claim that Romantic authorship ideology has infused 
copyright law and led to its expansion. Indeed, it is not clear that it makes 
much sense to try to convert the innumerable possible connections and 
interactions between copyright law and society at large into philosophical 
approaches to authorship. It seems to me that any effort to spell out how 
the larger conversation has shaped copyright law would appear – in words 
Richard Rorty once used in a very different context – ‘much more like 
somebody’s description of how he or she managed to get from the age of 
twelve to the age of thirty (that paradigm case of muddling through) than 
like a series of choices between alternative theories’ (1991, p. 69).
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In other words, the nature of the influence is far too complex and ac-
cidental to allow for meaningful general descriptions. The reflectionist 
approach is to take samples from the legal record at different historical 
moments and then to examine copyright doctrine or case law through the 
prism of authorship, often in terms derived from literary theory. But the 
cultural, political, aesthetic, and social conversations that have no doubt 
shaped these legal outcomes are made up of countless random ingredients: 
debates about new technological products and practices; the things that 
critics have had to say about new artistic practices; or whatever IP-related 
issues major media outlets happened to pick up at a certain point in time, 
to name just a few. In addition, of course, all the alternative explanations 
listed at the outset have also affected copyright. The reflectionist seeks 
to apply terms drawn from academic discourses – ‘Romantic’, ‘modern-
ist’, ‘postmodernist’, or ‘poststructuralist’ – to the samples. To my mind, 
however, these are not so much names of cultural attitudes and beliefs that 
have suffused and then shaped copyright law as simply descriptive labels 
that designate what the legal decisions – i.e. the outcome of all the actual 
influences – may be said to look like from the point of view of someone 
versed in academic authorship theories.
A more panoramic lens
Unfortunately, there is no quick and easy way to make sure that we get at 
‘real entities […] rather than linked abstractions’, as Skinner puts it (1966, 
p. 215). The solution he proposes is a decent starting point, however, namely 
to ‘describ[e] as fully as possible the complex and probably contradictory 
matrix within which the idea or event to be explained can be most meaning-
fully located’ (ibid., p. 213). Of the alternative accounts mentioned at the 
outset, it is probably Bracha’s that comes closest to such an approach. He 
shows, for example, how copyright law interacted with changing ideological 
views of government and the judiciary, and he outlines the ways in which 
the development of new markets, new industries, and new interest groups 
seeking to gain market advantages helped shape legal doctrine.
The advantage that Bracha’s account has over the reflectionist explana-
tion is that it examines copyright cases and statutes from a much broader 
perspective, and dispels any notion that legal concepts of authorship and 
originality are signs that we are still in thrall to the old romanticist myth. 
Bracha clearly states that even though copyright law can be considered a 
‘mystif ication’ in the sense that parts of it are removed from the realities of 
authorship, ‘the point […] is not that anyone is being deceived’, but rather that 
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copyright as a conceptual f ield ‘enables us to maintain deeply conflicting 
images, commitments, and modes of argument’ (2008, pp. 266–267). Thus 
he substitutes for the reflectionist account a purely functional explanation.
Of course, this is not to say that misconceptions about authorship and 
originality do not exist. Undoubtedly, many people in all walks of life some-
times hold too rigidly romantic beliefs about authors and their works, and 
it is important to seek a richer and more nuanced understanding by calling 
attention to the other half of the originality paradox as well. However, it 
is something else entirely to see ideas and intuitions about authorship 
outside of the legal domain as an essential and recognisable agency in 
copyright’s historical development. And even if we agreed, for the sake 
of argument, that Romantic authorship ideology – either as an article of 
faith, or a form of naivety, or false consciousness, or some amalgamation 
of these ingredients – did exert an influence, it still seems ill-equipped to 
explain both copyright’s expansion and the peculiar legal def inition of the 
key criterion: originality.
This is precisely where Bracha’s analysis excels. It does away with the no-
tion that whatever ‘theories of authorship’ we become aware of in copyright 
law on the basis of hermeneutic theories are meaningful ref lections of 
actual beliefs and assumptions ‘out there’. While early copyright statutes 
might arguably have been informed by contemporary ideology, ensuing 
doctrinal developments and adjustments seem a highly deficient barometer 
of changes in social attitudes (copyright’s originality threshold, for example, 
is pretty much out of step with any understanding of the term outside of 
the legal context). Rather, the initial concept of authorship is principally 
important because it established the conceptual framework – the ‘language 
game’, we might say – within which subsequent contests over, and transfor-
mations of, copyright have taken place. Bracha argues that once authorship 
rhetoric had taken hold, agents motivated by commercial purposes who 
sought to make their case in public needed to avail themselves of the same 
vocabulary and rationale. ‘The result’, he writes, ‘was that the preexisting 
ideology of authorship was reshaped by interested parties in order to f it 
their concerns’, though their arguments ‘were constrained by the need to 
use terms and concepts taken from the lexicon of authorship’ (2008, p. 201).
Clearly, there is a lot of detail and data for future historians to f ill in yet in 
this narrative, but as a working hypothesis it seems much better equipped 
to contend with copyright’s features and developments, such as the curious 
rhetorical insistence on the significance of originality and the simultaneous 
reduction of the term to a well-neigh technical minimum requirement in 
practice. Similarly, Bracha convincingly argues that the concept of ‘the 
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work’ as well as the idea/expression dichotomy in US doctrine can be shown 
to belong to the language game of authorship, while at the same time al-
lowing copyright to extend its reach. He also observes that copyright as 
a conceptual f ield is highly flexible, and thus serves to alleviate tensions 
between conflicting assumptions and arguments (2008, pp. 267–270).
Bracha’s functional approach to, and bird’s-eye view of, history provides 
a more persuasive account both of copyright’s conceptual transformations 
and characteristics, and of the mechanisms that underlie copyright’s expan-
sion. The reflectionist hypothesis rests on an intuitively reasonable premise 
– that copyright is shaped by surrounding attitudes and discourses – but 
upon closer reflection the alleged connection turns out to be extremely 
hard to spell out in a convincing manner. The method of looking for analo-
gies through the somewhat arbitrary and quite narrow prism of literary-
philosophical notions of authorship generates results, but their reliability 
is disputed, for once one signs off on the hypothesis and locks into its optic, 
copyright history tends to appear brimming with distant reverberations 
and contorted reflections of Romantic authorship. Those same phenomena 
might well look rather more like straightforward representations through 
a more panoramic lens.
Part II
I want now to return to the role of literary-philosophical approaches to 
authorship in copyright law and copyright scholarship. I  have argued 
that copyright doctrine does not constitute a philosophy of authorship 
comparable to those we f ind in the humanities, and that to map one onto 
the other may confuse more than clarify. However, to say that copyright 
law is not a philosophy of authorship is not to say that it is nothing like it at 
all. It is in many respects reminiscent precisely of a philosophical system in 
that it necessarily expresses and embodies certain general and systematic 
beliefs and assumptions about the nature of creativity and creations, about 
the properties of and interrelationships between works of authorship from 
which concepts and categories are drawn, then defined and aligned so as 
to be as internally coherent as possible.
However, unlike standard philosophical investigations, copyright’s 
elaboration of things like authorship and originality does not – or rather, 
not solely – flow from the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. For while 
copyright doctrine ought to rest on disinterested contemplation of the 
nature of the phenomena it covers, the relevant results of that activity – i.e. 
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of doing philosophy proper – must not necessarily be incorporated indis-
criminately, as there are numerous practicalities to consider that might be 
hard to reconcile with the fruits of investigations conducted simply for the 
love of wisdom. For example, copyright cannot hold as many f ine-spun dis-
tinctions as philosophical investigations because the amount of exceptions 
would be unmanageable. Also, the most philosophically ref ined concepts 
and distinctions are not liable to lend themselves to legal implementation.
It is thus easy to see why literary studies might appear considerably more 
discerning than copyright law. Literary scholars are free to explore inher-
ent rhetorical presumptions or tensions, to critically examine the hidden 
values upon which a dichotomy rests, and to interrogate terminological and 
philosophical inconsistencies and ambiguities. As Judge Hand reasoned in 
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp the arbitrariness of the line between idea 
and expression ‘is no excuse for not drawing it; it is a question such as courts 
must answer in nearly all cases’ (ibid., p. 221). So while courts too must make 
philosophical distinctions, they are also expected to actually apply them in 
the trickiest circumstances imaginable: either to borderline cases or to new 
categories of works that did not exist at the time the distinction was devised.
Humanities scholars also have the luxury of limiting their f ield of study 
as they see f it, and may choose to simply avoid the fuzzy borders of the 
categories and concepts they explore, or simply criticise the fuzziness 
without proposing a fully-fledged alternative. Judges must apply copyright’s 
concepts and distinctions not just to the central examples that make them 
seem sharp and distinct, but also – and especially – to all the inevitable 
peripheral examples that make them seem problematical, sometimes even 
perverse. They must, in short, draw the line precisely where it hurts the 
most, where it is most awkward and inelegant.
Copyright is also different in that it is constrained by legal precedent and 
standards of interpretation: Unlike philosophers, judges are not simply free 
to follow their intellectual conviction wherever it leads them, for they are 
bound by the terminology and definitions laid down in law and elaborated 
by their predecessors. While philosophers are at liberty to revise, or even 
to devise from scratch, their ontological systems, courts must take into 
account how any changes affect the real-world cultural and economic 
infrastructure which has sprung from the current legal framework.
Finally, in order not to undermine the authority of law, judges must 
probably convey a certain confidence in their own verdicts. They cannot 
afford to follow the example of philosophers and literary theorists who 
make a virtue of the inability to arrive at universally consistent concepts 
and distinctions, and who make do with uncovering cracks and contra-
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dictions by self-reflexively foregrounding the radical indeterminacy and 
contingency of all meaning.
Clearly, then, copyright law is not designed to make those who practise 
it look good. But even though the definitions and distinctions judges are re-
quired to make sometimes seem naïve or even a little farcical from the point 
of view of literary theory, they are not necessarily any less accomplished, for 
copyright law is by and large geared towards different purposes. In other 
words, copyright law forever straddles the divide between ontology and 
utility: On the one hand, it must seek to weave a suitably tight-knit web 
of assertions and assumptions about authorship without any gaping holes 
in it, to devise an intellectually subtle and internally coherent conceptual 
framework attuned to the realities of authorial products and practices; on 
the other, it must keep in mind what is feasible and functional. The second 
consideration is frequently irrelevant in literary theory and philosophy; 
these f ields meanwhile, tend to have their own uses and idiosyncrasies. So 
while there is a lot of legal scholarship based on the assumption that literary 
theory has made important discoveries about the nature of authorship that 
copyright law has failed to take into account, we must keep in mind that 
what has cash value in the humanities (or some enclave of the humanities) 
may be no good in the legal domain.
All of this begs the question: What is the relationship between, on the 
one hand, copyright law’s notion of authorship and originality and, on the 
other, the ways in which the same concepts are mobilised and theorised 
in f ields like philosophy, aesthetics, comparative literature, musicology, 
or f ilm studies? It is one thing to argue, as I have so far, that copyright law 
can neither ignore philosophy nor mindlessly mirror it – but can we spell 
out the connection more positively, and in greater detail? I doubt that it is 
possible to answer such questions meaningfully at a general level, as there 
are simply too many variables to consider. We must instead proceed more 
or less on a case-by-case basis, scrutinising the relevance and usefulness 
of specif ic concepts and theories in specif ic contexts.
I want to highlight how challenging it is to bridge the gap between these 
academic disciplines by offering some observations on the approach that 
seems to be most often invoked in copyright debates about the persistence 
of Romantic authorship ideology, namely post-structuralism. The more 
specific aim is to call attention to the importance of recognising the distinc-
tive protocols and purposes that guide investigations into authorship in 
different f ields and sub-f ields, and to provide a starting point for more 
general explorations of the value of perspectives from the humanities to 
copyright scholarship.
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Raising the stakes – the death of the Author, of God, and of man
We should note at the outset that post-structuralism is not integral to the 
argument that the ideology of Romantic authorship informs copyright law. 
Boyle, for example, emphasises that he wants to separate his project from 
post-structuralism’s ‘full-court author-bashing’ (1996, p. 59). Jaszi, however, 
explicitly cites the influence of poststructuralist approaches (1991, p. 457), 
and several commentators link the persistence of Romanticism to a gap 
between legal and literary thinking, and especially to copyright’s failure to 
take on board relevant insights from literary theory, in particular theories 
that give emphasis to the intertextual relationships that necessarily hold 
between all works.8
The most radical formulation of this vision of authorship appeared in 
the 1960s in the work of a group of philosophers and literary critics based 
in France, especially Roland Barthes, Julia Kristeva, Michel Foucault, and 
Jacques Derrida. It is important to keep in mind that the writings of these 
thinkers do not add up to a single coherent theory (nor, indeed, do their 
individual oeuvres). In order to make the analysis somewhat manageable, 
then, I will focus mainly on the work of Roland Barthes, particularly his 
‘The Death of the Author’. While the article is not representative of some 
unif ied poststructuralist position, it is arguably the most well-known text 
on authorship of the 20th century, it has often been alluded to by copyright 
scholars, and its epigrammatic style is particularly well-suited to point out 
the rhetorical and epistemological differences between poststructuralist 
and legal scholarship.
Barthes’ image of the author, or ‘Author-God’ as he calls it, is very much 
a caricature, as is his description of literary culture and criticism as ‘tyran-
nically centred on the author’ (2002, p. 5). The essay completely ignores the 
many approaches prior to its publication that not at all deified the author, but 
explicitly sought to bracket authorial subjectivity, such as Anglo-American 
New Criticism, Russian formalism, and Prague structuralism. This is not to 
say that poststructuralist authorship theories simply added a heavy dose 
of hyperbole to old truisms. Earlier anti-authorial movements argued that 
the study of literature ought to focus on the immanent properties of texts, 
and were thus strictly limited to literary interpretation. Post-structuralism 
too waged war on biographical positivism, as when Barthes laments that:
[…] criticism still consists for the most part in saying that Baudelaire’s 
work is the failure of Baudelaire the man, Van Gogh’s his madness, 
Tchaikovsky’s his vice. The explanation of a work is always sought in the 
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man or woman who produced it, as if it were always in the end, through 
the more or less transparent allegory of the f iction, the voice of a single 
person, the author ‘confiding’ in us (2002, p. 4).
But at the same time, poststructuralist explorations of authorship were 
part of a far more encompassing philosophical-political project at ‘the 
intersection between phenomenology and structuralism [which] produced 
an iconoclastic and far-ranging form of anti-subjectivism’ (Burke, 2008, 
p. 13). This means that:
Barthes, Foucault and Derrida were not content with simply sidelining the 
authorial subject as in earlier formalisms. A phenomenological training 
had taught them that the subject was too powerful, too sophisticated a 
concept to be simply bracketed; rather subjectivity was something to 
be annihilated. Nor either could they be content to see the death of the 
subject as something applying merely to the area of literary studies. The 
death of the author must connect with a general death of man (ibid., p. 14).
Barthes’ essay is mostly devoted to literary matters, but does link the read-
ing strategy it promotes to broader issues, as when Barthes writes that ‘by 
refusing to assign a “secret”, an ultimate meaning, to the text (and to the 
world as text), [literature] liberates what may be called an anti-theological 
activity, an activity that is truly revolutionary since to refuse to f ix meaning 
is, in the end, to refuse God and his hypostases – reason, science, law’ (2002, 
p. 6). Such grandiloquence lends poststructuralist writings a remarkable 
sense of urgency, a feeling that just about everything is at stake, but it is not 
at all clear whether, or how, such statements are relevant to copyright law.
Post-structuralism’s strategic ambivalence
Part of the problem, then, is that poststructuralist works are inclined to 
point in many directions at the same time. Of course, scholars are under 
no obligation to adopt Barthes’ ideas wholesale; they may circumnavigate 
the philosophical context that ‘The Death of the Author’ emerged from and 
addressed, and pick up the ingredients that are relevant for their concerns. 
Still, even the parts that are most narrowly focused on literature are highly 
idiosyncratic and problematical to bring to bear on legal matters.
There are two related and vaguely formulated ideas in the essay that 
at a glance seem of relevance to copyright law. First, as Woodmansee and 
Jaszi note, Barthes inverts the conventional relation between author and 
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reader, as when he reasons that ‘a text’s unity lies not in its origin but in its 
destination’ (Barthes, 2002, p. 7) and they seem to regret that this message 
‘has gone unheard by intellectual property lawyers’ (Woodmansee and 
Jaszi, 1994, p. 8). I must admit, however, that I have no idea what it would 
mean for courts to take on board this idea.
As so often in the work of the poststructuralists, it is possible to follow 
Barthes’ suggestive observation down two very different paths. On the 
one hand, it seems to restate the, at least by now, rather commonplace 
notion that meaning is not simply found but made by the reader. On the 
other hand, and more speculatively, it is possible to relate it to the much 
more radical idea that the critic takes priority over the author, which is 
most explicitly formulated in Derrida’s deconstructive readings. Curiously, 
though, as Burke explains, this approach is not nearly as anti-authorial as 
is commonly presumed, and does not even heed the New Critical dictum 
to ignore intention on the ground that it is irrelevant and unknowable:
If authorial intentions are to be deconstructed it must be accepted that 
they are cardinally relevant and recognizable. The deconstructor must 
assume that he or she has the clearest conception of what the author 
wanted to say if the work of deconstruction is to get underway. The 
model of intention culled from the text must be especially conf ident 
and sharply def ined since the critic undertakes not only to reconstitute 
the intentional forces within the text, but also to assign their proper 
limits. It is only in terms of this reconstitution that the deconstructor 
can begin to separate that which belongs to authorial design from that 
which eludes or unsettles its prescriptions. Accordingly, deconstructive 
procedure takes the form of following the line of authorial intention up 
to the point at which it encountered resistance within the text itself: 
from this position the resistance can then be turned back against the 
author to show that his text differs from itself, that what he wished to 
say does not dominate what the text says, but is rather inscribed within 
(or in more radical cases, engulfed by) the larger signifying structure 
(Burke, 2008, p. 136).
Whichever path we take – the well-trodden one in which Barthes seems to 
merely aff irm ‘with supremely French intelligence, the pieties of English 101’ 
(Clairborne Park, 1990, p. 390), or the bolder one in which ‘the critic sets out 
to show that he or she is a better reader of the text than its author ever was’ 
(Burke, 2008, p. 137) – Barthes is making an argument about interpretation 
so far removed from the concerns of copyright as to be of no relevance.
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The other element of ‘Death of the Author’ that seems pertinent to 
intellectual property scholarship is the challenge it poses to the notion of 
originality. Barthes writes that ‘The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from 
the innumerable centres of culture’, and that ‘the writer can only imitate 
a gesture that is always anterior, never original’ (2002, p. 6). This observa-
tion too can be traced to either a highly orthodox or a highly unorthodox 
conclusion. On the one hand, it is often seen simply as the idea that all texts 
necessarily build on previous texts.9
This, however, makes ‘The Death of the Author’ just an esoteric para-
phrase of the old notion, long familiar, as we have seen, to critics as well 
as artists, that no one creates from nothing, that all art is derivative, that 
‘masterpieces are not single and solitary births [for] the experience of the 
mass is behind the single voice’, as Virginia Woolf put it.
Understood thus, post-structuralism offers nothing new, but merely 
obsesses over the opposite part of the originality paradox that McFarland 
described. Both extremes are equally flawed, and it seems inconceivable 
that anyone would seriously commit fully to one side of the equation. It is 
as absurd to deny that all authors draw on certain linguistic and generic 
resources that are not of their making as it is to reject the idea that some 
writers avail themselves of these assets more inventively than others.
But this commonsensical view is not – or not only – what Barthes has in 
mind. He takes it upon himself to promote a way of reading that endorses 
play and polyphony and resists closure. He proposes to attend to the surface 
of the text, to stop trying to plumb its depth, or to listen to the voice ‘behind’ 
it. To understand what is at stake, though, we must read ‘The Death of the 
Author’ in the context of other works by Barthes (which is itself testament 
to the indispensability of the traditional notion of authorship). For when 
Barthes deals with more experimental, non-representational avant-garde 
texts, he has no issue with authors or intentions: ‘If a text has been “unglued” 
from its referentiality, its author need not die; to the contrary, he can flourish 
[…] What Roland Barthes has been talking about all along is not the death 
of the author, but the closure of representation’ (Burke, 2008, p. 45).
Here we must keep in mind Barthes’ distinction between ‘work’ and 
‘text’. The former has substance and exists in physical space whereas the 
latter is ‘a methodological f ield’ (1979, p. 74), a space within which readers 
can themselves become writers. This comes easiest when we encounter 
challenging modernist literature, what Barthes calls writerly texts, which do 
not purport to be vehicles of referential meanings and authorial messages, as 
in the classical-realist novel, the prototypical example of Barthes’ so-called 
readerly text.
72 erlend lAvik 
The distinction between work and text is linked to the distinction be-
tween ‘author’ and ‘scriptor’. The former term corresponds to the traditional 
conception of the author as ‘the past of his own book: book and author 
stand automatically on a single line divided into a before and an after. The 
Author is thought to nourish the book, which is to say that he exists before 
it, thinks, suffers, lives for it, is in the same relation of antecedence to his 
work as a father to his child’ (Barthes, 2002, p. 5). The scriptor, by contrast, 
‘is born simultaneously with the text, is in no way equipped with a being 
preceding or exceeding the writing, is not the subject with the book as 
predicate; there is no other time than that of the enunciation and every 
text is eternally written here and now’ (ibid., p. 5).
The death of the author, then, obviously does not refer to an empirical 
fact. It is, as Burke notes, ‘a call to arms and not a funeral oration’ (2008, 
p. 27). Barthes urges us to approach literary works in a new way: We should 
seize the initiative as readers and not grant the biographical author mastery 
of the text. We should think of all of literature as one massive text, an 
interlinked fabric with threads to be traced in all directions, rather than 
some chronology of distinct works with precise meanings we can unearth 
one by one with the aid of each creator’s life and design.
This is a rather counterintuitive form of reading, however, and Peter 
Lamarque is surely right that it tends to be ‘more interesting, more demand-
ing, more rewarding for understanding, to consolidate meaning, to seek 
structure and coherence, to locate a work in a tradition or practice’, and 
that this preference ‘has nothing whatsoever to do with reinstating some 
bullying authoritarian author. But then that f igure was always just a f iction 
anyway’ (2002, p. 91).
Even if we grant that the approach to reading that Barthes advances might 
sometimes have its uses in a purely aesthetic context, it is surely diametrically 
opposed to the concerns of copyright law. After all, the active reader-writer’s 
effort to bring to light the plurality of texts within any one text are not bound 
by the protocols of empirical and historical investigation: ‘Intertextual analy-
sis is distinguished from source criticism both by its stress on interpretation 
rather than on the establishment of particular facts, and by its rejection of a 
unilinear causality (the concept of ‘influence’)’ (Frow, 1990, p. 46). To study an 
author on this view is to cast aside concerns about progress and development 
and rather traff ic freely between works: ‘No longer a forward march from 
fledgling texts to mature thought, the oeuvre becomes an arena or ellipse 
in which everything is rhapsodic, nothing sequential’ (Burke, 2008, p. 35).
Intellectual property requires precisely the mindset that ‘The Death 
of the Author’ wants to do away with, which sees authors as identif iable 
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historical beings and works as their more-or-less distinct creations. That 
basic premise does not mean that we swear allegiance to some supreme 
Romantic Author-God; there is plenty of room for us to worry about the 
inescapable porosity of terms like ‘author’ and ‘originality’. It is certainly 
possible to adopt a different optic in the aesthetic domain, to think of 
authors as scriptors and works as texts. It is not, however, a ‘theory’ that 
can be ‘implemented’ in the legal sphere, at least not in a way that would 
preserve copyright in even vaguely recognisable form.
Avant-garde theory
The reason poststructuralist theories of authorship have caused so much 
confusion is that they tend to blur the distinction between methodology 
and ontology. As Burke notes they ‘promote authorial absence as an inher-
ent property of discourse rather than as merely one approach amongst 
others to the problems of reading and interpretation’ (2008, p. 167). The 
argument of ‘The Death of the Author’ only makes sense if we think of it 
as something along the lines of a suggestion, an invitation, a manifesto, a 
strategic hypothesis, or speculative experiment, yet it is largely framed as 
a statement of fact. For example, Barthes writes assertively, as if he were 
announcing a philosophical breakthrough, that ‘We now know that a text 
is not a line of words releasing a single “theological” meaning (the “message” 
of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of 
writings, none of them original, blend and clash’ (2002, p. 6), that ‘it is 
language which speaks, not the author’ (ibid., p. 4), and that ‘a text’s unity 
lies not in its origin but in its destination’ (ibid., p. 7). Burke is right, however, 
that ‘the decision as to whether we read a text with or without an author 
remains an act of critical choice governed by the protocols of a certain way 
of reading rather than any “truth of writing”’ (2008, p. 169).
Copyright law’s utilitarian function means that ‘ought’ and ‘is’ are 
reasonably distinct most of the time, and we can bring either dimension 
into sharp focus: First, we can adopt a normative perspective, and reflect 
on what copyright’s primary purpose(s) should be, or on the fairness or 
effectiveness of a certain provision. Alternatively, we can look at it simply 
as what is. From this point of view, to analyse copyright is to consider what 
is and is not allowed, which is to say that it corresponds to the mindset of a 
lawyer in court, or any citizen charged with some infringement. ‘The Death 
of the Author’, by contrast, merges the two perspectives. As Lamarque 
notes, it ‘can be read either as a statement of fact or as wishful thinking’ 
and ‘waver[s] on the question of description and prescription’ (2002, p. 83).
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Post-structuralism is an especially boundary-breaking approach, a kind 
of avant-garde theory that seeks to challenge received wisdoms, push ideas 
to their limit, and transcend disciplinary conventions and distinctions. 
Often it interrogates even the distinction between scholarly and artistic 
practices. This is particularly evident in the case of ‘The Death of the Author’, 
as it f irst appeared in Aspen, an American multimedia art and lifestyle 
magazine published irregularly from 1965 to 1971.10 The double issue in 
which Barthes’ essay appeared was edited by the conceptual artist Brian 
O’Doherty11 and was distributed to some 20,000 subscribers in the form of 
a white box containing 28 items. Among them were experimental super 8 
f ilms by Hans Richter and Robert Rauschenberg, phonograph recordings of 
William S. Burroughs and Alain Robbe-Grillet, a conceptual poem by Dan 
Graham, and a musical score by John Cage on transparent sheets with dots 
and lines that could be rotated over a piece of graph paper so as to enable 
different performances of ‘the same’ work.
It is this avant-garde impulse which makes it so hard to pin down Barthes’ 
writings, to f ind in them a stable and coherent argument. In ‘The Death 
of the Author’ and related works the scriptor seeks to ‘perform’ what he 
preaches, to create a writerly text that eludes closure, that undermines its 
own status as authorial and authoritative communiqué. As Dale Townshend 
(1998) has shown, in his increasingly experimental efforts Barthes would 
go on to tirelessly rename the central distinction between work and text 
in metaphorical and ambiguous ways. His writings, individually and col-
lectively, are like puzzles with too many pieces; the reader is free to assemble 
them in multiple ways, but there is always something left over.
A pragmatist perspective
‘The Death of the Author’ is an extreme example, of course, but it serves 
to bring out with particular force a more general point about analyses 
of authorship and works of authorship in the humanities, namely their 
penchant for addressing multiple issues at once. Even far more conventional 
and less intellectually ambitious efforts than those of the poststructural-
ists tend to engage multiple and overlapping perspectives simultaneously, 
to blend – explicitly or implicitly – descriptive, analytical, philosophical, 
evaluative, political, ideological, ethical, historical, or biographical ques-
tions and discourses. Their relevance to copyright law, however, is simply 
off the radar.
By far the most dominant authorship issue in the humanities is the role of 
the author in hermeneutics: Does the creator’s life and/or intention provide 
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a privileged point of access to what the work is up to? Does it determine 
what the text ‘really’ means, or at least impose certain constraints on what 
it can say, or is it of no consequence at all? Is textual coherence a function 
of intrinsic properties or something readers impose? Does it invalidate the 
work if the author fails to achieve his or her intention? Is it not the case that 
there is always more in the text than what its author had in mind? And is the 
author’s intent even accessible to us, or even to him- or herself in the f irst 
place? Such questions – and the above are only the tip of the iceberg – are 
mostly wholly irrelevant to copyright law, but I want to argue that certain 
similar inquiries can be made relevant. First, however, we need to realise 
that they are futile absent of some human interest, goal, or preference.
Often these theoretical explorations rest – sometimes knowingly; some-
times, I suspect, unknowingly – on more specif ic questions, usually ‘What 
is the proper (or most rewarding) function of criticism?’, though also ‘What 
is art (or literature, or f ilm, or drama)?’, that remain unexposed. This is to 
clothe a matter of opinion in the garments of ontology (which by and large 
is what Barthes does in ‘The Death of the Author’). When no such context 
is present even as an undercurrent scholars seek to locate an essence where 
there is none.
It is not just that authorial practices and products, as well as the herme-
neutic exercises they engender, are far too varied to bring under a general 
description (though that alone should be enough to put us off the effort). 
More importantly, the questions about authorship and interpretation that 
scholars in the arts typically pursue cannot be answered in the abstract, 
for the phenomena do not possess some immutable essence. Here I am 
heavily indebted to Richard Rorty’s neopragmatist philosophy, which sees 
language as analogous to a set of tools, and knowledge not as a matter of 
getting reality right, but of acquiring habits of action for coping with reality 
(1991, p. 1). While often accused of relativism, Rorty’s ideas are more properly 
understood as anti-essentialist. He does not deny that the world and its 
phenomena can cause us to hold beliefs, only that it cannot suggest beliefs 
for us to hold. Objects and practices do not insist on being described in a 
certain way, their own way (ibid., p. 83). This does not mean that we are free 
to say or believe anything we like, for what we say and believe must still add 
up – nonsense is still nonsense, and stands little chance of being adopted 
by others unless it carries persuasive force, i.e. unless it chimes with related 
beliefs and can be shown to be useful for some purpose.
Consequently, pragmatism itself does not provide any predef ined an-
swers to diff icult problems; it is therapeutic rather than programmatic. It 
makes the inclination to think of language as a mirror of an antecedently 
76 erlend lAvik 
determined reality loosen its grip, and helps us to stop asking questions that 
lead down blind alleys. It is not that dead-end investigations are devoid of 
meaning; even the endeavour to identify the true nature of interpretation 
has meaning ‘if you give it one. To give meaning to an expression, all you 
have to do is use it in a more or less predictable manner – situate it within 
a network of predictable inferences’ (Rorty 2007, p. 34). Rather, the sense in 
which such debates are meaningless is that they have no bearing on practice 
except by reference to some human interest.
Whether or not to bracket the author’s intention is not an issue that can 
be settled philosophically. It is not just that some are persuaded by Barthes’ 
assassination attempt while others are uncomfortable with it12, or that some 
approve of the kind of overreading that thinkers like Derrida, Deleuze, 
and Zizek engage in, which wilfully and flagrantly exceed the meanings 
supported either by the text or its author, while others f ind it silly.13 It is also 
that it is virtually impossible to remain faithful to one’s philosophical ideas 
about authorship on the ground, in practical criticism. To insist that the 
author’s intention is always irrelevant is to deprive criticism of a potentially 
valuable resource; to insist that it is paramount all the time is to treat the 
text as a kind of code to be deciphered that is sure to produce barren read-
ings. In practice, no one sticks to a single ‘theory of authorship’. Even the 
staunchest anti-auteurists tend to drop their guard when they move from 
philosophy to criticism. They mostly write about canonised authors and, 
as Colin Davis has shown, frequently regard them ‘as prestigious individual 
thinkers with opinions and intentions. In other words they are authors in 
a quite old-fashioned sense […] The basic principle is: if it helps, use it; if it 
doesn’t help, a discreet veil may be drawn over it’ (2010, p. 182).
I am not suggesting that metaphysical debates about authorship have 
had no consequences whatsoever; no doubt a text such as ‘The Death of 
the Author’ has inspired many critics to produce bolder interpretations of 
poems and novels than they would have done had they never read it. But 
that, I want to argue, is because they have been persuaded by the profits of 
reading without the author, not because Barthes disclosed the true nature 
of authorship or interpretation. The phenomena ‘in themselves’ will not 
recommend the appropriate approach for us; that only emerges when we 
put them to use for some purpose.
This can be hard to see, however, for scholars interpret works of author-
ship for a remarkable variety of reasons, and usually for several reasons at 
the same time, and they are not necessarily fully present or fully articulated 
either in the analysis or even in the mind of the hermenut. Some might 
read a text for coherence and persuasion, others to see what it can yield, by 
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any means, philosophically; some analyses are aimed at understanding or 
historical contextualisation, others serve as ideological or political interven-
tions. Indeed, the term ‘purpose’ frequently sounds too crude to describe 
what motivates aesthetic investigations; their motivation may be highly 
elusive – to somehow enrich experience or provoke ref lection, say – in 
which case it may be more appropriate to talk of ‘interest’ or ‘predilection’. 
Of course, a philosophical or theoretical superstructure may inform a given 
reading. The point is that philosophy and theory may provide traction for 
some purpose, but it cannot select a purpose for us by granting access to 
how the phenomena themselves really are, or really want to be or ought to 
be described and employed.
Lessons
Now, what can all of this tell us about the role of aesthetics in copyright 
law? First, and most generally, it serves to illustrate just how hugely chal-
lenging it is to ‘apply’ aesthetic concepts and theories in the legal domain, 
for the endeavour requires of those who undertake it to master two highly 
complex and specialised language games. ‘The Death of the Author’ is a 
particularly enlightening example of the confusion that may ensue, because 
it is particularly obscure about its intentions. It offers itself as a kind of 
general theory of authorship but is, I believe, much more like a lobbying 
effort for one approach to, or perspective on, authorship, interpretation, 
and literature.
I think legal scholars realise more clearly than their colleagues in the 
humanities that their concepts of authorship and originality are contingent, 
for they are more obviously constrained by utility and compromise. They 
look, it seems, at the more sophisticated and intricate explorations that 
take place in humanities departments, and become tempted to indulge 
in the f iction that the philosophical-theoretical dissections there might 
allow them to get in touch with the true nature of the concepts they have 
in common. They read Barthes and take from his concept of intertextuality 
that all works build on previous works, not realising that they have in the 
process adapted it to their own purposes (which are rather different from 
those Barthes had in mind), and end up restating what they already knew 
in more esoteric terms.
This brings us to the second, more specif ic and interesting point for the 
present discussion about how the humanities may be of use to copyright 
scholars: We need to recognise that philosophy and aesthetics will not pro-
vide courts with the means to ground law or legal decisions in foundational 
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principles uncorrupted by historical context or human interests. To be sure, 
one does not have to subscribe to Rorty’s pragmatism to reject the notion 
that there is some magical metaphysical algorithm that may disclose the 
way phenomena are ‘in themselves’. But this approach pushes further the 
idea that we should think of concepts as tools for particular purposes, and 
that to start with philosophy – with, for example, the theories of Locke, 
Kant, and Hegel, to name three thinkers frequently cited by copyright 
scholars – is to put the cart before the horse. The more specif ic problem 
with aesthetic concepts and theories is that they are not designed to resolve 
legal issues in the f irst place. They gravitate towards interpretation and 
evaluation, and are generally better at putting things in question than at 
asking ‘What’s the problem?’ If they are to be of any use outside of their own 
domain, that is precisely where the inquiry should begin: Only by asking 
‘How may this or that concept or approach serve this exact legal purpose?’ 
can we begin to say something meaningful about the role of aesthetics in 
copyright law. This means that it is important to be clear about the purposes 
of copyright. For example, if we think it is to reward those who deserve it 
the most through their creative contribution, it would make sense to look 
to sociological or anthropological studies of f ilm, television, music, and 
theatre production.
But what about aesthetic concepts and theories? Is it at all possible 
to align their disciplinary purposes with the purposes of copyright law, 
given that courts expressly and deliberately seek to refrain from artistic 
interpretation and evaluation? In fact, while there are weighty reasons why 
we should not make it the business of judges to rule on the meaning or merit 
of works of authorship, I want to argue that aesthetics has most to offer 
legal scholarship precisely as a set of hermeneutic and evaluative tools, but 
only on the precondition that we take the purpose (or at least a purpose) of 
copyright law to be something like the facilitation of cultural f lourishing.
An enormous amount of legal scholarship already draws on work in aes-
thetics to argue that some form of borrowing is both inescapable and more 
historically prevalent than we tend to assume. Such studies are eminently 
sensible and highly valuable, but it seems to me that the humanities f irst and 
foremost helps legal scholars come up with ever more examples of a general 
observation that by now is quite uncontroversial, and that is in fact already 
clearly recognised by copyright law. Different national legal frameworks 
take various measures to safeguard the public domain, for example by striv-
ing to separate ideas and expression (and only granting protection to the 
latter), through concepts such as scene a faire, or by creating exceptions for 
parody and criticism. It is precisely because it would constrain the creative 
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efforts of subsequent creators that such things as genres, styles, and stock 
characters are non-protectable.
The cumulative nature of cultural creation is a crucial point that is impor-
tant to keep pressing, but unfortunately the problem is not that this is some 
insight that judges have failed to grasp and simply need to be reminded 
of.14 Being or becoming aware of intricate connections between works 
of authorship does not in itself suggest some better solution. I am afraid 
that humanities scholars are unlikely to have anything in their toolbox 
that would improve the situation. No doubt, philosophers could call into 
question the distinction between ideas and expression in impressively 
sophisticated ways, and literary scholars could easily demonstrate how 
awkward it is to tell lawful uses of routine story elements from the unlawful 
copying of original plot instantiations. This, however, is not the problem; 
rather, it is to come up with more effective concepts, definitions and distinc-
tions for the purposes of copyright law. Sadly, those that humanities have 
devised for themselves are not designed to separate copyrightable from 
non-copyrightable subject-matter, or legitimate from illegitimate uses of 
existing works of authorship.
Take, once more, the poststructuralist notion of intertextuality. While 
it very much defies any easy summary, we might say that what makes it 
something more than just a cryptic paraphrase of the old truism that all 
works build on previous works is its insistence that this holds true even 
when we are completely unaware of it. The fact that some particular text 
took inspiration from, or alludes to, some other particular text, or that 
it belongs to and draws on certain generic conventions is too trivial to 
merit attention, and is why it is so important for its theorists to distinguish 
intertextuality from the study of sources, inf luences, and biographical 
details. Instead, the idea is that everything is intertextual, even the very 
building blocks of language. Thus, at the beginning of ‘The Death of the 
Author’ Barthes quotes a line from Balzac’s short story Sarrasine describing 
a castrato disguised as a woman: ‘This was woman herself, with her sudden 
fears, her irrational whims, her instinctive worries, her impetuous boldness, 
her fussings, and her delicious sensibility’ (2002, p. 3). As Graham Allen 
observes, when Barthes goes on to ask ‘Who is speaking thus?’, his point is 
that Balzac’s sentence ‘does not express a single meaning stemming from 
an originary author; rather, it leads the reader into a network of possible 
discourses and seems to emanate from a number of possible perspectives’ 
(2000, p. 13). The text itself does not determine who speaks, Barthes argues, 
for it is conceivably either the thoughts of the protagonist, unaware that 
the woman is really a castrato; the philosophy of Balzac the author; or a 
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universal wisdom concerning women. Indeed, the single word ‘sensibility’ 
extends to numerous intertextual discourses beyond authorial intention; it 
can relate ‘to psychology, eighteenth-century medical discourses, notions of 
Romantic love, of ethical and social concerns, ideological commitments and 
conflicts, literary conventions such as the novel of sentiment and sensibility 
and so on’ (Allen, 2000, p. 13).
Similarly, Julia Kristeva, who coined the term intertextuality, argues 
that all texts are made up of what she calls the social text, which consists 
of pre-existing ways of speaking and thinking. As Allen argues, her point is 
that language always already embodies social struggles over the meaning of 
words: ‘If a novelist, for example, uses the words “natural” or “artif icial” or 
“God” or “justice” they cannot help but incorporate into their novel society’s 
conflict over the meaning of these words. Such words and utterances retain 
an “otherness” within the text itself’ (2000, p. 36).
The only signif icant distinction that emerges from these ideas runs 
between ‘conventional’ texts and the kind of avant-garde texts that Kristeva 
and Barthes champion: experimental writings that are self-conscious about 
their own intertextuality, that foreground their own non-originality, that 
so-to-say strive to think outside of ordinary language (which is one reason 
their own texts burst at the seams with neologisms). I have no idea, however, 
how the notion that the vast majority of texts reverberate with meanings 
outside of themselves can serve any meaningful purpose in copyright law.
Aesthetic evaluation in law: pastiche and parody
Again, the poststructuralist perspective on authorship and originality is 
extreme and much disputed. Often intertextuality is understood more 
restrictively, as a catch-all term for the more direct ways in which texts 
commonly interact with each other. Some terms are mostly descriptive, like 
quotation, collage, sampling, adaptation, and rewriting; others are more 
expressive, like homage, satire, pastiche, and plagiarism. These latter terms 
are more likely to be of use in copyright law, for they suggest something 
about the character and purpose of one work’s appropriation or evocation 
of some other work or works. Indeed, several of them are listed explicitly 
in various legal frameworks under the rubric of exceptions and limitation. 
I believe they are of great value to copyright law, but primarily for their 
ability to shed light on the kinds of practices that are worthy of protection 
rather than for their ability to provide clear guidelines on how to protect 
them.
I want to clarify my reasoning by commenting upon a specific suggestion 
that I f ind useful, partly because it makes some enlightening observations, 
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and partly for the ways in which I believe it is somewhat misguided. In 
‘“Po-mo Karaoke” or Postcolonial Pastiche’ Zahr Said Stauffer discusses 
the case of Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Muffin (2001) in which author Alice 
Randall’s The Wind Done Gone, a rewriting of Margaret Mitchell’s famous 
novel Gone With The Wind from the slaves’ point of view, was found to be 
parodic and hence fair use. Stauffer’s conclusion is that the court’s f inding of 
fair use was correct, but that the reasoning behind the decision was wrong, 
as The Wind Done Gone is not really a parody. To classify it as such ‘puts too 
much pressure on both legal and literary def initions of parody, and risks 
diffusing the category beyond recognition’ (2007–2008, p. 44).
I f ind these observations convincing, and Stauffer provides a detailed 
and astute analysis of Randall’s work in which she argues that the novel’s 
value emerges more clearly and persuasively through the lens of postco-
lonial literary studies. From this perspective, The Wind Done Gone can be 
seen to belong to a tradition that seeks to ‘control the direction of cultural 
representations in the future and to correct those representations deemed 
to be tarnishing or misrepresenting the past […], to take the dominant 
f igure’s language and use it, verbatim, in a context that channels power 
back to the previously oppressed f igure’ (ibid., p. 68).
This is clearly a hermeneutic argument, but at the infringement stage 
courts frequently engage in both evaluation and interpretation already. For 
example, in the case of Geva v. Walt Disney (1993), concerning an alleged 
parody of Donald Duck, the Israeli Supreme Court found the appropriation ‘ 
“attractive and funny” rather than producing “artistic-satiric value” ’ (quoted 
in Bently, 2008b, p. 371). In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc. (1994) concern-
ing a rap parody of Roy Orbison’s Oh, Pretty Woman, the US Supreme Court 
observed that ‘[the defendant] 2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings 
of a man whose fantasy comes true, with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand 
for sex, and a sigh of relief from parental responsibility. The later words can 
be taken as a comment on the naivety of the original of an earlier day, as 
a rejection of its sentiment that ignores the ugliness of street life and the 
debasement that it signif ies’ (ibid., p. 381). This is clearly an interpretation 
of the work, and would not look out of place in an academic humanities 
journal.
Indeed, merely categorising a work as parody (or satire or homage, for that 
matter) inevitably comprises some measure of interpretation. It is not like 
f inding that a poem is composed in iambic pentameter or follows a certain 
rhyming pattern, for it involves making a conjecture about what the text is 
up to, and why. Sometimes this is entirely straightforward, in which case 
it will seem that we are simply understanding what is clearly there. Other 
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times a parody will be more subtle or ambivalent, and thus not lend itself 
so easily to intersubjective agreement. Then we must spell out what we 
believe the work takes aim at, how it goes about it, and to what purpose, in 
which case we are more obviously making an interpretation (it is this kind 
of account of non-obvious meaning the court made in the Campbell case).
The purportedly more objective alternative is to focus on quantitative 
overlaps between the original and the allegedly infringing work. How-
ever, this does not rule out either uncertainty or subjectivity, for so-called 
‘substantial similarity’ cannot always be measured precisely, especially 
when we are dealing with complex, multidimensional works like f ilms 
or plays. More importantly, Stauffer’s analysis convincingly argues that 
The Wind Done Gone’s critique of Mitchell’s classic novel, and of a more 
widespread tendency in US culture to marginalise African-American 
voices and perspectives, rests not just on the borrowing (and subsequent 
recontextualisation) of signif icant parts of the underlying work’s setting, 
characters and story, but also of pieces of dialogue, i.e. of its protectable 
expression.
I am not quite as worried as Stauffer, however, that judges are ‘trying 
to reinvent the literary wheel’ (2007–2008, p. 47), for ‘producing their own 
literary criticism’ (ibid., p. 48), for creating ‘their own sometimes procru-
stean literary categories’ (ibid., p. 50), and for ‘using idiosyncratic terms and 
tools’ (ibid., p. 52). She provides two examples of this. First, she claims that 
copyright law draws a non-literary distinction between parody and satire 
(ibid., p. 44). She points out that: ‘According to Campbell, parody targets an 
underlying work, whereas satire targets something broader than a single 
work, like an institution, a society, or an era’ (ibid., p. 45). This, however, 
is pretty much how the terms are commonly used in aesthetics as well. 
Admittedly, a parody does not have to target a specif ic underlying work; it 
is possible to parody some aspect of a genre, for example, without invoking 
any individual work in particular, but such cases are unlikely to raise any 
legal issues since no recognisable work is being infringed upon.
Stauffer notes that Campbell did not actually specify how much latitude, 
if any, satires should receive under copyright’s fair use analysis (ibid., p. 45), 
but even though Justice Souter ‘may not have intended to draw a sharp line 
between parody as non-infringing and satire as infringing, courts have 
tended to interpret Campbell in those stark – and somewhat illogical – 
terms’ (ibid., p. 46). The problem, then, is not so much that US judges have 
failed to def ine parody and satire properly, but rather that they have failed 
to take into account that works sometimes borrow from other works for 
satirical purposes, and that some such borrowings may be socially valu-
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able and so ought to be considered non-infringing. This is most obviously 
the case when we are dealing with very famous works that have become 
common frames of reference (like Gone With the Wind), where a critique of 
the underlying work serves as a critique of what it represents more broadly 
(like softening the cruelty of slavery, or keeping a lid on the perspectives 
of the oppressed).15
Stauffer mentions a second example in passing, the (legal) concept of 
transformative use,16 which is ‘based not on any literary criticism as such, 
but on the work of another judge’ (ibid., p. 52). But as we have seen, critics 
and creators have long appreciated that it is necessary to draw on previous 
works, sometimes quite explicitly, and that the purpose of such borrowing is 
not merely to take what is valuable from another author’s work, but to alter 
it, make it one’s own. A good example is T.S. Eliot’s famous observation that 
‘Immature poets imitate; mature poets steal; bad poets deface what they 
take, and good poets make it into something better, or at least something 
different’ (quoted in Julius, 1995, p. 130). Thus even though transformative 
use is not a literary term, it is derived from, or at least consonant with, a vital 
and widely held belief in literary studies, and hence a successful instance 
of a reinvention of the literary wheel for legal purposes.
Stauffer also suggests that pastiche would serve as a better umbrella 
term than parody, because the distinction between parody and satire is 
imprecise and subjective. She is no doubt right that these terms are fuzzy 
at the borders, and that they sometimes converge, but I f ind it unlikely that 
pastiche is ‘much easier to recognise’, as Stauffer claims (2007–2008, p. 82). 
She def ines it as a mixture of contradictory and unorthodox elements, 
styles, or modes, which does not necessarily seek to mock or criticise. 
However, because it is so loosely def ined (it can be applied to any mélange 
of styles) and not tied to any specif ic purpose (it can be either honorif ic or 
iconoclastic, but most typically the former) pastiche is in fact a far more 
elusive concept than parody.
Moreover, I do not think it is entirely accurate to say, as Stauffer does, that 
‘Pastiche is understood to be imitative at its core, but towards transforma-
tive ends’ (ibid., p. 83). In probably the most well-known account of pastiche, 
Fredric Jameson distinguishes it from parody precisely by reference to its 
lack of transformativeness and critical bite:
Pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a peculiar or unique, idiosyncratic 
style, the wearing of a linguistic mask, speech in a dead language. But 
it is a neutral practice of such mimicry, without any of parody’s ulterior 
84 erlend lAvik 
motives, amputated of the satiric impulse, devoid of laughter. Pastiche is 
thus blank parody, a statue with blind eyeballs (1991, p. 17).
Thus for Jameson pastiche is characterised precisely by its failure to alter 
that which it borrows. It is ‘the random cannibalization of all the styles of 
the past, the play of random stylistic allusion’ (ibid., p. 18).17 So even though 
pastiche tends to invoke past texts to celebrate them, the practice itself is 
not universally celebrated in aesthetics. Indeed, in her historical study of 
pastiche, Ingeborg Hoestery writes that it has been, and continues to be, 
used in a ‘predominantly negative sense’ (2001: ix). This somewhat blunts 
Stauffer’s claim that one reason pastiche is a more appropriate term than 
parody in copyright law is that it provides secondary authors ‘a way to argue 
that their uses were contributing to a recognised body of art’ (2007–2008, 
pp. 85–86).
Of course, there are more positive accounts of postmodernism’s playful 
recycling of past texts as well, and I agree with Linda Hutcheon that it can 
serve as a form of critique. The point is not, then, that Stauffer gets it wrong, 
and that parody is really the better umbrella term after all. Rather, it is that 
there is no need for an aesthetic umbrella term in the f irst place. Parody is 
useful because it typically identif ies clearly critical and transformative uses 
of an underlying work or works; however, it is too narrow to accommodate 
all critical and transformative uses. Pastiche is useful because it draws 
attention to more subtle and non-comedic transformations; however, it is 
too broad in that the label encompasses non-transformative uses as well.
Stauffer too acknowledges this when she writes:
‘Qualifying as pastiche would not give secondary works a free pass 
to copy, just as parodies do not automatically qualify for fair use’s af-
f irmative defence […]18 Unlike parody, pastiche may be merely imitative 
without ridiculing or criticizing, and it may be imitative without being 
transformative. Importantly, then, a pastiche would need to meet Camp-
bell’s transformative use test just as parody does now. Merely recycling 
clips or extended passages from underlying works would not qualify as 
fair use’ (ibid., p. 85).
I agree with Stauffer’s implication that the term pastiche in itself does not 
provide any resolution in copyright infringement cases. It is interesting, 
however, that the key criterion in her account too is the non-literary concept 
of transformative use. To my mind this shows that there is no need to pit 
parody against pastiche in order to f ind out which is ‘better’, for the only 
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umbrella term we have use for is the judge-made one. ‘Transformative use’ 
is better suited to draw a distinction between infringing and non-infringing 
borrowings than either parody or pastiche. It has the potential to do all the 
work we require of it to serve copyright’s purpose of facilitating cultural 
flourishing. If US courts have come to equate transformative use exclusively 
with parody, then the problem is that it is being understood and used too 
narrowly. Courts should be open to the possibility that a range of cultural 
appropriations – including parody and pastiche – can be transformative 
and culturally and artistically valuable. This is where aesthetics can be of 
service. It can help f ill the concept of transformative use with meaningful 
content; it can maintain a conversation about, and provide perspectives on, 
what constitutes cultural f lourishing, and hence what is worthy of a fair 
use defence. In Europe, which has no real equivalent to fair use, aesthetics 
can serve to demonstrate the value of a broader and more flexible range of 
exceptions and limitations.
From theories to practical skills
The broader point to take from this is that aesthetics would seem to be better 
equipped to offer insights on copyright’s ends than they are to supply the 
means by which to reach them. Of course, this conclusion merely restates 
the perennial problem of the humanities, namely that any prospective 
effects are likely to be long-term and indirect. Is there some way to make 
them more immediate and hands-on? I believe there is, if we accept the two 
premises this article has promoted: f irst, that copyright is supposed to foster 
creativity (also for secondary authors); and second, that in infringement 
cases courts already engage in evaluation and interpretation (or that they 
should, for this is one area of copyright law in which it is worth sacrif icing 
quasi-objective criteria in the name of cultural policy).
However, we should not expect aesthetics to possess cut and dried tools 
for legal analysis. What scholars of art and popular culture could bring to 
the table is not so much existing terms and theories as a more broad-based 
and eclectic expertise in recognising, and providing arguments for, cultural 
and artistic value. It is by putting this competence to work on actual legal 
problems that truly useful concepts, def initions, and distinctions might 
eventually emerge. It would be a worthwhile undertaking to get literary 
scholars, f ilm scholars, art historians and so on to grapple with a broad 
range of examples of cultural borrowings that raise tricky questions in 
copyright law. They would have to work closely with legal scholars, who 
would contribute in two main ways. First, they could identify relevant case 
law. It would be useful to examine closely and systematically what kinds of 
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works and issues have typically been brought before the court, what decision 
judges have come to, and how they have reasoned. Copyright experts also 
often express regret that some particularly interesting case has been settled 
out of court, and such specimens would also be indispensable objects of 
analysis. In addition, both sets of scholars are undoubtedly aware of new 
types of works and practices, like fan f iction or amateur remixes, that raise 
thorny legal issues, or call into question current terms and distinctions. 
Together, they could offer informed analyses that would shed light on dif-
f icult limit cases.
This brings us to the second contribution that legal scholars would make, 
namely to clarify the legal context within which the investigation of value 
takes place. Practical matters of law must actively shape the hermeneutic 
and evaluative input. It is by taking into account factors that literary schol-
ars rarely need to reflect thoroughly upon – such as freedom of speech, 
the commercial intent of secondary works (another factor in US fair use 
analysis) and the moral rights of the f irst author (especially the rights of 
paternity and integrity) – that aesthetic know-how would be disciplined, 
and made to serve legal purposes specif ically.
There is no guarantee of success, of course, but I believe we are much 
more likely to achieve genuine results if we stop looking for ways in which 
current terms and theories in aesthetics, no matter how suggestive, might 
have some relevance in copyright law, and rather seek to exploit the general 
competences of humanities scholars. Their sense of the history of different 
art forms and artistic practices, and their sensitivity towards, and ways of 
thinking about, social and artistic value must be confronted specif ically 
with the kinds of works that de facto pose problems in copyright law, as 
well as with the full range of legal considerations relevant to the analysis. 
Only then might new definitions and distinctions emerge that are actually 
of any use to copyright.
It is not at all certain, however, that the most valuable contribution of 
such a project is terminological. Infringement analysis is simply too complex 
to tolerate much conceptual exactitude and f ixed procedures. It is possible, 
of course, to impose a fair degree of precision and predictability. Hypotheti-
cally, courts could decide that all secondary works that are commercial in 
nature are infringing, or that secondary works must explicitly credit each 
and every author they borrow from, or that authors are only allowed to 
reproduce some specif ic amount from another work. This would still not 
make the analysis entirely objective – for example, it might not always be 
clear-cut whether or not a work is commercial – but more importantly, 
such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. The US fair use 
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system seems to me to have a sensible amount of f lexibility within certain 
guidelines. European copyright scholars also seem to think so, as their calls 
for a more flexible system of limitations and exemptions in EU copyright law 
often refer to fair use US style (Hugenholtz, 2013, Senftleben & Hugenholtz, 
2011). Analysis should proceed on a case-by-case basis, and precision and 
predictability should come into view gradually as we amass ever more 
good decisions.
Aesthetics can throw light on what makes a decision good, and provide 
the most informed arguments available about why various forms of bor-
rowings are worthy or unworthy of legal protection. Bright-line rules and 
tests are frequently inadequate; good policy sometimes entails evaluation 
and interpretation, or taking into account the reputation of the author, 
or the cultural standing of the underlying work. I have no illusions that 
involving experts in art and popular culture is going to make the task any 
easier. I do think, however, that copyright is a matter of cultural policy, and 
never more so than in the area of exceptions and limitations (whether they 
are called fair use, fair dealing, the right to quote, or something else). I do 
not think decisions in this extremely tricky region of copyright law should 
take the form of extrapolations from strict def initions and distinctions, 
but be guided by f lexible umbrella concepts like ‘transformative use’ or 
‘critical purpose’.
No one is better suited to f ill these terms with meaningful content than 
critics, historians, and theorists of art. Here the purposes of aesthetics and 
copyright law are perfectly congruent, yet the means by which they habitu-
ally explore the critical and transformative functions of works of authorship 
differ because they operate in different contexts, the main difference being 
that the legal one is far more pragmatic, more epistemologically restricted. 
It is typically only when they are called upon as expert witnesses in specif ic 
cases that humanities scholars are brought into contact with legal perspec-
tives on the works they study. Such random one-off encounters tend to 
be of limited value because experts in aesthetics are unfamiliar with the 
intricacies of copyright law. To truly make a contribution they would have 
to be familiar with a range of diff icult cases as well as the legal context 
within which infringement analysis takes place. That is when their relevant 
competence is geared towards legal purposes.
What I am suggesting, then, is that copyright law should not think of 
aesthetics as some reservoir of terms and theories that may, with a little 
tweaking, prove useful, but rather as a set of practical skills. In other words, 
I believe the input of humanities scholars should be less top-down and more 
bottom-up, less a matter of philosophy than of know-how.
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The current uncertainty about what borrowings and appropriations 
courts actually allow is deplorable. The problem is not that copyright law 
has failed to shore up its definitions and distinctions properly, however, but 
rather a shortage of legal decisions. An interdisciplinary research project 
involving both aesthetic and legal scholars might improve this sad state 
of affairs somewhat by making public pronouncements on the legality 
or illegality of as many relevant works of authorship as possible. While 
their f indings would not be legally binding, it would be beneficial to have 
a catalogue of expert opinions about how copyright law ought to give 
substance to concepts like ‘transformative use’ and ‘critical purpose’. Of 
course, interpretation and evaluation in aesthetics is notoriously anarchic 
and inscrutable, but relating it explicitly and methodically to the needs and 
practices of copyright law should curb obvious excesses.
Maintaining a conversation about the transformative and critical func-
tions of works of art is a fairly accurate description of what many academics 
in the humanities do every day. As Jaszi notes, this conversation probably 
already shapes legal attitudes. I remain sceptical of his analysis that the two 
famous infringement cases involving Jeff Koons – the court rejected his fair 
use defence in 1992, but found a similar work transformative in 2006 – tells 
us very much about the wellbeing of the Romantic author; it is possible, 
however, that the reversal owes a little something to the efforts of critics 
to validate postmodern art in the intervening years. The problem is that 
we do not really know. The aesthetic conversation could inform copyright 
law more directly. In my opinion, the common ground between law and the 
humanities is f irmer at the level of hermeneutic craftsmanship than at the 
level of theory. Keeping their shared interest in cultural value apart on the 
grounds that one is objective and the other subjective deprives copyright 
law of a valuable resource and obscures the utility of aesthetics.
Notes
1. The struggle over Romantic authorship has been far more pronounced in 
the US. In Europe copyright expansion has generally not been explained by 
reference to the ideology of Romantic authorship, though there has been 
resistance to the Romantic rhetoric that stakeholders frequently resort to, 
especially the media, film, and publishing industries. The greater disincli-
nation in Europe to see Romantic authorship as a root cause of copyright 
expansion is somewhat paradoxical in light of continental jurisprudence’s 
insistence that works of authorship are expressions of their creators’ per-
sonality. On the other hand, as we will see, this argument is often derived 
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from deconstructive ideas, which had a far more profound and lasting 
impact in US universities. 
2. Peter Jaszi writes that ‘On the whole, the full-blown Romantic conception 
of “authorship” has a continuing grip on the legal imagination’ (1991, p. 463); 
Margareth Cohn that ‘the construct of the romantic author still very much 
influences copyright authorship’ (2012, p. 830); Martha Woodmansee that 
‘In contemporary usage an author is an individual who is solely responsi-
ble – and therefore exclusively deserving of credit – for the production of a 
unique work’ (1984, p. 426); and Elton Fukumoto that ‘Copyright law seems 
to depend upon this Romantic conception [as] the statute makes original-
ity a requirement for protection and imbues authorship with the ideology 
of Romanticism’ (1997, pp. 907–908). See also Woodmansee and Jaszi (1994 
and 1995); Boyle (1996).
3. Bracha too mentions this: ‘There is probably no more striking example of 
how far modern copyright law travelled from its supposed grounding in 
romantic authorship’ (2008, p. 249).
4. Mark Rose provides a similarly caricatured description of copyright 
when he writes that it is ‘an institution built on intellectual quicksand: 
the essentially religious concept of originality, the notion that certain 
extraordinary beings called authors conjure works out of thin air’ (1993, 
p. 142).
5. I do not have any particular originality criterion in mind as they are fairly 
similar both across different national legal frameworks and international 
treaties. As Elisabeth F. Judge points out, ‘originality standards are more 
properly understood as constellations, rather than silos, where the surface 
differences in wording mask similarities in both concepts and results’ (2009, 
p. 403). Generally, the legal criteria are that a work must reflect an author’s 
intellectual creation, display a modicum of creativity, and originate from 
the author (ibid., p. 404).
6. See Lavik and Van Gompel (2013). 
7. As we have seen, irreducible individuality is another criterion that is 
sometimes offered as a symptom of Romantic authorship ideology’s 
enduring presence in legal doctrine. The difficulty legal scholars have 
identifying what Romantic authorship is, and their failure to agree on 
what parts live on in copyright law and where, adds to the impression that 
the reflectionist analytical framework is overly associative and accommo-
dating.
8. Bently notes that for scholars such as Mark Rose, Martha Woodmansee, 
and Jane Gaines, ‘a gulf had been opened up between copyright law’s no-
tion of authorship and the new-orthodoxy of critical literary studies’ (2008, 
p. 20). 
9. For example, commenting on Justice Story’s decision in Emerson v. Davies – 
where he states that ‘Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and 
must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and used be-
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fore’ – Bracha notes that it only remains to ‘add some gloss of literary theory 
[…] and a version of the poststructuralist critique of original authorship 
emerges’ (2008, p. 202). Bently, meanwhile, calls the argument that musical 
performers borrow their style from others ‘the poststructuralist strategy’ 
(2008, p. 108). To my mind the awareness of the collaborative and cumula-
tive nature of works of authorship is a long-known (though no doubt often 
soft-pedalled) commonplace rather than the discovery of modern literary 
theory. 
10. Barthes’ article came out in a double issue in 1967, and was only published 
in French one year later in the literary journal Mateia.
11. The previous two issues were edited by Andy Warhol and Marshall McLu-
han.
12. Lamarque, for example, finds that to treat a text ‘as an explosion of 
unconstrained meaning, without origin and purpose [is] like trying to 
hear a Mozart symphony as a mere string of unstructured sounds’ (2002, 
p. 90).
13. Theatre director Jonathan Miller reckons that this is to make works of 
authorship occasions for something else, to turn texts into pretexts: ‘It 
becomes something which permits high jinks which happen to quote the 
text, but doesn’t actually express it or mean it. And that seems to me hardly 
worthwhile doing’ (1996, p. 164).
14. See the contributions to this book by Van Gompel on originality and by Van 
Eechoud on adaptations and the EU exemption for parody.
15. This is not to say that The Wind Done Gone is a satiric parody, just that such 
a work would clearly be possible. 
16. Transformative use is an important possible justification for so-called fair 
use under the US Copyright Code. As a rule, the author has the right to pre-
vent the making of any work ‘based upon’upon his or her preexisting work 
(the derivative right). Quoting or invoking a copyrighted work is less likely 
to be deemed infringing under the fair use defencedefense when an author 
not merely replicates some part of an underlying work, but rather somehow 
adds something new to it, i.e. in the act of appropriation also alters or trans-
forms it. That is, if the other factors of the fair use test, notably the effect 
on the (market for) the source work. See Pierre N. Leval, ‘Toward a Fair Use 
Standard’, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1990).
17. Perhaps Stauffer has Jameson in mind when she acknowledges in a footnote 
that pastiche has ‘additional meanings in other art forms such as film and 
the visual arts’ (2007–2008, p. 51). It should be noted, however, that Jame-
son’s analysis also includes literature. 
18. In my view, though, a work is more likely to be overtly transformative if it 
can be plausibly labelled a parody than when it can be plausibly labelled a 
pastiche.
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 Creativity, autonomy and personal 
touch
A critical appraisal of the CJEU’s originality test for 
copyright
Stef van Gompel
Copyright protects a wide range of productions in the literary, scientif ic and 
artistic domains. This not only includes cultural creations, such as works 
of literature, music, drama, f ilm, photography and art, but also functional 
types of subject-matter, such as computer programs, databases, industrial 
design and works of applied art. As a rule, copyright protects works regard-
less of their ‘merit’ or purpose: the design of ordinary household items is 
eligible for copyright protection just as much as creations of ‘high’ art. The 
only threshold that must be satisf ied for a work to attract copyright is that 
its expression is suff iciently ‘original’, in the legal sense of that word.
Copyright law’s originality threshold is not a high-to-attain standard. 
Recent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
confirms that copyright extends to subject-matter that is original in the 
sense that it is the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ (Infopaq International, 
2009, § 37; Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, 2010, § 46; Football Association 
Premier League, 2011, § 97; Painer, 2011, § 87; Football Dataco, 2012, § 37; and 
SAS, 2012, § 45) and that no other criteria may be applied to determine its 
eligibility for protection. In the Eva-Maria Painer case, the Court clarif ied 
that an intellectual creation is the author’s own ‘if it reflects the author’s 
personality’ and that this is the case ‘if the author was able to express his 
creative abilities in the production of the work by making free and creative 
choices’ (2011, §§ 88–89). This was reiterated in the Football Dataco case, 
where it was once more emphasised that, for an intellectual creation to 
be original, the author must have stamped it with his ‘personal touch’ by 
making ‘free and creative choices’ during its production (2012, § 38).
For readers untrained in copyright law, the language used by the CJEU 
may give the false impression that copyright law’s originality test is not at 
all that easy to satisfy. The references to ‘the author’s personality’, ‘creative 
abilities’ and ‘free and creative choices’ seem to suggest that only culturally 
signif icant creations carrying an obvious personal stamp of the author 
qualify for protection. This is not the case. Copyright applies to a wide range 
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of culturally trivial objects with no unique distinctiveness, as the Eva-Maria 
Painer case perfectly illustrates. This case involved a simple school portrait 
photograph – indeed, those school portraits that are impossible to tell 
apart, except for the images of the persons they portray. The CJEU found 
that the creation of such photographs could involve suff icient ‘free and 
creative choices’ to regard them as the own intellectual creations of the 
photographer (2011, § 93). This shows that, in reality, the words def ining 
copyright law’s originality criterion differ considerably from what they 
mean to convey in everyday speech.
The CJEU’s endeavours to def ine copyright law’s standard of originality 
and to craft an EU-wide legal notion of copyrighted works came somewhat 
unexpected. Up until the Infopaq International decision of 2009, it was 
thought that the originality standard and the subject-matter def inition of 
copyright were largely unharmonised terrains that are not governed by 
EU law but that instead fall to national regulation. Accordingly, the CJEU’s 
appropriation of the work concept has consequences for Member States 
that have traditionally applied other criteria to determine whether or not 
creations are eligible for copyright, such as the United Kingdom (Alexander, 
2009; Derclaye, 2010; Griff iths, 2011). Due to the CJEU’s harmonisation of 
the originality standard, such national criteria will possibly need to be 
reassessed so as to put them on par with the ‘author’s own intellectual 
creation’-test. More specif ically, it seems that the national criteria must be 
brought into line with the ‘free and creative choices’ language, which the 
CJEU has made a corner stone of its ‘author’s own intellectual creation’-
test. By accentuating the author’s personality as a key constituent of the 
originality criterion, this test has been tied closely to the author as the 
individual creator of a work.
Interestingly, the meaning and substance of the CJEU’s originality crite-
rion has not yet attracted much analytical scrutiny. In particular, the limits 
inherent in the CJEU’s originality standard have received little attention in 
legal doctrine – let alone in court decisions (although that is probably not 
where one would expect a critical review of the test be conducted in the 
f irst place). This is remarkable, seeing that copyright regulates such a wide 
variety of cultural production and may restrict the use of even the most 
low-key, routine creations that surround us in everyday life.
A more critical and out-of-the-box reading of the ‘free and creative 
choices’-language suggests that the CJEU’s originality standard may 
perhaps impose more limitations than is currently recognised in legal 
discourse. For one thing, authors are of course not autonomous creators 
who work in a vacuum. Creative processes are contingent on many external 
creATiviT y, AuTonoMy And personAl Touch 97
factors. Cultural productions are usually made with audiences in mind 
and individual creators operate within social, technical and institutional 
environments with all of the attendant constraints. This implies that, in 
reality, the autonomy of authors to make free and creative choices is often 
naturally restricted.
Moreover, it is questionable whether the ‘author’s own intellectual 
creation’-test is an appropriate standard for determining the eligibility 
of protection of joint works. If free and creative choices imply that the 
autonomy of the individual creator is a key factor, how then are works to 
be rated that result from complex collaborative processes such as those 
that online communities create (whether art, software or encyclopaedias)? 
Whose free and creative choices count for this matter? Only those of the 
main author or all choices made by individual contributors? The weaker 
the connection between a work and the authors who created it, the more 
diff icult it seems to apply the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’-test as it 
is currently def ined by the CJEU.
Since ‘free and creative choices’ has become the mantra in decisions on 
copyrightable subject-matter, it is high time for a considerate study of the 
limits of the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’-test. Given that the original-
ity standard is so easy to attain that even works of minimal creativity qualify 
for protection, there is need for a more nuanced understanding of how the 
‘author’s own intellectual creation’-test operates in law. That is where this 
chapter aims to make a contribution.
This chapter consequently examines what the elements ‘free and creative 
choices’ and the author’s ‘personal touch’ entail and how limits to creativity, 
autonomy and the expression of personality in creative processes may 
have bearing on the practical application of the CJEU’s originality test. In 
so doing, it draws upon aesthetics and creativity studies to explain how 
creative processes can be affected by conventions and constraints. As has 
been remarked in the Introduction of this book, creativity studies is not a 
homogenous discipline, but rather a complex of diverse specialisations and 
approaches in the humanities and social sciences, each studying creativity 
from certain perspectives. Between these specialisations, creativity may be 
treated differently, depending on the specif ic strands that are examined 
and the approach that is taken. Because this chapter covers diverse areas, it 
necessarily takes a broad-brush approach to creativity and does not provide 
such a detailed account of concepts of creativity as many specialisations in 
the humanities and social sciences do.
For the most part, this chapter has the law as its object. Apart from the 
CJEU’s case law, which is at the heart of the examination, I also discuss the 
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rich case law on copyrightable subject-matter from the Netherlands. Dutch 
courts not only tend to pass elaborately argued decisions, they often also 
have an open attitude towards court decisions and doctrine from other 
EU Member States. Furthermore, the Dutch originality test shows close 
similarity to the CJEU’s ‘author’s own intellectual creation’-test. In the 
Zonen Endstra v. Nieuw Amsterdam case, the Dutch Supreme Court has 
ruled that a work must have an ‘own, original character’ and ‘bear the 
personal stamp of the author’ to attract copyright. This means that its form 
‘may not be derived from another work’ and that it ‘must be the result of 
creative human labour and thus of creative choices, so that it is a production 
of the human mind’ (2008, § 4.5.1). The Supreme Court considers this to 
be on par with the CJEU’s originality test (Stokke v. H3 Products, 2013, § 
3.4(a); Stokke v. Fikszo, 2013, § 4.2(a); Hauck v. Stokke, 2013, § 4.2(a)) and so 
do Dutch legal commentators (see, e.g., Koelman, 2009, p. 205; Visser, 2010, 
p. 986; Hugenholtz, 2011). Accordingly, the Dutch case law can be considered 
suff iciently representative for illustrating the limitations of relying on the 
author’s ‘free and creative choices’ and ‘personal touch’ in copyright cases.
The chapter consists of four parts. First, it clarif ies what the CJEU alludes 
to when it uses the word ‘creative’. It will be seen that, in copyright law, 
this notion has an entirely different connotation than it has in aesthetics 
and creativity studies. This explains why insights from these disciplines 
are diff icult to apply for the purpose of reinterpreting or reconf iguring 
copyright law’s originality test. Nevertheless, there are ways in which 
creativity studies can help to ref ine specif ic elements of the test. This will 
be elucidated in the next two sections on autonomy and personal touch. 
I explore how creative autonomy of authors can be constrained and whether 
such constraints are – or ought to be – accommodated for in copyright law’s 
originality test. In addition, I show the diff iculty of determining whether 
the author’s personality is suff iciently reflected in works, in general, and 
jointly created works in particular. The chapter concludes with a synthesis 
of the main f indings.
Creativity: a concept with diverse meanings
As explained in the introduction of this chapter, for readers unfamiliar 
with law, the terms ‘originality’ and ‘creativity’ in copyright law may have 
a somewhat surprising meaning. To illustrate this, this section contrasts 
copyright law’s concept of creativity with that in aesthetics and creativity 
studies and explains the reasons for the difference of approach. It concludes 
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that it is not useful to reinterpret creativity in copyright law by drawing 
upon the same concept in aesthetics and creativity studies, but that further 
study of creative constraints and the imprint of the author’s personality is 
necessary and desirable.
The creativity standard in copyright law
At f irst sight, the degree of creativity reflected in a work seems to be a 
critical factor for accepting copyright protection. In multiple instances, 
the CJEU has ruled that, for the author to achieve a result which is an 
intellectual creation of his or her own, the author must have ‘express[ed] 
his creativity in an original manner’ (Infopaq International, 2009, § 45; 
Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, 2010, § 50). If understood in the ordinary 
day-to-day meaning of the word ‘original’, this language appears to suggest 
that copyright only extends to intellectual creations that, at least to some 
extent, are novel, innovative or unique in the sense that they depart from 
conventional expression.
On closer inspection, however, this is not how originality in copyright 
law is interpreted. The word ‘original’ merely signif ies that the work must 
originate from the author or, in the words of the CJEU, that it is the ‘author’s 
own intellectual creation’. The CJEU does not specify when something is a 
‘creation’ for the purposes of copyright. It seems to entertain the idea that it 
covers a very broad array of productions of the mind. The CJEU neither tests 
whether the subject-matter at issue belongs to the category of copyrightable 
works, nor categorically excludes specif ic types of creations in advance. Ac-
cordingly, it has denied copyright to sporting events for the reason that they 
‘cannot be regarded as intellectual creations classif iable as works’ (Football 
Association Premier League, 2011, § 98), while accepting that copyright 
may extend to other – non-aesthetic – creations, including graphic user 
interfaces (Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, 2010, § 46), football f ixture 
lists (Football Dataco, 2012, §§ 29–45), programming languages and the 
format of data f iles in computer programs (SAS, 2012, § 45).
On the whole, a work only needs to reflect a minimum level of crea-
tive input to attract copyright. It suff ices that the author has made ‘free 
and creative choices’ in its production (Van Eechoud, 2012, §§ 56–57). In 
particular, it is not required that a work is new or that it possesses certain 
quality or merit (Van Gompel & Lavik, 2013). The CJEU has explicated that, 
for literary works, the author’s ‘free and creative choices’ can exist in the 
selection, sequence and combination of words (Infopaq International, 2009, 
§ 45) and, for photos, in f ixing the background, pose, lighting and framing, 
100 sTef vAn goMpel 
choosing the angle and atmosphere and using developing techniques or 
computer software (Eva-Maria Painer, 2011, § 91). Here it must be stressed 
that copyright does not protect mere facts or ideas. Its protection does not 
extend beyond the individual expression that the author has given to his 
or her thoughts.
Interestingly, the CJEU has acknowledged that there are constraints to 
creativity that need to be taken into consideration when determining the 
eligibility for protection of works. It has explicitly ruled that copyright does 
not protect features of a work that are predetermined by technique or func-
tion and therefore are not based on free and creative choices (Bezpečnostní 
softwarová asociace, 2010, §§ 48–49; Football Association Premier League, 
2011, § 98; Football Dataco, 2012, § 39; SAS, 2012, § 39). Yet, the CJEU is not 
really clear on what the requirement to disregard technically or function-
ally dictated choices means. Given that often it is feasible to make small, 
subjective deviations in the design of technical products (see Quaedvlieg, 
1987, pp. 22–25), it is not at all so obvious where it has set the limit at which 
the author’s creative freedom is too narrow for the work to attract copyright.
In general, the originality standard is very low. As observed in the intro-
duction of this chapter, even regarding ordinary school portrait photos, the 
CJEU has held that ‘the freedom available to the author to exercise his crea-
tive abilities will not necessarily be minor or even non-existent’ (Eva-Maria 
Painer, 2011, § 93). This is also recognised at the national level, where there 
is an abundance of examples of low level creative works having received 
copyright protection. In the Netherlands, copyright has been conferred on 
‘passport photographs, striped wallpaper, the design of simple games like 
“four in a row” and designs of basic holiday homes’ (Hugenholtz, 2012, p. 44).
It remains unclear from the CJEU’s case law whether there are any 
further constraints to creativity that may render creations ineligible for 
copyright protection. Since the CJEU relies so heavily on the author’s free 
and creative choices, it seems safe to assume that copyright does not extend 
to too obvious or trivial creations that insuff iciently express the author’s 
creative abilities. That is at least how originality’s lower limit is traditionally 
understood in most Member States. Here too, however, it is not easy to 
draw a bright line between works that possess just enough creativity and 
those that are too obvious or trivial to attract copyright, at least if courts 
are expected to eliminate evaluation beyond the ‘author’s own intellectual 
creation’-test of the CJEU (see Van Gompel & Lavik, 2013, pp. 219–229).
The f inal judgment in the Dutch court case of Zonen Endstra v. Nieuw 
Amsterdam corroborates this. The case dealt with the question of whether 
copyright subsists in (transcripts of taped) conversations. These conversa-
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tions took place during a series of secret meetings between police off icers 
and Endstra, a real estate broker who was later murdered. The tapes were 
transcribed into off icial police reports, a copy of which found its way 
to crime reporters who published a book of the transcripts, with minor 
edits. The sons of the murdered businessman sought to stop publication 
by claiming copyright in the conversations. The case made it all the way 
to the Supreme Court (2008) and was ultimately remanded to the Court of 
Appeal of The Hague. In 2013, this court ruled that Endstra’s conversations 
with the police were not original works, because Endstra had expressed 
himself in a nigh-endless sequence of incomplete, badly versed phrases 
that involved insuff icient creative labour. Copyright protection was denied 
because Endstra had construed his speech in a form too ‘ordinary or trivial’ 
(§ 5.13). With this f inding, some argue, the court makes, or at least comes 
close to making, an aesthetic quality judgment on the coherence of Endstra’s 
speech (Tsoutsanis, 2013; Grosheide, 2013; Cohen Jehoram, 2013). It can also 
be argued, however, that the court actually sought to apply the originality 
test as phrased by the Dutch Supreme Court by critically examining whether 
Endstra had made ‘free and creative choices’ in expressing himself (Van 
Gompel, 2013, p. 203).
Creativity standards in aesthetics and creativity studies
The low standards of creativity and originality in copyright law stand in 
stark contrast with how these notions are understood in aesthetics and 
creativity studies. Although, within and between these disciplines, there 
are obviously many variations in the way these terms are used (Parkhurst, 
1999), in general, the various def initions of creativity have in common that 
they involve an element of novelty and an element of quality or usefulness 
(Sternberg and Lubart, 1999, p. 3; Sternberg and Kaufman, 2010, p. 467). 
That is, to be creative, a work must exhibit some sort of novel, original or 
innovative outcome, either in its appearance or in its underlying ideas. 
In addition, it must also be appropriate (signif icant, valuable or useful) 
within the specif ic context (Mayer, 1999, pp. 449–450). As Amabile and 
Tighe describe it, creativity does not merely rest on a work being ‘different 
for the sake of difference’ but also requires it to be ‘appropriate, correct, 
useful, valuable, or expressive of meaning’ (1993, p. 9).
Regardless of the common elements, the def initions of creativity and 
originality vary greatly in detail. This can perhaps be explained by the vari-
ety of disciplines in which creativity has been studied, including psychology, 
sociology, biology and economics, with a vast ‘panoply of perspectives on 
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creativity’ within these disciplines (Kozbelt, Beghetto and Runco, 2010, 
p. 21). Richard E. Mayer notes for example that creativity can be perceived 
as a property of people, products or processes, as a personal or social phe-
nomenon, as a common or exceptional incidence, as a domain-general or 
domain-specif ic concept or as a qualitative or quantitative matter (1999, 
pp. 450–451).
Despite the broad variety of disciplines and perspectives on creativity, 
however, both aesthetics and creativity studies seem to have in common 
that they treat creativity and originality as relative or comparative no-
tions (cf. Moran, 2010, p. 75). That is, these notions are used as criteria to 
determine how one person, product or process stands out creatively against 
other people, products or processes within the same symbolic domain 
(Csíkszentmihályi, 1999, p. 316). This is an important observation, because 
it allows us to understand the fundamental difference with the way in 
which originality and creativity are applied in copyright law. There, these 
notions are treated not as relative or comparative, but as independent, 
normative concepts.
Explaining the difference of interpretation and approach
The main reason for the difference of interpretation is that especially aes-
thetics and art studies on the one hand and copyright law on the other start 
from completely different points when examining notions of originality and 
creativity. At an abstract level, these points of departure can be described 
as being one of assessing distinctiveness versus one of legal demarcation.
Having artistic evaluation as one of its principal objectives, aesthetics 
clearly takes a relative approach to creativity by considering how original, 
novel or unique a work is in comparison with other works within a specif ic 
genre or cultural domain. That is not to say that aesthetic evaluation de-
pends solely on how an artwork relates to similar works that precede it. It is 
also relevant what contribution the work makes to the further development 
of a genre (Levinson, 1990). As Sherri Irvin explains, if ‘the characteristics 
for which a work is praised are … developed further by other artists … this, 
in turn, will reflect favorably on the initial work’ (2007, p. 295). Whether 
the signif icance of an artwork is evaluated retrospectively or prospectively, 
however, it is evident that in making the assessment, other works within 
the same genre serve as key reference points.
Other disciplines do not concentrate on aesthetic creativity or value 
the superiority of one creative person, product or process over another. 
Creativity studies can also be oriented on organisational creativity (Puccio 
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and Cabra, 2010), educational creativity (Smith and Smith, 2010), functional 
creativity (Cropley and Cropley, 2010), et cetera. As a general rule, however, 
the degree to which creativity or innovation manifests itself in organisa-
tional, educational or functional settings is also measured in relation to 
other – sometimes hypothetical – settings to which they compare.
In copyright law, by contrast, the courts do not generally draw a com-
parison with other works to determine whether an intellectual creation 
meets the required level of creativity. Because copyright law’s originality 
test ‘is primarily concerned with the relationship between the creator and 
the work’ (Bently and Sherman, 2009, p. 93) and not with how novel or 
meritorious a work is compared with earlier works, originality is examined 
solely on the basis of the work itself. Reference to pre-existing works is 
usually only made if there is doubt about whether a work is truly the author’s 
own intellectual creation, for example, if there are indications that the 
author has copied parts of earlier works or draws upon unprotected ideas, 
elements of style or materials that are in the public domain (Van Gompel 
& Lavik, 2013, p. 217).
The reason why copyright law’s originality test is primarily author-
oriented and does not require a comparison of works with prior art is largely 
historically determined. In the 19th century, the justif ication for copyright 
was found to exist in protecting the labour and expense incurred by the 
author in creating the work (the labour theory of copyright) or in protect-
ing the author’s personality as manifested in the work (the personality 
rights theory of copyright) (Buydens, 2012, pp. 258–309, 315–340). This was 
reflected in the originality test being centred on the author as the creator 
of the work (Van Gompel & Lavik, 2013, p. 215). Since copyright extends only 
to the author’s individual expression and not to facts and ideas, an original-
ity criterion that focuses on the author’s own intellectual endeavours in 
creating the work was considered a suff icient threshold. For the purpose 
of a legal demarcation of copyright, no further object-oriented criteria such 
as novelty, quality or merit were thought to be required.
Restyling copyright’s creativity standard: an arduous task
Since the concept of creativity differs greatly between the humanities 
and copyright law in terms of interpretation and points of departure, 
reinterpreting copyright law’s originality test by using insights from the 
humanities appears to be a diff icult task. Although, in theory, the idea of 
drawing upon aesthetics or creativity studies to rephrase copyright law’s 
creativity standard in more positive terms looks sympathetic, in practice, 
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raising the standard along these lines would seem to create far more 
problems than it solves. As Erlend Lavik also argues in this book, aesthet-
ics and creativity studies simply do not provide suff iciently well-def ined 
and coherent principles for the purpose of creating legal certainty in the 
copyright domain. This has been explained in greater detail elsewhere 
(Lavik & Van Gompel, 2013).
Without repeating the said discussion here, it is evident from the 
comparison above that if copyright law were to move away from the low, 
author-oriented originality criterion by adopting a higher creativity test 
akin to the one applied in aesthetics and creativity studies, then this would 
undoubtedly mark a departure from the core principles upon which copy-
right law rests. It would subject copyright to a novelty-like criterion and 
would require courts to determine whether a work creatively stands out 
against other, comparable works. Rather than centring protection on the 
author’s own intellectual creation, it would require evaluating a work’s merit 
vis-à-vis other works to ascertain whether it is worthy of protection. This 
is undesirable, as it would completely upset the current copyright system 
and the principles upon which it is based.
Still, this does not change the fact that creativity is part of copyright law’s 
originality criterion and that it will remain a hollow term unless it is taken 
more seriously. For this reason, the following two sections will examine 
whether it would be practical and feasible to reinforce the current ‘free 
and creative choices’-test by requiring courts to take full account, f irst, of 
constraints that may restrict the author’s creative autonomy and, second, 
of the bond between a work and its creator so as to determine whether his 
or her personality is suff iciently reflected in it.
Autonomy: Exercising free choice within creative constraints
Creativity requires certain autonomy on the part of the creator. Without 
autonomy, creators may lose the intrinsic motivation for creating works, 
which can affect their sense of intellectual ownership (Amabile, 1998, p. 82). 
Moreover, as Mark A. Runco writes, ‘[o]riginality implies that the person is 
doing something that is different from what others are doing, and that is 
probably easiest if he or she is independent and autonomous’ (2007, p. 288). 
Hence, there is a certain relationship between the degree of freedom that 
creators enjoy and the level of creativity evident in the works they produce.
This is also acknowledged in copyright law. As observed, the CJEU 
has judged that copyright protection is granted only to works that result 
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from the author’s free and creative choices. Conversely, it has ruled that 
copyright’s originality threshold is not met when the creation of a work is 
dictated by technical or functional considerations, rules or constraints that 
leave no room for creative freedom (Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, 2010, 
§ 48–49; Football Association Premier League, 2011, § 98; Football Dataco, 
2012, § 39; SAS, 2012, § 39). The CJEU has held that copyright extends nei-
ther to the functionality of a computer program, nor to the programming 
language, the format of data f iles and the graphic user interface insofar 
as these components are differentiated by their technical function only 
(Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, 2010, § 48; SAS, 2012, § 39).
From a legal perspective, since the originality criterion requires a work 
to express the author’s free and creative choices, it makes sense that courts, 
in deciding on a work’s eligibility for protection, ignore elements that do not 
result from autonomous creative choices by the author. However, the dif-
f iculty remains how the originality of a work as a whole is to be judged when 
it contains technical, functional or other non-original features. This will be 
considered in more detail below. In the Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace case, 
the CJEU has further explained the importance of discounting technical or 
functional considerations, rules or constraints when making judgment on the 
originality of a work. It stated that, if the different methods of implementing 
an idea are so limited that idea and expression become indissociable, then 
the space for authors to express their creativity in a personal manner is too 
narrow to create a work that constitutes an intellectual creation of their own 
(2010, §§ 49–50). Although the way in which the CJEU brings in the idea/
expression dichotomy is odd, it clearly seeks to prevent that the originality 
test is interpreted in such a way that it would enable a monopolisation of ideas 
‘to the detriment of technological progress and industrial development’ (SAS, 
2012, § 40). Competition or innovation must not be excluded by authors who 
claim exclusive protection for elements of works that are merely technically 
or functionally defined and that leave no room for creative choices.
Creative constraints also play a role outside the mere technical or 
functional domains. At least, that can be inferred from the Football Associa-
tion Premier League case, in which the CJEU denied protection to football 
matches on the grounds that they ‘are subject to rules of the game, leaving 
no room for creative freedom for the purposes of copyright’ (2011, § 98). It 
would have been more straightforward had the Court denied protection by 
reasoning why a football game is not a literary or artistic ‘work’. Copyright is 
indeed not intended to protect football matches or, more precisely, to cover 
sports techniques and tactics. If the Dutch athlete Epke Zonderland could 
claim copyright protection for the three consecutive flight elements which 
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he introduced and successfully completed in the men’s horizontal bar f inal 
during the 2012 Olympics in London, then he could eliminate competition 
and innovation in this sport by precluding others from performing the same. 
The objective of sports being to attain maximum physical performance in 
fair competition with other participants, any athlete may seek a competitive 
advantage through physical training, mental preparation, ref ining skills, 
better applying knowledge, using better equipment or developing new tech-
niques. It would be unthinkable, however, if the one athlete has a competi-
tive advantage over the other due to an intellectual property right over the 
execution of sports elements (with the exception maybe of choreographed 
movements in disciplines such as f igure skating or free style gymnastics). 
That is why it makes sense to exclude sports from the copyright domain 
altogether, as they are commonly understood to be in most countries (Spoor, 
Verkade and Visser, 2005, p. 127). It is somewhat surprising that, instead, 
the CJEU applied the ‘creative freedom’-test to football matches, because 
by doing so it seems to imply that sports events are in principle eligible 
subject-matter. That in turn raises the thorny question of authorship. Who 
qualif ies as ‘author’ of football matches? (The players, captain, technical 
staff, the coach, one team, both teams, all of the above?).
In practice, the challenge is to determine how much freedom authors 
actually have for making creative choices. Creative processes and outcomes 
are always contingent on conventions and constraints of some kind. These 
may exist in various forms and may vary from soft, self-imposed restrictions 
to hard limitations that are imposed from outside. This section first explains 
how creativity and constraints interact and then sketches types of constraints 
by which the author’s creative freedom may be inhibited. Because the object 
is to illustrate that the author’s autonomy in creative processes is invariably 
restricted, in these sections the copyright implications are not examined in 
much detail. That will be done in the subsequent section, which examines 
how courts deal with creative constraints when judging on copyright law’s 
originality test. It will be seen that courts often only investigate the creative 
space that is available, without observing how that space is used and whether 
the author has been restricted in any way during the creative process.
The interplay between creativity and constraints
In creativity studies, there is extensive literature on how tradition, conven-
tions and constraints affect creative processes. Most writings focus on the 
intricate relationship between creativity and constraints, explaining that, 
while the latter obviously restrict the creative freedom of authors, at the 
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same time, they are an intrinsic and perhaps necessary part of creative 
processes. If a suff icient degree of freedom is critical for artists to be able 
to make creative choices, then creativity will be stif led if there are too 
many restrictions. Yet, too much freedom can also paralyse creativity. If 
authors are offered too many choices, then the creative space may be too 
large to make adequate creative decisions. Linda Candy rightly observes 
that, since ‘[a] totally free or unoccupied space in which to begin a creative 
work is both unimaginable and probably undesirable’, constraints can also 
be conducive to creativity by providing the author with ‘a more manageable 
creative space’ (2007, p. 366).
For Igor Stravinsky, for example, rules and restrictions were an integral 
and essential part of musical composition. He wrote:
The creator’s function is to sift the elements he receives from [imagination], 
for human activity must impose limits upon itself. The more art is controlled, 
limited, worked over, the more it is free. As for myself, I experience a sort 
of terror when, at the moment of setting to work and finding myself before 
the infinitude of possibilities that present themselves, I have the feeling 
that everything is permissible to me. … My freedom thus consists in my 
moving about within the narrow frame that I have assigned myself for each 
of my undertakings. I shall go even further: my freedom will be so much the 
greater and more meaningful the more narrowly I limit my field of action 
and the more I surround myself with obstacles. Whatever diminishes con-
straint, diminishes strength. The more constraints one imposes, the more 
one frees one’s self of the chains that shackle the spirit (1970, pp. 63–65).
Hence, in constraint theories, creativity is typically defined as ‘a process of 
exercising free choice in the context of a range of existing constraints’ (Candy, 
2007, p. 366). In a similar vein, Jon Elster interprets creativity as ‘working 
within constraints’ and originality as ‘changing the constraints’ (2000, p. 180), 
thus qualifying originality as a higher to attain standard than creativity. At 
the very end of this spectrum is Patricia D. Stokes’ constraint model, accord-
ing to which genuine artistic freedom is left only to artists like Motherwell, 
Mondrian, Klee and others ‘who self-select and self-impose constraints on 
their current successful solutions’ and, in so doing, pursue ‘a novel goal and 
in the process of realising it [enlarge] a domain’ (2008, pp. 234, 235).
Obviously the way in which constraints affect creativity fully depends 
on their nature. As in the example of Stravinsky, the restrictions are totally 
self-imposed and therefore part of the creative process. This does not directly 
upset creative freedom. In fact, it is creative autonomy that allows artists to 
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set the boundaries within which they wish to create. However, every creative 
choice, even if imposed by entirely idiosyncratic constraints, involves sub-
sequent restrictions that may have an effect on the creative space available 
to authors. For this reason, Jon Elster suggests in his book Ulysses Unbound 
(2000, p. 176) that artistic creation must be envisaged as a two-step process, 
i.e., as a ‘choice of constraints followed by choice within constraints’. The f irst 
step involves voluntary choices of constraints that include, for example, the 
choice to work in a certain genre or the choice of materials. Such choices 
inevitably require authors to make subsequent – not necessarily voluntary 
– choices based on the external constraints that working in a particular 
genre or with the one or the other type of material implicate.
At the same time, there are also many external and internal constraints 
to creativity to which authors would usually not submit themselves volun-
tarily. Examples vary from psychological barriers, such as writers’ blocks 
and early creativity that limits future achievements (Goncalo, Vincent and 
Audia, 2010), to external restrictions, such as f ixed deadlines and limited 
budgets. The former are personal and do not affect all authors, but the latter 
are very common. Nearly all authors are somehow restricted by time and 
money. In one way, these constraints are useful as they keep authors focused 
on creation. Jon Elster (2000, pp. 210–211) writes: ‘For a movie director, an 
unlimited budget may be disastrous. For a TV producer, having too much 
time may undermine creativity’. On the other hand, the same constraints 
may also restrict creative freedom, especially if the deadlines are too short 
or the available budget too tight.
Table 1. Some sources of creative constraints
Voluntary/Autonomous Involuntary
Internal choice of genre
choice of audience
choice of topic and content
choice of medium, format, methods 
and materials
psychological barriers such as mood, 
writer’s block, early creativity, etc.
personality of the author, including 
personal traits, habits and preferences
External rules of the genre
Trends and audience expectations
functional demands
Work environment, including creative 
briefs and instructions, imposed 
deadlines and available budget
Barriers to understanding, such as 
limits of language
physiological barriers such as range of 
hearing and vision
limits to physical performance such 
as musical performance
properties of texture, strength and 
structure of materials
Technical limitations
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Table 1 provides examples of internal and external constraints to creativity 
and the voluntary or involuntary nature of them. Several of these examples 
are dealt with in more detail in the next section on creative conventions 
and constraints.
Conventions and constraints in creative processes
The previous section shows that, while different types of conventions 
and constraints affect creative processes, not all of them truly inhibit the 
author’s creative freedom. In fact, authors often exercise their creative 
autonomy to actually impose restrictions on themselves. The voluntary 
internal constraints indicated in Table 1 clearly illustrate this. Other con-
straints, such as the psychological barriers to create as a result of mood, 
writer’s block or early creativity hinder the creative process, but copyright 
discounts these factors because they are viewed as involuntary internal 
constraints. Hence, for the purpose of establishing whether a work passes 
or fails copyright law’s originality test, all internal constraints mentioned in 
Table 1 are not directly relevant or useful, either because they do not impede 
but rather facilitate the author’s ability to make ‘free and creative choices’ 
(the voluntary internal constraints) or because they are totally accidental 
and unintentional (the involuntary internal constraints).
Having said that, the voluntary internal constraints are not entirely 
irrelevant. They can serve as a useful starting point for laying bare the 
external constraints to creativity that will affect the ability of authors to 
make ‘free and creative choices’. This follows from Jon Elster’s depiction 
of artistic creation as a ‘choice of constraints followed by choice within con-
straints’. Because every creative process requires authors to make creative 
decisions (the voluntary internal constraints), these decisions eventually 
will also inflict various external constraints on them. Therefore, this section 
discerns three types of internal decisions that creative processes involve, 
namely, the choice of genre, the choice of medium, format, methods and 
materials and the choice of the audience that authors want to reach. It 
ascertains how these choices may impose external constraints on authors 
that limit their freedom of action. Next, it analyses how creative freedom 
may be inhibited by external constraints that may arise in employment or 
contractual relationships.
This approach differs from other ways of systematising constraints to 
creativity. Jon Elster, for example, distinguished purely between soft, self-
imposed constraints and conventions, on the one hand, and hard, intrinsic 
and imposed constraints, on the other hand (2000, p. 190). Another division 
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was proposed by Brian Moeran who, in his paper on cultural production, 
creativity and constraints (2011, p. 16), differentiates between material, 
temporal, spatial, social, representational and economic restrictions. While 
these scholars engage in a treatment of how creativity is limited in a general 
way, our intention is to categorise constraints that restrict the author’s 
ability to make free and creative choices in shaping their work. That is why 
the approach in this chapter differs.
At f irst sight, many constraints mentioned in the following sections 
may appear not very problematic from a copyright viewpoint, since the 
required originality threshold is so easily reached. However, the deeper 
we dig into the constraints to creativity, the more we shall realise that it 
cannot automatically be assumed – as courts sometimes do – that authors 
have made ‘free and creative choices’ in producing their works.
The choice of genre
The specif ic genre in which authors create their works clearly imposes 
a number of restrictions. While the term ‘genre’ has multiple meanings, 
varying from discipline to discipline and sometimes even within disciplines, 
in this section, it is used in a rather general fashion. It refers to any type, 
class or category of literature, music or art – in the broadest sense of the 
word – that is def ined by shared characteristics of content, form, style, 
mood, et cetera. Genres are necessarily formed retroactively, as they require 
(informal) recognition of their shared characteristics by a specif ic artistic 
community or culture. Genres are thus defined by established conventions, 
the so-called ‘rules of the genre’. These are – implicit or explicit – norms or 
understandings, to which nearly all authors in a particular genre submit 
themselves. Blues compositions, for example, traditionally have a twelve-bar 
chord scheme and a distinguishable A-A-B rhyme and lyric pattern.
Another example is Western movies, which comprise not only various 
visual conventions, such as their location in the countryside or in towns 
with saloons, people wearing wide-brimmed hats, high-heeled boots with 
spurs, using rif les, riding horses, and so on (Buscombe, 1970, pp. 36–38). 
Perhaps even stronger genre characteristics of Westerns are the recurring 
repertoire of situations and events that draw on the history of the American 
frontier, including ‘gunfight, drifters from a defeated south, confrontations 
of cavalry and Indians, ambushes, gambling, cattle drives and railway build-
ing’ (Collins, 1970, p. 70). It is these and possibly other conventions that allow 
audiences to recognise a f ilm as belonging to the genre of Western movies.
In practice, it is very common that authors choose to work within certain 
artistic conventions of genre. While this obviously is a free choice, it may 
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restrict them in a way that is far more restraining than other constraints that 
they impose on themselves. This is, as Elster argues, because artistic conven-
tions are not invented by authors who submit themselves to the rules of the 
genre (Elster 2000, pp. 175 and 196). For authors, artistic conventions can 
be ‘normatively compelling’ in the sense that, in the view of other artists, 
critics and the audience, they ‘embody the right way of doing things’ (ibid., 
p. 198). If authors would disobey the conventions, they risk being rejected 
or misunderstood by the public whom they wish to address. Additionally, 
authors may have no real incentive to deviate from artistic conventions, 
because their works can only be evaluated by competent judges if a reason-
able comparison can be made with similar works. This ultimately compels 
all authors who work within a particular genre to conform to the same set 
of artistic conventions (ibid., p. 199).
This does not mean that, by working in a specif ic genre, authors cannot 
freely express themselves. With regard to blues music, Steven C. Tracy 
writes:
[…] the blues provide a basic structure free enough to accommodate 
individual temperament, abilities, and creativity. Far from being a limited 
genre, it provides a structured but expansive place for the individual to 
relate to and express the community, and for artists to touch home base 
but still express themselves individually (2004, p. 124).
The rules of some genres are more strictly def ined than others. In contrast 
to Western movies, for which there are scores of – more or less – loosely 
organised conventions (of which usually only part need to be included in a 
movie to qualify it as a Western), some poetry follows clearly defined rules. 
To give an example, a sonnet always consists of a fourteen-line verse with 
a specif ic metrical structure and a f ixed rhyme scheme (i.e. usually three 
quatrains and a couplet or an octave and a sestet). Limericks and other 
verse forms follow similar conventions. The rules of these genres ‘may 
be so specif ic as to leave little room or necessity for elaborate rhetorical 
planning’ (Flower and Hayes, 1981, p. 379). Still, the large variety of poems 
that are created over the years reveal that these genres leave ample room 
for individual expression.
The point is, however, that while genres may leave enough creative space 
for personal expression, authors cannot disregard the rules and conven-
tions that intrinsically def ine it. Certainly, authors may challenge certain 
conventions or even abandon ones that have become too cliché. For ‘avant-
garde’ works, pushing the boundaries of existing norms or genres is even 
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an essential aspect. This allows artistic conventions to evolve or change 
over time. Still, as it takes time to gain enough institutional momentum for 
recognition and appreciation of new conventions in existing genres, such 
progress can only occur slowly. To be understood and accepted, authors 
cannot recklessly deviate from the conventions of a genre. They must 
always remain somewhat traditional and conservative in their approach 
(Csíkszentmihályi, 1996, p. 71). This suggests that a work ‘may bend or break 
the rules, but it cannot simply ignore them’ (Lavik and Van Gompel, 2013, 
p. 396). Authors must somehow obey the rules of a genre.
Copyright law recognises creative constraints imposed by rules of 
genres in literature, f ilm, visual arts, music, and so on, insofar as ‘style’ is 
excluded from protection. This means that authors are free to use the shared 
characteristics of form, content, style, or mood of existing genres, as long as 
they refrain from copying the original expression of specif ic works within 
those genres. However, as will be explained below, diff iculties may arise in 
copyright infringement cases when it needs to be determined how elements 
of ‘style’ must be disregarded in comparing the overall impression of a work 
with the allegedly infringing copy. Another problem may occur when a 
new genre is born, that is, when an innovative style that emerged with one 
particular artist is followed by other artists and retroactively def ined as a 
new ‘genre’. In such a case, separating the unprotected elements of ‘style’ 
from the protected ‘original expression’ of works created by a trendsetting 
artist at the time when he was still the only person using his or her own 
invented style may be very diff icult (Verkade, 1996, § 9). This raises the 
question whether (parts of) the trendsetter’s works would not gradually 
degenerate into an unprotected style (Hugenholtz, 1999, § 3). This problem, 
which is manifested particularly in fashion, industrial design and other 
areas driven by trends, has stirred quite some debate in the Netherlands. 
Some legal scholars have argued that copyright protection can indeed 
‘dilute’ and degenerate into an unprotected style (see e.g. Quaedvlieg, 2004), 
but the Supreme Court has denied that the scope of copyright protection 
can diminish over time (Stokke v. Fikszo, 2013, § 6.3.6).
The choice of medium, format, methods and materials
Other than by the choice of genre, authors may be constrained by the choice 
of the medium and format in which to cast their works and the methods 
and materials that they will apply. Nowadays, authors have the choice 
between digital and ‘analogue’ means of production and dissemination. This 
has opened new possibilities, but also introduced new constraints. In the 
digital arts, for example, while the space available for creative expression 
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is enormous, authors must duly understand digital technology to generate 
the desired outcome. Linda Candy (2007, p. 366) writes that producing 
digital art often requires a trade-off between artistic aspiration and digital 
constraints, explaining that ‘[t]he choice of whether to program or to use 
a software application can be critical to how much the artist has control 
over the character of the constraints to be specif ied’. The creative freedom 
of digital artists is consequently limited to the extent that they run into 
technological deficiencies of their own or of technologists with whom they 
collaborate. Not only does this challenge the boundaries of creative partner-
ships and the perception of authorship, as Elena Cooper’s chapter in this 
book demonstrates, but digital artists must also accept the limitations of 
existing software applications and tools that they apply for creating their 
works. Even with state-of-the-art technologies, they simply cannot always 
create what they have envisaged.
Creative constraints may be stricter or looser depending on whether or 
not a work also has a utilitarian function. For example, while architectural 
works may be designed for aesthetic appeal, they ultimately must lead 
to the construction of real houses or buildings. In the drafting process, 
therefore, architects are constrained f irst of all by the utilitarian purpose 
of a building. If it is meant for living, then it must have certain basic facili-
ties, such as a living space, a kitchen, one or more bedrooms, a toilet and 
bathroom, et cetera. Although there are various ways in which architects 
may spatially organise these facilities, in the end, there must be a – more or 
less – appropriate order between them if the architect wants the building to 
suit the purposes for which it is designed (Hall and Hall, 1975). A building 
must moreover have a f irm construction. While any futuristic building 
can be designed on a creation table, it is not a given that constructing it 
is technically feasible. This will depend on the strength of materials, the 
distribution of stress, and environmental factors, including the level of 
hurricane or seismic activity in a region. Architects must use the right 
combination of materials, composition structures and assembly methods 
to ensure that their creations are durable and safe (Place, 2007). In practice, 
architects must also handle a large number of external constraints. They 
have to follow various statutory protocols and building regulations, such as 
technical regulations about minimum ceiling heights and room sizes and 
safety instructions about the place and number of f ire exist doors in public 
spaces. Furthermore, they may be bound to comply with urban planning 
permissions, which not only have an impact on what can be built, but may 
also impose (aesthetic) guidelines on how buildings must be shaped (Imrie 
and Street, 2011).
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For other, more artistic types of works such as music, literature, photos 
and f ilms, the creative freedom in choosing the appropriate medium, 
format, methods and materials is usually much larger (unless the work is 
commissioned to be cast in a specif ic form, as will be discussed further 
below). Film directors, for example, can opt to shoot their movies with 
specif ic cameras (varying from 8mm to HD to 3D), silent or with sound, 
in colour, black-and-white or other toning effect, et cetera. Painters can 
choose between particular surfaces (e.g. canvas, wood or paper), painting 
sizes, types of paint (e.g. oil or acryl), specif ic painting techniques (e.g. 
aquarelle or airbrush), and so on. For other visual artists, photographers, 
music composers and novelists, the range of available media, formats, 
methods and materials is likewise very broad.
This does not mean, however, that these artists are not in any way 
constrained by the choice of medium, format, methods and materials. 
Just as works of architecture are meant to be built, so are musical com-
positions meant to be performed. Composers must therefore realise that 
there are limits to what musicians can physically perform (Elster, 2000, 
p. 191). Furthermore, artists must take account of the specif ic nature of 
the materials that they intend to use. Natural materials such as wood, 
clay and stone have specif ic properties of texture, structure and strength, 
which make them better or less suited for creating particular types 
of works. Other materials, including metal and glass, require special 
processing techniques like metalworking and glassblowing that involve 
specif ic constraints of their own. This has signif icance for the way in 
which authors can ultimately shape and cast their works (Moeran, 2011, 
pp. 19–21).
Here too, creative constraints may be tighter once a work receives a more 
utilitarian purpose. A good example is the creation of portraits, the object 
of which is to display the characteristic features of a person. This requires 
artists to compose the portrait in such a way that it enables viewers to 
instantly recognise the portrayed person. This obviously limits artistic 
freedom to some degree, but it certainly does not eliminate it. However, 
where it concerns passport photos made for off icial purposes, the creative 
freedom is almost certainly absent. To prevent crime, fraudulent uses and 
identify theft, states prescribe strict requirements for passport photographs 
in terms of size, photo quality, background, framing, exposure, position, 
visibility of facial features and expression of the portrayed person. Such 
regulations leave hardly any room for photographers to make ‘free and 
creative choices’.
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The intended audience
Limitations further derive from the anticipated relation to the audience. 
In his book Values of Art, Malcolm Budd (1995, p. 11) writes ‘that the role of 
the artist, properly understood, requires the artist, in the creation of her 
work, to adopt or bear in mind the role of the spectator’. While this does 
not prevent authors from making creative choices, it does limit the creative 
space in one way or the other. Since most works are created with an audience 
in mind, authors will somehow be constrained by their own expectations 
about the expectations of intended readers, viewers or listeners. As Jon 
Elster (2000, p. 188) argues: ‘Once the artist has constructed his idea of 
the reader, he is constrained to write in a way that the reader will f ind 
instructive, entertaining, puzzling, moving, disturbing, and so on’. The 
same applies to painters, f ilm directors, music composers and other artists. 
They usually also paint for intended viewers, make movies for intended 
spectators, compose for intended listeners, and so forth (although some 
authors may only be interested in the act of creation, but this is irrelevant 
for our present purposes because copyright presupposes communication: 
no proprietary legal regime is needed for authors who merely keep creation 
to themselves).
Authors must also understand that there are limits to what an expected 
audience can rationally endure. This is certainly important for works that 
attract a captive audience in theatres, cinemas and concert halls. As Thomas 
G. Pavel (1986, p. 98) remarks: ‘a play cannot usually sustain the audience’s 
attention for more than a couple of hours; a movie’s duration depends on 
the eye’s tolerance to strain’. Such restrictions will thus def ine the average 
length of a work within these genres. But even if the audience can freely 
choose the time and interval of consuming a work, as is typically the case for 
novels, then authors must still construct the plot and story line in such a way 
that they keep the reader’s attention continuously alive (Elster, 2000, p. 191). 
This certainly also imposes limits on length, style and order of story telling.
Especially on the Internet, authors are bound to communicate their 
works as clearly and effectively as possible. Usability studies show that, on 
average, it takes only a few seconds to grab the attention of website visitors. 
If a page loads too slowly (Krishnan and Sitaraman, 2012) or visitors do not 
promptly f ind something of interest to them (Nielsen and Pernice, 2010), 
then the website is likely to be abandoned during the f irst couple of seconds 
of interaction. Authors that create and disseminate their works online can 
therefore easily lose (part of) their audience if a creation does not meet the 
immediate expectations of viewers. While this may be different for works 
that make greater demands on the audience’s patience, such as modern 
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art, here too, there are specif ic challenges for engaging online users, as 
experience with virtual museums and art exhibitions corroborates (Soren 
and Lemelin, 2004; Soren, 2005). This means that websites not only need to 
operate well. To satisfy online users, web developers and creators must also 
take full account of online user expectations. For this purpose, they may 
adapt online content to make it more appealing to the target audience, for 
example, by including catchy headlines, writing short introductory notes, 
or using specif ic colours that are favoured by most users (Bonnardel, Piolat 
and Le Bigot, 2011).
Adaptations of such kind, although authors may freely apply them, are 
not necessarily based on autonomous choices. If they are primarily guided 
by user demands, it cannot truly be upheld that they result from the author’s 
free and creative choices.
Constraints in employment or contractual relationships
The author’s freedom of action may also be limited in cases of commissioned 
works or works created in the course of employment. A good example is 
journalists who work for a newspaper, either as freelancers or in employ-
ment. They must typically conform to an editorial statute or ethical code 
that guides them in writing their reports. Reuters (2008), for example, has 
published an online Handbook of Journalism, which contains detailed 
accounts on how to write a journalistic report, including rules on story 
length, basic story structure, consistency of style, key words, language 
that must be avoided, et cetera. While Reuters indicates on the homepage 
that ‘the handbook is not intended as a collection of “rules”’ that seeks to 
constrain journalism, its guiding principles do restrict creative writing in 
the sense that journalists are expected to use the handbook ‘as guidance 
to taking decisions and adopting behaviours’ (ibid.). Hence, they are not 
allowed to make creative choices fully at their own discretion.
Likewise, ‘no creative team in an advertising agency starts out with a 
blank piece of paper, but is given a “creative brief” by the client who directs 
the strategy to be taken by a particular campaign’ (Moeran, 2011, p. 18). 
Such a brief unmistakably leads the authors of the campaign in a particular 
direction. Commercially this may be attractive, as it instructs the team to 
draft a campaign that will satisfy the client, but artistically, it comes with 
a number of restrictions. As Jeremy Bullmore (1999, p. 56) explains, a brief 
may encourage creative thinking and ensure the relevance of the message 
being conveyed, but it may also restrict creativity. Being informed by clients’ 
demands that often follow consumer beliefs and expectations, advertising 
campaigns cannot be said to result from the free and creative choices of 
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authors alone. The advertising industry clearly also follows consumer trends 
and impacts (see e.g. Sinclair, 2012).
Other than creative instructions, authors may be constrained by the 
available budget and imposed deadlines. Although there seem to be few 
productions where time is not an issue, deadlines are obviously most critical 
for authors who create works on regular intervals, such as writers of daily 
newspaper columns or producers of daily or weekly TV shows (Elster, 2000, 
p. 193). But time constraints are also common in other areas, such as f ilm 
production, where the schedules for shooting and production are to a consid-
erable extent determined by factors like the availability of actors, access to 
set and locations and, ultimately, the allocated budget (Barnwell, 2004, p. 50).
That budget matters in creative endeavours is clearly illustrated by f ilm 
and television production. Although there are many examples of low-budget 
f ilms that are regarded as highly artistic, as for example Alfred Hitchcock’s 
thriller Psycho illustrates, there often is a strong correlation between the 
available budget and what f ilmmakers can eventually put on the screen 
(Barnwell, 2004, p. 48). While it certainly does not prevent creative choices 
being made, the allocated money may have bearing on the creative freedom 
of f ilmmakers (and other types of creators) in the sense that it may prevent 
them from making the creative choices that they would have preferred to 
make (see e.g. Affron and Affron, 1995, p. 16; Jørholt, 2010, p. 107).
For copyright purposes, these types of diverse f inancial constraints will 
usually not be relevant for the question of whether there is a work, since 
copyright law’s originality test is so low. However, they possibly are relevant 
in copyright infringement analyses, for example, where f ilm directors reuse 
costumes, props or sets or even entire scenes or shots from earlier f ilms to 
cut corners in their production budget. Such ‘recycling’ regularly occurs in 
the f ilm industry, but will not easily lead to court cases, as f ilms are often 
produced by the same company that owns the reused materials.
Implications for copyright law’s originality test
As the preceding section has illustrated, authors may be invariably con-
fronted with various restrictions during the creation of their works. For 
this reason, it cannot be unquestioningly presupposed that a work results 
from the author’s ‘free and creative choices’, as the CJEU’s originality test 
for copyright requires. Therefore, one would expect that in the assessment 
that courts make of the original character of a work, or the lack of it, ample 
consideration is given to the presence and impact of constraints. This sec-
tion examines recent case law of the CJEU and Dutch courts on this point. 
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After some preliminary remarks and a short discussion of copyright and 
creative constraints generally, specif ic attention is given to how the case 
law handles technical and functional constraints and other constraints to 
creativity in applying copyright law’s originality test.
Preliminary remarks
Before discussing the impact of creative constraints on copyright law’s 
originality criterion, two observations must be made. First, it is important to 
understand that, in practice, there are very few stand-alone cases about the 
question of whether a creation is original enough to qualify as a copyright-
protected work. For obvious reasons, copyright’s originality test appears 
as part of infringement analyses, where the defendant disputes that the 
plaintiff ’s work attracts copyright or claims that no copyright relevant 
parts are copied in the allegedly infringing work. Accordingly, in such cases, 
courts necessarily make a comparison between the plaintiff ’s work and 
the allegedly infringing copy. Even if a court f inds that certain borrowings 
(e.g. of technical or functional elements) are not infringing by themselves, 
they may still f ind infringement if they see much similarity in the ‘overall 
impression’ of the two works under consideration.
Second, it must be noted that manufacturers and designers of techni-
cal and functional products regularly claim copyright infringement as 
a subsidiary fall-back option to obtain protection against competitors, 
with infringement of registered design rights as the main claim. Before 
Dutch courts, actions for design right and copyright infringements are 
sometimes accompanied by an action in the tort of slavish imitation (slaafse 
nabootsing). Copyright can easily be relied upon, as the right comes into 
existence automatically upon the creation of an original work of authorship. 
It does not depend on registration or any other formality. Moreover, in most 
countries, the copyright term lasts for the author’s life plus 70 years which 
is much longer than the usual 25-year term for design rights. If manufactur-
ers and designers cannot rely on design protection because they failed to 
fulf il the formalities required for acquiring or maintaining design rights, or 
because the term has expired, or the use made is allowed under design law, 
they often can still fall back on copyright protection. Such copyright cases 
are primarily about thwarting competition, not about protecting artistic 
or creative achievements.
Copyright and creative constraints
Some constraints to creativity are diff icult to accommodate in copyright 
law, because they do not restrict choice but merely limit creative freedom to 
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a certain degree. That is the case, for example, with deadlines and budgetary 
ceilings. While clearly limiting the freedom of action of authors, within the 
time and budget that is allocated to them, authors can exercise considerable 
autonomy to make creative choices of their own. Thus, time constraints 
and limited budgets are of no relevance in determining the eligibility for 
protection of works. As long as authors have made free and subjective 
choices within the creative space that is available to them, their works 
should benefit from the protection afforded by copyright law.
Other types of constraints, however, limit creative freedom to such a 
degree that it is more diff icult to assume that they leave suff icient room 
for free and creative choices. Examples include cases where there are 
limited possibilities to accomplish the same or a similar artistic effect or 
utilitarian purpose, where the author’s choices are clearly informed by 
audience demands or trends, and where creation is shaped by external 
instructions, such as those imposed by law or regulation. This suggests 
that courts should take such restrictions into account, since they might 
impinge on the question of whether a work is suff iciently the author’s own 
to be eligible for protection.
Technical and functional constraints
As observed above, the CJEU has explicitly recognised that copyright does 
not extend to elements of works that leave no room for creative freedom. 
This principle is widely accepted, as case law at the national level of the EU 
Member States corroborates.
In the Netherlands, it is settled case law that functional or technical 
characteristics of a work – i.e. aspects of form that are determined by 
functional or technical demands – cannot attract copyright, as they fail to 
reflect the author’s subjective creativity. This has recently been confirmed 
by the Dutch Supreme Court in Kecofa v. Lancôme (2006) and Gavita v. 
Puutarhaliike Helle (2010). Most published cases in which functional and 
technical constraints play a role concern productions in the applied arts and 
industrial design, e.g. furniture, upholstery, utensils, fashion accessories. 
These categories of works reside more on the edge of copyright, as evidenced 
by their optional protection under Art. 2(7) of the Berne Convention and 
their special treatment in the copyright laws of countries such as Italy, 
where they attract copyright only if they have ‘inherent artistic value’, and 
the UK, where they receive copyright only if they f it the statutory categories 
of ‘artistic’ or ‘literary’ works (Bently and Sherman, 2009, pp. 679–681). 
However, they obviously are eligible for copyright protection, as explicit 
in the Dutch Copyright Act (Art. 10(1) under 11).
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The Dutch Supreme Court even assumes that works of applied art are 
subject to the same CJEU’s ‘author’s own intellectual creation’-test as all 
other creations, as is evident from three cases involving Stokke’s Tripp 
Trapp children’s chair (Stokke v. H3 Products, 2013, § 3.4(b); Stokke v. Fikszo, 
2013, § 4.2(b); Hauck v. Stokke, 2013, § 4.2(b)). In these cases, it was held that 
copyright may extend to technical or functional design if the author had 
suff icient room for making creative choices. Interestingly, the Supreme 
Court further ruled that also a selection of individually unprotected ele-
ments can attract copyright if it bears the author’s personal imprint (Stokke 
v. H3 Products, 2013, § 3.4(e); Stokke v. Fikszo, 2013, § 4.2(e); Hauck v. Stokke, 
2013, § 4.2(e)).
The latter is remarkable and, from a doctrinal viewpoint, not necessarily 
satisfactory. It testif ies to the move of copyright’s originality test towards a 
‘creative collection’-test. While before, creative collection was a concept at 
the macro level, designating an outlier category of works like anthologies and 
collections of texts, now it seemingly becomes a core concept at the micro 
level of the originality test. Of course, it can be argued that all protected works 
essentially consist of an ‘original’ combination of unprotected elements. 
Literary works are also made up of individual words that, taken in isola-
tion, are unprotected (Infopaq International, 2009, § 46) – safe perhaps for a 
few exceptional cases where new words might attract copyright (cf. Spoor, 
Verkade and Visser, 2005, p. 118). However, this comparison does not really fit.
The diff iculty is to establish the units, elements or resources from which 
to select. For example, saying that a written text is made up of ‘units’ of 
a language (a system of signs that encode information) or that a musical 
composition is made up of ‘elements’ of sounds (distinct manifestations of 
frequencies audible to the human ear) is not the same exercise as construct-
ing the ‘pool’ of possible units, elements or resources from which industrial 
design may be composed. In the latter case, it is not only the object, but 
also the function of the design and the constraints that this poses on the 
eventual form and materials used (including functional restraints like e.g. 
stackability of say garden furniture, and market-oriented restraints like 
limiting production costs) that determine the relevant pool of resources. 
The question is whether making such a distinction is feasible, as it requires 
a comparison of works of industrial design to a theoretical pool of possible – 
creative and/or functional – choices to ascertain whether the combination 
of elements of which such work is composed would represent a suff iciently 
‘original’ selection.
Legal reasoning on this point is not very well developed, probably because 
copyright covers such a vast array of cultural production. The ‘unit’ problem 
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is studied more in depth per category of work in other disciplines such as 
literary studies, visual arts, and f ilm studies. In copyright law, by contrast, 
resort is made to more general statements and sweeping comparisons 
that do not easily withstand scrutiny from expert domains within the 
humanities. In practice, what happened in the three Stokke cases is that the 
defendants unpacked various elements of form of the Tripp Trapp chair to 
show that they could not qualify as ‘original’. The Supreme Court, however, 
urged the Court of Appeal to look at the chair’s overall impression and 
to repack all elements to determine whether the collection of elements 
constituted an intellectual creation by the author. This question is often 
resolved by assessing how much creative space a designer had at his or her 
disposal when creating a work. Still, while the existence of creative space 
is a prerequisite for an author to make an ‘original’ creation, this does not 
of itself lead to the conclusion that the creation must therefore also be 
original. Instead, as will be argued below, courts should distinguish the 
presence of creative space from how it is used. An individual assessment 
of the use of space in expressive form should thus be the ultimate test for 
establishing originality.
Obviously, if a combination of unprotected elements is deemed suf-
f iciently original to attract copyright, then protection would only extend 
to the specif ic combination of unprotected elements. This means that 
competitors can create similar products using a different combination 
and/or a different set of protected or unprotected elements. The overall 
impression of the product must differ from that of the original. This needs 
to be determined by the facts of each case (Stokke v. H3 Products, 2013, § 
3.4(e)(f); Stokke v. Fikszo, 2013, § 4.2(e)(f); Hauck v. Stokke, 2013, § 4.2(e)(f)).
While this assumes that the scope of protection granted is ‘thin’, in 
practice, it is not without significance. Once a court in an infringement case 
accepts that a work attracts copyright, this also has consequences reach-
ing beyond the infringement case at hand. One important consequence is 
that, unless a copyright exception or limitation applies, third parties are 
prohibited from reproducing or communicating the work to the public (e.g., 
for advertising purposes or in a f ilm documentary or TV special) without the 
copyright owner’s consent. This may affect freedom of speech. It is unclear 
whether the Supreme Court realised this when drawing the originality 
criterion into copyright law’s infringement analysis, as it did in the Stokke 
cases. From a doctrinal viewpoint, it would have been better if the Court 
had more critically approached the question of whether copyright extends 
to combinations of unprotected elements, especially where it concerns 
products created under technical and functional constraints.
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Other creative constraints
Apart from functional and technical elements, the courts generally ac-
knowledge that copyright does not extend to mere facts, ideas or elements 
of style, but only protects original expression. In the landmark case of Van 
Gelder v. Van Rijn (1946), the Dutch Supreme Court ruled that a style or 
method of treatment that confers a specif ic artistic effect on an object – in 
this case: applying burn and steel-brushing techniques to create wooden 
sculptures – cannot attract copyright. This was reiterated in the Decaux 
v. Mediamax case (1995), where it was held that style, trends and fashion 
are not copyrightable, but that protection may extend to the author’s own 
individual way of expressing a design in a particular style, trend or fashion. 
In 2013, in the Broeren v. Duijsens-Kroezen case, the Supreme Court once 
more underlined that copyright does not protect style and further held 
that, save for exceptional circumstances, tort law does not grant protection 
against slavish imitation (slaafse nabootsing) of style. Doing so would harm 
the principle underlying the exclusion of style from copyright law, which 
is to foster cultural growth by ensuring that authors have enough freedom 
to build upon ideas and abstractions developed by others.
In practice, however, courts sometimes do recognise copyright in 
creations that balance on the edge of convergence of idea and expression. 
This includes productions like family board games and formats of TV 
programmes (Hugenholtz, 2012, pp. 44–45). Illustrative is that the courts 
in such cases often abstain from assessing whether authors, in expressing 
their works, exerted creative autonomy or whether the creative choices they 
made were rather informed by external considerations.
In the Impag v. Hasbro case (2001), for example, the Supreme Court upheld 
the ruling of the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam that, notwithstanding 
the uncopyrightability of game concepts, the design of family games like 
‘Jenga’ (a wooden tumbling stacking tower game), ‘Connect Four’ (a f irst to 
get four-in-a-row game) and ‘Guess Who?’ (a flip-and-f ind face game) was 
sufficiently original to attract copyright protection. As it concerned a case in 
summary proceeding, the Supreme Court accepted that the Court of Appeal 
had only briefly motivated its decision. Nevertheless, it is fairly remarkable 
that both courts overlooked that the concepts of most family games are 
based on early playing games that, if protectable, would be in the public 
domain. ‘Connect Four’, for example, is a variant of tic-tac-toe and tower 
building games have also been known for many centuries. Furthermore, 
the courts too easily glossed over the fact that the simplicity of many game 
concepts puts restraints on the execution of form. The creative choices 
involving the design of a stacking block tower game like ‘Jenga’, for instance, 
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leave little choice for variation. The blocks must be stackable, their height 
must exceed the average diameter of a f inger (but not too far), their surface 
must be smooth enough to allow their removal from the tower, and so on. 
In reality, therefore, the creative space for designing such a game is limited. 
This raises questions about how much creativity the designer truly exercised 
in creating the game, other than in developing and elaborating the game 
concept along technical or functional constraints.
As regards TV programme formats, in the Castaway v. Endemol case, the 
Court of Appeal of Amsterdam (2002) ruled that such formats might attract 
copyright if they are suff iciently elaborated in detail and their specif ic 
elements, which alone do not need to attract copyright, together form a 
‘unity’ with an own, original character. This decision, which was upheld by 
the Supreme Court in 2004, resembles the protection conferred on original 
combinations of unprotected elements in the three Stokke cases discussed 
above. In this case, which concerned the format of a reality TV show, the 
court identif ied twelve elements of the format and concluded that, together, 
these elements were suff iciently original to attract copyright. How the 
court arrived at this conclusion is unclear, but nothing in the judgment 
reveals that it examined how much of the format essentially resulted from 
the author’s own, subjective choices and how much of it was based on 
established conventions within the genre and thus resided outside the 
author’s autonomy. That is disappointing, because it could have shed more 
light on whether the format was really the author’s own intellectual crea-
tion. While in the end, the court did not f ind copyright infringement in this 
case, the fact that it gave the format the status of a copyrighted work may 
have consequences for third parties who wish to create similar formats for 
other reality TV shows. In this regard, it should be noted that it is debateable 
whether TV programme formats actually need copyright protection. As 
Stefan Bechtold (2013) argues, despite the diff iculty of claiming protection 
for TV show formats under intellectual property laws, the international 
trade in them is thriving. In practice, their protection is often jealously 
guarded through contracts and industry norms (Kretschmer, Singh and 
Wardle, 2009). This places question marks on the importance of copyright 
for protecting TV show formats in the f irst place.
In cases concerning the copyrightability of websites, the courts also 
look at the overall impression of webpages to consider whether they are 
suff iciently original. Sometimes protection is denied because a webpage 
mainly consists of elements that are also used on other websites (Social 
Deal v. Wowdeal, 2012) or because the design and layout of a webpage are 
too trivial and obvious to involve any type of creative labour (Union v. 
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Calleur, 2012). Other times protection is granted if the court f inds the text, 
design and layout of a webpage to suff iciently reflect the author’s creative 
choices, as the E2Ma v. Malicor case (2012) illustrates. Oddly, in this case, 
the District Court of Utrecht based its analysis on the choice and arrange-
ment of elements that, on closer inspection and save for individual texts 
and pictures, are common and basic features of webpages, such as the 
division and placement of texts and f ields, the use of banners, arrows and 
other indicators, the letter type, the colour pattern, et cetera. While such 
elements can be combined in various ways, the question remains whether 
the webpage design was the result of the author’s ‘free and creative choices’ 
or primarily informed by trends and audience expectations about how 
websites are logically organised.
Courts’ overly one-sided analysis of creative autonomy
The above examples reveal that examining creative constraints is usually 
not part of the court’s analysis when ascertaining the eligibility for protec-
tion of works. Dutch courts look at the creative space that is available, 
without actually observing how the space is used and whether, in the course 
of the creative process, the author has been restricted in any way. As a 
result, they evaluate whether creative space exists and then apparently 
assume that if it does, the way in which it is used automatically produces 
an original result of the author.
The CJEU seems to sanction that. In the Eva-Maria Painer case (2011, 
§§ 90–93), it generally observed that photographers of a school portrait 
photograph, ‘can make free and creative choices in several ways and at 
various points in its production’, thereby pointing at the possibility to f ix 
the background, pose, lighting and framing, choose the angle and atmos-
phere and use developing techniques or computer software. The CJEU then 
concluded rather one-dimensionally that school portrait photographers 
enjoy a considerable freedom to exercise their creative abilities, without 
considering that making portrait photographs also involves various creative 
constraints, as has been clearly demonstrated above. In the end, it was 
left for the national court to determine whether the photograph was an 
intellectual creation of the author reflecting his personality, but the positive 
way in which the CJEU constructed the creative space available to the 
author gives the impression that the national court could not simply deny 
protection to it.
In the Netherlands, a similar one-sided analysis of creative freedom 
led the district court of Haarlem to accept copyright in basic passport 
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photographs (X v. Ringfoto Nederland, 2010). The case concerned ‘old style’ 
passport photographs which did not have to meet the strict requirements 
for off icial passport photographs, e.g. no smiling, head kept straight, ear-
lobes visible, plain background, no head attire. The Court ruled that, in 
comparison to off icial passport photographs, the photographer had made 
‘various autonomous, subjective choices’ in producing the photo, including 
the cropping of the image, the posing of the portrayed person, the lighting 
of the face, and the f ixing of hair. It can be disputed, however, whether 
these choices were really part of the photographer’s creative freedom: they 
could have also been prompted by demands of the portrayed person, who 
probably was also responsible for f ixing his or her hair and perhaps even for 
choosing the pose. Moreover, the making of passport photos is often a highly 
standardised and automated process in a f ixed studio setting, making it 
questionable to what extent the photographer actually exercises creative 
freedom. Nevertheless, the Court held that there was enough space for 
making personal and creative choices and that the passport photo therefore 
qualif ied as an own intellectual creation.
This line of argument is remarkable and unsatisfactory, because it gives 
an incomplete picture of the creative autonomy exerted by authors. There 
are several possible explanations for the approach taken. One reason seems 
to lie in the low originality criterion itself. Since the design of creative 
products nearly always leaves some room for small variations, it is arguably 
harder for courts to establish that authors did in effect not exercise any 
creative autonomy than that they did. Creative space thus seems easier to 
demonstrate, or at least to assume, than creative constraints, especially 
in the absence of a clear appraisal by the courts of the creative process. In 
many cases, however, it is not feasible for a court to dig into every detail 
of each case, particularly when it concerns summary proceedings or when 
the list of judicial proceedings set down for trial is long. Judges may fur-
ther be confronted with poorly defended cases, where creative freedom is 
insuff iciently put into question. This may also have to do with the cost of 
expert witness testimonies and the fact that parties are not necessarily 
eager to accept instructions of proof. Lastly, courts may sometimes also 
be guided by notions of fairness or unjust enrichment, especially in cases 
where copyright is used as an instrument against competitors. This shows 
how policy considerations may affect the interpretation and application of 
legal concepts such as originality.
This is not to say that courts always ignore limits to creative autonomy. In 
the case of Doréma v. Isabella (1996), the Arnhem Court of Appeal declined 
copyright protection to caravan awnings because of the lack of originality. 
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The Court held that the different elements of the awnings, including the 
austere lines and simplicity of the design, the combination of colours, the 
dimensions, the circular canopy, and the layout of panes that creates a 
special light effect, were either technically or functionally determined, or 
elements of style, or existing features of known awnings produced by third 
parties, or clearly designed to f it in with current trends in the awning in-
dustry. Further, it found that the selection and combination of unprotected 
elements of which the caravan awnings were made up was insuff iciently 
original for vesting copyright. The awnings too much followed patterns and 
trends that are common in the caravan awning branch to constitute own 
intellectual creations eligible for copyright protection.
Similarly, in the case of Timans v. Haarsma et al., the Leeuwarden Court 
of Appeal refused to grant copyright to the design of basic, low-cost holiday 
homes, holding that the margins for designing them in an original way 
were too limited. The Court argued that Timans’ design was very similar 
to existing design traditions in holiday housing in the Netherlands and 
that, generally speaking, holiday homes must satisfy the same functional 
requirements. The Supreme Court, however, overruled this decision as it 
found that the Court of Appeal had erred in putting these considerations 
at the heart of its originality analysis (2006, § 3.7). It is unclear from the 
Supreme Court’s ruling whether it reversed the decision because the Court 
of Appeal had put relatively much weight to the ‘common fact’ of similar 
holiday homes having been built under similar circumstances (thus giving 
lesser importance to the specif ic facts of the case at hand), or because the 
Court of Appeal had recognised that the creative freedom in this case was 
marginal due to the constraints that designing basic holiday homes involves. 
The latter reasoning would be odd, at least in light of the current ‘author’s 
own intellectual creation’-test. If copyright is granted only to works that 
result from the author’s free and creative choices, then it would appear that 
protection must be denied whenever a court f inds that the author’s creative 
autonomy is restricted too tightly.
Personal touch: the author as key constituent of the originality test
A last key element of copyright law’s originality criterion is unmistakably 
the author. Pursuant to the CJEU’s case law, an intellectual creation is 
original if it reflects the author’s personality. To that end, the author must 
have left a personal imprint on the work (Eva-Maria Painer, 2011, §§ 88–89). 
This requirement applies not merely to cultural types of works, such as 
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books, music and works of art, but also to functional and technical types of 
works like computer programmes and databases, for which it seems difficult 
to determine in which elements the ‘personal touch’ of authors can be found. 
The CJEU has ruled, however, that such works must also bear the imprint 
of the author’s personality to attract copyright (Football Dataco, 2012, § 38).
This directly shows that the requirement of a ‘personal touch’ or ‘personal 
stamp’ is somewhat problematic. Only in certain aesthetic genres, such 
as high-end visual arts and music, would an (trained) audience recognise 
works as emanating from a specif ic person, or at least attribute it to him 
or her. Apart from the creator’s own, individual way of expressing him/
herself in a specif ic work, therefore, the notions of ‘personal touch’ and 
‘personal stamp’ cannot mean to signify an easily detectible ‘signature’ or 
personal ‘style’ of a creator, such as the style of painting of Vincent van Gogh. 
Similarly, these notions cannot be linked to individuality of personhood 
as in personal traits, habits or preferences of a creator that can be actually 
recognised in the work. Probably, the reflection of the author’s personality is 
merely required to show that the work must be the author’s own individual 
expression, i.e., that is must originate from the author in the sense of not 
being copied (see Laura Biron’s chapter in this book on the meaning of 
‘originating from’). Yet, this raises a broader diff iculty. If copyright law’s 
originality criterion is so tied to the individual author, how then must the 
original character of large-scale collaborative works, such as Wikipedia 
entries, be assessed?
This section examines how the courts deal with the requirement that 
a work must bear the personal imprint of the author to attract copyright. 
Do they f irst establish who the author is and what types of subjective 
choices he or she has made in producing the work? The CJEU’s originality 
test would arguably require such an analysis, but in reality, courts do not 
seem to systematically examine the question of authorship in assessing 
the originality of a work. This section then examines the question of how 
the originality of large-scale collaborative works must be determined if 
the co-contributors’ expressive marks are not readily ascertainable. This 
question is highly relevant to the digital environment, where works are 
increasingly produced in online creative communities or with the help of 
audience participation.
Who is the creator? And does that actually matter?
As observed above, the justif ication of copyright is largely premised on 
protecting the author as creator of the work. This personality-based justif i-
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cation materialises clearly in connection with moral rights, which concern 
the immaterial interest of authors to receive protection against acts that can 
damage or alter their work or harm their name or reputation. However, it is 
also reflected in the originality standard, which subjects copyright to the 
requirement that the work is the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ that 
exhibits his or her personality. This suggests that, to determine whether 
a work is suff iciently original, it is of utmost importance to know who is 
the creator and which subjective choices he or she has made during the 
creative process.
In the Netherlands, the Supreme Court has also emphasised that the 
bond between the author and the work matters in ascertaining originality. 
In the Van Dale v. Romme case (1991), which concerned the copyrightability 
of a list of headwords in a dictionary, it held that a collection of words by 
itself does not satisfy the originality test, because it consists of no more than 
factual data that as such do not attract copyright. It ruled that a collection 
of headwords would be eligible for protection only if it ‘were the result of a 
selection process expressing the author’s personal views’. By so ruling, it tied 
the originality test closely to the author’s individual creative endeavours.
In practice, however, the courts – especially those adjudicating cases 
at f irst instance and in summary proceedings – tend to disregard who 
actually created the work. Instead of looking at the work and the process 
that led to its creation to ascertain which creative choices have been made 
by the author, they ask themselves the theoretical question whether it is 
conceivable that two or more authors, independently from each other, create 
exactly the same work. If they consider this to be (nearly) impossible, then 
they typically assume that the work satisf ies the originality test (Eek BV v. 
Esfera, 2007). Otherwise, they will accept that the work lacks originality 
and deny protection to it (Social Deal v. Wowdeal, 2012). In such rulings, the 
courts clearly overlook the actual author in assessing whether a work is the 
author’s own intellectual creation.
The courts’ reliance on a hypothetical situation, whereby a comparison 
is made with other, f ictitious creators, seems to be based on doctrine 
developed in scholarly literature. One of the leading treatises on copyright 
law in the Netherlands suggests that, in practice, the courts can apply such 
a pragmatic comparison as a rule of thumb to determine whether a work 
meets the originality standard (Spoor, Verkade and Visser, 2005, p. 66). 
While it may ease the originality analysis, such an approach is not entirely 
satisfactory, since it virtually eliminates the author from the originality 
test. Applying a hypothetical comparison of this kind means that courts 
only consider whether subjective choices can be made, without actually 
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examining whether creative choices have been made by the author during 
the production of the work.
Therefore, it is undesirable if the rule of thumb is used as a stand-alone 
criterion for establishing originality, as Spoor, Verkade and Visser (2005) 
themselves admit. They warn against the risk that the courts may lose 
sight of ‘the relationship between author and work, which is the foundation 
of copyright’ (p. 73). Moreover, they argue that, if applied too strictly, the 
rule of thumb may convert the originality test into an analysis of whether 
a creation is considered ‘statistically unique’ (p. 66), which is an argument 
about the distinctiveness of works, not about the author’s use of the available 
creative space. In the Technip v. Goossens case (2006), the Supreme Court 
also considered that the answer to ‘the question whether it is inconceivable 
that two (teams of) scientists, working independently from each other, 
would have arrived at the same selection … is but one of the viewpoints to 
be considered in assessing [originality]’ (§ 3.5).
Nonetheless, since the rule of thumb is mentioned in a leading treatise on 
copyright and the Supreme Court, by presenting it as ‘one of the viewpoints 
to be considered’, has recognised that courts may base their originality 
analysis on it, it is not unlikely that the rule enters the mind-set of judges 
who must decide on the copyrightability of works, as the above cases il-
lustrate. Thus, it cannot be excluded that courts assess the originality of a 
work by ascertaining whether it is virtually unrepeatable, rather than by 
examining whether it results from the author’s free and creative choices.
Still, there are examples of courts adjourning a ruling if they want more 
information about the ‘chain of authorship to copyright owner’. In its in-
terim decision in the case of Inspirion v. Pokonobe et al. (2011), for instance, 
the District Court of The Hague required the defendant, the producer of the 
tower game ‘Jenga’, to deliver proof of the chain of title. Although this was 
not to examine the author’s role in creating the work but to demonstrate 
copyright ownership, the f inal verdict (2012) reveals that, in the end, the 
court took notice of the right owner’s statements on the chain of title about 
how the author had made own, subjective choices in the process of creating 
the game. However, this did not help the plaintiff who claimed that the 
‘Jenga’ game could not attract copyright. The court found both the design 
of the game and the elaboration of the game concept to be suff iciently 
original to attract copyright, thereby arguing that ‘other choices are pos-
sible’. Competitors could, for example, make the tower round or rectangular. 
As observed above, while other creative choices are probably feasible, in 
general, the creative space for designing a game like ‘Jenga’ is restricted. A 
round or rectangular stacking tower most probably has entirely different 
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stacking properties, so the shape of the game clearly affects the play. Hence, 
the court could have entertained a much more critical approach to the 
question of originality in this case.
Moreover, there are cases where the courts deny copyright protection to a 
work while the authorship status is obscure. In the Melano v. Quiges Fashion 
Jewels case (2013), for example, the Court of Appeal of ’s-Hertogenbosch 
dismissed a claim for copyright in pieces of jewellery with interchangeable 
coloured elements on the ground that the plaintiff insuff iciently substanti-
ated the authorship of the jewellery and the required personal stamp of the 
author. This stands in contrast to the SEVV v. AY Illuminate case (2010), where 
the District Court of Amsterdam held that the plaintiffs, of which it was 
sufficiently convinced that they were the actual creators, had made creative 
choices in designing decorative lamps with comparable, interchangeable 
elements.
In the end, the outcomes of court proceedings will obviously depend on 
a variety of factors, including the value of the case, the resources available 
to argue it, the way the facts are presented to the courts, the strengths 
or weaknesses of arguments entertained by lawyers defending the case, 
et cetera. However, the manner in which the originality test is applied 
and interpreted is clearly also of relevance. As can be derived from the 
case law above, courts do not consistently and systematically review the 
rudimentary questions of who is the author of a work and whether free 
and creative choices have been made in the course of its creation. This is 
remarkable. If courts need to resolve whether an intellectual creation is 
truly the author’s own, as the CJEU’s originality test seems to imply, then it 
would appear that these questions must be an integral part of the analysis 
of whether or not a work qualif ies for copyright protection.
Personal touch in collaborative works
The reflection of the personality of authors seems more diff icult, if not 
impossible, to identify in large-scale collaborative productions. Traditional 
examples are f ilm, TV and theatre productions. Often, but not always, 
these are created within more or less tightly organised structures with 
a more or less specif ied division of roles among the actors involved. In 
the online environment, examples abound of productions that are co-
created within online communities. This includes open source software 
and collaborative projects like Wikipedia and other wikis. Outwardly, these 
projects have a less strict division of roles, but that does not mean that they 
lack organisational structure. On the contrary, within Wikipedia, there 
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is a complex hierarchical division of developers, stewards, bureaucrats, 
administrators, registered users, and anonymous contributors, which is 
not immediately visible (Pink, 2005; Reagle, 2010, pp. 126–127; O’Neil, 2011, 
p. 314). Furthermore, online communities often share a set of norms and 
ethics, guided by principles of etiquette on how to work with others in 
the community and by requirements on attribution, modif ication and 
exploitation of the output (Kelty, 2008; Reagle, 2010). This illustrates that 
in online collaborative projects, there is also control over the manner of 
participation of individual contributors.
Other examples are user-generated productions that involve the public 
in creating a movie, book, song or other type of work. Sometimes, these 
projects are led by known artists, such as Paul Verhoeven’s f ilm project 
Entertainment Experience, which won an International Digital Emmy 
Award in 2013. This project involves the audience in creating the script and 
scenarios, composing the music, acting, directing and f ilming and editing 
the f inal product. In the end, two movies will be created: one completely 
user-generated movie and one user-inspired movie directed by Paul Verhoe-
ven and his team. Other examples are the twitter book Wie een kuil graaft, 
which was drawn up by Simon de Waal on the basis of hundreds of tweets 
of different people, and the Koningslied, a song composed by John Ewbank 
for the instalment of King Willem-Alexander of the Netherlands, to which 
many citizens contributed by proposing lyrics. But there are also myriads 
of examples of user-created productions that do not involve one or more 
main artists directing, editing or f inalising the end-results, but that purely 
rely on self-governance and editorial control within creative communities.
When it comes to ascertaining the personal touch of authors in collabora-
tive creations, it seems that a distinction should be drawn between works 
created under the direction or guidance of one or more leading authors and 
works of which it is nearly impossible to identify who of the authors were 
in creative control. For the purpose of establishing whose personal touch is 
reflected in the work, so as to resolve whether the threshold for copyright 
is met, it is convenient if one of more creative leaders can be identif ied, as 
it seems reasonable to assume that, one way or the other, they will have 
left their personal imprint on the work. On the other hand, the fact that no 
creative leader can be identif ied does not mean that works produced by 
large-scale creative communities lack originality in a copyright sense. For 
the latter types of works, it is more suitable to assess the group level creativ-
ity than to unpack the creative choices made by the various individual 
creative co-contributors when it comes to ascertaining the existence of 
creative space and how is it used.
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The personal touch of distinct creative leaders
Who counts as a leading contributor to a joint work depends on various 
circumstances and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Legal rules 
on co-authorship are not necessarily useful in drawing distinctions between 
co-creators, as the focus must lie on identifying the natural creative persons 
who are the source of the work’s original character. Furthermore, as Lionel 
Bently’s chapter in this book clearly shows, there may be a disparity between 
who legally counts as a co-author and who is recognised as a co-creator in 
specif ic businesses or particular f ields of practice.
In general, however, it seems that artists whose names are attached to 
a work, such as Paul Verhoeven, Simon de Waal and John Ewbank in the 
above-mentioned examples, can be reckoned among the leading creators, 
unless they have merely lent their name and reputation to it for marketing 
or identif ication purposes. Yet, if they are seriously involved in the creative 
process, they probably have had an important, if not ultimate, saying in 
the creative decision-making. This is relevant, because the personal touch 
of authors who had a f inal say on the f inished product is likely to reflect 
better in a work than the personal touch of those who made relatively small 
creative contributions.
This is also recognised in contemporary cinema, where the director is 
often assumed to be the creator who has the ‘f inal cut’ and thus deserves 
to be credited as the main author of a f ilm, even though many other 
creators collaborated on it. According to this auteur theory, ‘there is a 
guiding, dominant, creative identity that is responsible for the essence 
and personality of the work’, such as the f ilm producer or actor but, more 
frequently, the director (Cahir, 2006, pp. 86-90). It is debatable whether 
such an auteur cinema concept f its new forms of f ilmmaking, including 
user-aided f ilm projects like the Entertainment Experience. Probably it 
would still f it the user-inspired movie that Paul Verhoeven directs, but 
not the entirely user-generated version that comes out of the project. It 
may not be easy to establish who counts as authors of the latter types of 
productions, or whose personal imprints they reflect. As Paul Sellors has 
argued with respect to collective authorship in f ilm, the question of who 
counts as an author ultimately depends on the contribution that is made 
to the f ilmic utterance, whether that be ‘the f ilm’s authorial body, [or] the 
number of authored components that contribute to the overall f ilm’ (2007, 
pp. 269–270).
The fact that a main artist or director leads a project does not mean 
that he or she is solely responsible for making creative choices. Except 
perhaps for the twitter book, many individuals were creatively involved at 
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different stages of the user-aided projects mentioned above. For example, 
John Ewbank worked together with Dutch artists like Alain Clark, Guus 
Meeuwis, Jack Poels and Daphne Deckers in arranging, editing and writing 
the lyrics for the Koningslied. Paul Verhoeven’s Entertainment Experience 
likewise involves a team of creative specialists including an art director, a 
casting director, a scriptwriter, a script doctor, and a composer.
The question remains, however, whether the creators assisting the prin-
cipal artist will necessarily also make creative choices that are expressed 
in the f inal product’s form. Whether creative collaborators can thus leave 
a personal imprint on a f inished work depends on the nature and closeness 
of the collaboration. Vera John-Steiner writes in her book Creative Col-
laboration that, through intellectual and artistic collaboration, individuals 
can develop ‘thought communities’ in which the participants ‘construct 
mutuality and productive interdependence’ with the aim ‘to develop a 
shared vision as well as achieve jointly negotiated outcomes’ (2000, p. 196). 
‘Thought communities’ of this kind vary from loosely organised distributed 
collaborations with a common interest, such as online discussion forums; to 
symbiotic partnerships dividing labour ‘based on complementary expertise, 
disciplinary knowledge, roles, and temperament’; to steady family collabora-
tions with flexible and interchangeable roles; to integrated collaborations 
where partners interact during ‘a prolonged period of committed activity’ 
with a ‘desire to transform existing knowledge, thought styles, or artistic 
approaches into new visions’ (ibid., pp. 197–204).
It seems that the stronger the creative collaboration is, the more the 
f inal work will reflect the joint personal imprint of the collaborators. Eva 
Novrup Redvall describes this clearly in her work on screenwriting in Dan-
ish f ilmmaking (2009). She followed the scriptwriting process of the feature 
f ilm Lille soldat, on which director Annette K. Oleson and scriptwriter 
Kim Fupz Aakeson worked together ‘all the way from an original idea to 
not only the f inal draft of the script, but also to the f inished f ilm with the 
writer also often being brought in during the “rewriting” of the f ilm in 
the f inal editing’ (ibid., p. 36). The f ilm being based on a shared vision of 
director and scriptwriter, she concludes that such intense collaboration 
challenges ‘the traditional notion of a f ilm being the personal statement 
of one auteur’ (ibid., p. 52). While the director still had the f inal say in the 
decision-making, ‘the f inished f ilm is very much the unique result of two 
people with complementary skills … creating something that they could 
never have created by themselves’ (Redvall, 2010, p. 76).
This raises the question whether joint subjective traces of co-creators 
also count as a reflection of the ‘personal stamp’ necessary for establishing 
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copyright protection. It seems that copyright law indeed recognises a per-
sonal stamp, not only of individual creators, but also of groups of creators. 
Otherwise it would be impossible to explain how it could protect works of 
co-creators who constructed a hybrid subjective work on the basis of a joint 
vision. At the same time, however, it seems that the larger the group creation 
is, the more awkward it is to require a reflection of a ‘personal stamp’ of 
the creators as a condition for copyright protection, as the next section on 
large-scale (online) creative collaborations will illustrate.
The personal touch of contributors in creative communities
The requirement that copyright only vests in works that bear the personal 
imprint of their creators does not correspond well with creations that are 
produced by a myriad of different co-creators. How can the user-generated 
movie created in the context of the Entertainment Experience project reflect 
the personal touches of the numerous contributors who sent in their sug-
gestion for a plot, the script, the music or perhaps even actual f ilm footage? 
How about the persons who submitted tweets for the twitter book or lines 
of lyrics for the Koningslied? In these examples, it can still be asserted that 
the principal artists have left their personal imprint in the work, but in 
many other examples it is diff icult to identify the leading contributors. 
That is frequently the case with programmers developing open source 
software and contributors writing entries on Wikipedia. Socially, culturally 
or economically speaking, such group creations are certainly as signif icant 
as other types of creations, but from a copyright perspective, they sit quite 
uneasily with the requirement that they must reflect the personal touch 
of their creators to attract protection. Although copyright has never been 
denied on these grounds, because usually courts merely take account of the 
existence of creative space without observing the contributions of actual 
creators (as was set out above), it is fairly remarkable that such large-scale 
creative collaborations are not well accommodated in the wording of the 
‘author’s own intellectual creation’-test for copyright.
Even a small individual contribution can be copyrighted on its own 
accord, if it is the author’s own intellectual creation that somehow reflects 
his or her personality. In the Infopaq International case (2009, §§ 46–47), the 
CJEU held that the expression of the author’s intellectual creation can be 
reflected in isolated sentences, or even parts of sentences, of a work such as 
a newspaper article. This means that, to the extent that copyright applies, 
permission may be required for including individual contributions in a joint 
work. For works created in online communities, such permission is usually 
explicitly or implicitly given when the contributions are submitted. That 
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is not to say, however, that authors whose contributions are used would 
then immediately also be entitled to copyright protection in the joint work. 
Whether that is the case depends on legal rules on co-authorship, which 
vary between different jurisdictions (cf. Ginsburg, 2003; Van Eechoud, et 
al., 2009, pp. 236–243; Margoni and Perry, 2012).
Irrespective of the rules on co-authorship, for the purpose of establishing 
whether the originality threshold is met, it is immensely diff icult to identify 
the personal touch of each individual contributor in insignif icantly small 
parts of a f inal production, such as parts of a sentence in a twitter book 
or in lyrics of a song, even if, in isolation, these parts would reflect (some 
of) the author’s personality. In the broader creative context, such small 
individual contributions merely constitute the building blocks from which 
the f inal work is created. This may be different, however, if a personal 
contribution is independently recognisable and occupies a prominent place 
in a work, for instance, as the opening line or refrain of a song. In such case, 
the work probably will reflect the personal touch of the individual creator 
who contributed the specif ic lyrics.
The diff iculty remains how to deal with large-scale collaborative produc-
tions, such as entries on Wikipedia and open source software, which are 
often created by numerous, sometimes anonymous, contributors and which 
are constantly being updated by other, subsequent contributors. Here, 
the problem is not only to ascertain the identity of the different creative 
co-contributors, but also to determine the ‘work’ or ‘unit’ of which the 
original character is established. As is argued in Van Eechoud’s chapter 
on adaptation in this book, for these types of works (as well as for drafts, 
versions and spin offs of other types of creative works), there is an important 
temporal aspect to the determination of originality. Because the group of 
co-creators changes over time, the question is at which point in time is the 
original character tested?
The example of Wikipedia can illustrate this. When a new Wikipedia 
entry is started, it will almost certainly reflect the personal touch of the 
f irst contributor (unless he or she has copied it from another person’s work). 
The personal imprint of subsequent contributors that substantially change 
the entry or add sections later on may perhaps also still be recognisable in 
it. However, the more the entry is elaborated on, the more pertinent the 
question becomes how much space is left for subsequent contributors to 
leave a personal stamp on it. Being part of a group effort not only creates 
restrictions for individual choice, but succeeding contributors also seem to 
be constrained by the creative choices that others have made before them. 
Over time, the entry may undergo changes by so many different people 
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that recognisable personal imprints of earlier co-creators can completely 
be erased by alterations of later contributors.
This shows that it can be very challenging to ascertain whether a Wiki-
pedia entry is suff iciently original to attract copyright protection. Perhaps 
this can be meaningfully done only at the stage of a copyright infringement 
analysis, when it is exactly known from which version the allegedly infring-
ing work is copied. However, even then, the requirement that Wikipedia 
entries must bear the personal imprint of their creators to attract copyright 
may raise diff iculties. If this requirement is interpreted too literally, this 
may imply that, through the course of time, an entry that once attracted 
copyright protection may lose protection, should the personal touch that 
links the entry to the various co-creators have evaporated due to successive 
changes. Moreover, if too much weight were put on the constraints faced by 
subsequent contributors who elaborate on existing entries, then copyright’s 
originality test would arguably set a higher threshold for large-scale col-
laborative works than for single-authored works. It seems that these are 
unjustif iable consequences, which copyright law does not wish to draw.
Accordingly, the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’-test seems inapt 
for determining the eligibility for copyright protection of large-scale col-
laborative productions, at least as far as it requires an unpacking of creative 
choices of individual co-contributors. If copyright would depend on how 
the personality of individual co-creators is ref lected in a collaborative 
work, then this could have the unintended result that no protection may be 
granted, if due to the large number of contributors or the successive changes 
that have been made over time, the work unduly expresses the personal 
touches of the various co-contributors. For large-scale collaborative produc-
tions, it would be better to focus on group level creativity when it comes to 
ascertaining both the existence of creative space and how is it used. The 
increasing body of literature on group creativity (e.g. John-Steiner, 2000; 
Paulus and Nijstad, 2003; Sawyer, 2007; Mannix, Nealeand and Goncalo, 
2009) can perhaps provide helpful guidance in this respect.
Conclusion
Originality in copyright law is a loose, but certainly not a meaningless, 
criterion. To attract copyright, a work does not have to be new, innovative 
or unique in comparison with other works in the same symbolic domain. 
The only requirement is that the work is the ‘author’s own intellectual 
creation’. Drawing upon studies in the humanities and social sciences, 
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this chapter has reviewed copyright law’s originality test and the ‘free and 
creative choices’ and ‘personal touch’ requirements that are part of it. It 
follows from this analysis that copyright law’s understanding of originality 
can only partly be informed by aesthetics and creativity studies. In these 
disciplines and sub-disciplines within them, the meanings of ‘creativity’ 
and ‘originality’ are much more vague and plural than in copyright law. 
Moreover, they generally apply a more novelty-oriented originality test 
that requires works to creatively stand out against comparable works in 
the same domain. Thus, other than in copyright law, where originality is 
tested solely on the basis of a work itself, most disciplines in aesthetics and 
creativity studies treat originality and creativity as relative or comparative 
concepts. If a novelty-oriented originality test were introduced in copyright 
law, this would completely overturn the core principle on which the system 
rests, namely that a work attracts copyright as long as it can be regarded as 
the own intellectual creation of the author.
Even so, the humanities can provide some valuable insights to reach more 
f ine-tuned decisions about protecting original works of authorship. If atten-
tion is focused on the autonomy that authors enjoy in creative processes, 
then it becomes apparent that, in practice, it is not always a given that a 
work results from the author’s free and creative choices. Creators are often 
constrained by audience expectations (e.g. about a logical organisation 
and order of things), trends, rules of the genre, utilitarian considerations, 
et cetera. Apart from excluding from protection elements of works that 
are technically or functionally def ined or that resemble ideas rather than 
expression, however, Dutch courts do not systematically examine whether 
creative choices were made freely or whether they were informed by out-
side constraints. They merely look at the available creative space, without 
observing whether the creative autonomy was inhibited in any way. That 
is remarkable. If free and creative choices made within the available space 
are part and parcel of the originality test, then courts need to acknowledge 
this in their analysis of copyrightability and dismiss those elements of a 
work that leave no room for creative choices or that are inspired by other 
motives than creativity.
This does not mean that in cases where creation is guided by technical 
or functional considerations or audience expectations, authors cannot 
produce works with an own, original character, as the Dutch Supreme Court 
confirmed in the MB v. Mattel case about the copyrightability of Barbie dolls 
(1992). However, to determine whether a functional work attracts copyright, 
it cannot merely be observed whether there was space for making free and 
creative choices. Such space almost always exists, at least to some degree. 
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To demonstrate originality, the question should be answered whether the 
author has made use of the creative space to produce an intellectual creation 
that can be considered the author’s own. For this purpose, courts should 
take more account of the creative decision-making process. In addition, the 
law could perhaps impose a higher burden of proof on authors who seek 
copyright protection to better substantiate their claim by demonstrating 
their use of creative space in expressive form.
Moreover, the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’-test for copyright is so 
tied to the author as the individual creator of a work that it raises diff iculties 
for determining the eligibility for protection of large-scale collaborative 
productions. The requirement that copyright only vests in works that bear 
the ‘personal imprint’ of their creators is especially problematic for group 
creations. Perhaps such a personal imprint can still be assumed if a joint 
work involves one or more creative leaders who have a f inal say on the 
f inished product. However, if no main authors can be identif ied or if the 
work is in a constant process of evolution, as is typically the case for Wiki-
pedia entries and open source software, the current originality test creates 
problems. A f irst diff iculty arises in relation to the question at which point 
in time is the original character tested. Since the group of co-contributors 
changes over time, this is a relevant question if the individual contributions 
matter for ascertaining originality. Taking apart the creative contribution 
of each individual co-author would moreover create a supplemental set of 
functional limitations at the level of the individual, because being part of 
a group effort undeniably creates restrictions for individual choice. This 
would imply a higher threshold for joint works than for single-authored 
works. Since copyright must not punish group creation, when it comes to 
ascertaining the existence of creative space and how is it used in large-scale 
collaborative productions, the originality test should rather focus on group 
level creativity than on individual creative choices.
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 Adapting the work
Mireille van Eechoud
When the Dutch government commissioned off icial portraits in the run-up 
to the investiture of Willem-Alexander as king of The Netherlands in 2013, 
artist Iris van Dongen was among the twelve artists asked to make a study. 
She based her work on a photograph she had found on the internet, without 
informing artist-photographer Koos Breukel, let alone asking him permis-
sion. To the average observer the similarities are striking. Van Dongen and 
two other artists went on to win the competition to make a state portrait of 
the new king. Breukel was not amused to see Van Dongen’s study exhibited 
in the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam. A public row ensued (Ribbens, 2014), 
which ended not in court but with apologies and a settlement: Van Dongen 
gave Breukel the study on loan (Mondriaanfonds, 2014).
More famous examples that did make it to the court room are controver-
sies over art in the US. The high visibility legal actions against Jeff Koons 
and appropriation artist Richard Prince come to mind. Both were sued 
for taking pre-existing photographs and then turning them into different 
artworks – Koons created the String of puppies sculpture, Prince produced 
the collages and paintings in the Canal Zone exhibition using Cariou’s 
Rasta images. Koons was held to have infringed Art Rogers’ copyright in 
the photo (Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992)). In the Prince case the 
district court found copyright infringement, but on appeal Prince’s fair use 
defense was honoured. The appeals court found that under applicable US 
copyright law standards most of the collages are sufficiently transformative 
and therefore not infringing.1 The works give ‘Cariou’s photographs a new 
expression, and employ new aesthetics with creative and communicative 
results distinct from Cariou’s’ (Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), 
p. 15). Of the f ive works which only show minimal alterations compared to 
the source photographs, the appeals court remanded for the district court 
to make the call on fair use (see Allen 2013 for a compilation of all court 
documents). The court never had to because Prince and Cariou agreed a 
settlement, the details of which remain undisclosed (Boucher, 2014).
These are US cases, and the European legal traditions that I will focus 
on here recognise certain free uses that under US law would constitute 
‘fair use’, such as parody and quoting for purposes of criticism or review. 
But generally speaking, the copyright laws of European countries know 
only a limited number of exempt uses, setting out exactly which acts do 
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not require authorisation from the copyright owner. What this implies for 
the legality of various kinds of borrowings, adaptations and appropriations 
will be taken up later.
Most copyright lawyers in Europe would probably have little trouble ar-
guing that takings of the kinds described above constitute an infringement 
of the copyrights in the source works. Artists themselves obviously hold a 
range of different beliefs about the freedom they have (or ought to have) 
to borrow. Richard Prince challenges the notion of intellectual property 
outright. That was never more obvious than from his recent piece, a faithful 
copy of the f irst edition of J.D. Salinger’s Catcher in the Rye in all respects 
but authorship credit: Prince substituted his name as author (Gordon, 2012).
Marlene Dumas based her painting Nuclear Family on a photograph by 
(friend) Van Noord, who incidentally was rather pleased to f ind his work 
had inspired hers. When asked whether this was not plagiarism Dumas 
responded: ‘In my view plagiarism is a literary term. You can copy a text 
literally, it stays the same medium, but my painting is built out of strokes 
of paint, it is such a different “thing”. You can see this best when you show 
a detail of the painting next to a detail of the photograph. Then the differ-
ences appear instead of the resemblances. They are two worlds.’2 (quoted in 
Cohen, 2014). From the perspective of art this might be true. The medium 
and genre in which a work is expressed matter to artists when it comes to 
the acceptability of borrowing.
Copyright laws have much less nuance. The author has the exclusive right 
of copying and adaptation, to which there are limited exceptions. In popular 
culture too, the rigidity of copyright notions is at odds with social practices 
of borrowing. The rise of ‘user generated content’ such as fan f iction, video 
parodies, artifacts in virtual games, blogs and music remixes has led to 
intense debate on the need for more flexible copyright law, a cause for which 
Standford law professor Lessig is a celebrity champion, authoring influential 
books such as The Culture of Ideas (2002) and Remix (2008). The rise of 
social media platforms shows it is now common for individuals to construct 
and communicate online identities. We do this not just by producing our 
own texts. The copy/pasting and forwarding of image, text and audio is 
an integral part of it too. The distinction between writing and rewriting 
blurs. Continual processes of writing and rewriting are key features too of 
what in recent years has become mainstream social production: large-scale 
networked collaboration to create information resources (Wikipedia is a 
prime example of course) and software. Copyright laws have not kept pace 
with these developments.
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My focus in this piece is on the interplay between the legal concepts of 
work, copy and adaptation in light of the now ubiquitous ‘new’ forms or 
genres of works that online networks enabled. Can European copyright 
law accommodate the increased f luidity of some of these work genres? 
What avenues might be taken to attenuate the gap between legal and social 
practices? Is a more flexible system of limitations enough? Or do we need 
a wholesale rethink of the work concept? Might a more relaxed notion of 
copying and especially of adapting suff ice? What would that mean for the 
kind of copyright infringement analysis courts engage in? My ambition is 
to explore potential avenues for reform, and in doing so take on board some 
insights from non-legal disciplines, notably genre and adaptations studies.
In the f irst part of this chapter I highlight the relationships that exist in 
most laws between the status of copies and adaptations, and discuss some 
challenges with the notion of adaptation when it comes to fluid works. In 
the second part, the focus is on how precisely the relationship work, copy, 
adaptation is encoded in copyright law. As all EU Member States share the 
norms of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Liteary and Artistic 
Property of 1886, I start there. But the Berne Convention and its satellite 
WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996 show the signs of being the product of more 
than a century of multiple rounds of drafting and political compromise: its 
treatment of adaptations is patchy.
The making of copyright policy is a thoroughly European affair because of 
the effect diverging national intellectual property laws have on the common 
market. Still, twenty-f ive years of piecemeal harmonisation has resulted in 
a corpus of directives that leave plenty of uncertainty about the scope of 
the right to control adaptations. I will therefore consider how a number of 
laws of EU Member States shape the relationship between work, adaptation 
and copies and how this affects infringement analysis. In the f inal third 
part, I will examine some roads that might be taken to effectuate changes 
to the law.
Fluid works, discrete adaptations
Transformative, derivative, secondary, reworked, reproduced, translated, 
recast, altered, arranged works: these are but a few (translations) of the 
terms used in law and beyond to describe what I shall denote as ‘adapta-
tions’. For students of literature and f ilm, the latter term might have a 
strong connotation with the practice of creating a f ilm on the basis of a 
novel or play (or vice versa). But I use adaptation as the more general term 
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that covers the realm beyond mere direct copying, that of the reworking of 
works whether in text, image or sound. When I speak of ‘copying’ it refers 
to taking verbatim or literal parts.
Traditionally, a distinction is made in law between copying a work and 
adapting it. The exclusive right to copy (reproduction) essentially pertains 
to the f ixation of a work in a tangible form (Spoor, 2012, p. 206). Copying 
then is the more straightforward act that requires the author’s permission. 
It is the production of ‘mechanical’ copies of the work in the analogue world, 
as well as digital ones. It might be a complete copy or a partial one. It might 
involve a ‘technical’ kind of format shifting, like encoding a music f ile in 
a different f ile-type, or resizing an image to make it f it a certain layout.
If the work is modif ied in other ways, as was done in by artists Koons, 
Dumas, Prince and Van Dongen, the relationship between the earlier and 
later work is more complex. The right of adaptation is about changing the 
work as an immaterial object, that is the original intellectual creation that 
is taken to exist seperately from the (physical) form. Whether modification 
without permission infringes depends on the treatment of elements or 
features that give the source work its original character. In a nutshell, if on 
comparison enough characteristic elements of the source are recognisable 
in the later work, the latter is infringing. A change of medium, or reworking 
in the same medium offers no escape. Unless of course the source work 
is no longer in copyright, or a defense is available under the limitations 
recognised by the applicable law, for example on copying for private study, 
on free use for parody purposes or incidental uses.
The distinction between copies and modif ication matters for two rea-
sons. The f irst is that copying does not give rise to new rights, whereas the 
making of an adaptation often will. Standards of originality required for 
copyright protection are low, so the adaptation will qualify as a protected 
work itself. The second reason is that copying without permission – in whole 
or in part – will normally infringe whereas creating something on the basis 
of another work without literal copying might not.
A modif ication might qualify as a protected work in its own right, the 
second author being the copyright owner. A layering effect then arises, 
because with each exploitation of the second work the rights in the source 
work are at play as well. In principle this layering can build up over sub-
sequent adaptations, of adaptations, of adaptations, until such time when 
the resemblance between earlier and later works are so remote as to not be 
legally relevant anymore. The notion of adaptation makes sense in situa-
tions where there is one source work, and a follow-on creation that comes 
distinctly later in time. The concept becomes diff icult to operationalise 
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if there are multiple source works involved, or if a ‘work’ is continually 
updated or consists of versions that are created simultaneously or in quick 
succession. Think of the edits to Wikipedia entries, or daily updates of 
many software programmes. Does it make sense to view each version as a 
subsequent adaptation of the f irst version, or is there a web of adaptations?
In the sphere of the arts, collages are a good example. If a collage contains 
bits of different pre-existing works, does that make the collage an adapta-
tion of each source work? And what to make of interactive works, like 
‘database documentaries’ that consist of a series of tracks or guided paths 
through one or a number of (virtual) databases containing various types of 
items (e.g. static text, image, sound, live feeds) that allow the reader/viewer 
to ‘create’ his own documentary (Burdick et al., 2012)? Is each ‘path’ a copy 
or adaptation, and of what exactly? What constitutes the work in such cases, 
all of the potential instantiations combined? Copyright laws provide no 
clear answers because of its traditional orientation on materially distinct 
forms. Although what copyright ultimately protects is the (immaterial) 
intellectual creation, for assessing the work’s boundaries it is still easiest 
to consider a distinct material form.
In the history of copyright, technological developments have always 
caused debate about how (and if) copyright laws should accommodate new 
kinds of cultural production. But the problem was never really so much 
with the form, the boundaries of new works. Notable instances are the 
debates on photography in the 19th century, f ilm in the early 20th century 
and computer programmes from the 1970s onwards. In all these cases, 
there was initial hesitation about bringing them into the copright domain 
because of their perceived ‘functional’ or ‘technical’ character – as opposed 
to aesthetic qualities. Ultimately all were accepted into the fold. Reasoning 
by analogy proved a powerful tool: Photography is similar to graphic art, 
painting, and other types of imagery that copyright already protected. Once 
photographs were accorded work status, then surely f ilms – sequences of 
images – must benefit too.3 Computer programmes are forms of text, and 
copyright protected all kinds of writings, so authors of this new form should 
not be discriminated against, the argument runs.
What of the transition from analogue to digital then? Confronted with 
new work forms spawned by digital technologies, copyright scholars in the 
1980-1990s considered how ‘multimedia’ works consisting of image, text, 
sound and software f itted in the copyright system, and whether computer-
generated productions posed particular problems of authorship and origi-
nality. In the main, again through reasoning by analogy, the conclusion was 
that there was no fundamental problem with work status. There might be 
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diff iculties with the application of national rules written for specif ic genres 
of works, e.g. how to apply specif ic national rules for co-ownership in f ilm 
to multimedia productions, but no fundamental problems were foreseen.
What the transition from analogue to digital meant for the concept of a 
work as a stable, clearly identif iable entity seems to have remained below 
the radar of mainstream legal scholarship for quite some time. Although 
in most instances, it will remain easy to identify a ‘discrete work in reality’ 
(Hyperion Records v Warner Music, cited in Griff iths, 2013), there seems to 
be a growing number of situations in which it becomes diff icult to do so. 
Works become dynamic rather than static. The modular production of 
works, constant updating and revising, and open-ended nature of creations 
pose challenges to the concepts of work, copy and adaptation. David Sewell 
(2009) recounts how since the 1990s the openendedness and incompleteness 
of digital work(s) is often celebrated in literary studies and new media 
studies. Academic publishers of course struggle to deal with these digital 
born objects. The prevailing expectation among authors and readers alike 
still is that a publication has to be ‘done’ before being published.
Especially in networked collaborative environments, the notion of a 
stable, f inished work is problematic. Legal notions of work and adaptation 
might not have changed yet, but practice has adapted to the new realities 
of networked digital production already, as is evident from succesful peer 
production projects. The open-ended collaborative creation that character-
ises the famous encyclopedia Wikipedia and open source software projects 
like Linux, but also modular e-learning resources like Openstax4 is only 
possible because of ‘copyleft’ collective management schemes: the inventive 
use of copyright to impose standardised terms of use across communities or 
contributors and users that foster follow-on creation and prevent contribu-
tors from making legal claims to control adaptation of their contributions. 
These strategies make the identif ication of discrete intellectual properties 
of less importance – although attribution of (author) credit is an important 
element in open source and open content communities. Another view is that 
the recourse co-creating communities have had to take to ‘anti-copyright’ 
models shows just how inapt core concepts of copyright have become for 
these new forms of creation. Kelty (2008), Berdou (2010) and Reagle (2010) all 
analyzed the role of ‘copyleft’ models in collaborative communities. Many 
members have an extraordinary level of copyright knowledge, and need to 
have this to sustain collaborative production.
The examples above illustrate that in today’s digitally connected world 
we see large-scale open-ended intellectual creations that are perhaps more 
accurately understood as processes, or information services, or libraries, 
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than as discrete works of authorship. But at the same time, we also witness 
increasing atomisation: short communications such as tweets, RSS feeds 
of news headlines, alerts of all kinds. Short as they may be, these snippets 
represent economic value and their use is increasingly the subject of dispute, 
hence the tendency to accord them work status. Newsmedia in particular 
claim protection against copying (or at least compensation), the Infopaq 
case before the Court of Justice EU being a well known example. Copyright 
laws generally protect short works, if they are long enough to show original 
character, but a pertinent question is what constitutes an independent 
work, and what is merely part of a larger work. As we shall see later, for the 
assessment of whether copying constitutes infringement this is a highly 
relevant question. I turn now f irst to the question how the right to control 
adaptations is expressed in international norms and national copyright 
laws.
The adaptation right in (inter)national law
On a conceptual level, a distinction between ‘mere’ copies, ‘adaptations’ 
and free uses shows up in many national copyright laws. But the way in 
which these are given shape in concrete legal provisions, the terminology 
used, and the level of judicial interpretation required to make sense of 
them – especially in times of rapid changes in information markets and 
technologies we might add – is quite diverse, as we shall see throughout 
this chapter.
The Berne Convention
The 1886 Berne Convention obliges its signatories to protect foreign authors 
by granting them a number of communication rights (public recitation, 
broadcasting and the like, articles 10bis through 11ter) as well as the right to 
authorise reproductions (article 9). The current general right of reproduc-
tion was not introduced until the Stockholm revision of 1967 (Ricketson 
& Ginsburg 2005, at 8.104). From the beginning, the Berne Convention 
contained provisions that dealt with certain kinds of adaptations, over time 
the rights were expanded. Unlike the national laws of countries such as 
France, Belgium and The Netherlands, the BC does not classify adaptation 
rights as a subcategory of the reproduction right.
In its current wording, article 2 (1) of the Berne Convention for the protec-
tion of literary and artistic property, lists as protected
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‘every production in the literary, scientif ic and artistic domain, whatever 
may be the mode or form of its expression, such as books, pamphlets and 
other writings; lectures, addresses, sermons and other works of the same 
nature; dramatic or dramatico-musical works; choreographic works and 
entertainments in dumb show; musical compositions with or without 
words; cinematographic works to which are assimilated works expressed 
by a process analogous to cinematography; works of drawing, painting, 
architecture, sculpture, engraving and lithography; photographic works 
to which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to 
photography; works of applied art; illustrations, maps, plans, sketches and 
three-dimensional works relative to geography, topography, architecture 
or science’.
What the boundaries are of the domains of art, literature and science 
was not an issue debated in the context of the negotiations on the Berne 
Convention and subsequent revisions. The domains were copied from earlier 
bilateral treaties. Ricketson & Ginsburg (2005, p. 406-7) suggest they might 
be taken to refer to creations expressed as text (‘literary’) or image (‘artistic’), 
while ‘scientif ic’ has no special signif icance but covers written expression 
about scientif ic matters in a broad sense, since copyright does not aim to 
protect scientif ic f indings as such.
The list maps the kinds of works that many national copyright laws 
already protected (Ricketson & Ginsburg, 2005, at 8.08). The initial list was 
expanded in 1908 at the Berlin revision conference to include lectures and 
other oral works as well as choreographic works. Cinematographic works 
and photographic works, which were protected in some form already from 
the beginning, were included in the work list following the 1948 Brussels 
revision, as were works of architecture and applied art.
The text of the Convention shows the marks of the drawn-out battle over 
adaptation rights. Five provisions in the current text deal with adaptations 
(as works in their own right) and the right to control adaptations: articles 
2(3), 2(5), 8, 12 and 14bis. They have been rephrased, renumbered and reclas-
sif ied various times, as often the debate over what rights the author should 
have to control the creation of derivative works went hand in hand with 
discussion on the status of adaptations as protected works themselves. The 
birth of new genres and their subsequent development into independent 
art forms is reflected in the convention. The treatment of f ilm is a good 
example. Initially, f ilm was regarded as an adaptation of a dramatic work 
(i.e. play), and the making of a f ilm an act that required permission from 
the owner of the copyright in the play. But such f ilms were also seen as 
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a particular genre of dramatic work and were protected. Only later was 
f ilm considered a ‘stand-alone’ genre of work, to be protected regardless of 
whether pre-existing works used in its creation (see Ricketson & Ginsburg 
who discuss the development in the history of the Berne Convention, at 
8.31–8.41).
The earliest and most pronounced disagreements over adaptations 
concerned the proposed inclusion of a right of authors or their publishers to 
control any translation of books and plays into another language. In Cosmo-
politan Copyright (2011), Eva Hemmungs Wirtén ‘excavates’ the debate over 
freedom of translation and shows how it is also linked to shifting linguistic 
power relations in the 19th and early 20th century. Countries such as France 
and the UK were net ‘exporters’ of literary works and supported broad transla-
tion rights. Importing countries on the other hand were interested in freedom 
of translation and wanted very limited translation rights if any. In Europe 
opponents of broad rights included Scandinavian countries and the lowlands 
(Belgium, The Netherlands). The idea that it was important for authors to 
control the quality of translations, and that this justif ied the extension of 
copyright played a substantial role in the debate. The French delegations to 
the various diplomatic conferences in particular fervently pushed this idea.
The Convention recognises that a ‘derivative’ production enjoys copyright 
on condition that it meets the requirements for protection: it must be an 
original intellectual creation in the domain of literature, science or art 
(Ricketson & Ginsburg, 2005). The present Article 2(3), which dates back 
to 1908, conf irms the status of adaptations: ‘Translations, adaptations, 
arrangements of music and other alterations of a literary or artistic work 
shall be protected as original works without prejudice to the copyright in 
the original work.’
From this wording no test can be readily derived for establishing when 
authorisation is required for borrowings. As for translations, all that is clear 
from the legislative historical record is that the term denotes the recreation 
of a work in another human language (whether this also includes spoken to 
sign translation is uncertain, Ricketson & Ginsburg, 2005 at 8.78). Article 8 
stipulates that authors have the exclusive right to authorise translations. In 
addition, article 12 covers the right to authorise ‘adaptations, arrangements 
and other alterations.’ The original provision in the 1886 Convention was 
much narrower than the current text. Subsequent changes to it made for 
confusing reading, and included enumerations of e.g. the dramatisation 
of novels into plays as indirect unauthorised reproductions. Nonetheless, 
it is common opinion that ‘adaptations’ should be constructed as a broad 
category (ibid., at 8.79).
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Not specif ically named as adaptations are collections of works. Article 
2(5) accords work status to ‘Collections of literary or artistic works such 
as encyclopaedias and anthologies which, by reason of the selection and 
arrangement of their contents, constitute intellectual creations’. Article 
14bis recognises f ilms as works, regardless of whether they are based on 
pre-existing literary or dramatic works (and thus are adaptations).
The treaty further provides on the term of protection that ‘Authors of 
literary and artistic works protected by this Convention shall enjoy the 
exclusive right of making and of authorizing the translation of their works 
throughout the term of protection of their rights in the original works’ (Art. 
8 Berne Convention, introduced in 1908). Authors of plays, operas and other 
dramatic works enjoy ‘…during the full term of their rights in the original 
works, the same rights with respect to translations thereof.’ (art. 11(2)).
As to the limits of adaptation and translation rights, the Berne Conven-
tion itself contains few permitted uses. The only mandatory limitation 
is the right to quote of article 10(1) BC. It does not contain more general 
defences that allow for free use or transformative use of the kind known 
in e.g. Germany and the US. But article 9(2) BC provides that contracting 
states are free to have exceptions to the reproduction right on condition 
that they conform to the three-step-test (special cases only, not to conflict 
with a normal exploitation of the work, not to unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the author).
European laws
Despite a quarter century of harmonisation efforts by the EU, there still 
are differences among national copyright laws in the European Union on 
a number of aspects. One of the most striking is that the right to authorise 
adaptations remains unharmonised for most types of works, computer 
programmes and databases being the notable exceptions (Van Eechoud et 
al 2009, p. 84). The author’s exclusive right to authorise or prohibit copying 
(‘reproduction’) is subject to the common standard of article 2 of the 2001 
Information Society Directive. But many do not regard that provision as 
covering the right to authorise adaptations (Bently, 2011; Hugenholtz & Sen-
ftleben, 2011, p. 26; Walter & Von Lewinski, 2010, p. 964; different: Griff iths 
2013). While it is indeed diff icult to f ind support in the legislative record for 
the position that the EU lawmaker sought to harmonise adaptations rights in 
the Information Society Directive, the recent line of judgments by the Europe 
Court of Justice on the reproduction right (Van Eechoud, 2012) suggests that 
it might in the coming years construct a pan-European notion anyway.
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As noted above, the legal terms used in national laws to capture instances 
of borrowing that require the consent of the owners of rights in the source 
remain quite diverse and tied up with the particular act’s structure. Histori-
cally, in France the adaptation right is seen as part and parcel of the right 
to reproduce a work. The copyright acts of Belgium and The Netherlands 
follow a similar approach, although in all countries a conceptual difference 
is recognised between copying and adapting a work. The German copyright 
act has a more elaborate system of rules, including a provision on adapta-
tions that can be freely made. The Copyright act of the United Kingdom 
has yet another structure. A separate provision governs common types of 
adaptations, but since the right to prevent copying is interpreted broadly 
alterations can also be prohibited on that basis.
The Netherlands
Article 1 of the Dutch copyright act (Auteurswet) def ines copyright as the 
right of the author to make the work public and to reproduce it. The right 
to authorise adaptations or ‘bewerkingen’ is a sub-category of the broader 
right to authorise reproductions laid down in article 13 (‘verveelvoudiging’, 
literally: multiplication, see Spoor, 2012). The article stipulates that ‘The 
reproduction of a literary, scientif ic or artistic work includes the translation, 
musical arrangement, f ilm adaptation or dramatisation and generally any 
partial or full adaptation or imitation in a modif ied form, which cannot be 
regarded as a new, original work.’ When is something a new, original work, 
so that no permission of the copyright owner in the source work is required?
The standard is not easily met, but has in the past been successfully 
invoked for parodies. The extent of copying allowed is determined by the 
need to identify the work that is parodied and signal that the adaptation is 
a parody. In contrast to the German Supreme Court (see discussion below), 
the Dutch Supreme Court has held that in case of famous works, less is 
needed to make clear which source is parodied; so for famous works the 
level of copying allowed is lower. It can also be argued that works with 
canonical status should if anything be protected less, precisely because 
of their status. In response to the inclusion of a parody exception in the 
Information Society Directive, the Dutch legislator enacted an explicit 
exception that is somewhat broader than the one developed by the Courts 
on the basis of the adaptation right (Senftleben, 2012). Another exception 
of particular relevance to adaptations is the right to quote for the purposes 
of ‘announcement, review, polemic or scientif ic treatise or a piece with a 
comparable purpose’ (article 15a). Article 14 clarif ies that any (additional) 
f ixation of a work or part of it constitutes reproduction as well.
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Germany
In Germany, the use of material copies of works is subject to the twin 
rights of reproduction and of distribution (‘Vervielfältigungsrecht’ of art. 
16 Urheberrechtgesetz and ‘Verbreitungsrecht’ of art. 17 UrhG). Any material 
f ixation that allows the work to be perceived by human senses triggers 
application of these rights. The rights also extend to material f ixations of 
works in altered form, but adaptations are subject to specific rules (Loewen-
heim, 2010, p. 375-376). For making direct copies permission is required, 
but this is not so for most work categories when it comes to adaptations 
(‘Bearbeitungen’) or other transformations (‘Umgestaltungen’). It is not the 
production as such, but the communication or exploitation of an adaptation 
that requires prior permission.5 Article 23 names a number of exceptions 
to this rule: dramatisation (to f ilm), the execution of designs of sculptural 
works, the imitation (by construction) of a building as well as the adaptation 
of a database all require permission at the reproduction stage. The database 
provision implements the adaptation right of the EU Database Directive, 
presumably the other exceptions are the result of succesful lobbying.
The distinction between adaptation and other transformations is not 
clearly established. Adaptations seem to cover instances where the source 
work is altered only to enable a new form of exploitation while retaining 
the work’s identity, for example by translating a text from one language to 
another (Schricker, 2010, p. 512). Other alterations are ‘umgestaltungen’. 
Like adaptations, they retain elements of the source that give it its original 
character, albeit fewer. In both cases, the alteration itself can be a protected 
work if it is original.
German copyright law recognises free transformative use: either a 
transformative work is ‘dependent’ on its source and covered by the ad-
aptation right of article 23, or it has ‘independent’ status under article 24 
(‘Freie Benutzung’). In that case the owner of copyright in the source has no 
claim in controlling its use. Which side of the divide a particular creation 
is on must be decided on a case by case basis and has never been easy to 
determine. Some 90 years ago Smoschewer (1926) already observed that the 
division depends less on logic than on aesthetic feeling.
Landmark cases in which the German Supreme Court interpreted article 
24 are Alcolix-Astérix (1993) and Perlentaucher (2010). The Alcolix case 
concerned a parody on the famous Astérix comics. The plaintiffs claimed 
that the use of the comic characters as such constituted infringement. The 
use of a number of characteristic features of the Asterix stories – such as the 
situation of the parody in a Gallic village and the use of f ish as a weapon 
in f ights – were claimed to infringe as well. It was not contested that the 
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characters of Astérix and Obelix are protected as works, separate from the 
actual graphic representations (drawings).
Perlentaucher was an altogether different case: it is an online journal 
that produced summaries of book reviews. Two newspapers sued for in-
fringement. The Supreme Court held that that courts must assess for each 
summary individually if it is distinct enough from the review it summarises. 
Since only the expression of a bookreview is protected and not thoughts 
expressed, it comes down to the question whether the original wording of 
the book review is copied.
The free use is allowed when the second work foregrounds its individual 
and distinct personal character to such a degree that the original charac-
teristics of the source fade – even though some of its original traits might 
remain identif iable. Of course, the more well-known the source work is, 
the fewer the hints that are necessary to reference it. That the reference to 
a (famous) work is clear does not mean that (too many) original elements 
have been taken, or too little own character is developed in the new work. 
If the ‘outer’ distance to the source is great (i.e. as regards form), the source 
is in effect only an inspiration. If the outer distance is not great, e.g. as will 
be the case in parodies for which the copying of some form aspects is typi-
cally required, but the ‘inner’ distance is great because of the independent 
original nature of the second work, the transformative use is also free. 
According to the German Supreme Court, the ‘inner distance’ test is a strict 
one (Astérix). Whether there is a case of free use must be judged from the 
perspective of (a hypothetical) observer who knows the source work but 
who also has the intellectual capacity to understand the new work.
United Kingdom
Countries like Canada and the UK initially treated rights to control adapta-
tions quite separate from the right to copy. The black letter text of the laws 
still give the impression that a reproduction right and adaptation rights 
exist side by side. However, the continuously expanded interpretation of 
the reproduction right caused it to overlap with the specif ic adaptation 
provisions (Fischman, 2007). These retain value mainly as examples of the 
kind of derivative works that cannot be created without permission, and 
that themselves will typically qualify as protected works.
Section 16 of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (‘CDPA’) 
reserves to the copyright owner a catalogue of rights, among which are 
the right to copy (para. a) and the right to make adaptations (para e), 
both ‘in relation to the work as a whole or any substantial part of it’. The 
substantiality test has over the past decade or so become a qualitative test. 
158 Mireille vAn eechoud 
Griff iths (2013) describes and critically assesses this development in depth, 
in particular in light of the previous importance attached in UK copyright 
to material form (see also Ginsburg, 2006: about similar struggles in early 
French and US copyright to view the object of protection as immaterial). 
Copying or adapting a ‘substantial’ part is not so much about the proportion 
of the source work that is copied or taken (i.e. quantity, like the number 
of pages in relation to the whole source work), but the quality of what was 
taken: those elements that define the work’s original character, or ‘skill and 
labour’ in English copyright language. The distinction between copying and 
making adaptations fades in the light of this test.
Section 17 of the CDPA considers as an infringement unauthorised 
copying, that is the act ‘of reproducing the work in any material form’. 
Section 21(1) stipulates that the ‘making of an adaptation of the work is 
an act restricted by the copyright in a literary, dramatic or musical work’. 
The Act is quite specif ic in describing what qualif ies as an adaptation. 
For musical works it is an arrangement or transcription. For literary and 
dramatic works it includes e.g. translations, conversions into non-dramatic 
works and conveying action or story of a literary work into pictures (sec-
tion 21 CDPA). Artistic works are not covered. But since section 21 further 
provides that ‘No inference shall be drawn from this section as to what 
does or does not amount to copying a work’, there seems ample room to 
regard transformative uses of artistic works as acts of the copying rather 
than adapting of substantial parts. It is indeed a criticism of UK courts 
that they only consider what is taken rather than what is added, which 
leaves little room for genres such as parody. There is only limited room to 
protect parody, namely under the fair dealing provision for criticism and 
review (Mendis & Kretschmer, 2013). The planned introduction of a parody 
exception in the CDPA will remedy this.
France and Belgium
In the French copyright system, a division is made between two broad 
categories of exploitation rights: the right to make the work public (le droit 
de représentation) and to reproduce it (art. L 122-1 Code de la propriété 
intellectuelle, CPI). The right of representation includes any form of com-
munication to the public. The Act lists a few, including communication 
by recitation, stage performance and (as a later addition) broadcasting. 
Further instances have been elaborated by the courts, e.g. it also covers 
the exhibition of (art) works (Lucas, 2012, p. 286–287). A reproduction is 
any ‘f ixation’ of a work in material form. What the minimally required 
permanence should be was controversial (Lucas, 2012, p. 256–259), but the 
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2001 Information Society Directive leaves no doubt it includes transient 
copies (e.g. in cache, RAM).
French doctrine and courts developed the notion of a right of ‘destina-
tion’ to capture the copyright owner’s claim to control subsequent uses of 
copies of a work, such as playing records in a club or broadcasting them 
(Lucas 2012, pp. 259–277). This droit de destination then is wider than the 
German notion of distribution right, and seems more akin to the Dutch 
right to communicate to the public. Lucas criticises the French approach 
and suggests the droit de destination be abandoned for a distribution right 
German style, including an exhaustian rule (ibid.). Belgian copyright law 
also retains the (implicit) notion of a destination right that was developed 
as part of the old law’s broad reproduction right. To make matters more 
confusing, since 2005 the Belgian copyright contains an explicit provi-
sion on the distribution right as harmonised by the Information Society 
Directive (see F. Gotzen, 2012, p. 12–15). The exclusive right to authorise 
reproductions also covers translations and other adaptations, says article 1 
(1) Belgian Auteurswet.
Partial reproduction requires the author’s consent in both jurisdictions. 
Examples from French caselaw include the copying of a few lines of a book 
and the incorporation of an image in a f ilm (Lucas, 2012, p. 300–302). An 
exception to the reproduction right exists for parodies (art. L.122–5) and 
quotations for among other things critical, educational or research pur-
poses. A parody must be humoristic and not have the intention to harm 
the economic or moral interests of the author of the targeted work (Mendis 
& Kretschmer, 2013).
The copyright owner’s right to control the creation of translations and 
adaptations are corrolary to the rights of reproduction and representation, 
and thus not distinct. Only for computer programmes is this different due 
to the harmonised EU rules (Lucas, 2012, p. 251, 303 ff).
The short overview of the rights of reproduction/copying, of adaptation 
and the exemptions for parody and quotation given above make clear that 
even within the harmonised landscape of the EU, adaptations are dealt 
with differently. In Germany and the Netherlands, the assessment of free 
adaptations not only considers what is taken from the source, but also what 
is added. UK courts on the other hand tend to focus on what is taken and 
thus seem more likely to f ind infringement. This takes us to the topic of 
infringement analysis. How do courts go about establishing infringement, 
and what are the particular challenges they face when they have to consider 
source works that are not f ixed and stable?
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Infringement analysis
Sanders (2006, p.  12) argues that the relationship between adaptation 
and source text is ‘often viewed as linear and reductive; the appropria-
tion is always in the secondary, belated position, and the discussion will 
therefore always be, to a certain extent, about difference, lack or loss.’ 
For students of adaptation in f ilm, literature and other arts it is better 
‘to think in complex processes of f iltration, and in terms of intertextual 
f ields of signifying f ields, rather than simplistic one-way lines of influence 
from source to adaptation (ibid., p. 24). These observations are interest-
ing because they stand in sharp contrast to how lawyers approach this 
relationship.
To lawyers, adaptations are not about what is lost, but about what is not 
lost. Having to work with existing legal constructions, lawyers need to be 
precise about identifying the ‘one-way lines of influence’. The predominant 
view in law is that what matters is how much has been taken, not how much 
has been added. As Stef van Gompel in this book elaborates: when courts are 
called upon to decide whether a work is original, they tend to consider the 
creative space that was available to the author in the case at hand. If such 
space existed, the work is judged to be original. No particular comparison is 
made with other creations to ascertain originality, the existence of creative 
space suff ices. If on the other hand courts are asked to judge whether a 
work infringes, they will compare the later with one very specif ic earlier 
work (Spoor, 2012, p. 207).
Any amount of direct copying will normally constitute infringement, for 
example copying part of a text, or a few bars of a song. The lower treshold 
is – according to the Court of Justice EU in Infopaq – where the material 
presumably taken does not show the original expression by the author of 
the source. With a low originality threshold, virtually any amount of literal 
copying would infringe. The case is somewhat different in case of adapta-
tions, i.e. if not the wording but themes, plot or characters are borrowed, or 
when the alleged adaptation is in another medium or genre.
Some have taken the Court of Justice’s reasoning in Infopaq as saying 
that copyright exists in snippets of text, that is: a snippet can be a work (I 
have discussed the reception of Infopaq and later judgments extensively 
elsewhere, see Van Eechoud 2012). Such a reading would allow copyright 
owners to carve up their work in ever smaller units, with the result that 
if such units were copied there would always be infringement. Laddie J., 
when confronted with such an attempt (before Infopaq) by a publisher 
who argued various elements of a magazine cover were independent works 
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judged that the cover could not be treated as a ‘millefeuilles’ with layers 
of different copyrights (IPC Media Ltd v Highbury-Leisure Publishing Ltd). 
In many ‘analogue’ cases there can be little doubt about what is the ‘unit’ 
of work, namely a focussed whole that the relevant public recognises as a 
discrete entity.
Dutch courts increasingly apply an ‘overall similar impression’ test. 
This test is in a sense a reverse test. The focus is not on f irst establish-
ing what makes a work original and then looking for those elements in 
the derivative work. Rather, the court compares the source and alleged 
infringing work to determine how similar they are. If the impression is one 
of overall similarity and difference on minor points only, the later work 
is judged infringing. A major critique of this approach is that features of 
the work that do not contribute to its original character – because they 
are dictated by function, or style – should be ‘discounted’. They are not 
protected thus copying them is free. If the courts are not dilligent in doing 
this, the test favours plaintiffs. Initially the overall-impression test was 
applied in cases involving industrial design, but increasingly it is also 
used to decide cases on copying of e.g. TV formats and musical works 
(Spoor, 2012, pp. 210–12).
The French courts approach to assessing infringement is to only consider 
the taking of characteristic elements by which the (initial) author has per-
sonalised the theme/idea (Lucas, 2012, p. 309). Under Dutch copyright law, 
the fact that only little is copied and much added is regarded as not relevant 
for a f inding of infringement (Spoor, 2012, pp. 208–209), although one might 
speculate that in such cases the courts are more likely to moderate remedies 
sought. Likewise, UK courts also stress that to f ind infringement what 
matters is to what extent protected elements have been copied and not 
how (dis)similar the works are (Griff iths, 2013).
Roads that might be taken
In this section I consider in a bit more detail what we might want copyright 
law to do in light of the problems outlined above, and possible ways in which 
change could be achieved, notably by looking to transplant certain national 
solutions to the European level. For some questions solutions are relatively 
easy to design within the current copyright system, even though achieving 
reform might be a substantial political challenge. Others would require 
more profound changes and as a f irst step will need to be researched more 
in depth in a multi-disciplinary setting.
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Limits of the work concept
The recent line of cases by the Court of Justice of the EU has made clear 
that the notion of ‘work’ is an autonomous concept of European law that 
must be interpreted and applied in a uniform manner in all Member States 
of the EU. As Stef van Gompel details in his contribution, the originality 
test that the Court elaborated is that copyright protects the author’s own 
intellectual creation, that is: the author must give the work a personal stamp 
through the exercise of free and creative choices (Infopaq 2009, BSA 2011, 
Football Association Premier League 2011, Painer 2011, Football Dataco 2012, 
and SAS 2012). This focus on originality does not give us a comprehensive 
def inition of what a work is.
What are the boundaries of a ‘creation’? What def ines the domain of 
intellectual creations that copyright covers in the f irst place? In Football 
Dataco for example, the Court observed that football matches as such can-
not be copyrighted because players must follow the rules of the game so 
the requisite creative freedom is not present. By grasping at the straws of 
creativity the court in my view dodged the more diff icult questions of what 
productions count as being in the ‘literary, artistic or scientif ic’ domain and 
whether speech of any genre could be a ‘work’ (Van Eechoud, 2012).
As we have seen, the Berne Convention gives us examples of the kinds of 
creations copyright protects, but not much guidance beyond. The domains 
of art, literature and science are commonly understood in copyright to 
be extremely broad and not (or no longer) tied to more limited meanings 
they might have in everyday language. Some have argued the domain is 
all things ‘cultural’ (Grosheide, 1986), or simply ‘information’ (Hugenholtz, 
1989) but courts seem to stay away from pronouncing on the domain. In 
the UK, the challenge for the courts was to f it new genres into one of the 
work categories of the closed list of the Copyright act, which is why broader 
domain questions probably did not arise. Anyway, for our purposes the 
domain question is not the most problematic.
What is relevant is whether new forms of cultural production lead to 
genres that can always be fitted into the work concept. Or must we recognise 
more readily the limits of the work concept and not always seek to make 
new genres f it through reasoning by analogy? For open-ended creations 
I suggest just that. We might ask: Are open-ended ventures like Wikipedia 
just enormous draft databases? Conceptually, the problem is not that the 
f irst version created is not the ‘definitive’ one. After all, copyright laws have 
long recognised that works need not be f inished to be protected. No-one 
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would deny the studies that the artists made for the Dutch King’s portrait 
of state are works. The Computer Programme Directive states explicitly 
that preparatory works are protected under copyright. If ‘drafts’ are denied 
work status it is because the level of elaboration from idea(s) to expression 
is too low, not because they are not the ‘f inished’ work. The problem with 
open-ended works is that they really are not like drafts – the notion itself 
already implies that at some later stage there will be a f inished work – but 
a continuing work-in-progress.
We might more accurately conceive of open-ended ‘works’ as processes 
or practices. What is interesting is that in (popular) music studies and 
musicology the work concept – or to paraphrase Goehr, the objectified result 
of a special creative activity that did not exist prior to compositional activ-
ity – has come under fundamental and prolonged attack. In her influential 
book The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works, Goehr (1992) unpacked the 
specif ic historical, social and aesthetic conditions that gave rise to the work 
concept in what we now categorise as classical musical works.6 She argues 
it is neither necessary nor obvious to speak of classical music – let alone all 
types of music – in terms of ‘works’, despite ‘the lack of ability we presently 
seem to have to speak about music in any other way’ (ibid., p. 243).
Discussing the validity of the musical work concept in popular music, 
Middleton (2000) argues that the focus in music copyright on the (written) 
composition does not do justice to the process by which music is created. 
Making music involves multiple creative contributors, who rely on common 
stock models, tune families and riffs. A score is seldom used to transmit 
pieces; rather this happens through oral/aural channels. The work concept, 
it is argued, causes law to favour scored music over improvisation, melody 
over harmony and rhythm, to give author-composers more power than 
performers. It also throws up barriers to genres that rely on sampling. 
To make a distinction between performance and composition is often 
artif icial. Similar criticisms are made by Horn (2000), Lacasse (2000) and 
Théberge (1997).
Admittedly the idea of a work does not map onto all types of creative 
practices equally well. Testing legal norms against creative practices should 
be done more commonly, and the knowledge from disciplines outside law 
can be immensely helpful. A problem with much of the criticism voiced in 
humanities disciplines – be it music studies, literary studies, f ilm studies or 
another f ield – is that it only helps to deconstruct legal concepts. Replacing 
them with a better alternative is another matter. What would it mean for 
the law for instance, to treat music production (and consumption) or open-
ended peer production as a practice, or process? What is the implication of 
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resisting the urge to f it them into the work of authorship concept? Possibly 
it means that rather than having the author-work relationship at its core, the 
focus of law would be on regulating the information relationships involved 
more directly: between contributors, editors, users, and competitors. For 
some of these relationships we might look to special areas of law, notably 
consumer law and unfair competition law. But I must admit I have trouble 
conceiving of alternatives that still fulf il the primary function of copyright 
today: safeguarding exploitation rights to foster creation. I have fewer 
problems imagining how moral rights might be protected separate from 
the notion of work (but that is material for another article).
Versioning
Distinct from the open-ended nature of internet-based peer production 
projects is the frequent updating or versioning aspect, which characterises 
many other internet-based content as well. Is a continuously refreshed 
Facebook profile just a sequence of adaptations? Is the rapid versioning of 
software merely a hugely accelerated type of publishing editions?
Versioning is by no means a recent phenomenon. Musicologists’ research 
on the manuscripts Chopin prepared for publishers shows that he often 
produced three different versions of the same composition for his German, 
French and English publishers; he did not regard one as the authentic one 
(Rink, 2012). In literature, Dickens and Arthur Conan Doyle are famous 
examples of authors whose work was routinely published in serial form. 
In broadcasting, the continuous, drawn-out narratives of radio soaps and 
other long-form narratives were deployed to create a regular and faithful 
audience (Hilmes, 2012, p. 279).
An important difference between old and new kinds of serialism is the 
sheer volume (caused by open-endedness), the short interval between 
versions and the fact that older versions are changed. In the case of the 
radio-soap and publication in instalments, the later part adds to what came 
before but is not meant to replace the earlier. There is no adaptation of 
earlier instalments.
Kelty (2008) argues that different genres are affected differently by the 
changing ways in which information is created, stored and distributed. 
In his view music production has not changed much because even with 
new composition and recording technologies, musicians largely mimic 
previous practices. Much online publishing also recreates something that 
looks like traditional print (e.g. e-book, magazines). But for open source 
and other collaborative projects the change from editions to versioning 
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and forking – ‘breaking away’ to continue a separate project based on the 
same source materials – ‘raises troubling questions about the boundaries 
and status of a copyright work’ (Kelty, 2008, p. 278).
A particular problem is caused by the dominant method lawyers apply to 
establish infringement, which is as we have seen a one-to-one comparison 
of works. Furthermore, whether updates or revisions qualify as a copyright 
work themselves – because relative to the source an original contribu-
tion has been made – will depend on how frequent updates or edits are. 
If updates are very frequent, changes are more likely to be minor and the 
latest version as not original. Obviously, ‘saving up’ modif ications over a 
longer period (as is done in traditional book publishing) leads to a more 
substantial change from one version to the next. Therefore each new version 
is more likely to be protected as a separate work. Current copyright law 
favours slow change over rapid change. It is obvious why this is so, but not so 
obviously justif iable. Particularly when it comes to establishing authorship, 
a contributor that makes frequent but small contributions is less likely to 
be recognised as author than someone who ‘saves up’, for example. Also, 
it becomes more diff icult to establish the point in time at which the new 
version is not just a copy but an adaptation protected in its own right. What, 
in other words, is the cut-off point for determining originality?
How might copyright better recognise the incremental nature of new 
forms of production? One possibility is that the one-to-one comparison of 
the penultimate version (source work) and the latest version (derivative 
work) to establish work status is replaced by comparison across a range of 
editions. This might sound harder to do than it is. Version control is a key 
feature of collaborative production platforms. All modif ications can be 
tracked and archived. In principle then, it should be possible to compare 
versions and establishing which changes were made by whom over time.
Another possibility is to consider a more nuanced system of rights of 
attribution, a system that reflects the social norms in communities rather 
than the rather myopic view of authorship that traditionally characterises 
copyright laws. Bently and Biron suggest just that in their contribution to 
this book. But also beyond authorship status norms there might be more 
that could be done to ensure copyright law supports modern forms of col-
laboration. Society has an interest in fostering collaborative continuous 
creation of knowledge and tools, so has an interest in a legal system that 
enables collaboration. The development of copyleft systems for the manage-
ment of collaborations in a way shows that copyright seems to do this 
quite well. The fact that rights can be licensed allowed copyleft models to 
be developed. As the use of such collective licensing schemes continues to 
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expand – from open source software to education, research and the arts – it 
is time for lawyers and f ield experts to consider whether there are legal 
norms need f ine-tuning (or a radical overhaul for that matter) to safeguard 
the continuity of copyleft systems of copyright management.
A reigned in reproduction right
Although as was noted above, the general opinion among scholars still 
seems to be that the adaptation right is not harmonised, there are clear signs 
that the reproduction right of article 2 Information Society Directive lends 
itself to such broad interpretation that it usurps all types of copying, bor-
rowing and reworking. Recall that the provision says that it is ‘the exclusive 
right to authorise or prohibit direct or indirect, temporary or permanent 
reproduction by any means and in any form, in whole or in part’ of a work 
of authorship. The provision has no internal normative brake so to speak, 
that prevents it from applying to uses of minor economic signif icance. 
Especially if the reproduction right will be constructed as including the 
adaptation right by the Court of Justice, its lack of normative meaning 
is troubling. We have seen that in a number of countries (Netherlands, 
Belgium, France) the right of adaptation is regarded as part of the exclusive 
right of reproduction, whereas in other countries it is viewed as slightly 
more separate (Germany, UK).
The reason why in the end adaptation and copying might be judged as 
being essentially similar acts by the ECJ is best illustrated by the Advocate 
General’s approach in the Painer case. The Advocate General’s opinion in 
Painer implies that the reproduction right of article 2 Information Society 
Directive does include the exclusive right to authorise adaptations. In Painer, 
one of the questions (in the end not directly addressed by the Court) was 
whether a photo-f it made on the basis of a simple portrait photo infringed 
the copyright in the portrait photo. The Advocate General observes (para 
129): ‘The publication of a photo-f it thus constitutes a reproduction of the 
portrait photo used as a template only if the personal intellectual creation 
which justif ies the copyright protection of the photographic template is 
still embodied in the photo-f it. In a case where the photo-f it was based on 
a scan of the photographic template, this as a rule can be assumed.’ Clearly 
the thinking here is that reproduction covers both direct copying and 
transformative ‘copying’. In Infopaq, the f irst case on article 2 Information 
Society Directive, the court had ruled that the reproduction right protects 
against the copying of parts of a text (potentially even parts of sentences in 
the text in question) if such parts ‘convey[ing] to the reader the originality of 
AdApTing The Work 167
a publication such as a newspaper article, by communicating to that reader 
an element which is, in itself, the expression of the intellectual creation of 
the author of that article.’ In Infopaq the dispute was about the taking of 
11-word long snippets of newspaper articles. The copying was literal.
If the test for infringement of both the reproduction right and the adapta-
tion right is: were characteristic elements of the source taken, then it seems 
to make sense to view the reproduction right as overarching. However, this 
leaves no room in the infringement analysis to have regard for what has 
been added in the adaptation. In my view, if the adaptation in its overall 
impression is so different from the source(s) that the source works only play 
a minor part in the whole, the adaptation should be a free use.
We have seen above that the German concept of ‘Freie Benutzung’ allows 
transformative uses but the test is also quite strict. If original elements 
of the source work are recognisable, the derived work must have a great 
distance in terms of genre and purpose in order to be free (e.g. a parody). 
The test I suggest is less strict. It is more akin to the free adaptation Lionel 
Bently (2011) proposes, namely ‘where as a result of the adaptation or ar-
rangement, a new work with a substantially different meaning, or of a 
significantly different genre, is thereby created.’ Perhaps combined with the 
added test that the exploitation of the new work does not significantly harm 
the commercial interests of the original creator or copyright owner, this 
seems a good alternative. One thorny question is how such a free adaptive 
use limitation plays out in entertainment industries where trans-media 
storytelling is an increasingly important business model. The strategy is 
to take intellectual properties (such as comic characters, or a story, a toy) 
to multiple markets, rather than bringing a work developed for one market 
(say f iction books) to another market once it is successful. Examples are 
toymaker Mattel (Bulik, 2010) and comic publisher Marvel’s ventures in 
f ilmed entertainment (Johnson, 2006). Obviously, the more trans media 
a company is, the less room there would be for free transformative use.
Limitations
The continued expansion of the exploitation rights of authors in European 
law has not been accompanied by equally robust claims to fair uses. The call 
for a stronger and more flexible system of limitations has become louder 
over recent years (Van Eechoud et al., 2009, Geiger et al, 2010, Guibault, 2010, 
Senftleben, 2012). In terms of feasibility, it is much more likely that more 
room for ‘borrowing’ will be effectuated through broader limitations, rather 
than through a narrower right of reproduction. Law professors united in 
the European Copyright Society have called for making limitations manda-
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tory and more flexible, by giving courts the ability to develop tailor-made 
solutions (European Copyright Society, 2014).
In the f ield of limitations and exceptions, the introduction of a defence 
for user generated content might go some way to accommodate the by 
now common practice of individuals to create their own text, video and 
music through remixing and adapting existing works. It stands to reason 
that the limitation would only apply for non-commercial uses and only if 
there has been a substantial adaptation of the source works. Otherwise 
user generated content could compete with the source work. Legal scholar-
ship could benefit from media studies to get a fuller understanding of the 
role user generated content plays in entertainment industry commercial 
strategies because the dynamics are largely unknown to students of the 
law. Scolari (2013) for example analysed UGC surrounding the successful 
TV-series ‘Lost’. He found boundaries between commercial industry and 
non-commercial user generated content to be porous; some UGC can be 
acquired and elaborated by industry.
The limitations for parody and pastiche and on quotation are other 
obvious candidates that can be propped up so as to enable more liberal 
transformative uses. The European Court of Justice could take a broad 
reading of the exception for parody of article 5(3)(k) Information Society 
Directive, which leaves Member States the freedom to allow free ‘use for 
the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche’. National courts so far have 
tended to demand that the parody or pastiche target the source work. But 
as Dyer argues in his in-depth examination of pastiche, it is an artistic 
imitation of other art, not necessarily of one particular work of art, and 
not necessarily critical (Dyer, 2007, p. 2, 157). Erlend Lavik observes in his 
contribution to this book: ‘Courts should be open to the possibility that 
a range of cultural appropriations – including parody and pastiche – can 
be transformative and culturally and artistically valuable. This is where 
aesthetics can be of service. It can help f ill the concept of transformative 
use with meaningful content.’ Likewise, Julie Sanders invites us to bring 
(literary) adaptation and appropriation ‘out of the shadows’, not to view 
them as merely ‘belated practices and processes; they are creative and in-
fluential in their own right. And they acknowledge something fundamental 
about literature: that its impulse is to spark related thoughts, responses and 
readings’ (Sanders, 2006, p. 160).
Lastly, there is the exception ‘for incidental inclusion of a work or other 
subject-matter in other material’ (art. 5(3) sub i Information Society Direc-
tive) that might be expanded. How likely the Court of Justice is to take the 
lead is uncertain however, since it has repeatedly stated that the exceptions 
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laid down in article 5 Information Society Directive are to be given a narrow 
interpretation.
There are we have seen, several potential routes. Some can be taken by 
courts; others would need to be taken by the EU legislator. Whatever the 
route to be taken, a less all-encompassing right to control copying and 
adaptation is called for, if the law is to keep at least remotely in step with 
today’s practices of cultural production.
Notes
1. For my purposes, I shall not go into the details of the US fair use defense. 
The Cariou v. Prince case has drawn much attention among copyright 
scholars and in art circles because the district court gave a narrow reading 
of fair use. It held that no defense is available if the secondary work does 
not somehow comment on the source work, its author or popular culture. 
The appeals court ruled that the law does not require such comment. The 
four factors that must be considered when assessing whether a use infringes 
or is fair are (1) the purpose and character of the use (including commer-
cial nature); (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value 
of the copyrighted work (Section 107, 17 U.S.C.).
2. Dumas gave the interview in Dutch. She said: ‘Plagiaat is mijns inziens een 
literaire term. Een tekst kun je letterlijk overnemen, het blijft in hetzelfde 
medium, maar mijn schilderij is opgebouwd uit verfstrepen, het is zo’n 
ander “ding”. Dat zie je het beste als je een detail van het schilderij laat zien 
naast een detail van de foto. Dan verschijnen de verschillen in plaats van de 
overeenkomsten. Het zijn twee werelden.’ Vrij Nederland, 13 February 2014. 
3. At the international level, the protection of computer programmes and 
databases was secured through the TRIPs Agreement (1992) and the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty (1996), which essentially oblige contracting states to them 
as literary works and collections within the meaning of the Berne Conven-
tion. 
4. Openstax (formerly: Connexions) is an example of an online collaborative 
system designed to promote the sharing and reuse of educational content: 
teachers/authors can contribute ‘pages’ (learning modules) that can be 
adapted and combined into collections (text books, readers). Content is 
licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution license, making it freely re-
usable on condition that the author(s) are credited. See http://cnx.org/.
5. The German Copyright lists exceptions to this rule that the creation of an 
adaptation does not require permission, but only its subsequent commu-
nication or trade (art. 23 UrhG), e.g. turning a work into a film does require 
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prior authorisation, as does executing a work or art (after a plan), or copy-
ing a work of architecture through building, or adapating a database (as the 
EU Database directive imposes such a rule).
6. Looking to the historic development of UK music copyright and the influ-
ence some scholars attribute to Romanticism on notions of work, Barron 
(2006) concludes that changes in thinking about property, notably the 
inclusion of intangibles is what caused the musical work concept (as score-
based) to develop. The rise of a ‘middle class’ with an appetite for buying 
sheet music is the more likely cause. About the difficulty of establising 
causal links between Romantic ideas in the arts and the development of 
legal concepts, see Erlend Lavik’s contribution to this volume.
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 Reassessing the challenge of the digital
An empirical perspective on authorship and copyright
Elena Cooper
Policymakers have long noted the challenges posed by new internet and 
digital technologies to copyright’s category of authorship. As the European 
Commission expressed at the advent of the internet, in its Green Paper 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society of 1995:
The traditional picture of the author as a craftsman working more or less 
in isolation and using wholly original materials is contradicted by new 
forms of creation. The new products and services are increasingly the 
outcome of a process in which a great many people have taken part – their 
individual contributions often diff icult to identify – and in which several 
different techniques have been used […] (European Commission, 1995, 
p. 25).
The perception that creative practices of the digital age often involve the 
contributions of many people is thought to complicate the task of identi-
fying the author.1 In addition, scholars noted how digital technology, in 
facilitating collaboration, was ‘hastening … the demise of the illusion that 
writing is solitary and originary’ (Woodmansee, 1994, p. 25). As Martha 
Woodmansee expressed, this was a development that sat uneasily with a 
proprietary notion of authorship:
Electronic communication seems to be assaulting the distinction between 
mine and thine that the modern authorship construct was designed to 
enforce (1994, p. 26). 2
This chapter3 explores these perceived challenges of the digital for copyright, 
through ideas about authorship that underpin so-called creative practices 
today. It does so through a qualitative empirical study that involved semi-
structured interviews with ‘artists’ and ‘poets’ who use digital technology.4 
The interviews sought to uncover the extent to which the participation 
of many people was characteristic of the interviewees’ work and their 
views about ‘authorship’. For example, is authorship of any signif icance to 
interviewee ‘artists’ and ‘poets’? If so, who do they consider to be the author? 
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In situations where many have contributed, how and why do they attribute 
authorship to some contributors while denying it to others? Finally, why is 
authorship important to the interviewees, if at all, and does this bear any 
relation to copyright’s proprietary author?
The interviewees were those listed as ‘notable individuals’ on Wikipedia 
entries for ‘Digital Art’ and ‘Digital Poetry’ accessed in May 2011.5 No claim 
is made that the interviewees are representative of all ‘creative’ practices 
involving digital technology. Notwithstanding this, I will argue that the 
interviews provide a basis for questioning the common assumptions noted 
above, thereby facilitating a more nuanced understanding of the implica-
tions of the digital.
By way of introduction, over the past decades practices involving digital 
technology have been characterised by what interviewee Joseph Nechvatal 
termed to be an interdisciplinary ‘conversation’ between ‘computer science’ 
and ‘art’, the result of which is that the parameters of ‘artistic practice’ 
changed and gave way to a ‘third culture’: ‘… these two f ields are rubbing 
up against each other and they used to be thought of as … discrete and 
separate activities and now there is a kind of third culture that is emerging 
out of the combination of these two areas of interest’.
In this context, Nechvatal observed that ‘it’s been a growing thing for 
creative artists to have computer science at [their] disposal and collabora-
tion’. In the early years of computer technology, such work was inherently 
collaborative, involving multiple contributors each with different areas 
of expertise. The pioneers of such work in the 1960s and 1970s, such as 
Lillian Schwartz at Bell Labs,6 David Em at Jet Propulsion Labs7 and Herbert 
Franke,8 all entered a highly technical environment in order both to obtain 
access to technology that was not readily available, as well as to come 
into contact with ‘scientists’ who knew how it worked. By contrast, today, 
technology has become ubiquitous, with the result that in many instances, 
work that was formerly collaborative has now become solitary. Today, David 
Em is able to work alone from his studio or garden at home. As he explained, 
technology is so easily accessible that ‘I don’t need all those programmers 
and I don’t need a big facility’.
Further, in certain spheres, the favoured approach is for solitary work, 
rather than collaboration. Loss Pequeño Glazier is director of the Electronic 
Poetry Center, the world’s largest collection of electronic poetry which was 
founded in 1994,9 as well as being the f irst ‘digital poet’ to hold an academic 
chair (recently awarded by the University of Buffalo, USA). Glazier questions 
whether the involvement of many in producing a work of ‘digital poetry’ 
(or to use his term, ‘digital poesis’) can work, as it can, for example, in the 
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case of f ilm, as the process of creation or ‘poesis’ requires involvement in 
all levels of the digital poem, from the computer coding, to the words and 
images. In Glazier’s view, these are therefore best composed by one person 
working alone.
Notwithstanding these movements towards solitary working practices, 
the interviews revealed a number of instances where current practices using 
digital technology give rise to the involvement of many people. These are 
explored in this chapter in f ive detailed case studies.
First, there continue to be instances where ‘artists’ enter a highly tech-
nical environment, in order to gain access to powerful technology that 
is not generally accessible. An example of such a practice is explored in 
Case Study 1, which concerns the collaborative work of ‘artist’ Donna Cox 
and the interdisciplinary team at the National Center for Supercomputing 
Applications, Illinois, USA, who produce what she terms ‘visualisations’ of 
scientif ic data. Inspired by the philosophy of the Renaissance, which saw 
a convergence in the goals of science and art, Cox articulates a concept of 
co-authorship which encompasses the contributions of all members of the 
team: as she described, both those with authority over ‘artistic decisions’ 
(for example, ‘colour or timing or viewpoint’) and those responsible for the 
‘computer science’ and ‘formatting’ of the data.
Even beyond the environment of the so-called ‘supercomputers’ there 
are other frameworks in which the interdisciplinary nature of the venture 
results in the collaboration between specialists in different disciplines. 
Case Study 2 concerns the work of ‘artist’ Joseph Nechvatal at Louis Pas-
teur Atelier, France who has worked with computer programmers so as 
to develop applications of computer virus algorithms, as a metaphor for 
biological virus attacks on cells. Nechvatal characterised such work as ‘an 
equalised exchange’ between ‘art’ and ‘computer science’: a ‘collaborative 
union’. Yet, when it comes to determining authorship of the resulting work, 
this rests with Nechvatal alone because, as he explained, he is the ‘project 
director’ who has ‘control’ over the ‘aesthetic demands’ (which he sees as the 
emotional effects of colour and form). In contrast to the views articulated 
by Cox, therefore, in this context, the computer scientist is termed a ‘techni-
cian’, not an author.
In Case Study 3, we turn to an example of a so-called ‘digital art collec-
tive’: the OpenEndedGroup based in New York, USA. The collective brings 
together the three Group members, along with external participants, 
described as ‘collaborators’, ‘consultants’ and ‘contributors’, with expertise 
in a variety of different areas such as computer programming, art, f ilm 
and dance choreography. The Group organise these participants in what 
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they consider to be a ‘strict’ ‘taxonomy of collaboration’, so as to restrict 
involvement in ‘artistic decisions’, the latter determining who are credited 
as the ‘artists’ of the piece. While attribution as ‘artists’ is important, the 
interview revealed that the Group feel uncomfortable with any notion of 
authorship tied to ‘creation’. As Group member Marc Downie expressed, in 
part due to the role of technology as ‘collaborator’, the Group see themselves 
as engaging in a process of ‘discovery’, over which they never have complete 
‘control’, a position that contrasts, in particular, to aspects of that taken by 
Joseph Nechvatal (in Case Study 2).
Another practice giving rise to the participation of many arises in the 
work of those who engage in what is sometimes called ‘the art of not mak-
ing’: the ‘artist’ takes on the mantle of ‘art director’ and delegates some or 
all of the skilled tasks, including computer programming and other digital 
technological tasks, to others.10 This is a process of delegation, rather than 
an ‘equalised exchange’ (as Joseph Nechvatal’s described his approach in 
Case Study 2). Case Study 4 looks at two examples of such works by ‘art-
ists’ who delegate tasks to different degrees. First, we consider the talking 
animatronic sculpture installations produced by New York based ‘artist’ 
Ken Feingold, which employ artif icial intelligence technology and digital 
synthetic voices. Feingold delegates specif ic tasks, for example, the making 
of the animatronic heads or the computer programming. This is in contrast 
to the broader delegation of tasks by Greek website ‘artist’ Miltos Manetas, 
in the second example that we consider which Manetas presents as ‘col-
laborative’ work: www.jesusswimming.com. In both cases, the interviewees 
drew analogies with the position of the director of a f ilm, to support their 
claim to sole authorship. This is a standpoint which contrasts with that 
taken by Cox, in Case Study 1.
Finally, Case Study 5 looks at the active role of the audience or user, in 
interactive digital works. Tracing the early history of interactive works in 
the pioneering laser-disc work called Lorna by California based ‘artist’ 
Lynn Hershman Leeson, the case study turns to consider an example of an 
interactive poem by Loss Pequeño Glazier, as well as the huge interactive 
installations produced by Don Ritter, a Canadian ‘artist’ based in South 
Korea. There was a general consensus amongst interviewees that the 
audience’s participation did not amount to authorship and we look at the 
justif ications for this position.
As is apparent from this overview, the interviews revealed a diverse set 
of practices, and consequently a diverse set of ideas about authorship. Ac-
cordingly, this contribution resists simplistic conclusions about what these 
ideas should mean for law. Instead the f inal concluding section makes more 
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general observations. In addition to addressing how the interviews might 
ref ine our perceptions of the challenge of the digital, this chapter draws 
out some unexpected results: while there was no evidence of any influence 
of copyright law in informing the techniques which interviewees used to 
identify the author(s), law did appear to underpin a number of interviewees’ 
understandings of authorship as proprietary. Therefore, one conclusion is 
that far from always a challenge, law sometimes in fact supports or even 
informs certain aspects of the interviewees’ ideas about authorship.
Case Study One: Donna Cox of The National Center for 
Supercomputing Applications, Illinois
The National Center for Supercomputing Applications (or NCSA) at the 
University of Illinois was established in 1986 as part of a national program 
aimed at providing powerful and high performance computing facilities to 
researchers of science and engineering. Supported by the state of Illinois, in 
addition to federal grants, the NCSA has developed a worldwide reputation 
in ‘scientif ic visualisation’. Using the computer facilities and expertise at 
the NCSA, simulations are made of complex natural phenomena, such as 
how galaxies collide and merge, how molecules move through a cell wall, 
and how tornadoes and hurricanes form.
Donna Cox11 is the Director of the NCSA’s ‘Advanced Visualisation Labora-
tory’. She works as part of a team comprising ‘artists’, ‘technologists’ (such 
as computer scientists) and ‘scientists’, who work together to transform 
scientif ic data into graphic visualisations such as computer animations 
called ‘visaphors’. Cox refers to the team as a ‘Renaissance team’, so drawing 
a parallel with the convergence of the goals of science and art in the time of 
Leonardo Da Vinci. Asked about this analogy, Cox explained that drawings 
by Da Vinci, while ‘amazingly beautiful’ were also visual representations 
of scientif ic information about anatomy or botany: a ‘mirror of nature’. In 
a similar vein, the ‘visaphors’ produced by Cox’s Renaissance team today 
are seen as ‘digital visual metaphors’ of scientif ic data. Yet, as Cox explains, 
as with Da Vinci, there is also ‘an art … in how we turn these numbers into 
pictures’. More than ‘just a translation or representation of data’, the creation 
of a ‘visaphor’ involves ‘interpretation and design’ and ‘art choices’.
For example, the team produced a ‘scientif ic visualisation’ of hurricane 
Katrina, which caused devastation in Louisiana in 2005. The team com-
prised ‘artist’ Cox, ‘cinematographer’ Bob Pattison, as well as ‘computer 
scientist’ Stuart Levy. The project began by the team visiting external 
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scientists at the National Center for Atmospheric Research, Colorado, to 
obtain scientif ic data concerning the hurricane, recorded in numerical 
form. The initial meeting with the external scientists was an important 
one: ‘We as visualisation artists needed to understand more completely 
about what was important about the numbers … the question that we asked, 
was what is the most important feature in this current hurricane of the 
data that we can help to show with the data, that tells the public why this 
hurricane became so deadly.’ The team’s goal, therefore, was to produce a 
visualisation of the data, to capture the scientif ic processes that cause the 
‘enormous power engine of the oceans to build up’: ‘as the planet warms, 
the oceans heat and it feeds this enormous hurricane…’
In producing the ‘visualisation’, the members of the team were ‘all playing 
kind of distinctive roles’, reflecting their particular expertise in computer 
science, cinematography and art. For example, Stuart Levy’s role was to 
‘handle’ the data; it was obtained from the Colorado scientists in numerical 
form and it needed to be formatted so it could be used by the team. Bob 
Patterson, as ‘cinematographer’, oversaw ‘the settings on a lot of the shots’. 
Cox’s specialism was the use of colour, for example, in suggesting that the 
piece shows ‘the sun rising and setting and the moon rising and setting and 
the stars to give the timeline of the life span of this hurricane’.
The result of these different areas of specialism is that ‘artistic decisions’ 
were generally seen as in the domain of Cox and Patterson, rather than Levy:
So, you have the person who deals primarily with the data, he does some 
graphics but leaves all the artistic decisions up to us – Bob and I. And Bob 
and I will get into struggles sometimes over colour or timing or viewpoint 
but we work it out and usually results in a compromise on something 
that satisf ies both of us.
Despite the greater authority of Cox and Patterson in ‘artistic’ matters, 
decisions are seen as made by the team collectively. Cox described this 
process as a ‘negotiation’ between all team members. For example, there 
was much discussion over how to present the ‘hot towers which feed the 
hurricane’, the source of its deadly consequences: ‘There are different ways 
of representing hot towers. We had choices … We had different types of 
software that can represent the data. We had lots of dials. We can turn these 
dials to make some of these clouds brighter or they can just be outlines 
instead of dense fog … all of those are negotiations …’
The result of the negotiations was a ‘compromise’ that satisf ied all team 
members, in the light of the overall goal: to produce something which is 
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‘jaw droppingly beautiful’ while also ‘informative’ in ‘[communicating] 
something essential about the science’. As the aim was clear, Cox considered 
that reaching a compromise was not diff icult: ‘we def initely are willing to 
compromise’. Facilitating this are team dynamics of ‘mutual respect’ and 
‘really listening’ to each other. As Cox explained:
You know … whatever we are producing together, we want it to be the 
best and sometimes that means that your f irst ideas might not be that 
great anyway, and you see how it might play out in another way, and you 
just sit back and say “well that other way does look better” … or “I’ll give 
you this if I can have this”. That kind of negotiation … but the ultimate 
goal for the team is that it looks good and it represents the data well, and 
accurately […]
The model of the ‘Renaissance team’, which operates today at the NCSA, 
stems from collaborative work dating back to the late 1980s. For example, in 
1988, Cox collaborated with Professor of Mathematics George Francis, and 
a computer scientist, in producing computer graphics software that would 
create images visualising Francis’ mathematical theories. As Cox explained, 
the basic principles for successful ‘Renaissance teams’ were formulated at 
this time. Cox published widely on this subject in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
she considers that those principles have continued to underpin ‘Renaissance 
teams’ from that time to today.
One of the most important prerequisites for a ‘successful team’ is that 
it ‘has to be egalitarian’, that is all members of the team must be ‘equal 
players’. The consequences of this ‘egalitarian’ framework for ‘authorship’ 
are that all of the team members are considered ‘co-authors’ of the resulting 
‘visualisation’. This conclusion flows from the characterisation of the team 
‘as a unit’, comprising ‘in and of itself … the collection of very unique guilds’ 
such as ‘artists, f ilm makers, software writers’. As Cox accepted during the 
interview, this is a concept of authorship which appears closer to Arts and 
Crafts ideas which circulated in the 1890s, involving recognition for every 
contribution, as opposed to the single author model of authorship implicit 
in, for example, some interpretations of the Auteur approach to f ilm. As 
she explained:
[…] what I don’t like and I have a real prejudice against, is when I see 
artists, so single artists, who can pull together teams and take the sole 
credit, and sometimes the team is not even listed on the work. I have 
always been against that director “Auteur” approach. … The authorship 
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has to be shared in these larger collaborations. It is a kind of plagiarism 
when an artist will say: “I have ‘hired’ that programmer to do this work, 
I conceptualised it, I could have hired another programmer to do the 
work”. I just take issue with that. The best work comes when you recognise 
that team […]
Later in the same interview, Cox returned to this point:
[…] Artists … f inally say “right, I’m going to work with technology” and 
they want to keep the technologists like technicians, and they want to 
retain that ownership, but for me and my early career, what I recognised 
early on … that through the collaborative process the outcome would be 
so much better than what I could do by myself […]
In this way, as Cox explains: ‘… the group shares authorship because the final 
artefact could not have come into being without the collective partnership 
and the collective authorship of working together and making the f inal set 
of sequences or digital images.’ And, later in the same interview: ‘I consider 
now the very sophisticated work that we do as a group of professionals that 
we are all co-authors because it simply could not have come about otherwise 
… the f inal artefact was so totally dependent on that collaboration that 
I don’t think you could separate them out …’
This notion of ‘collective’ authorship, including ‘computer scientist’ 
members of the team, in addition to those with authority over ‘artistic 
decisions’ (Cox and Patterson), stems from the ‘Renaissance’ inspired 
view of the work as a ‘mirror of nature’, encompassing both scientif ic and 
artistic aspects. As Cox agreed in interview, this is a concept of authorship 
conducive to capturing collaboration between practitioners of ‘art’ and 
‘science’, in contrast, for example, to the Romantic concept of the author 
as a ‘lamp’,12 which in privileging contributions of ‘personal expression’ or 
‘creation’, might confer authorship status only on Cox and Pattison, and 
deny it to the ‘computer scientist’ members of the team, for example, Levy.
While Cox considers all members of the team to be co-authors of the 
‘visualisation’, the ‘creators of the data’ that the team uses are not co-authors 
of the visualisation, because their ‘intent’ in creating the data was ‘to do 
research on that data’. This is in contrast to the ‘f inal intent of the f inal 
creator’, who is using that data as ‘part of an art work … [who] does so for 
a very different audience and very different purpose’.
The concepts which the ‘Renaissance team’ employ to determine author-
ship of the ‘scientif ic visualisation’ seem to be uninfluenced by copyright 
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doctrine. First, Cox’s ‘Renaissance’ or ‘mirror of nature’ approach, which 
accords parity between contributions of artists and scientists, provides a 
different emphasis to tests of co-authorship in US copyright law.13 Secondly, 
where convergence exists with the test of co-authorship in US law, this 
appears to be coincidental. For example, Cox’s test of authorship based on 
‘intent’ might, at a f irst glance, appear to converge with the US legal test 
of co-authorship, which following the Second Federal Circuit decision in 
Childress v. Taylor (1991) requires that the contributors intended to regard 
themselves as joint authors (which also involves the court considering a 
number of ‘objective indicia’ of intention, such as whether the contributors 
were billed as co-authors). However, this was a commonality with the law of 
which Cox was unaware.14 Instead, she explained that her notion of author-
ship based on ‘intention’ came from her studies of art history, particularly 
conceptual art. Here Cox drew on the practices of the American artist 
Robert Rauschenberg (1925–2008), who came to prominence in the 1950s 
for his collages of ‘found objects’. Just as Rauschenberg would ‘walk around 
the streets of New York and f ind objects and include them in a f inal original 
work’ so scientif ic data is an object which the artist uses; ‘the authorship 
is about the invention of this new sum of the parts that becomes a new 
kind of thing’.
Notwithstanding the independence of the team’s concept of authorship 
from that contained in law, the consequences of the status of authorship 
are f irmly tied to copyright law. This stems from changes in the channels 
of distribution of ‘scientif ic visualisations’ since the mid-1990s. By way of 
background, in the 1980s, ‘Renaissance teams’ operated outside the com-
mercial environment. As Cox explained:
These early Renaissance teams … were not budget driven. They were 
driven by curiosity. They were driven by people trying to get something 
back out of that new kind of research: out of creating graphics, out of 
exploring something that would give them their own rewards in their 
own systemic systems. … They didn’t get rewards other than academic 
feedback and academic rewards …
This changed in 1994, when Cox was approached by the Smithonian Aero-
space Museum, who sought a ‘scientif ic visualisation’ that would form part 
of an IMAX movie Cosmic Voyage. The f ilm had a budget of USD5 million 
and was funded by a ‘commercial partner’: Motorola. It was ‘the f irst time 
ever’ that the ‘visualisation of computational science’ was provided for the 
cinema. Cox has continued to work on projects such as these ever since. 
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For example, the ‘scientif ic visualisation’ of Katrina formed part of the f ilm 
Dynamic Earth, produced for the Denver Museum of Nature and Science, 
as an illustration of the f ilm’s narrative about the ‘story of the complex 
systems of the earth’.
In this way, the ‘egalitarian’ concept of authorship which underpins the 
‘Renaissance team’ entered into a commercial environment regulated by 
intellectual property agreements. For Cox, it was of great importance that 
co-authorship status as understood by the team was translated into both 
attribution and an ownership interest in the copyright in the visualisations, 
and she was instrumental in ensuring that the legal contracts secured this: 
‘I was drafting the f irst contracts here at the University, I could write into 
the contracts … the credit and the ownership. I hand wrote it f irst and then 
they drafted it on paper. … I made sure that we as a team got the appropriate 
credit … [and] ownership, so the collaboration as a true collaboration had 
to be preserved, and that was preserved through the funding model’.
Accordingly, Cox’s analysis of authorship (outlined above) underpins 
the ‘intellectual property agreements’ that are ‘vetted very carefully with 
lawyers’, and concluded for each project involving Cox and the team. These 
provide that copyright in the f inal visualisation images is to be co-owned by 
Cox and the other team members, the University of Illinois and the company 
seeking to exploit the visualisation (e.g. IMAX Corporation). The same 
agreement specif ies that any intellectual property arising as part of the 
production process, for example, copyright in software, is to be co-owned 
by Cox and her team. Further, the owners of any intellectual property in the 
underlying scientif ic data sign a ‘data release form’, making it available for 
use by Cox and her team for any purpose, whether academic or commercial.
In this way, for the ‘Renaissance team’, co-authorship is bound up with 
the consequences that flow under legal contracts and copyright law: co-
authorship status within the team results in ownership of copyright and 
entitlement to royalties. As Cox noted in relation to the hurricane Katrina 
project: ‘each of the co-authors – each of our team – … we all get royalties 
from the production … we are co-creators on the hurricane Katrina and 
we own it …’15 Further, the provision of ‘ownership’ and ‘royalties’ to all 
team members, are matters which Cox considers instrumental in promot-
ing collaboration. As she explained: ‘My philosophy is that you build that 
organism and it really becomes an active creative organism, by people 
having personal buy-ins and ownership and rewards out of the product …’ 
In this context, therefore, copyright’s proprietary framework is employed 
such as both to support and reinforce a spirit of ‘egalitarian’ collaboration 
amongst multiple authors.
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Case Study Two: Joseph Nechvatal and the Computer Virus 
Projects
‘Artist’ Joseph Nechvatal has worked on a number of Computer Virus Pro-
jects which involved him collaborating with two ‘computer scientists’ skilled 
in computer programming. For Nechvatal, this is an ‘equalised exchange 
between disciplines’ of ‘science and art’, as ‘each side has gained something 
and feels a positive growth coming from the exchange’. The result of ‘art and 
science … sharing and collaborating together’ in this way, brings about ‘ben-
ef icial things on both sides of the equation’: the ‘arts’ are ‘greatly enriched’ 
in ‘engaging with science and new technology’, while ‘the scientist gains 
… challenges to do things that they may not have conceptualised before’.
The f irst Computer Virus Project was completed in the early 1990s while 
Nechvatal was artist-in-residence at the Louis Pasteur Atelier and Saline 
Royal/Ledouz Foundation lab in Arbois, France. The project involved the 
development of computer software, written in Basic, by a computer program-
mer, Jean Philippe Massonie. The program enabled the launch of a computer 
virus onto Nechvatal’s database of visual works stored on a computer. From 
this process, Nechvatal selected a series of still images capturing various 
stages of the virus ‘attack’. These images were then transferred onto canvas 
using a robotic painting technique (conducted by a third party company), 
which involves the mechanical application of paint to canvas via the spray of 
an air-gun/nozzle pigment delivery system driven by a computer program. 
In addition, Nechvatal selected a series of moving images comprising part 
of the virus ‘attack’, which was exhibited as an animation.
The second such project, Computer Virus project 2.0, involved Nech-
vatal working with another computer programmer, Stéphane Sikora who 
specialises in ‘Artif icial Life’ technology. The software, written by Sikora, 
launches unpredictable virus operations on Nechvatal’s images that occur in 
real time, thereby creating a form of ‘artif icial life’ (or ‘A-life’). The resulting 
work was exhibited by Nechvatal in a solo show called cOntaminatiOns 
at the Château de Linardié in Senouillac, France. The exhibition featured 
digital prints and paintings (created by the robotic technique outlined 
above) of images which Nechvatal selected from the virus ‘attack’. It also 
included two live electronic virus ‘attack’ art installations entitled Viral 
Counter-Attack which enable the audience to watch an attack in real time 
thereby simulating life and death-like phenomena on screen.
The ‘collaboration’ between Nechvatal and Sikora started out as a 
conversation at a conference called Virtual Worlds held in Paris in 2000 
about virtual reality. Following this they met in Sikora’s studio. Nechvatal 
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explained how he outlined the ‘basic premises’ or ‘bigger ideas’ of ‘the vision 
of the project’ to Sikora: ‘I want to have an art work that can be penetrated by 
a computer virus-like algorithm that will treat my image as an ecosystem.’ 
Nechvatal then left Sikora for a few days, to allow him to ‘execute my vision’. 
Sikora would then be ‘back and forth’ from meetings with Nechvatal to 
programming, showing Nechvatal what he had achieved so far, and giving 
Nechvatal an opportunity for critique: ‘I would say “yes” or “no” basically. 
“Yes, that’s what I’m looking for” or “no, that’s not what I’m looking for”, to 
help him shape the result. And of course this is a cumulative process over 
several months. And in the end we reached the f irst plateau, where I was 
rather happy with the results … ’
Nechvatal described his ‘aim’ as to provide ‘aesthetically pleasing 
results’. While the computer programmers might ‘understand’ that aim, 
and be ‘great partners’, it is Nechvatal alone who determines what meets 
that aim. This understanding is consistent with Sikora’s account of his 
work with Nechvatal, described in a paper published online (Sikora, n.d.). 
Sikora concludes the paper as follows: ‘Above I have outlined the software 
architecture governing the simulation bases of J. Nechvatal’s Computer 
Virus Project. This software permits the exploration of complex dynamics 
while adhering to Nechvatal’s specif ic aesthetic demands.’
Asked what these ‘specific aesthetic demands’ were, Nechvatal explained 
as follows:
[…] like I want to have an emotional effect of aesthetic quality that 
revolves around a certain set of colour or has an aesthetic relationship 
between colours, between the forms and the form of the virus and the 
form of the host … because it is the imagery that you are really seeing, 
in terms of the still images, and of course I have complete control over 
that, so it is about how the virus interacts with that host, what is the form 
of the virus, what is the colour of the form of the virus, how the images 
interact with the preceding and following image … These are the kind 
of aesthetic demands that I put … Now I want it to be more transparent, 
now I want it to be more colourful, this one is going to be black. These 
kinds of specif ics.
Nechvatal described this ‘collaborative’ process as based on ‘goodwill and 
mutual respect’ and he could not think of a single instance where they 
had disagreed: ‘I cannot think of one instance in which we have clashed 
over anything … It has been an amazing collaborative union.’ If Sikora had 
disagreed, Nechvatal considered that it would have been ‘tough’ for their 
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project to continue: ‘he is … helping me execute my vision, and if we weren’t 
going towards what I wanted to do, there would be no point in us working 
together any more.’
Asked about how he would characterise the computer programmer’s 
contribution, Nechvatal said it was a ‘creative’ task. As he explained: ‘I am 
demanding things that they have not done before, in fact perhaps that no 
one has ever done before. So they need to bring all their creative powers to 
the enterprise.’ As he said of Sikora, ‘his talent to be a programmer at that 
level is a form of creativity … ’ However, his view is that this did not amount 
to authorship or co-authorship. Instead, the works are solely authored by 
Nechvatal. As he expressed:
[…] I am the sole author and my name is always on the work that we 
produce. I always credit my collaborators, but because the concept came 
from me, the desire came from me the context of the work came from me 
and continues through me, it is about my approach to art so generally it is 
my name on top and their name second. So they get credited, but it is my 
work and I own everything that comes out of the work, and again, it is a 
kind of respect and acknowledgement but this is my art work, and they are 
kind of helping me, collaborating with me to help me develop my work.
In the same interview, Nechvatal justif ied his position as ‘sole author’, on 
the basis that he is the ‘director’ of the project (a position which contrasts 
to that put forward by Cox in the previous Case Study):
What I do is to throw out big challenges and ideas and I also say “no” a lot. 
They show me what they did, and I say “no that’s not what I was interested 
in or where I’m going.” Or “that’s not acceptable for aesthetic reasons or 
other reasons.” So, I am the project director and I am controlling what 
comes out of it, it came from my original intentions and my name is 
going to be on it, so I have to be the one that is completely pleased with 
the end result.
This understanding of ‘authorship’ is also present in other works on which 
Sikora has collaborated with ‘artists’ other than Nechvatal:
Stéphane has worked with other artists, and they are always the author, 
almost always the sole author of the work … So he is accustomed to this 
procedure … He doesn’t have a creative vision himself but he loves to work 
with artists and do creative work, and he has a big appreciation for art 
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and music and culture, it is just that he needs someone to direct him as to 
what the project is, what the goal of the project is. So he is the technician. 16
As regards to those involved in making the arrangements for the robotic 
painting technique, Nechvatal considers them to be neither ‘creative’, as 
they are ‘merely fabricating to my specif ication’, nor ‘authors’, on the basis 
that they are providing a paid commercial service.
One issue explored in the interview was how the role of technology in 
Nechvatal’s work (e.g. the role of the computer viruses in acting on his ‘body’ 
of visual work) might limit human authorship. Nechvatal has previously 
described the relationship between ‘human agency’ and ‘non-human pro-
cesses’ in his work, as ‘a dialogue … conversation or dance’ (Roniger, 2012). 
Asked what he meant by this, Nechvatal placed his work in the context of 
avant-garde thought of the 20th century, in particular John Cage’s approach 
to music and art which ‘embraces chance operations’. As he explained: 
‘What you want to do is, you author the work and control it tightly but then 
you leave it open for chance, for things to happen, or actually you design it 
rigorously so chance can happen. That is what I did with the program with 
Stéphane. What we do is we … allow and dictate that chance will happen. 
So it is just a way of making the work more unexpected and a little more 
unusual than might be possible’.
While Nechvatal accepted that ‘chance’ might ‘fuzzy the edges a little bit 
of authorship’, he remained of the view that ‘authorship’ was an important 
concept: ‘I don’t see how that precludes the authorship of the work. It just is 
a technique for making work really.’ Therefore, while technology played an 
important role in his work, it still made sense to speak of ‘human authorship’:
[…] because … it is me that is making selections and choices and presenta-
tions and within a certain context of my choosing, so again the chance 
element is just another angle of opening up the work but it is no way 
destroying its connection to me. … I think it is very important that the 
human is dominant and I don’t for one second want to be dominated 
by non-human processes, of machines … particularly in aesthetics, I do 
not for one instance want to be subjected to dominance by machine 
processes, and I think part of our work, part of my work, is an attempt 
to resist that tendency.
Indeed, Nechvatal considered his ‘authorship’ of the work, to make it his 
‘property’, on the basis that it would not exist without him: ‘Do you consider 
your work to be your property?’ ‘Yes, absolutely.’ ‘And why do you feel that 
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way?’ ‘I never really question it, because I make it from nothing and because 
it wouldn’t be there without me. And I sign it, and now I even sign it with 
my DNA so there can be no forgery. I never even question that it isn’t mine, 
because without me it wouldn’t exist!’
Consequently, if his work was copied without his consent, he said he 
would be ‘shocked and dismayed’, regardless of whether he was attributed 
or not. Notwithstanding this, he would not mind his work being copied 
if there was an ‘educational context’ for the use or if the use amounted 
to a ‘new work’. As regards the latter aspect, Nechvatal related this to his 
understanding of the US legal test of transformative use:
[…] if they are artists and they are putting their art on the market and 
they are using appropriation as part of their work, I can accept that. 
I know other artists that have done that successfully, Richard Prince 
most famously, and many others, say Jeff Koons, Warhol. Sometimes 
it is a question of degree and I believe that the legal view, especially in 
the United States is “was a transformation created’, did the other artist 
transform the work or not.
Asked whether he felt that this approach was appropriate, Nechvatal 
responded: ‘I do. Then there is a creative process that is happening, and 
I think that we have to be open to appropriation as part of the artistic 
dialogue because we live in such an image conscious culture.’ In fact, the 
legal concept of transformative use, which stems from judicial interpreta-
tion of the f irst factor of the ‘fair use’ test set out in section 107 of the US 
Copyright Code, is not cast in such broad terms. Notwithstanding this, these 
comments indicate that while Nechvatal’s art practice might not bring him 
into proximity to lawyers (as in the case of Cox’s copyright exploitation 
contracts) copyright terminology resonated in his understanding of the 
limits of the control denoted by authorship, albeit in a form more accom-
modating of appropriation art than is currently contained in US law.
Case Study Three: The Open Ended Group, a ‘Digital Art 
Collective’
The OpenEndedGroup (or ‘OEG’) comprises three members: Marc Downie, 
Shelley Eshkar and Paul Kaiser. Established in 2001 and based in New York, 
the OEG exhibits in galleries, public spaces and the stage, in both the USA 
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and Europe. This often involves installations involving projections produced 
using motion-capture technology.
A recent project was the production of huge floating 3D imagery that 
was projected onto the stage of a performance of Mark-Anthony Turnage’s 
opera Twice Through the Heart at Sadler’s Wells Theatre, London. The 
opera concerned a housewife abused by her husband, and the ‘ethereal’ 
imagery, visible to the audience wearing 3D glasses, sought to capture her 
sense of ‘fear’. The imagery was produced from photographs which the 
members of the Group took of the interior of a 1980s-style Council f lat in 
Dartington. The photographs were then processed by software, written by 
the Group, which could locate where the photographs were taken within 
the geometry of the room. The resulting images were then displayed on a 
computer screen, with all three members of the Group working together 
to produce the f inal imagery. Downie described this process of working on 
the imagery as follows:
You capture a glimpse of an interesting shape or juxtaposition or mistake 
in the computer’s recognition of an object, and you go back and try to 
craft that particular angle, that particular moment, that particular shape 
by either changing the photographs that you put in, or changing the way 
the material is revealed. … You really are trying to work in dialogue with 
an algorithm, something which produces something unexpected. You 
are trying to take control over it, but it is not a situation where we are 
completely in control.
Asked about the different ‘roles’ of the various Group members, Downie 
explained that each brings different expertise. Downie’s grounding is in 
natural science and physics, and he specialises in computer programming. 
Eshkar’s emphasis is on drawing, computer graphics and the ‘exploration of 
human motion’, in particular through the use of motion capture technology. 
Finally, Kaiser’s background is in f ilmmaking and art history. The OEG 
members’ different backgrounds means that, as Downie acknowledged, 
‘there are some core things that we are each much better at that the others’. 
However, ‘other than that it’s a f lat organisation’, with the core activities 
performed by the three of them, working together as ‘equals’. As Downie 
explained: ‘If you were to be in the room while we’re working you would see 
three people staring at 3D projectors, shouting out opinions about the way 
that things are drawn until we agree that what we are looking at is good … 
When we are actually being creative it’s usually us staring at something, 
changing it, and shouting out our opinions’.
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At another point in the interview, Downie expanded on this further:
Really the bit that is us making art is about the three of us sitting in 
front of the screen shouting out things at it. That is the core of what we 
do. The drive that we have had to make pieces and distribute them has 
all been about maximising the time we spend together, as three artists 
staring at something and changing it. The common thread through all 
of our work, is that the reason that we write code is to be able to work in 
real time, even if what we are making is just a f ilm, so you don’t have to 
have code, but it has to be in real time so the three of us can sit in front 
of it as equals and change it.
As regards dynamics between Group members, Downie said that there is 
always a ‘broad level of agreement’ as to ‘what a piece is going to be about’. 
Where disagreements arise as to particular issues, such as ‘is this image 
good?’, this ‘simply leads to us working harder at it’: ‘If one of us thinks 
that an image is good, but another thinks it isn’t there yet, we continue 
to manipulate it until we reach a consensus’. However, he considered 
disagreements that could not be resolved through consensus to be ‘very 
rare’, a matter which he attributed to the fact that they all have ‘very similar 
aesthetics’: ‘We broadly agree about what images are good and what images 
aren’t. If you put us in for blind testing and flashed images at us, and asked 
us to say which images we liked, we would actually end up with fairly similar 
conclusions. I think we would end up with different reasons for what we 
liked. So that then is the balance that we can reach similar end-points by 
different means with different justif ications’.
Asked what would happen if an instance arose where no consensus was 
reached, Downie considered that the Group would probably ‘abandon the 
work’; ‘that would be the end of the piece’. As Downie concluded ‘working 
by consensus is the only way that we can really work’.
Where expertise or assistance is required from outside, the OEG have 
developed a ‘taxonomy of collaboration’, which designates the parameters 
of the external person’s participation. Downie described this as follows:
Well we internally have a taxonomy of people we work with. “Collabora-
tor” is top of the pile. Collaborator is where there is an equality. We are 
equal with collaborators, though we might have different responsibilities. 
Collaborators are the ones who at least have the freedom to give ideas 
quite directly for what we are working on. But beneath that, or different 
to that, are “contributors”, and beneath that still are “consultants”. So 
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a “consultant” is where you have a very particular technical issue that 
we need a fairly constrained answer on. And there is almost nothing a 
consultant can do to surprise you. The answer to a technical question 
will be either “yes” this is how you do it or “no” that’s actually impossible. 
A “contributor” is somewhere between those things, in that they could 
surprise you with the quality of what they do, but they are working 
within a fairly conf ined space, a space that you have pre-determined. 
What they are working on is not up for change. A sound designer for 
example might be a contributor. You have chosen the material that they 
will use and provided them with the actual piece of music or track, and 
simply you need someone with sound engineering competence to realise 
it and make it sound good in a gallery. So that would be an example of 
someone contributing to the art work. So they’re important because if 
they screw up it sounds awful and if they are not there it is left to 3 people 
that aren’t particularly good at sound devices, but it is not an open-ended 
equal class structure, in that sound designers aren’t allowed to say “why 
don’t you do that, it would be better”, because that’s not what they are 
being brought in to do. So that is the taxonomy of collaboration from 
our point of view.
‘Collaborators’ are credited alongside the OEG as ‘artists’, for example 
when the work is displayed, unlike ‘consultants’ and ‘contributors’. 
Downie explained the purpose of the ‘taxonomy’ as follows: ‘It is about 
accurately curating the voices in the room when you are all looking at 
something shouting out “that’s right”, “that needs to be over there” or 
“that’s awful” or “that’s really good, that bit there” or “we need more of 
that”. So whoever is barking out those opinions at the crunch moments 
when we are really trying to discover what we’ve got, what we could make, 
so it’s an invitation as to that, as that moment has to be very carefully 
constructed’.
The taxonomy of collaboration is very strictly enforced by the OEG, and 
‘collaborators’ are ‘[selected] … very carefully’ to ensure consensus with 
OEG members will be reached. Asked whether ‘contributors’ or ‘consultants’ 
ever sought to exceed their roles, Downie remarked that they stick to their 
taxonomy so rigidly ‘that no one tries to exceed their role’. This contrasts to 
an earlier project, How long Does the Subject Linger on the Edge of the Volume 
(2005), when the Group was ‘less experienced’, where ‘engineers’ who were 
merely meant to ‘provide engineering support’, assumed they were ‘equal 
participants in all artistic decisions’. As Downie explained: ‘… in that case 
we weren’t nearly clear enough which caused a certain amount of heart-
reAssessing The chAllenge of The digiTAl 193
ache amongst everyone. So since that point we’ve been much clearer about 
the status of people involved … So we’ve been more careful in choosing 
our collaborators and more careful in making sure that people who aren’t 
collaborators know it …’
An example of the OEG’s work with a ‘collaborator’ is Stairwell, displayed 
at the Hayward Gallery in 2010. The ‘collaborator’ in that instance was the 
dancer and choreographer Wayne McGregor. McGregor’s movements in the 
space of the stairwell at the Hayward were recorded using specially designed 
motion-capture technology. The f inal work involved the 3D projection of 
that footage into the space of the stairwell. Downie described this process 
of working as follows: ‘And that involved the three of us challenging Wayne, 
to do something in the particular curve of the stairwell, round the corner 
or vertically this way. Sort of giving him regions of space to work in and 
to improvise within them, a region marked out by cameras.’ The footage 
was then edited by the three members of the OEG: ‘After all of that … it 
was just me, Paul and Shelley sitting around the screen editing footage in 
real time, and then all of it is saved and sent off-site so it could be put on 
three screens – one at the bottom, one in the middle and one at the top of 
the stairwell. On site we continued to revise our editing. Finally the whole 
thing was played back in stereo.’
McGregor was, according to Downie, ‘the motor of the piece’ and the 
status of ‘collaborator’ denotes the influence and freedom which he was 
allowed to exert. As Downie explained in relation to his work with another 
dancer/choreographer ‘collaborator’: ‘we were all influencing very strongly 
what each of us were doing, so all four of us had responsibility for the way 
the piece worked and we were all allowed to blurt out ideas, and we were 
all allowed to say “that’s crap” or “this bit here, that’s the good bit”. We were 
all allowed to make those statements.’
This contrasts to ‘contributors’ who, while creative in the tasks they 
perform, are ultimately working under the control and direction of the 
OEG:
For example every time we need to f ilm something, where we might care 
how it looks, so it’s not just data capture, especially if it’s in the US, there 
are a couple of camera men that we like so we’ll bring them on, and they 
will be in a contributor role. They know how to hold a camera and have 
vastly more knowledge about where to stick the lights than us, about 
what to do. And they will be there on-site, with us directing. We have a 
very good rapport with them. So that would add two to the project but 
only for a few hours. Only for the shoot.
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In this way, the OEG’s taxonomy of ‘collaborators’, ‘contributors’ and ‘con-
sultants’ can be seen as a way of restricting the number of participants 
that deserve equality of status with the OEG members, in the making of 
‘artistic decisions’. As Downie noted, ‘the status of collaborator marks that 
relationship as different.’ For Downie, ‘artistic decisions’ are:
[…] when we are responding to material, and manipulating it, and navi-
gating through possibilities, we are working very quickly, shouting out our 
initial responses to what we are seeing. There is a tremendous amount of 
instinct in that. The three of us and every other artist that we’ve worked 
with are capable of producing opinions about material very very quickly 
… we are very quick in evaluating things. … I think you have to marry 
that with the vision of being able to see the long-term consequences or 
potential of those things. So you see an image and you don’t really like it 
but there is something in it that offers a glimmer of hope. … So, if this is 
good it goes into the piece, or we grow that out into a section of a piece […]
While the Group (and any collaborators) make the ‘artistic decisions’, and 
are credited as ‘artists’, Downie felt uncomfortable with any notion of 
authorship that denoted ‘creation’:
[…] the sense of discovery, the sense that you are mining something out 
of material, weakens my claim to have authored it in a direct way, in the 
sense that I have had this idea, this idea has come from me, and I have 
given this life in the world. It is hard to be completely convinced about 
that when you feel like you have discovered something’.
In part, the resistance to the view of ‘author’ as ‘creator’ rests with the role 
of the technology itself as a ‘collaborating agent’. As Downie explained 
(in a manner which differs in emphasis, from Joseph Nechvatal’s views at 
Case Study 2 above): ‘… when you are working like this, it really does feel 
like there is an additional agency, be it of the algorithm or of the material 
as seen through a lens you have constructed, and even if you write your 
own code, or even if know intimately how things work, when this way of 
working is good is where there is an additional agency – you are working 
in collaboration with material or in collaboration with an algorithm.’17 
Further, Downie felt uncomfortable with the suggestion that the work 
might be the OEG’s ‘property’. In his view, the work felt like ‘property of 
the world’, again stemming from their work being ‘more like discovery 
than creation’:
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Quite often when things are going really well, the way that we work 
in particular, it feels less like creation. So you build some complicated 
system or analytical way of looking at some object in the world, and you 
craft it and change it, and suddenly you see something on the screen that 
you f ind surprising. Those are the moments which keep you going. It feels 
more like discovery than creation. You have found something that you 
have always suspected that was there, but you’ve found it. It’s not like 
we’ve made it up. It’s not like the process of drawing where a person uses 
his talents to create something from the blank page.
While unauthorised copying might ‘upset’ Downie ‘slightly’, this was not 
something which concerned him. In part this was due to the fact that the 
technical complexity of their work made close copying implausible:
[…] an exact copy of our work, short of someone breaking into your 
computer and stealing it, is just so highly implausible. The indirection 
that goes into making a piece is so great, that defends off against many 
of these sorts of duplications. If someone stole all of my computers and 
then asked me to duplicate Stairwell, I’d have a pretty hard time doing 
it. We’d have a hard time copying ourselves.
Notwithstanding this, the attribution of the Group (and any collaborator) as 
the ‘artists’ of a particular work, was a matter of signif icance, as attribution 
ensured accurate ‘critical discourse’ about ‘who did what’ in the f ield:
One of the things that makes me upset … right now, is the quality of the 
critical discourse in our particular area of art. One thing is that if I’d feel 
that the world, or art historical record, is not getting the biography of 
the story straight, that would make me upset in that way. So when the 
critical history of the f ield can’t f igure out who did what. So I feel upset 
in the sense that people were getting the wrong idea in the sense of the 
genesis of something and can’t f igure out who did what.
Indeed, if the OEG’s work was copied by another artist, in making a ‘new 
work’, they would want ‘a general acknowledgement in any critical sec-
ondary literature’. In this way, while ‘attribution’ is important to Downie, 
like Cox the OEG’s engagement with ‘computer science’ results in their 
distancing of their activities from any concept of ‘authorship’ as ‘creation’. 
Yet, unlike Cox, the implications of this for Downie are that ‘authorship’ 
denoting ‘ownership’ or ‘property’ appears irrelevant.
196 elenA cooper 
Case Study Four: Ken Feingold’s installations and Miltos Manetas’ 
jesusswimming.com
Ken Feingold is based in New York. He specialises in installations using ‘ani-
matronic’ sculptures of human heads or ventriloquist puppets, programmed 
using speech recognition and artif icial intelligence software so they can 
have conversations with each other. Each character is programmed to have 
its own personality, so there are certain parameters to the conversations, 
but no one conversation is the same. Feingold has exhibited widely for 
example at the Museum of Modern Art in New York, the Centre Georges 
Pompidou in Paris, and at the Tate Liverpool in the UK.
Feingold explained that his ‘animatronic’ installations stem from his 
residency at the Zentrum Fur Kunst und Medientechnology (or ‘ZKM’) in 
Karlsruhe, Germany. This brought him into contact with computer pro-
grammers who, over a period of three years, developed complex software 
providing a series of modules for enabling pieces of language to interact with 
visuals. The software is used by Feingold, along with artif icial voice technol-
ogy by researchers at the University of Edinburgh which is made available 
for use on an open source basis. The installations also involve physical 
sculptures. Sometimes these are ‘found’ objects, for example ventriloquist 
dummies that are bought from a car-boot sale. More frequently, however, 
they involve new sculptures, occasionally, as in the case of Self-Portrait as 
the Center of the Universe, involving casts of Feingold’s own head which 
are made at a workshop by a group of ‘sculptors’. This involves moulding 
in latex and casting in silicone, to which f ibre glass ‘skin’ is applied in such 
a manner that the mouth and eyes can open and close. Once this is done, 
stubble, facial hair and the feint appearance of veins is added using needles.
Feingold described his interaction with these computer programmers and 
sculptors as ‘very close-up at times and other times very long distance’. With 
regards the programmers, Feingold usually develops ‘a flow chart’ to ‘show the 
programmer the chain of events that have to happen’, then leaving them to ‘go 
through and write all the routines and the functions’. In the case of the sculp-
tors of the ‘animatronic’ heads, Feingold provides them with photographs or 
drawings to give an example of what is required. The sculptors then produce 
a head in clay, as a model for the cast that will eventually be made in silicone. 
Feingold described the process of working on the clay model as follows:
I would work with the sculptor who was essentially my hands, because 
she had a skill to be able to sculpt in clay in a photographic way. I mean 
her abilities are extraordinary. She would be able to make things look so 
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realistic and do things that I could never attain the skill to be able to do. 
So it would be very simple kinds of suggestions on my part, like let’s make 
the lips fuller, let’s make the chin narrower, let’s make the jaw line squarer. 
And then she would do that and I would say “yes” “no” “less” “more”.’
More than just ‘technical skill’, Feingold saw the programmers and sculptors 
as providing ‘special knowledge’, which placed them in a position ‘occasion-
ally’ to make ‘suggestions’. For example, he described how, on one project, 
the sculptor made a ‘suggestion’ about the size of the ears of a particular 
head. Feingold wanted the head to be of someone in their forties or f ifties, 
and the sculptor had ‘special knowledge’ about that: ‘she was right and that 
was what I wanted.’ Similarly, the programmers have ‘special knowledge’ 
of mathematics, for example, as to the algebra required in order to move a 
f igure in virtual space in an oval.
Feingold characterised the tasks performed by the programmers and 
sculptors as ‘creative’:
I depend a good deal on the creativity of the people that I work with, 
they have a tremendous influence on the outcome of the project, and 
it is a quite interesting process to collaborate in that creative moment 
with computer programmers and with sculptors, because even the ones 
that are life cast have imperfections and they have to be adjusted in the 
making of them, both the physical moulding and the painting and the 
kinds of expressions that the faces have, lend a lot to what the experience 
of the work is.
However, the ‘programmers’ and ‘sculptors’ are not authors or co-authors; 
Feingold is the sole author. Indeed, the ‘art part’ consists of the tasks which 
Feingold performs in his studio alone:
[…] so the work is physically put together and then set up in my studio 
where I then undertake the actual art part, which is working and rework-
ing, writing, editing images and seeing how things work, how they sound. 
Spending time with the work, watching it unfold, noticing that it does 
things that I don’t want it to do, taking things out that I don’t want it to 
do, putting things in that I do want it to do that it’s not doing […]
Feingold explained his position as sole author, by drawing analogies with 
certain interpretations of the Auteur concept of authorship of a f ilm by a 
f ilm director:
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I would say that it is collaborative to the extent that people were helping 
me, but I always took it as one might think of a f ilm director, that it 
was my project, I was not seeing this as co-authorship, neither with the 
programming nor with the sculptural factors, and so the works would 
be fabricated for me, the physical object would be fabricated for me and 
sent to my studio at which point I would assemble them into sculptural 
objects which appear in the f inal work.
At another point in the conversation, Feingold elaborated further on this 
analogy:
I think about things in the framework of f ilm-making to give myself a 
precedent for groups of people working towards an end to accomplish a 
particular person’s vision. Auteur cinema where you have the director 
who is also the writer and who also does a lot of the camera work who 
also sits in or does quite a bit of the editing, some sound and creates the 
entire f ilm, still there are many people who work on the project and they 
are considered contributors, absolutely, and valuable contributors, but 
the notion of authorship is the person who is the director as the person 
who is the individual who takes responsibility for the entire thing18 […]
As Feingold concluded, this ‘is a monotheistic view of authorship, not a 
polytheistic view’. During the interview, Feingold referred to the ‘author’ 
as having an ‘authority’ as ‘the primary creator of a particular work’: ‘… 
this is the work that I’ve made and it’s f inished, I’ve done it. I’ve made this 
work and its mine’. Asked whether the reference to the art work as ‘mine’ 
denoted that it was his ‘property’, Feingold’s answer was informed by his 
understanding of copyright law:
We are talking about intellectual property … I would say that art work 
has certain laws surrounding it. If an artist makes something they have 
the copyright. So how do we identify who it belongs to? Right now I think 
it has to do with who owns the copyright to it. Does that mean that 
that person has exclusive rights to do anything with it forever and ever. 
Perhaps legally yes, but ethically? I don’t know.
Feingold said that he would object to unauthorised copying of this work, 
‘to the extent that it interfered with my economy’; his works are made in 
‘limited numbers’, so their commercial value is ‘in part due to their scarcity’ 
(the installations having physical as well as digital attributes). In outlining 
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the kinds of copying he would consider unobjectionable, Feingold’s answer 
was informed by his understanding of US copyright principles of ‘fair use’:
[…] not to rely on the law but just to think which factors had been in the 
notion of fair use, one of them is whether or not it competes economically 
with the original work,19 and I need to survive, this is what I do for a 
living, to a certain extent, you know my work as an analyst is one aspect 
and my work as an artist another, and these are my economic bases so 
if someone was to take one of them away because they found a way to 
commercialise something and I wasn’t benef itting from that it would 
harm me and it would harm my ability to make other works. It would 
force me into another kind of working that I would then have to go into 
competition with someone who was changing my economy because of 
the way they were doing things.
Feingold’s implicit endorsement of the general principle of copyright, 
contrasts with the very public denouncement of copyright law by the other 
interviewee in this Case Study: Miltos Manetas. Manetas is from Greece 
but is currently based in Rome. He founded the web art movement called 
Neen in 2000, which promotes the view of websites as art objects. As each 
URL is unique, each piece of website art is a ‘unique edition’ in that sense. 
The URL, therefore, provides the art work with a physical property that 
can be bought and sold by art collectors, through trades in ownership of 
the domain name at the various domain name registries. Indeed, Manetas 
sees the act of buying and owning the website, as ‘ “initiating” the artwork’: 
the ‘most important step’ towards ‘becoming the creator of the website’ 
and the ‘most important, because it’s yours’. Therefore, while the Neen 
movement is characterised by emotive claims about the ‘struggle to get 
free from the slavery of intellectual property and copyright’, it advocates a 
different notion of ‘property’ – the ‘real estate’ of URLs (Manetas, 2002). On 
the point of Manetas’ stance against copyright, it was interesting to note 
that one of his income streams is the licensing of applications based on 
his website art to i-phone. When asked what he was being paid for, he did 
not connect this to copyright; rather he considered it as akin to receiving 
a conference fee for speaking.
In the art gallery environment, Manetas projects his websites onto blank 
canvas hung on the gallery wall. One such example is jesusswimming.com 
hosted at that URL, which was displayed in 2006 by projecting it onto a 
canvas 120 x 90 inches. The website depicts a simple animation of a bearded 
f igure swimming slowly in the sea, accompanied by music. The toolbar of 
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the website reads ‘Jesus Swimming by Miltos Manetas’, but the website 
manetas.com, providing an overview of his work, states the following: ‘Jesus 
Swimming, created by Miltos Manetas. Credits: Mark Tranmer (music), Joel 
Fox (animation)’.
When asked about these credits, Manetas explained the process of ‘col-
laboration’ as follows:
[…] many times us artists work in collaboration. So I wake up with an 
idea, of jesusswimming.com. So I call up an animator, and I say could 
you please produce a Jesus swimming. I then call up a composer, and 
I say could you please compose music for him. Yes. Ok. And then I make 
the work. It is absolutely mine. It is a work of art by Miltos Manetas only, 
but in that work there are credits. Animation made by this person, music 
made by Joel Fox.
When asked what his instructions were to the ‘animator’ and ‘composer’, 
Manetas explained that they were ‘not very detailed at all’: ‘The departure 
point for Jesusswimming.com was exactly the name of the website “Jesus 
swimming” and I just asked from the composer to write a music that brings 
in mind Jesus when he swims … [and to the animator] “please draw for me 
a Jesus swimming” …’. While the ‘composer’ and ‘animator’ were given little 
detailed guidance, Manetas retained the right to reject the contributions: 
‘if I didn’t like the music or the animation, I wouldn’t have used it’.
In Manetas’ view, neither Tranmer nor Fox are co-authors; they are merely 
assistants working for a ‘master’, a practice which he analogises with the 
work of Michelangelo. Instead, Manetas is the ‘sole author’, a claim he sup-
ported by analogising his position to the ‘director’ of a f ilm. After drawing 
attention to the fact that he had paid the ‘assistants’, he continued: ‘Well, 
it is my art work. In that case, I am totally the artist 100%. It is my total art 
work. Because it is my creation. It exists only because of me’. At another 
point in the interview, he repeated that he was the sole author on the basis 
that: ‘The artistic idea is completely mine in that case … the idea of the 
Jesus swimming’. In this way, for Manetas, ‘authorship’ denoted being the 
‘director’ or person who ‘created’ the idea of the piece.
In addition, it was apparent that Manetas’ views of what it meant to be 
an ‘artist’ were informed by perceptions in the wider ‘art world’. As Manetas 
described in relation to jesusswimming.com, when he registered the URL, 
he did so ‘as a private person, but ‘not … as an artist’: ‘to own it as an artist 
I have to claim its artistic value, to somehow create interest around it and 
make it an artwork’. These comments were consistent with his view of an 
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‘artist’ as stemming from some form of ‘art world’ recognition: An artist 
def ines himself as an artist and then if other people agree with him and he 
has a commercial success, he is an artist; if not he is just someone who has 
fantasies’. And does it matter who that other person is? ‘This is the business 
of culture. Of course it matters. If it is the postman, it is one thing, but if it 
is the director of a museum, it is another thing. And if it is 10 directors of 
museums, then suddenly our conversation goes to the metaphorical.
As we noted above, the Neen approach to the work as ‘property’ relates to 
the property in the URL. Copying the content of the website is not something 
of concern. Instead Manetas appeared to be concerned with the use of his 
name, or the gallery display of the website at the URL by another ‘artist’. 
As he explained, using one of his other website pieces, maninthedark.com 
as an example:
If now you will invite people to see the exhibition of Miltos Manetas at that 
gallery, I would sue you. If you will invite the people, to see maninthedark.
com, again, I will sue you. But if you will invite the people to see an exhibi-
tion of yours, and you have a simulation of my maninthedark.com there [i.e. 
an exact copy of the website, which appears to be hosted at maninthedark.
com, though it is not at that URL], this is your art work, it is not mine.
Manetas’ position, therefore, includes expectations of attribution in relation 
to the registered domain name (rather than the website content).
Case Study Five: Interactivity and the role of the ‘audience’ or ‘user’
Interactivity is frequently noted to be an important aspect of digital technol-
ogy as a ‘creative’ medium (Stallabrass, 2003, p. 60 and Paul, 2003, p. 8). As 
the art historian Frank Popper expressed in a much publicised interview, 
‘On the Origins of Virtualism’, the emphasis on interactivity, that is, ‘the 
work’s openness to reciprocal creative action’ by the spectator or user, is 
an important feature of such work (Nechvatal and Popper, 2004, p. 71).20 A 
number of examples of this were encountered in the interviews.
The very f irst interactive works were developed by Lynn Hershman 
Leeson, an award-winning ‘artist’ based in California.21 Her work Lorna from 
the late 1970s was issued in limited edition on a laser disc (later moved to 
DVD in 2002) and exhibited in galleries on a screen in a space that depicted 
Lorna’s living room. Using a remote control, the audience could choose 
which steps Lorna took in her fear-dominated life. Other early forms of in-
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teractive work were in the form of ‘hypertext poetry’ which, as Loss Pequeño 
Glazier recounted, involved users clicking on particular words triggering 
a different page to come up on screen. Most commonly, this would involve 
the ‘user’ choosing between different events in the story. 22 More recently, 
one of Glazier’s own digital poems, COG, relies on the viewer to click on 
various coloured ‘cog’ shapes, which turn and release further words, letters 
or phrases into the poem. Similarly, Jason Nelson’s recent work Game, Game, 
Game and Again Game involves the user ‘playing’ thirteen computer-game 
style levels, which contain his drawings and poetry.
Interactivity is also a central component of much installation work 
using digital technology. Don Ritter, a Canadian ‘artist’ currently based 
in South Korea, recently created a large-scale installation called Vested 
which involves a visitor putting on a military vest and walking in front of 
a 14 metre-high projection depicting a panorama of famous international 
buildings. When the visitor pushes a red button on the vest, a large explosion 
takes place on the projection triggered by complex digital technology. The 
interaction enables Ritter’s work to capture the schadenfreude phenomenon 
and draw attention to the mass media’s vested interest in depicting images 
of human tragedy. Similarly, Joseph Nechvatal has also displayed aspects of 
his Computer Virus Projects in the form of an interactive gallery installation. 
Under the title Viral Counter-Attack, the progress of the virus in ‘attacking’ 
Nechvatal’s body of work was displayed in real-time on a touch-screen. Up 
to two members of the audience could touch the screen simultaneously, to 
influence the movement of the virus ‘attack’.
A number of these interviewees noted the central importance of the 
position of the audience to these works. As Glazier notes, in respect of his 
own interactive poem COG, the ‘reader is essential because if you just turn 
on the piece, there is nothing there’. Notwithstanding this, all interviewees 
were of the view that the ‘user’ is not a co-author of the work, pointing 
to the limited number of choices which users are faced with. As Leeson 
expressed, users might be active and also perhaps creative in their choices 
but they were not authors:
Because it is pre-set. You know, somebody walks through a building, they 
are not the architect. But they could choose how to walk through it. The 
structure is already there, implanted. So in order to be an author, they 
have to start from scratch. Even though you can alter something and 
even if an interactive piece requires you to alter something, you haven’t 
designed it, or come up with a conception, then you don’t author it, then 
you are not really the original author.
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Further, in Joseph Nechvatal’s view, the role of the audience was ‘mildly 
creative’ in the ‘choices’ made and in ‘helping explore the piece’, but this 
did not make them authors or co-authors: ‘Oh, no, [the audience is] not even 
close [to being authors]. … Derrida … claims that a reader is as much the 
author, as the author of a book, but I can tell you that that’s not really true! 
… Yes, they are using their consciousness and are anticipating an art event, 
but they are not creating an art event, they are receiving it’.
Similarly, Don Ritter thought that a participant in his works might be 
‘creative’ in relation to their own experience of the work, but this did not 
amount to authorship. It was akin to deciding how to walk through a gallery 
displaying paintings and how long to spend in front of each work.
Indeed, a number of interviewees expressed the challenge of interactive 
work as located in how to constrain the audience’s freedom of action, so 
as to ensure that their contribution forms part of the ‘artist’s vision’. Ken 
Feingold’s early installations, for example, enabled gallery visitors to have 
conversations with the animatronic f igures. However, he was unhappy with 
the result, as visitors tended to have open-ended conversations about their 
own concerns, rather than allowing Feingold’s work to steer the conversa-
tion:
I did f ind a certain shifting point where I was no longer particularly happy 
about the ways in which viewers become participants, would interact 
with works, and found that people wanted things from works, because 
of the metaphors that were involved, essentially you thought if you really 
were interacting in an open-ended way with an open-ended character 
you could talk about anything and it started to feel like crafting a very 
particular musical instrument, and putting it on a stage and inviting the 
audience up to let them play music. Now I wanted to play the music, so 
the more recent works involved computers interacting with each other, 
or programs within computers interacting with each other.
Other interviewees noted that the key to a successful interactive work was 
to ensure that the scope for audience participation is fairly constrained. 
For example, the OpenEndedGroup’s Into the Forest, which opened for 
exhibition at the Museum of the Moving Image in New York in January 
2011, involves a 3D projection of painterly imagery which enables the public 
to sense the daydreams of childhood. For one minute in every three or 
four, the piece projects the public’s stereoscopic shadow back through a 
spotlight, thereby inviting the audience to respond to the work’s projections. 
As Downie explained, the reason why this only happens for one minute 
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in every 3 or 4, is because ‘we didn’t want the interactivity to become the 
point of it.’ As he elaborated:
So, I mean I think you use the word “user” which is exactly the sort of 
relationship we want to avoid, and exactly the noun that I’d hope would 
never apply to any of our interactive pieces, especially a piece that uses 
computer vision of any kind. … People actually act quite silly in most 
interactive pieces, and the relationship that they have is extremely non-
contemplative, and they are trying to bring attention to them, and they 
are trying to push the boundaries of what the computer can see, so they 
start moving quickly to see if the computer can still follow them; they 
move in extreme ways. And none of that is what we want. If you stick a 
microphone in front of someone people will generally start making very 
silly noises, it is some sort of human desire to see what the envelope of 
interaction is, rather than paying attention to a particular piece. So the 
interactive pieces we’ve made have all tried to be completely autonomous, 
to have integrity by themselves, so the interaction is quite constrained 
in time like it was in In the Forest, or optional or invitational.
Instead of ‘user’ of an interactive work, Downie prefers the term ‘partici-
pant’. In his view, this provides a different emphasis. As he explained, a 
‘participant’ denotes a person ‘who accepts the invitation from the work; 
who has accepted the invitation to walk into the spotlight and to follow 
and be part of the piece’.
Conclusions
As we noted at the outset, a perceived challenge of the digital for copyright 
stems from the assumption that the ‘creative’ practices of the ‘digital age’ 
involve the contributions of many. Not only is this thought to make the 
identif ication of the author more diff icult but the presumed collaborative 
nature of such practices is thought to pose problems for authorship as a pro-
prietary category. As we have seen, the interviews revealed that technology 
has in many cases in fact facilitated solitary work: as technology becomes 
ubiquitous, a number of interviewees today work alone on processes which 
in former times were collaborative. Further, as solitary work is now feasible, 
in certain spheres it is considered to be the working practice of preference.
Where collaborative practices do prevail, the case studies revealed 
diverse ways in which relations between contributors are understood, 
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reflecting diverse ideas about authorship. Indeed, a number of interviewees 
articulated positions which were diametrically opposed to each other. For 
example, Donna Cox juxtaposed her ‘egalitarian’ notion of the whole team 
as authors of the ‘visualisation’, against the solitary view of authorship 
inspired by Auteur cinema, of the ‘artist’ as ‘director’. This was the very 
‘monotheistic’ view of authorship, adhered to by interviewees such as Ken 
Feingold.
Another point of difference of opinion was on how the role of technology 
impacted on authorship. For the OEG, technology is a ‘collaborating agent’ 
restricting the ‘control’ that the Group felt over their work. The result is that 
the Group felt as if they were engaged in a process of ‘discovery’, and Marc 
Downie was uneasy with any concept of authorship related to ‘creation’. By 
contrast, the language of creativity frequently featured in the interview with 
Joseph Nechvatal, who saw technology as subject to his human ‘creative 
vision’.
The diversity of ideas about authorship revealed in the interviews means 
that it would be simplistic to use the views articulated by any one inter-
viewee, as the basis for the reform of legal tests. For example, while the views 
of interviewees such as Joseph Nechvatal might accord with the legal test 
of originality as ‘free and creative choices’, explored by Stefan van Gompel 
in his contribution to this volume, other interviews such as that with Marc 
Downie, revealed the diff iculties of a test that def ines ‘creative choices’ in 
opposition to constraints: for the OEG the constraints posed by technology 
are an intricate part of their process of making ‘art’. Notwithstanding this, 
a number of more general concluding observations can be made, with a 
view to presenting a more nuanced account of the perceived challenge of 
the digital.
First, authorship is an important category for the ‘artists’ and ‘poets’ 
interviewed. This is the case, even in the face of interactive technologies 
enabling audience participation which was the very development which 
scholars had thought would pose the most signif icant challenge to author-
ship (Woodmansee, 1994, p. 26).23 Indeed, while there may be differing posi-
tions as to the degree to which technology limits human action, as is evident 
from his much publicised interview ‘On the Origins of Virtualism’ with art 
historian Frank Popper, the over-arching theme of ‘digital art’ discourse 
is ‘how technology is – or can be – humanised through art’ (Nechvatal 
and Popper, 2004, p. 72).24 In this way, the discourses of ‘digital art’, with 
their focus on humanising technology, contrast to what one commentator 
thought to be the implications for copyright’s concept of authorship of new 
technologies: the ‘struggle over the soul of copyright’ when the law protects 
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the products of machines, rather than human authorship (Ricketson, 1991–2, 
p. 2).25 The implications of this for law are that tests that defer to some 
extent to social understandings of authorship, such as the US requirement 
of ‘intention’ as to co-authorship, remain relevant in the ‘digital age’, as 
‘authorship’ remains a meaningful category.
Secondly, in some instances (though not all), it was striking that the 
law actively contributes to concepts of authorship. As we saw in the above 
case studies, law contributed to certain interviewees’ understandings of 
authorship as denoting ‘ownership’ (in Case Study 1), or to the demarcation 
of the limits of authorial control (in Case Study 2 and Ken Feingold in 
Case Study 4), though, as we noted, the interviewees’ understandings did 
not always accurately ref lect current copyright law. Other interviewees 
directly resorted to copyright law to give their views on authorship as 
a proprietary, normative force. For example, David Em commented on 
his relation to his work as follows: ‘Do you consider the work to be your 
property?’ ‘Absolutely.’ ‘And what do you mean by that?’ ‘If you take seri-
ously the idea that there is such a thing as intellectual property, who else 
does this belong to, it came whole cloth out of my head, no one else could 
have come up with this, in a million years. And that makes it mine … 
when it comes down to it, this is what I’ve made. This is the only thing that 
I can attach my thumb print to in a sense and say this is something that 
I created. Nobody else created this. And I am very strong about defending 
that.’
Similar comments were made by Casey Reas26 and Herbert Franke.27 
Moreover, copyright also appeared to influence other interviewees who, at 
a f irst glance, rejected proprietary authorship. For example, Jason Nelson 
initially rejected the idea that his work was his ‘property’ because: ‘I want 
my work to spread and I love that notion that you have people in strange 
corners exploring my work’. Yet, later in the same interview, when asked 
how he would earn a living if he did not have his current academic position 
(at Griff ith University, Queensland), he referred to revenue streams that 
are dependent on copyright. As he commented:
I think that digital artists, especially net-based artists, are better posi-
tioned for making a living than a lot of other artists, and the reason for 
that is that there is beginning to be more streams of revenue for that sort 
of thing, so for example making an app, an i-phone app sort of thing … 
the ability to charge a dollar or two dollars for people viewing or playing 
around with your work is beginning to be an amazing stream of revenue 
for artists working in this genre.28
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While these examples29 illustrate that copyright law influences certain of 
the interviewees’ understandings of authorship, the connection between 
‘art’ and law should not be overstated. As we saw in Case Study 1, even where 
‘artists’ conclude legal agreements about copyright, ‘vetted very carefully 
with lawyers’, the criteria which they use to determine who is an author, 
appears uninfluenced by that in law. Also, other interviewees, such as Miltos 
Manetas, articulated ideas which were antithetical to copyright concepts.
Drawing this chapter to a close, what is the significance of these observa-
tions for how we understand the challenge of the digital for authorship? As 
noted at the outset, no claim is made that the interviewees are representative 
of all practice involving digital technology. Indeed, a number of other quali-
tative empirical studies are currently in progress, investigating different 
‘spheres’ of practice using digital technology and preliminary indications 
are that these uncover quite different experiences. For example, a recent 
Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) funded study which is being 
conducted by Smita Kheria and Penny Travlou at Edinburgh University on 
Creation and Publication of the Digital Manual: Authority, Authorship and 
Voice, is examining authorship in the context of digital ‘manuals’, which 
function as resources for online communities, for example in providing 
a platform for online performances or instructions for using open source 
software or a medium for exchanging information about farming practices. 
The ‘manuals’ involve the contributions of many in the online environment. 
Travlou and Kheria’s preliminary conclusions are that the interviewees 
‘struggle with the term author and the notion of authorship’. Further, a 
European Research Council-funded project in progress Music, Digitiza-
tion, Mediation: Towards Interdisciplinary Music Studies (MusDig), lead by 
Georgina Born at Oxford University, has uncovered, amongst other things, 
the views of a younger generation of ‘digital musicians’ who would rather 
describe themselves as ‘researchers’ than ‘authors’, with the consequence 
of a lessening of feelings of authorship as an ‘exclusionary’ or ‘boundary 
making’ category.
In this way, placing the observations of the current study in the context of 
these other qualitative studies reveals a complex picture about authorship 
in practices involving digital technology. On one level, these differences are 
unsurprising: the interviewees of the current study were taken from a list of 
‘notable individuals’ and were all ‘artists’ or ‘poets’ whose work is directed 
towards fora for which authorship is well established as a structuring cat-
egory. Donna Cox, for example, explained that ‘the marketing model for art’ 
in the ‘high end art market’ is geared towards ‘the artist as a sole producer’, 
and that she instead preferred working on f ilms, as these had ‘established’ 
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models for multiple authorship. Similarly, Joseph Nechvatal presented 
‘digital artists’ as working within the context of ‘historical precedent’:
I think when someone is audacious enough to call themselves an artist 
… you put yourself in the context of all the artists that have come before 
and have come after and that are contemporary with you, so you have 
already conceptualised your activity […]
This empirical study, therefore, encompasses interviewees whose channels 
of work differ signif icantly from those engaged in making digital ‘manuals’ 
for use by online communities (interviewed by Kheria and Travlou), or 
musicians at the PhD stage (interviewed, amongst others, by Born). This 
suggests that the challenges to authorship may stem from the objectives 
of particular practices, informed by their context (e.g. online community 
resource as opposed to art gallery display), rather that the use of digital 
technology per se. Indeed this may go some way to explaining why a number 
of the ‘digital’ case studies explored in this chapter (e.g. Case Studies 3 
and 4), evidence greater aff inity with the hierarchical divisions between 
contributors described by Jostein Gripsrud in his empirical study of the 
‘analogue’ practices of theatre (in this volume), than with each other. As 
well as indicating the variety of digital practice, placing the current study 
in the context of others, may therefore lead us to a more nuanced analysis 
of the challenges currently facing authorship.
Notes
1. This is, of course, not a new challenge. See, for example, the nineteenth 
century case of Nottage v. Jackson (1882-83) concerning authorship of a por-
trait photograph: ‘The idea of photographing the Australian Cricketers no 
doubt was the idea of one of [the photographic firm’s] managers. The man 
who went to the Oval was the man who took the photograph. They said, ‘Go 
to the Oval and photograph the Australian Cricketers,’ and he had to do it. 
Well, he goes to the Oval. What had he to do? He had to arrange the group, 
to put them in the right position and the right focus. But he does not do it 
all, because I suppose there is another man who gets the plate ready; and 
there is another man who, when the thing is ready, takes the cap off. It is 
difficult to say who is the author of the photograph.’ (Per Brett M.R. at 632).
2. Similar observations were expressed by Georgina Born in a paper entitled 
‘Composer and Work Revised: Ontological Politics in Digital Art Music’ at 
the conference Music and Digitisation held at Oxford University in January 
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2013. In the context of qualitative empirical interviews with ‘musicians’ who 
use digital technology, Born presented, amongst other things, the views of 
a new generation who saw themselves as ‘researchers’ rather than ‘authors’, 
with the consequence of a weakening of the exclusion or ‘boundary mak-
ing’ denoted by ‘authorship’.
3. Aspects of this paper were presented twice at the University of Amsterdam: 
in December 2011, at the HERA workshop Trends in Authorship: Empirical 
Studies and Legal Implications and in April 2013, at the HERA conference 
Creativity That Counts. I thank Lionel Bently, Paul Heald, Martin Kretschmer 
and Charlotte Waelde for their comments.
4. The general structure of each interview was as follows: the interviewees 
were first asked to introduce their work and how they use digital technol-
ogy. Following this, interviewees were asked to give an example of a recent 
work and talk through how it was made, who was involved, whether it had 
an ‘author’ and if so the justifications for why ‘authorship’ was conferred 
on some contributors but not others. The interviewees were also asked 
whether they considered their work to be their ‘property’ and about how 
they had felt/would feel when/if their work was copied without their 
consent. In relation to the latter, the interview explored the different factors 
that impacted on how they felt, in particular whether or not they were at-
tributed and whether the copying was exact or modified.
5. The names were verified as genuine by Simon Biggs of Edinburgh College 
of Art, the Project Leader of the ELMCIP project, a HERA funded sister 
project to Of Authorship and Originality. No claim is made that the sample 
is representative of all creative practice in the digital arts. However, it was 
considered by Simon Biggs as providing a good spread of examples. I was 
also grateful to Nicholas Lambert of Birkbeck College, London and Bronac 
Ferran of the Royal College of Art, London for early discussions regarding 
project design. The full list of interviewees is as follows: Philippe Bootz, 
Donna Cox, Marc Downie (of the OpenEnded Group), David Em, Ken Fein-
gold, Herbert Franke, Loss Pequeño Glazier, Lynn Hershman Leeson, Miltos 
Manetas, Michael Mandiberg, Joseph Nechvatal, Jason Nelson, Casey Reas, 
Don Ritter, Lillian Schwartz and Alan Sondheim. The interviews took place 
in August 2011. A second round of interviews was conducted in August/
September 2012 with interviewees whose work today frequently involves 
the contributions of others: Donna Cox, Marc Downie (of the OpenEnded 
Group), Ken Feingold, Lynn Hershman Leeson, Miltos Manetas and Joseph 
Nechvatal. Philosopher Laura Biron participated in the second round of 
interviews, asking a separate line of questions about the interviewees’ views 
on ‘relational’ theory concepts, which relate to the subject of a separate 
paper.
6. Lillian Schwartz joined Bell Labs, the research and development arm of 
AT&T in the late 1960s, where she worked closely with a number of com-
puter scientists such as Kenneth Knowlton. See further Schwartz, 1992.
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7. Jet Propulsion Lab, Pasadena, USA, specialised in the creation of visuali-
sations from data collected by NASA missions. David Em was ‘artist in 
residence’ from 1977 to 1984.
8. Herbert Franke was based at the Academy of Fine Arts, Munich from 1973-
1997, and is author of one of the earliest books on the subject of ‘computer 
art’, which was published in 1971 under the title Computergraphik – Com-
puterkunst (Franke, 1971). Speaking through his translator Franke explained: 
‘[collaboration] was in former times very usual. Because all these machines 
that he was using in former times were not accessible to him without 
collaboration. Always a scientist or a programmer is, in early times where 
you haven’t had a PC at home, where he had to go in laboratories, to the 
industry, in new research centres, and he asked, “is it possible to get your 
instruments to do some artistic work with those instruments?”, instru-
ments which had a totally different purposes, for medicine for instance. So 
scientific research tools… in the medical field, or big computers for space 
flight and so on, and he got there and got the possibility to work there at 
night for instance, he had to find somebody there who would be interested 
in working with him together, and with those guys together he did work. It’s 
changed in the last twenty or thirty years.’
9. The website of the Electronic Poetry Center can be found at: http://epc.buf-
falo.edu/. See further Pequeño Glazier (2002).
10. See Petry (2011), who traces this practice back to the work of Marcel Du-
champ, who in 1917 famously submitted a mass produced porcelain urinal 
signed ‘R. Mutt’ for exhibition at the Society of Independent Artists in New 
York.
11. Donna Cox is also Professor of Art and Design at the University of Illinois 
Urbana-Champaign (UIUC).
12. For a detailed exploration of these differences see Abrams (1971).
13. In the USA, the ‘scientific visualisations’ will be copyright subject matter, as 
audiovisual works (S.101 US Copyright Code defines ‘audiovisual work’ as a 
‘series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the 
use of machines or devices such as projectors, viewers or electronic equip-
ment…’). The statutory definition of ‘joint work’ is contained in s.101 of the 
US Code: ‘a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that 
their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of 
a unitary whole.’ Amongst other things, the US doctrine of ‘joint works’ re-
quires that each co-author’s contribution is ‘independently copyrightable’, 
such that it amounts to an ‘original expression that could stand on its own 
as subject matter of copyright’. See Erickson v. Trinity Theatre (1994, para. 
46). In this way, for example, if the computer scientists contribution to the 
‘audiovisual work’ is merely to facts and ideas (e.g. to background research 
or to technical facts regarding the scientific principles which the still/mov-
ing images illustrate), they may not be co-authors as a matter of law. This is 
illustrated by the facts of Childress v. Taylor (1991) where it was held insuf-
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ficient for joint authorship of a play to merely contribute facts and details 
about the play’s leading character. Further, following the Ninth Circuit Dis-
trict Court decision in Aalmuhammed v. Lee (2000), co-authorship doctrine 
in the case of audiovisual works focuses on the question of ‘creative control’ 
and it might well be held that this rests with the ‘artistic decisions’ of Pat-
tison and Cox, and not the ‘computer scientists’.
14. When explained that the legal doctrine of co-authorship includes a require-
ment of ‘intention’, Cox responded: ‘No I had never heard of that… The 
reason why I talk about intention is because in my art history, when I was 
taking classes at Madison, intention in the books that I’d read, was the 
definition that really changed artists in the 1970s. It was why certain artists 
could put stripes on trains and call it art… And it is my understanding 
that these conceptual artists that would do these large projects, or… have 
piles of dirt inside an art museum, it was their intention, their intention to 
contextualise, or Marcel Duchamp, it was his intention to contextualise the 
urinal or a bicycle to make it art. That’s where I got that.’
15. Other comments made by Cox during the interview, illustrating this tying 
of co-authorship/co-creator status to copyright ownership are as follows: 
‘I co-author with my group and I share all the royalties with my group’. The 
‘final images of that work are co-owned by the company with whom we are 
contracting and the University of Illinois, and with myself and members of 
my group who are the primary creators because we create the visualisations 
from the numerical data….’
16. Cf. Cox’s critique of treating ‘technologists as technicians’ above.
17. This is explored in detail by another member of the OEG, Paul Kaiser in Kai-
ser (2004): ‘you also collaborate with your materials, onto which you do not 
simply impose your vision, but rather discover it there… The responsive and 
even intelligent quality of our “material” (ie, the program itself) deepened 
my sense of tools and materials as active collaborating agents. Who can 
doubt that this sort of man/machine collaboration will only intensify in the 
future?’
18. Also on the comparison with the film director, Feingold explained: ‘… in 
the sense that we talk about it in art, in a way again I use the analogy of a 
film, people have roles, and who would call the film theirs, generally the 
director…. yes there are a lot of people that worked on it, but you would say 
that this is a new film by so and so, Jean Luc Godard has made this film. We 
know that he had camera people, lighting people, sound people, make up, 
costume, sets you know people who were moving the equipment around 
and who drove the trucks to bring it from one location to another. People 
who made the food you know, people who edited it, people who made the 
copies and who distributed it, but still we say this is a film by Jean Luc God-
ard.’ Another analogy that Feingold used is with the position of a writer of a 
literary work, who may rely on the skill of those with knowledge of type-set-
ting, yet will still be accepted as the author of the book: ‘the analogy I might 
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use is if you are going to do an old fashioned book, where you have to take it 
to a printing-press, and you needed someone to set the type. So they might 
suggest using Baskerville instead of Times New Roman for the book because 
it is going to read better or because the ink sits in the paper better, or they 
might suggest a certain binding or page size or something like that. And 
you would rely on their experience and their ingenuity to present you with 
choices and I like making choices, I like it when someone would say “we 
could do it like this or like that”, and then I’d say “oh, that’s good, what about 
doing it like that?” And then they’d say “oh I can do it like this” or “I can’t do 
that”, and if it wasn’t possible we would come up with a solution.’
19. This is most likely a reference to the fourth ‘fair use’ factor set out in Section 
107 US Copyright Code, which requires the court to consider, amongst other 
things, ‘the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.’
20. See also Popper, 2007, p. 1, after terming developments in the relation-
ship between ‘art’ and ‘technology’ as giving rise to ‘virtual art’: ‘virtual art 
represents a new departure – new in its… emphasis on interactivity, its 
philosophical attitude toward the real and the virtual, and its multisensorial 
outlook.’
21. In 2010 Hersmann Leeson received a ‘ddaa’ lifetime achievement award 
from the Museum of Digital Arts, Berlin.
22. To quote the example that Glazier gives: ‘Jane is stuck in the woods, should 
she go in the direction of that rock or follow that frog, and then you click on it.’
23. Martha Woodmansee commented, at the advent of the internet, as follows: 
‘More significant… however is that hypertext can be interactive; and when 
the reader begins actively to intervene in the text, adding to, subtracting 
from, and modifying it from his or her keyboard, the boundaries between 
author and reader disintegrate…. By contributing… the reader becomes 
an overt collaborator…’ (Woodmansee, 1994, p. 26). Cf. in particular to Nech-
vatal, quoted above.
24. The passage continues: ‘A main thread in your new book, and the reason 
that you stress the biographical details of the artists, I believe, is your desire 
to show how technology is – or can be – humanized through art.’
25. Ricketson was considering the implications for authorship of the expansion 
of copyright subject matter to include ‘computer programs’ as a category 
of ‘literary work’ as well as the UK’s protection of ‘computer generated 
works’ (defined under by s.178 of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 
1988 as works for which there is ‘no human author’). He presented this as a 
challenge of the ‘machine age’ and stemming from ‘a fundamental dispute 
about the nature and meaning of the concept of authorship.’ (Ricketson, 
1991-2, p.1 and 2). For a discussion of how the computer programmer was 
presented in the interviews and how this compares to copyright concepts of 
‘authorship’ of software, see Cooper (2012).
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26. ‘And you say that you… feel that you have “ownership” over the work, why 
do you feel that way? Well, because it is a product of my mind and some-
thing that I worked hard to produce. It is my labour… I do this work out of 
interest and passion and it is incorrect and unethical to use the work if I am 
not consulted or if it’s used against how I’ve chosen to license the work or 
how I want it to be used. As far as I understand, under copyright law, it is 
illegal as well.’
27. Speaking through his translator, Herbert Franke commented as follows: 
‘does Herbert consider his work to be his property? Yes. It is his work and 
in this sense it is his property, yes. And what is it that makes him feel that 
it is his property? Because it is his creational work…. It’s his intellectual 
property.’
28. Unlike Miltos Manetas (see above), Nelson accepted that these licensing 
transactions were dependent on copyright.
29. Another example is Michael Mandiberg. He is well known for his ‘appropri-
ation’ work www.afterSherrieLevine.com which enables visitors to the site 
to print off copies of digital photographs which he took of photographs by 
Walker Evans (1903-1975), as a means of playing with the concept of ‘repro-
duction’, explored in the analogue environment by Sherrie Levine. Yet, other 
aspects of his work fall firmly within the copyright framework through his 
use of attribution Creative Commons or GPL licences. This is well illustrated 
by his response to a comment left on his page entitled ‘Michael Mandiberg 
– Three Creative Commons Case Studies’ at http://vimeo/6303349 (ac-
cessed 19 August 2011) which complained that the problem of ‘open source’ 
projects was that others ‘use them “word for word”’ and then ‘credit them-
selves’. Mandiberg replied by invoking the legal framework: ‘but they have to 
credit you, and keep the code GPL licensed. If they don’t they are breaking 
the contract of the GPL. How you choose to remedy that situation is up for 
debate (a polite email to their creative director, calling them out publicly, or 
getting lawyered up)… it is imperative that these covenants are kept. And 
that requires us to force the issue when someone breaks the covenant.’
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 Creativity and the sense of collective 
ownership in theatre and popular music
Jostein Gripsrud
If one asks people what they think of when hearing the expression ‘the artist 
at work’, the chances are overwhelmingly that they will picture a painter in 
front of his (rather than her) canvas or a writer alone at a desk or table where 
there is a piece of paper, a typewriter or a computer. What lies behind this, is 
of course the Romanticist idea of the artist as an individual with particular 
expressive needs and gifts. The simple historical fact that much or perhaps 
even most art has routinely been created by more than one person – from 
the work of Michelangelo’s assistants to the creation of performances and 
orchestral concerts – has not signif icantly altered this standard image of 
the lone creator. The image even pops up in recent arguments that digital 
technologies are challenging it (cf., e.g. Woodmansee, 1994, p. 25) – as if it 
had not been challenged already by actual artistic practices.
Clearly, to the extent that such an individualistic notion of creative 
practice underlies copyright law, a critical look at how art is actually made 
may be useful with a view to possible sensible revisions of such laws. On 
the other hand, even when the production of art takes a collective form, 
the individuals involved may still think of themselves and their work in 
terms of the Romantic image of artistic creation, regardless of the extent 
to which this is adequate.
With this as a background, the purpose of the research presented here 
has been to investigate empirically how practising artists, in art forms where 
production is predominantly of a collective nature, feel and think about the 
nature of their contribution to the f inished whole. More precisely, the idea 
is to explore to which extent those involved in the collective production of 
art have a sense or feeling of ownership vis-a-vis the outcome of the creative 
process, and what they think this might entail in terms of f inancial and 
other rewards. On this basis, I wish to raise some questions regarding the 
role of current copyright law in relation to actual artistic practices.
Norwegian law closely follows copyright laws of other Nordic countries as 
these have traditionally developed copyright policy in cooperation. Because 
of Norway’s membership in EFTA, the large body of EU copyright norms 
is also implemented in Norwegian copyright law (see G. Karnell, 2012). 
Both in theatre and music the roles of creative contributors are governed 
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by either copyright law (copyright in a play, set design, costume design, 
choreographies, and other works of authorship) or so-called neighbouring 
rights for performing artists (visual, musical, dance). Rights of performing 
artists are typically limited and centre on their right to authorise the record-
ing of their performance. Subsequent copying and distribution of such 
recordings also requires their authorisation. Unlike authors protected under 
copyright law proper however, the law does not give them a claim against 
adaptations or copying of the performance by other performers. That is, 
rights only rest in a particular recording of their performance, not in the 
performance as such. The director of a play has, from a legal point of view, 
a less clear position. In the intellectual property landscape, the director 
seems situated between authorship (creating a work) and performance. The 
details of the legal distinctions made in black letter laws do not necessarily 
feature in contractual practices.
Imagining that perceptions of and practices relating to these matters 
might vary from one form of collective art to another, I decided to look 
more closely at production practices in two very different arts: Professional 
theatre and popular music, both professional and semi-professional. Theatre 
is an art form with ancient origins that still relatively low-tech in terms of 
production, relying almost completely on live performances before a public 
assembled in the same space at the same time. Popular music certainly also 
has ancient origins, but it has to a much greater degree become a relatively 
high-tech art form in several respects: Its history over the last 100 years is 
closely related to modern (and changing) technologies of recording, repro-
duction and distribution and it now relies to a great extent on electronic 
equipment also for the composing as well as for the live performance of 
musical works. A comparison between the two arts may thus be interesting 
also in terms of how very different forms of production, distribution and 
consumption might influence how participants in the respective creative 
processes experience their contributions and their relationship to them.
The data was gathered in two periods – October/November 2011 and 
March/April 2013. The f irst of these periods was mainly devoted to the study 
of theatre. I observed rehearsals of a play by Australian playwright Alan 
Bovell, When the Rain Stops Falling, at the public repertory theatre in Bergen, 
Norway, Den Nationale Scene (‘The National Stage’), and I did very loosely 
structured interviews with a middle-aged male actor, Stig Amdam, and a 
young female actress, Ida Cecilie Klem, the female art director (scenograf ), 
Siri Langdalen, and the male director (regissør, iscenesetter) Svein Sturla 
Hungnes. I also interviewed the theatre’s male director at the time, previ-
ously and currently a nationally prominent actor, Bjarte Hjelmeland, and an 
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experienced playwright, who is also one of Norway’s most acclaimed poets, 
Cecilie Løveid. As for popular music, I interviewed Mats Lyngstad Willassen 
and Aksel Gaupås Johansen, two amateur musicians in their twenties with 
some experience of contributions to the professional music scene (mainly 
record productions) in October/November of 2011 and then, in March/April 
of 2013 a leading, very internationally-oriented male owner of record labels 
and a management agency in Bergen, Mikal Telle, plus two professional 
musicians, Frank Hovland and Eirik Glambek Bøe, and a (female) singer 
and producer with considerable professional experience, Kate Augestad. In 
terms of genres, the interviewees represented a broad variety of popular 
musical forms, including rap, r&b, largely acoustic pop, rock, electronica and 
jazz. I further studied the media coverage of and documents pertaining to a 
recent (February 2013) court case in Bergen over the rights to two electronic 
pop songs associated with the internationally renowned group Röyksopp.
The following account of my f indings is organised around three key 
questions: (1) What is the nature of collaborative creative work in these two 
art forms – how is it organised, which structures or relations of power can 
be discerned? (2) What are the current copyright regimes like in theatre and 
music respectively? (3) Do copyright issues influence creative processes, 
and if so, how? But I will start out by sketching the Romantic notion of 
artistic creation against which the specif icities of collective authorship 
are to be interpreted.
The Romantic notion of artistic creation
The modern understanding of artistic work as ‘creation’ has a long prehistory, 
but basic elements in its present form were established in the 18th century 
and decisively shaped by representatives of the Romantic movement in the 
arts from the late 18th century on.
It is on the one hand tied to spiritual, i.e. religious, thinking, in that it links 
artistic creation to the original divine creation of the world out of nothing 
(cf. the notion of inspiration from above). According to the Romantic Ger-
man author Novalis, for example, artistic creation is ‘as much an end in itself 
as the divine creation of the universe, and one as original and grounded 
on itself as the other: because the two are one, and God reveals himself in 
the poet as he gives himself corporeal form in the visible universe’ (cited in 
Taylor, 1985, p. 230). As once pointed out by Danish literary scholar Morten 
Thing (1973), many portraits of poets in the Romantic period show them 
looking upward into the air rather then downward on the piece of paper 
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they are supposed to write on. The religious understanding lingers in the 
many statements by much more current artists who describe themselves as 
the mouthpieces of a muse or some other extra-worldly force. For instance, 
John Lennon is said to have distinguished between the songs he wrote just 
to complete an album, and the ‘real music … the music of the spheres, the 
music that surpasses understanding … I’m just a channel … I transcribe it 
like a medium’ (Negus and Pickering, 2004, p. 3, citing Waters, 1988).
On the other hand, the Romantic idea of authorship also attributed 
creativity to the psychology of the artist. The voice of the spirit, also known 
as the voice of Nature, was to be found within the individual artist. As put by 
Keith Negus and Michael Pickering, the artist was seen ‘as someone whose 
‘inner’ voice emerges from self-exploration and whose expressive power 
derives from imaginative depth’ (ibid., p. 4). They argue that artistic creation 
has since ‘become synonymous with this sense of exploration and expressive 
power’, but also note that this understanding has exerted considerable 
‘influence over the development of the trend towards subject-centredness in 
modern culture, along with the accompanying ideal of authenticity’ (ibid.).
Importantly, it is also inextricably linked to the modern notion of the 
individual, which underpinned not least the pioneering declarations 
of human rights in the late 18th century. American historian Lynn Hunt 
(2007) has convincingly argued that these declarations were fundamentally 
marked by Western élites’ experience of reading epistolary novels such 
as those by Samuel Richardson, primarily Pamela: Or, Virtue Rewarded 
(1740) and Clarissa: Or, The History of a Young Lady (1748), and Jean Jacques 
Rousseau: Julie, ou la nouvelle Héloïse (1761). These inspired empathy across 
divisions between nations, classes and genders, based on an understanding 
of an ‘inner life’ that all humans have in common in spite of differences. 
Rousseau’s novel has, along with much else of his work, been regarded 
as a source of inspiration for Romanticist criticism and thinking more 
generally. What the understanding of the artist’s creativity is tied to is thus 
no less than the tenets of our modern understanding of the individual, of 
subjectivity, of the self. One cannot simply declare it dead – it won’t lie 
down since it is thoroughly bound to fundamentals of (Western, at least) 
civilization.
Even the structuralist and post-structuralist critiques of Romantic no-
tions of authorship can be seen as moving around in the same old paradigm. 
They have (off icially) refused to accept that authors are ‘ventriloquists who 
speak through their works’, i.e. the psychological dimension of authorship 
according to Romanticism; instead they cast them ‘in the role of dummy, 
manipulated by the hidden hands of language’ (Murdock, 1993, p.131). ‘Lan-
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guage’ or the total ‘Text’, in principle consisting of all texts ever produced, 
has taken the place of the external, higher spiritual powers that inspired 
artists in the Romantic understanding. I for my part think it is simply naïve 
to take eminent French structuralist and post-structuralist writers such as 
Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault in complete earnest when they argue 
for ‘the death of the author’:
It is particularly ironic that Barthes, who insisted so forcefully on the 
death of the author, should have taken so much care to develop a voice 
that is instantly recognisable as his. While this is entirely understandable 
in the context of Parisian intellectual life, where style is a decisive weapon 
in the struggle for ascendency, it hardly squares with his stress on the 
relative autonomy of textual codes. If Barthes served a life sentence in 
the prison house of language, his works strive remarkably hard to give 
the impression that he is out on parole’ (ibid.).
What all of this entails is that artistic creation is undeniably and irreversibly 
tied to culturally ingrained notions of individuals and their interiority – 
their experience, sentiments and knowledge – their subjectivity. We can 
hardly envision it otherwise, in practice. We are moderns, and therefore 
in a sense Romanticists, to some extent. However, if authorship, in the 
Romantic understanding, remains fundamentally tied to the individual, 
how can we then understand collective creativity, collective creation of 
works of art? Is it possible at all?
Creation in the collective arts: theatre
The production of a theatre performance in today’s publicly funded reper-
tory theatres in Norway is a rather complex affair, involving a number of 
decisions made at different levels of the organisation. First, the theatre’s 
director, who is responsible for its repertoire, selects a certain play from 
the vast list of options, ranging from international and national classics to 
current or recent pieces available in the market. In some rare instances, a 
play might also be ordered from a particular playwright whose talent the 
theatre director trusts. Having made a choice, and signed a contract, the 
theatre director then chooses a director (regissør, iscenesetter – in French 
‘metteur en scène’) for the play. The theatre director is thus a key person 
in what appears like a pyramidal structure of power. In the context of 
copyright, however, it is worth mentioning that theatres, contrary to f ilm 
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production companies, do not have any formal rights to their own produc-
tions in Norway, say, in the case of recordings or transmissions.1
The director of Den National Scene, born and raised in the Bergen area, 
was near the end of his successful four-year term when he chose to have 
When the Rain Stops Falling staged. He turned 41 in the autumn of 2011, and 
could already look back on a long and varied career in Norwegian theatres. 
Having decided already very young that he wanted to become an actor and 
not a rock star as he originally had dreamed of (he played in a few bands as 
a teenager and in fact released a country music CD recorded in Nashville, 
Tennessee, in 2008), he chose a high school offering drama as a specialty 
at 16. He entered the school but he almost immediately ‘ran away with 
the circus’, as he put it, i.e. he left school and joined a touring group at the 
regional theatre. He says he had set aside several years for preparing his 
entry to the national school of acting in Oslo, but was accepted at his f irst 
try when he was only 17 – much too early in his view: He was not mature 
enough to make proper use of what the school offered. He ‘entered the school 
as a natural talent and left it as a natural talent with a poor education’, he 
said. But his barely cooked talent was evidently much appreciated and 
he was given a variety of important roles early on. After only a few years 
he ended up in the most prestigious of Norwegian theatres, the National 
Theatre in Oslo.
After developing very much as an actor there, he was given together with 
two other young actors, the responsibility of running the National Theatre’s 
branch Torshovteatret, which is situated in a working class area of Oslo in 
the process of being gentrif ied. They did so successfully, both in terms of 
critical acclaim and audience numbers, for a few years. Having been warned 
by friends not to get stuck in the safety of the grand old theatre institution, 
he then joined a group of freelancing comedians, Lompelandslaget, where 
he also contributed to the writing of sketches and gags, before returning 
to Nationaltheatret where he again took on several high profile roles. He 
was continuing the practice of participating in outside projects, including 
at least one in Copenhagen, and also worked as a director of several plays. 
Wanting to realise his interest in (and previous experience of) selecting a 
repertoire in a regular repertory public theatre, he applied for the job of 
Director at the Theatre in his hometown and got the job.
The point of telling this story in such detail is to show how this artist’s 
successful career indicates the importance of a strong ‘natural talent’ 
combined with a daredevil’s taste for new challenges and risky choices – of 
several sorts: Early on he went public with his being gay (useful not least 
since his appearance is far from the stereotypes of gay men); and he is 
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probably the only director of a high culture institution anywhere in the 
world to have released a country music CD when in off ice. He has done 
practically every possible type of role in the theatre, including drag show 
characters. He said his engagement with every role probably made him a 
demanding collaborator for directors, since he would argue quite hard for 
his own conception of the character if it differed from the director’s. His 
interest in directing came from his interest in the interpretation of a play 
as a whole, and his interest in directing a whole theatre sprang in a related 
way from his interest in public theatre as an institution, in negotiating the 
demands for artistic quality on the one hand and popular entertainment on 
the other. Typically, at the time I interviewed him, in January 2012, he was 
in the process of co-writing a character-based one-man show with strong 
elements of stand-up comedy – which ended up commercially successful. 
What all of this also entails is that his choice, both of the play When the Rain 
Stops Falling and the person who was to direct it, was very well informed. 
While he had at other times chosen to give quite inexperienced people a 
chance to direct a play, several times having to step in himself to make a 
performance work toward the end of rehearsals, he knew this Australian 
play was so demanding there was a need for a highly competent, strong 
director.
A theatre director is as a rule of course not (unless there is some major 
crisis) directly involved in the practical creative process leading to the 
actual performance. Neither normally is the playwright: In my interview 
with the experienced poet and playwright Cecilie Løveid, who started her 
writing career in her teens, she described the organisation of the produc-
tion of a play as a ‘Christmas tree’ where the director is the star at the 
top – the playwright is expected only to look at the tree from a distance. 
She or he is normally not consulted when changes are made in the original 
manuscript.
The director of the play is the star of the Christmas tree because he or she 
is expected to ‘translate’ the written text into an on-stage, live performance. 
This involves developing a thorough, coherent interpretation of the text in 
question as a whole, based on an analysis of its concrete motif(s), its thematic 
content (i.e. its key conflict(s)), its narrative (if any) and its characters. It is 
by way of this analytical and interpretive work that the director then arrives 
at decisions on how to realise the text’s potentials in the most artistically 
rewarding way: What are the play’s most important elements and how can 
they best be communicated to the theatre’s public? What will this entail 
in terms of the visual aspects of a performance, i.e. the décor, the ways in 
which characters move and gesticulate, the way the stage is lit and so on? 
222 JosTein gripsrud 
How should the play sound, i.e. what sounds are to be involved outside of 
the characters’ voices, how should these voices be used?
The Norwegian Intellectual Property Law (Åndsverksloven) mentions 
in its list of examples of protected works in section 1: ‘stage works, both 
dramatic and musical-dramatic as well as choreographic works and panto-
mimes, and radio plays’ (my translation of ‘sceneverk, så vel dramatiske og 
musikkdramatiske som koreografiske verk og pantomimer, samt hørespill’). 
The specif ic roles of directors and scenographers are not mentioned in 
the law. But according to the standard agreement concerning the work of 
directors and scenographers/costume designers in Norwegian theatre2, any 
particular staging of a play is the director’s ‘property’ and cannot be used 
again after two years of the original staging unless the director agrees and is 
compensated again. This agreement is between the national association of 
orchestras and theatres (NTO) on the one hand and the national organisa-
tions of ‘stage directors’ and scenographers and applies to both categories 
whether in permanent positions or hired for a particular staging. Amateur 
theatres hiring professional directors and scenographers are to follow the 
agreement as well. Interestingly, the director I interviewed seemed not 
to be aware of his legal rights to his conception and solutions; he seemed 
only to think of moral rights: He thought of what he regarded as a German 
copy or near copy of his Norwegian outdoor staging of Ibsen’s Peer Gynt as 
immoral rather than illegal.
In the course of this work, the director will most often make changes in 
the playwright’s text. The current agreement between Norwegian theatres 
and dramatists3 states in point C 5 (‘Alterations in the work’) that ‘[t]he 
theatre cannot make signif icant changes in the work except by agreement 
with the dramatist’. What ‘signif icant’ means is not clarif ied there, but 
two of my informants mentioned what appears to be a rule of thumb: The 
director may delete or otherwise change up to 30 per cent of the drama text 
without consulting the playwright. In practice, the counting of percentages 
never takes place, and in the production I studied, it is likely that much more 
was deleted or altered in other ways – and this is not an extraordinary case. 
I asked the director how he would react if the playwright showed up and 
protested these changes. ‘I would lose all respect for him.’ The director was 
very much convinced that the changes he had introduced vastly improved 
the play.
This strong confidence in his own interpretation and aesthetic judgement 
is also clearly useful when the set design is to be discussed with the sce-
nographer. While the scenographer has her or his own artistic competence 
and ideas, it is the director’s comprehensive vision of the performance as a 
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whole that must guide the design job. It is most probably quite normal to do 
as the director and scenographer did in the case at hand, i.e. meet early on 
and several times later for discussions on how to solve questions raised by 
the director’s interpretation. This may well entail forgetting much or most 
of the playwright’s descriptions of the space in which the action takes place. 
In the case I studied, the director selected an experienced scenographer 
he knew and whose previous work he knew and liked. In other words, he 
chose a scenographer he knew he could cooperate well with and whose 
creative contributions would be likely to support and possibly improve his 
own ideas. While the scenographer obviously contributes signif icantly in 
her or his own right, it still seems reasonable to say the director has the 
upper hand in this relationship.
The director also most certainly has the upper hand in the relationship 
with the play’s actors. Not only is it the director who selects which actors 
he wants to work with (choosing mostly from among the public repertory 
theatre’s regular staff), the director also almost totally controls the interac-
tion that takes place during rehearsals. As I followed two rehearsals on 
When the Rain Stops Falling, I was very impressed with the thoroughness 
of the director’s preparations – and his instructions to the actors addressed 
their performance in minute detail.
The original manuscript had not only been cut and altered in other ways, 
it had also been segmented in small bits, each of which seemed to carry a 
particular signif icance related to the overall conception of the play. The 
director required not only certain movements across the stage, not only 
particular ways in which the actors should position themselves vis-à-vis 
each other, not only particular intonations of lines – he also had particular 
ideas on arm movements and other gestures much as a choreographer of a 
dance performance would have.
Both the director himself and the actors I interviewed were well aware 
that this directorial style would be located quite far toward an authoritarian 
pole in an imaginable spectrum of such styles, which vary greatly from 
one director to another. I was told stories of directors who would start the 
rehearsal period with exercises reminiscent of psychodrama or related 
practices – also instances of the power awarded to the directorial function, 
one might add – but then, during the actual rehearsals would be much 
more open to the creative contributions of the actors involved. This is not 
to say, however, that the director in my case study did not allow for such 
contributions, there were very short discussions and occasional signs of 
disagreement, but on the whole the actors appeared to be held on a pretty 
tight leash.
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Given the above, my interviews with actors were not least about the 
ways in which they experienced their ability to actually contribute crea-
tively to the f inal shape of the performance. Interestingly, it turned out 
that both the young female and the middle-aged male actor I talked to 
were also artistically active in other media – the female was painting and 
the male was writing, predominantly drama. This gave them a basis for 
comparing the space for creativity in the two artistic professions. They 
both commented on the ways in which the very strict directorial style I had 
observed limited their possibilities for co-creativity. But they still insisted 
that there was a space for them (albeit minimal) in which to manoeuvre, 
through ideas they had accepted by the director and through (attempted) 
protests where their own understanding of their role conflicted with that of 
the director. Still, compared with the freedom experienced when painting 
or writing, they also agreed that the space for creativity was very limited 
for an actor.
In fact, the limitations of the role of actor was a primary reason why the 
director had decided to quit his long, varied and critically acclaimed acting 
career in stage drama, f ilm and television. He talked about his interest in 
being an actor as if it were a youthful folly; it was def initely something he 
‘grew out of’. He was for a while, he said, the sort of argumentative actor 
he himself now hated to work with. The middle-aged male actor’s attitude 
seemed akin to this – his artistic interest was increasingly in his activity 
as a playwright. The acting was still of considerable interest, but it was 
perhaps more importantly what paid for his bread and butter. The young 
actress also treasured the freedom she experienced when painting, but she 
was, not surprisingly, less inclined than the middle-aged actor to think of 
an end to her acting career for this reason.
The scenographer (born 1957) had a solid education. She f irst studied at 
the Academy of Fine Arts and Design in Oslo, originally in furniture design, 
but early on oriented herself toward scenography, also doing stage design 
for student productions at the Opera School in Oslo while still a student 
herself. In order to perfect her skills she took a year of painting classes in 
the same school after her diploma, before embarking on her career as a 
scenographer at various Norwegian theatres. She also did work in f ilm 
and television and was, about 25 years ago, hired in a regular position in 
the public broadcaster NRK’s drama division. Since then (2000–01), she 
also studied f ilm and production design in f ilm and television in London. 
Regularly taking unpaid leaves of absence between NRK productions she 
has worked on a large number of theatre productions and other projects 
over the years.
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The scenographer described her contribution to the production of When 
the Rain Stops Falling as an original idea she arrived at having read the play. 
She brought it to her f irst meeting with the director, who she knew well 
from previous collaboration. He also brought some sketches and ideas to the 
f irst meeting, but quickly agreed to work with her proposal. She saw their 
relation as one between equals, but conceded that in case of a conflict, his 
opinion would be decisive: ‘it was his production’. Somewhat surprisingly, 
she seemed not to be aware she had any legal rights to her scenography, 
which she has in accordance with the same agreement as directors. She had, 
however, in fact exercised her (moral) rights, for example when refusing the 
use of props she had designed for particular drama productions outside of 
the original context in NRK television programs.
The scenographer thought of herself explicitly as an artist, doing creative 
work much like any other visual artist. She was constantly working on 
new ideas – also for plays not yet written! This free artistic work might 
one day be exhibited. But she also saw some of her stage designs for actual 
performances as installations that could well deserve exhibition as stand-
alone visual art and might one day choose to concentrate on work as an 
independent visual artist. She was, however, very content with her present 
situation, especially since she was able to take on such different projects: 
Between two major productions of television drama, she would soon after 
my interview travel to Greenland to do the scenography for an Inuit dance 
performance.
The two major differences between her work as a scenographer and work 
as a free visual artist were f irst, that it involved a lot of communication 
with other people involved in a production and might include that changes 
to her original ideas were made necessary by other people’s opinions (the 
director’s in particular) and, second, that she had to work within much 
tighter time frames: a production process, whether in f ilm, television or 
theatre involves a large number of people and is very expensive – all of 
these people can’t be asked to wait around while she ref ine her ideas. A 
scenographer is simply a team member and must adapt her work to the 
organisation of the production process.
As for the question of the relationship of copyright to artistic creativity 
in the theatre, it is well worth noting the following: All of those interviewed 
decided early on in their lives that they wanted a career in the theatre or 
related arts. The issue of copyright law appears marginal at best to all, with 
the possible exception of the playwright, while the copying – more or less – 
of someone else’s work or ideas was morally condemnable, not comme il faut 
in any of the involved arts or professions. An exception worth mentioning 
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here is the theatre director’s opinion that if he saw a performance he liked 
and someone said the staging had been stolen from London, he couldn’t 
care less: What works well, works well. When I mentioned this position to 
the CEO of the Association of Norwegian Theatres and Orchestras, he said 
the theatre director thought like that because he is ‘a theatre animal’. What 
the theatre director did, however, was take the point of view of the audience. 
Maybe this ability is what basically def ines a true ‘theatre animal’?
The alleged copying of the director’s staging of Peer Gynt in Germany did 
not lead to his hiring a lawyer to punish those involved. The scenographer 
said it would be damaging to the reputation of someone in her profession 
to be caught replicating solutions successful in London or elsewhere. Both 
seemed unaware of – or at least did not mention – the rights they had to any 
performance they produced according to the standard agreement I referred 
to above. I had myself, at the time of the interviews, the impression that 
the director’s work did not have any copyright protection while the work 
of the scenographer did. This misunderstanding was expressed in some of 
my questions to the director, the scenographer and the theatre director 
but not corrected by any of them. This low level of awareness, knowledge 
and interest in copyright law, in addition to the strong impression they all 
conveyed of being driven into the arts by wishes, desires and dreams that 
were at work no matter what the legal status of their work would be, may 
be said in itself to testify to the modest importance of copyright protection 
of creative work in the arts for creativity itself.
Creaton in the collective arts: popular music
Music is as old as mankind, but popular music is a considerably younger 
phenomenon if a distinction between folk and popular music is accepted. Com-
mon usage of the term popular music refers to music in the age of mass com-
munication, and developed at f irst through the mass distribution of printed 
songs and sheet music. In England, it has been estimated that popular music 
in this sense replaced traditional folk music in many areas before the mid-19th 
century.4 Since the introduction of recorded music in the early 20th century, 
this has been a primary medium for the production and distribution of popular 
music. The use of various kinds of sound technologies in live performances 
has also been a characteristic of popular music, even if acoustic instruments 
and singing has retained a place within the field. The recording of popular 
music was for decades little more than the quite straightforward recording 
of studio performances, but this changed decidedly in the mid-1960s when 
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The Beatles – in an interesting sort of dialogue with serious contemporary 
music’s experiments – made the studio itself a laboratory and instrument for 
new sounds, new forms of musical expression. Technological developments 
since then have made significant parts of modern popular music more or less 
unimaginable without advanced electronic and digital technologies in com-
position processes, production, recording, distribution and live performances.
Over the last ten to f ifteen years, digital technologies have radically 
changed the ways in which most popular music is produced and especially 
distributed. Outside of the folk and singer-songwriter genres, it has always 
been a collective enterprise, but with digital technology the possibilities for 
cooperation in a variety of forms grew tremendously. Music began to consist 
of pieces assembled from a multitude of sources, anything from everyday 
sounds, bass lines, rhythmic figures and melodic motifs could be voluntarily 
or involuntarily contributed by a number of creators in the form of samples or 
more or less sketchy drafts or complete elements of a f inal recorded product. 
These developments challenged previously established notions of single artists 
creating musical works, perhaps with the product of a similarly single lyricist 
added in songs to be performed by a singer and/or an orchestra/band. However, 
the lone creator was already a somewhat problematic character in popular 
music, especially since the group or band format gained hegemony in the 1960s.
Which band members actually contributed what to which songs have been the 
subject of innumerable quarrels in thousands of bands worldwide since then.
In order to have a closer look at the conditions of creativity in popular 
music and the conundrum of copy- and other rights in this area, I inter-
viewed people in Bergen, Norway involved in popular music in very different 
ways at very different levels and the following is a report on what I was told.
My first two interviews were with two men in their twenties both of whom 
had been involved in the production of music as amateurs who occasionally 
contributed to concerts and/or recordings – also recordings which generated 
signif icant sales internationally. They both discovered the joys of music 
early on, including the joys of making music – composing and writing lyrics. 
One of them, Johansen, talked about playing with cassette recorders with 
friends, eventually composing music with them; the other, Willassen, talked 
of playing in bands and eventually discovering hip hop music, especially rap, 
to which he had since devoted his musically creative energies.
They had both in more mature years – late teens, early twenties – actually 
contributed bits and pieces to professional productions, as mentioned above. 
One of them had, for instance, contributed beats (a sound sequence of 
chords and rhythm instruments to which one writes a melody and lyrics) 
to two albums in a genre located somewhere between r&b and rap, by an 
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originally Canadian artist, the former opera singer Kinny, who has been 
living and recording on and off in Bergen and performing and selling records 
internationally.5 The other had contributed to several hip hop recordings 
and performances, including rapping and singing in his northern Norwegian 
dialect on a successful record where the featured artist was a Norwegian art-
ist living in Los Angeles (Big Ice: Trunk of Funk, 2010). The very international 
nature of current popular music is something I will return to shortly.
Perhaps the most relevant information to be gained from these two 
interviewees in relation to the issue of copyright is their confirmation of 
the perception that the motivation for productive efforts in music is not 
money or careers in the music business. The love of music, perhaps certain 
genres or styles in particular, is what inspires the largely playful creative 
activities that take a collective form from early on. Both talked about the 
sharing of musical ideas and sketches between friends via mobile phones or 
via computers hooked up to the Internet. G-mail was a very useful service, 
since it allowed for very large (in term of bytes) attachments that could be 
stored in people’s mailboxes if necessary. Bits and pieces communicated in 
this way could later form the basis for the actual making or construction 
of a f inished piece in a professional studio. If others used these pieces the 
answer to questions of rights could vary. In some cases it would just feel 
good to know they had contributed something to a piece that sounded 
good. In other cases they would feel that a mentioning of their names on 
the cover of the record would be suff icient compensation, adding to their 
‘cred’ and self-esteem. If they felt they had contributed considerably to a 
production that became commercially successful, however, they would feel 
entitled to a share of the profits. But such success is very hard to foresee, 
and the money to be derived from a success at the level in question would 
be limited anyway, so generally neither of the two were very concerned 
about the issue of rights.
I also talked to a mature professional musician, Frank Hovland, born 
1962, whose main instrument is the electric bass but who is also a singer 
and songwriter who has worked extensively as a record producer. He has 
been a leading member of a number of Bergen rock groups with national 
reputation, he has participated in innumerable recording sessions and one-off 
band constellations, and he has over the last f ifteen years toured Europe 
and North America with artists such as Chris Thompson (once member of 
Manfred Mann’s Earth Band and a contributor to a large number of records, 
concerts and international tours with celebrity artists besides his own career) 
and Terje Rypdal (globally acclaimed Norwegian jazz guitarist with a rock 
background). Hovland agreed with my two younger interviewees that money 
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was not the motivation for his embarking on a musical career, and money or 
sales would never be the basic motivation for his creation of songs and writing 
of lyrics. Once a song was written, however, and especially when it had been 
recorded, things were different. For Hovland, when music becomes a full-time 
profession, money and issues of rights are certainly not without interest.
When playing the bass as a member of the orchestra at the city’s public 
repertory theatre, or in recording sessions where other musicians realised 
their projects, Hovland was okay with a regular salary or, in the latter case, a 
one-off honorarium. He mentioned that this would be normal also for session 
musicians in studios where world famous stars record their material, even if 
it is often these musicians and their ideas that make these records interesting 
and successful. But his work as a composer and writer of songs was something 
else. In some cases, he did everything himself – and would of course expect 
the complete rights to such a musical and lyrical piece of work. But he also 
provided an example of a somewhat more complicated process: A friend had 
approached him with something he had created – a drum pattern, a couple of 
guitar riffs, a vague idea of a form. But there was no melody and no lyrics. My 
interviewee wrote a melody and lyrics for the song and so wanted the rights 
for music and lyrics attributed to him. The guy who came with the bits and 
pieces actually only provided key elements of the arrangement of the song, 
and so he should settle for arrangement rights, the bass player and songwriter 
thought. But his collaborator protested: There would have been no song had he 
not approached the bass player with his drum pattern, riffs and formal ideas, 
or, perhaps there would have been a quite different song written by himself. 
‘There was a bit of shouting and teeth-grinding, but we arrived at a 50/50 share 
of all rights to the song.’ The reason for this was of course social – he referred 
to this solution as ‘doing a Lennon-McCartney’: They both wanted to remain 
friends and collaborators on future projects, and a struggle over who did what 
on this particular song should not be allowed to jeopardise this.
This sort of solution is quite common in bands, since it is common knowl-
edge that struggles over who contributes most to what in a production are 
also among the most common reasons for bands – and friendships – breaking 
up. I also interviewed one member of the Bergen based duo Kings of Conveni-
ence, Eirik Glambek Bøe, who have sold over one million copies of their three 
f irst albums and are among the most streamed artists in services such as 
Spotify6. Their success internationally has lead to their touring the world, 
e.g. all over South America and in several Asian countries such as Indonesia 
– and they recently received an invitation to do a gig in Ulan Bator: ‘You guys 
should come to Mongolia, people love you here’. My interviewee admitted 
there had been a lot of quarrelling between the two partners over the years, 
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but that they had arrived at a 50/50 share of the rights for all songs – ‘even 
if I would argue that the correct f igures would be 60 for me and 40 for him, 
and he would, given his character, probably say 70 for him and 30 for me’. 
Income from the use of their recordings in movies and advertising would 
consequently always be equally shared. Concert revenues, that constitute 
the major part of the duo’s income, would of course always be split 50/50.
These musicians thus saw the issue of rights as partly distinct from the 
question of who contributed what to the creation of a piece of music: They 
may maintain a special feeling in relation to some songs as being their 
offspring, so to speak, but handle the question of legal and economic rights 
in a pragmatic manner.The actual act of artistic creation is one thing, rights 
and income something else.
Further underlining this distinction is the complex area where the music 
industry operates between musicians and their audiences. I interviewed a 
key person in Bergen popular music, Mikal Telle, who started his career at 
nineteen, in 1995, when he opened a shop in the city centre exclusively for vi-
nyl records – the shop was called Primitive Records – some three years after 
the CD had (seemingly) completely taken over the market. The shop became 
a hangout for young people seriously interested in music and eventually, 
in 1998, he started a record label – the f irst of several, one for each genre 
or style. The background for this was that he discovered his international 
suppliers of records could also function as distributors for vinyl records 
produced in Bergen. He had no contracts and made only about 500 copies of 
each. Working exclusively from his social capital (his economic capital was 
close to zero) and his gut feeling for interesting music (he has no musical 
education, plays no instrument) he became the key person behind a series 
of Bergen-based bands and artists, several of which have had national and 
not least international success – among the artists who originally launched 
their international careers through his tiny labels are Röyksopp and Kings 
of Convenience.7 He is currently concentrating mostly on the management 
of a number of artists, mostly people who are up-and-coming.
The experience Telle has with negotiations on all levels and in all areas 
of the music business makes him an interesting source on rights issues. He 
talked, for instance, about the need for bands to accept very meagre deals 
with major record companies in exchange for the distribution and attention 
such deals may provide, crucial not least in today’s business where live 
performance is the major source of income for most if not all musicians. 
According to Telle, Norwegian musicians in general are inclined to be too in-
flexible in rights issues for their own good, i.e. they would intuitively refuse 
record deals that give the lion’s share to an international record company 
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even if the deal would move them up to a different league internationally. 
Composers of a song would not always themselves think of sharing a bit, e.g. 
a third, of their rights with the other members of their band for the sake of 
peace and collective creativity. So a part of his job as a manager would be to 
convince his clients through discussions of the benefits of strategic thinking 
in this area. Still, as evidenced in my interview with Frank Hovland, the 
bass player, as well as in the interview with Eirik Glambek Bøe, one of the 
two members of Kings of Convenience, pragmatic solutions to such issues 
are not at all alien to the musicians themselves: They mostly arrive at them 
without the intervention of a manager.
Solutions such as an equal 50/50 split of revenues are probably easier to ar-
rive at when there is (relatively) little money at stake, though. Furthermore 
there may be cases where a composer may grant rights to someone because 
he or she feels under pressure from a record producer or manager with 
some sort of hold on them. This is indicated also by a high profile lawsuit 
in Bergen in February 2013 concerning publishing rights to a particular 
Röyksopp song. The history behind the case is complex and it is impossible 
here to go into the details of the court proceedings and the decision. But 
for our purposes the following summary, based on Röyksopp’s view of the 
case, confirmed in court, should suff ice.8
When the members of the duo Röyksopp were still teenagers and living 
in the northern Norwegian city of Tromsø, they were perceived as elec-
tronica musicians with remarkable talents by a considerably older DJ, Rune 
Lindbæk, who also participated in the popular music milieu there. They 
formed a band/group where Lindbæk became a leading member because of 
his contacts and management skills – he had ideas concerning sound and 
marketing, but never produced a melody or anything else that was musi-
cally important. His younger partners later discovered that he had credited 
himself as one of the composers for every piece of music he registered with 
the Norwegian musical rights organisation TONO.
When living in Oslo in the late 90s, one of Röyksopp’s later members, 
Torbjørn Brundtland, recorded songs for an album and Lindbæk was present 
in the studio some of the time. A particular song, ‘Lift’, was already more or 
less created in Brundtland’s head when he arrived at the studio one morning, 
and the recording of it was almost done when Lindbæk showed up. Lindbæk 
suggested there should be a ‘take off’ effect, with no further specif ication, 
when the last part of the song started after a ‘breakdown’, but otherwise 
contributed nothing. He used to repeat ‘nothing leaves this studio without 
me being credited as composer’, and so the song ‘Lift’ was registered with 
TONO with him as one of its creators. The real creator was at that point so 
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tired of Lindbæk and his practices that he moved to Bergen where he teamed 
up with his old Tromsø friend Svein Berge to form Röyksopp.
A first single, ‘So Easy’, was released on one of Mikal Telles’ local labels, 
and led to Röyksopp being signed by the international company Wall of 
Sound Recordings (according to Mikal Telle, he told Wall of Sound to talk to 
the musicians directly, wanting nothing for himself). Eventually, their major 
international hit, the album Melody AM was released. One of the tracks on 
this album was called ‘A Higher Place’. Years later, Rune Lindbæk approached 
Röyksopp and wanted to be paid for his composer’s rights in that track, 
arguing that it was a near copy of the song ‘Lift’ that Brundtland had recorded 
in Oslo back in 1998. He pointed to two elements in the song as his creations, 
one of them the ‘take off’ before the last part of the song, the other a melodic 
motif. After a number of attempts to get his way through e-mails and the like, 
he had his story of ‘theft’ by Röyksopp told in a ten-page article in the weekend 
magazine of a major national daily, DN, and then, f inally, sued Röyksopp.
The court case in Bergen in February 2013 was highly publicised and 
involved, among a number of witnesses and others present, Röyksopp dem-
onstrating concretely, with all or much of their technical machinery in the 
courtroom, how they go about composing a song/musical piece. The court 
f inally ruled in favour of Röyksopp on all accounts. The verdict contains a 
highly informed and interesting piece of musical analysis that compares 
the songs ‘Lift’ and ‘A Higher Place’ in detail, most probably written by one 
of the two lay judges in the case, an internationally acclaimed composer of 
contemporary serious electronic music, Asbjørn Schaathun.9 It concludes 
that the two pieces are very different, that the idea of a ‘take off’ does not 
constitute a signif icant contribution without any further specif ication, and 
that the melodic motif Lindbæk claimed to have created, and which was 
used in both recordings, in fact had been sampled from the work of Jean 
Michel Jarre and thus was no product of Lindbæk’s.
What this case illustrates, I think, is the following points: 1) Popular music 
is, at its highly creative, lower, local levels, marked by a shared, strong interest 
in music and productive collaboration where the interest in issues of rights 
and revenues are of anything from low to modest importance. 2) If sales take 
off, though, these issues may become important. Strong feelings regarding the 
moral ownership of a piece are at work also in battles that may take a juridical 
form – Röyksopp had no interest in any compromise with Lindbæk. 3) Between 
musicians, solutions are as a rule pragmatic, as evidenced in my interviews 
with the bass player and the member of Kings of Convenience above – there has 
not, to my knowledge, been a struggle over rights between the two members 
of Röyksopp. 4) The verdict is of course based in copyright law, but would have 
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been impossible without the solid musical competence of one of the lay judges, 
since he was able to convincingly argue for the conclusion with reference to 
the musical material itself. This is probably an example of the most important 
place in copyright law for people in aesthetic academic disciplines: The best 
of them have skills that can meaningfully analyse a piece of art and make 
sustained arguments about the importance of this or that element.
Comparison and tentative conclusions
In spite of all the differences between a publicly funded repertory theatre 
(‘high culture’) and the private enterprise-dominated (yet now also publicly 
supported) f ield of popular music (‘low culture’), it seems to me that some 
important similarities or parallels may be pointed out. They are tied to the 
fact that both cultural arenas are marked by the persistence of a modif ied 
version of the Romantic notion of creativity. But both are also marked by 
a willingness to operate in pragmatic ways if real life conditions challenge 
a clear-cut, dogmatic version of the ideal norm.
First, there are notions of talent (genius), self-realisation, self-expression 
and recognition. All artists involved in both media have as a rule been drawn 
to the art in question at an early age, i.e. in their teens or even as children. They 
tend to experience their choice of profession as resulting from a particular gift 
for such work and as something tied to quite intense pleasures experienced 
when performing it. Being an artist is more so than most professions tied to 
self-realisation and self-expression – and to gaining public recognition for 
this. The traditional, romantic understanding of creativity lies behind this 
and is further supported through its being practised in the arts.
Second, there is an undisputed distinction between creative and non-
creative contributions to the realisation of a collective work of art. There 
are off ice workers, artisans and people doing all kinds of necessary physical 
labour involved who never get credited for their efforts (unlike f ilm credits, 
where every driver et cetera may be mentioned). In music, there may be 
studio technicians and, ‘gofers’ and sound and lighting people at concerts 
who basically do what they are told to do, and so are as a rule not counted 
as creative. A record producer is mostly seen as creative, though, and there 
are light designers who would be counted as creative personnel. In other 
words, there are sliding scales involved in some technical functions in 
spite of the apparent absoluteness of the creative/not creative distinction.
Third, related to the sliding scales just mentioned, there are hierarchies 
of creativity in both f ields. Actors are at or near the bottom of the theatre 
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hierarchy, but are still seen as creative and in some cases highly important 
to the end result of the collective process. This is roughly equivalent to the 
role of ‘rank and f ile’ band members in a rock band where one or two people 
do the writing of songs. Their creativity is invited and welcomed but they 
also basically told what to do.
The scenographer is or at least may be much more independent in her or 
his work than an actor and bases her or his work on an interpretation of the 
dramatic text in question as a whole. The director is above the scenographer, 
though, deciding which solutions the scenographer should work on or not. 
It should perhaps be mentioned that the strong position of the director in 
Norwegian theatre is due to it being tied to a strong continental European 
tradition of a ‘director’s theatre’. Still, the tensions between the director and 
the other obvious key person ‘behind’ a performance, the playwright, indicate 
that the director is not necessarily at the top of the hierarchy. This may for 
instance vary with the position of the playwright in the larger cultural f ield. 
I know of no Norwegian court cases on the copyright of a director versus that 
of the playwright, such as the British Brighton & Dubbeljoint v. Jones case.10
In popular music there is no exact parallel to the relation between the 
director and the playwright, but there is quite a bit of similarity in the 
tensions between those who created a song over who contributed the most 
important part. And if, for example, the lead singer in a band also wrote 
the song, he or she would be the undisputable top of the pyramid, even if 
every other member of the band, as well as the producer, have thrown in a 
variety of ideas as to the arrangement of the song in question.
Fourth, pragmatism in the handling of issues of rights is common in 
both the theatre and in popular music. In the theatre, it was striking how 
little the artists I interviewed seemed to know about their legal rights to 
their work, and so they were not inclined to feel very bound by them either. 
Neither were they seriously worried or irritated over a limited recognition 
of their rights. The playwright’s say in the staging of a play would vary with 
a number of factors, and especially with the extent to which he or she had 
clout in the form of cultural and social capital.
Musicians for the most part knew more about rights than theatre people. 
But this is understandable given the fact that they make a living by way 
of copyright and people in the theatre don’t. Still, there is, as exemplif ied 
above, considerable room for pragmatic solutions to disputes simply because 
of the fact that maintaining friendship and productive cooperation is in 
most cases seen as more important than the extra money gained from a 
higher percentage of revenues from a particular song or record. A different 
sort of pragmatism is involved in the negotiations between musicians and 
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their administrative associates – management and record companies. This 
is about strategic thinking about marketing – where the limits seem mostly 
to be drawn on the basis of artistic integrity, much less on the basis of 
percentages and up-front settlements.
This latter point actually leads to a f inal one, which concerns possible 
future research in this area. It seems to me that the role of various kinds of 
social power in the cultural f ields is of great importance when it comes to 
the actual handling of copyright issues both in theatre and in popular music, 
and I see little reason why it would be much different in other art forms. The 
ways in which stars can dictate conditions for their participation in both 
artforms is one indication: The bass player I interviewed is highly competent 
but has to accept a f ixed honorarium for a job that an internationally famous 
bass player might demand to be listed as co-composer for. The nature of 
different kinds of bargaining power in the complex variety of music industry 
contexts as well as the worlds of theatre, f ilm and television, would be a 
good topic for highly interesting and useful research both for copyright 
scholars and the sociology of culture.
Notes
1. Point made by Director Morten Gjelten at Norsk Teater-og Orkesterforening 
(Association of Noregian Theatres and Orchestras) in telephone interview, 
22 April 2013.
2. The agreement can be found here: <http://spekter.compendia.no/kunder/
nto/avtaler.nsf/oversikt?ReadForm&kuni=COMW-7RZBU3>, a. ccessed 
15 April 2013. This is the relevant part of the Norwegian text of the agree-
ment’s § 9.1.: Sceneinstruktør og scenograf/kostymetegner har de rettigheter 
til sitt verk som følger av lov om opphavsrett til åndsverk mv. av 12. mai 1961. 
Verket er opphavsmannens eiendom, og denne overenskomst gir teatret 
bare rett til (ikke enerett) i inntil 2 år (for Den norske Opera i 6 år) å frem-
føre verket på de av teatrets faste scener det er laget for.’
3. Agreement between Norsk Teater- og Orkesterforening and Norske Drama-
tikeres Forbund, dated 28 October 2012, downloaded from: <http://drama-
tiker.no/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Protokoll-og-avtale-26.10.2012.pdf>, 
accessed 6 April 2013.
4. The historian Eric Hobsbawm suggested that the 1840s in England ‘marked 
the end of an era when folksong remained the major musical idiom of 
industrial workers’ (Chambers 1986, p.30). 
5. One example: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?vv.=jECbrAoCXs4&list=RD
02WjTg8UtClNc>. 
6. An example of their music: <http://vimeo.com/32738987>. 
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7. Cf.: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BergenWave>, and this recent piece from 
The Guardian: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/2013/mar/15/bergen-
norway-new-music-scene>.. 
8. The following is based on a 45-page document originally published on the 
internet at royksoppsvarer.com, dated 20 April 2011 (on file with the author), 
and the decision from Bergen Tingrett of 6 March 2013, published in the 
database Lovdata, document no. TBERG-2012-86032-2.
9. Cf.: <http://www.schaathun.org/en/> 
10. For an overview of the case, cf.: <http://www.5rb.com/case/brighton-dub-
beljoint-v.-Jones>. http://www.5rb.com/case/Brighton--Dubbeljoint-v-Jones. 
Reference: [2004] EWHC 1157 (Ch); [2004] EMLR 507; Court: Chancery Divi-
sion; Judge: Park J; Date of Judgment: 18 May 2004.
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  Discontinuities between legal 
conceptions of authorship and social 
practices
What, if anything, is to be done?
Lionel Bently and Laura Biron
Authorship is central to the operation of copyright as a regulatory tool, but 
copyright law’s conception of ‘authorship’ appears to be ‘out of sync’ with a 
wide range of social practices: either copyright makes authors-in-law out of 
social ‘non-authors’, or vice versa. After offering three examples (scientif ic 
credit, conceptual art and literary editing)1 this contribution considers why 
these differences have emerged and whether these discontinuities should 
be thought of as a matter of concern. It appraises a number of academic 
proposals as to what might be done about these discontinuities, and of-
fers its own suggestion, namely, the deployment of a more open-textured 
concept of authorship, one that is able to respond flexibly to varied contexts, 
social understandings and practices, but limited in application to matters 
of attribution.
Legal conceptions of authorship
Although there is no universal ‘copyright law’, so that statements about 
copyright depend on the specif ic laws and jurisprudence of any given terri-
tory, ‘authorship’ typically plays a number of different roles in any particular 
jurisdiction’s copyright law. These include circumscribing the term of 
protection (by reference to a f ixed period after the life of the last author 
to die), and, perhaps most obviously, identifying the initial beneficiary of 
economic rights. Although copyright laws take a single author model as the 
paradigm, they also recognise the need to find rules for determining author-
ship of works to which more than one individual may have contributed. 
One such set of rules relate to joint authorship (though many jurisdictions 
also operate rules of collective authorship and some recognise notions of 
corporate authorship).2 In determining claims to joint authorship, most 
regimes consider three elements: the relationship between the participants; 
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the level and kind of participation; and the degree of integration of the 
contributions. For example, section 10 of the UK’s Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act 1988 (CDPA) def ines a work of joint authorship as: ‘[a] work 
produced by the collaboration of two or more authors in which the contribu-
tion of each author is not distinct from that of the other author or authors’. 
Here the relationship must be one of ‘collaboration’; the level and kind of 
participation is referred to as a ‘contribution’; and the level of ‘integration’ 
is ‘non-distinctness’.
The ‘relationship’ dimension refers to the context of the putative joint 
author’s creative activity. At the very least, it requires that the activity is 
undertaken in coordination with the other author, as opposed to independ-
ent addition, alteration or improvement, which may create an original 
derivative work of its own. Under British law, the requirement of ‘collabora-
tion’ means that, when setting out to create a work, there must have been 
some common design, cooperation or plan that united the authors, even if 
only in a very loose sense (Levy v. Rutley, 1871, pp. 528–530; Cala Homes v. 
McAlpine, 1995, p. 835; Beckingham v. Hodgens, 2003, pp. 389–90, [51] (CA)). 
This is to be distinguished from the ‘subsequent independent alteration of 
a f inished work’, such as a translation or a serialisation, which would not 
count as a collaboration (Beckingham v. Hodgens, 2002, p. 58, [44]). In some 
other jurisdictions, the relationship aspect of joint authorship may require 
something more than collaboration: for example, in the United States there 
must be an intention to become joint authors.
The second requirement is that a putative joint author participate suf-
f iciently in the creation of the work. Once again, the details vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction as to the precise kind and level of participa-
tion. In the United States there is a debate amongst scholars, reflected in 
a division between circuits, as to whether the contribution must itself be 
copyrightable. In the UK, the test demands that a co-author provides ‘a 
contribution’, the nature of which case law has clarif ied in the following 
ways. First, the contribution must be of ‘the right kind’ – to the creation 
of the work, not to the performance or interpretation of the work (Tate v. 
Thomas (1921), pp. 510–11; Hadley v. Kemp (1999), pp. 643–644; Brighton v. 
Jones (2004), p. 304, [34]). Second, the author must contribute to expression, 
not simply to ‘ideas’ or subject-matter (Evans v. E Hulton & Co Ltd (1923–8), 
131 LT 534; Springfield v. Thame (1903), 89 LT 242; Nottage v. Jackson (1883), 
pp. 632, 634, 636). Third, although the author need not literally put pen to 
paper for their contribution to count (Cala Homes South v. Alfred McAlpine 
Homes East Ltd (1995), p. 835), they must display ‘something akin to penman-
ship’ in the sense of being directly responsible for the expressive form of 
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the work (Robin Ray v. Classic FM (1998), p. 636). Finally, the contribution 
must be ‘signif icant and original’, as would be the case for a contribution 
of single authorship (Godfrey v. Lees (1995), p. 325; Hadley v. Kemp (1999), 
p. 643), though each author need not contribute an equal amount (Levy v. 
Rutley (1871), pp. 528–530).
The third requirement for joint authorship is one of ‘integration’ of the 
contributions of each author into some sort of whole. Article 7 of the Spanish 
Copyright Act similarly def ines a collaborative work as ‘a work that is the 
unitary result of the collaboration of two or more authors’. Under UK law, it 
is required that each author’s contribution is ‘not distinct’ from that of the 
other contributors. In more positive terms, this means that the contributions 
must merge to form an integrated whole, rather than a number of distinct 
works (Beckingham v. Hodgens (2002), p. 59, [46]). In Italy, it is required 
that the contributions are not only dependent upon one another, but are 
‘indistinguishable’ (Perry and Margoni, (2012), p 23). In some legal systems, 
most notably France, there is no such ‘integration’ requirement at all. Article 
L. 113–2 of the French I.P. Code def ines a ‘collaborative work’ as one ‘to 
the creation of which several natural persons have contributed together’, 
implying collaboration and contribution, but not necessarily integration 
(Lucas and Kamina, in Geller, 2012, sec. 1[3]). The Belgian Copyright Law 
explicitly distinguishes between two types of collaborative work – referred 
to as ‘divisible’ and ‘indivisible’ – each category having particular rules as 
to whose consent is required to exploit the contribution.3
Discontinuities between authorship in law and practice
A number of ‘social practices’ seem to be at odds with legal notions of author-
ship. These illustrate both the ways in which copyright law is unable to 
recognise authors as such, turning ‘social authors’ into ‘legal non-authors’, 
as well as copyright law’s capacity to turn ‘social non-authors’ into ‘legal 
authors’, constructing authors-in-law out of practices that are convention-
ally self-def ined as non-authorial. Here we highlight three examples.
Scientific authorship
The f irst example we consider is that of scientif ic authorship.4 It is com-
monplace to think of scientif ic authorship as collaborative, and to expect 
scientif ic publications to identify a number of named authors. Indeed, as 
long ago as 1963, Derek de Solla Price described the dramatic increase in 
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the numbers of authors as ‘one of the most violent transitions that can be 
measured in recent trends of scientif ic manpower and literature’. Examin-
ing the trend for authors cited in Chemical Abstracts, Price found that the 
number of articles with four or more authors had increased from about 2.7 
percent in 1946 to about 9.5 percent in 1963, and he predicted that ‘if the 
trend holds more than half of all papers will [have three or more authors] 
by 1980 and we shall move steadily towards an infinity of authors per paper’ 
(de Solla Price, 1963, p. 89). While this predicted growth has of course 
not occurred, the f irst paper to be issued from the collaboration over the 
Large Hadron Collider at Cern, from the Compact Muon Solenoid (CMS) 
project, in 2009, is formally attributed to the CMS Collaboration, but also 
contains an appendix listing over 2400 contributors. In the medical f ield, 
one article in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1993 was attributed 
to 976 authors, and another in Nature in 1997 to 151 (Smith and Williams 
Jones, 2012, p. 201). Meanwhile, concern with the increase in scientif ic 
authorship spread from chemistry to bio-medicine, astronomy and particle 
physics, and from there, to ecology (Weltzin et al., 2006) and even the 
social sciences.
There are, of course, many reasons for the expansion in scientif ic col-
laboration, and related increase in attribution. Most obvious is the changing 
nature of scientif ic research which has often come to require massive teams 
designing and building machines that ultimately produce information that 
in turn will be analysed by others (Haeussler & Sauermann, 2013, p. 688; 
Wuchty et al., 2007; Dreyfuss, 2000, p. 1162). Many of these projects, such as 
the Large Hadron Collider, involve co-operation between institutions and 
academics from all around the world. (If author citations for the LHC look 
extraordinary, it is worth bearing in mind that the LHC involves 111 nations 
at a cost of over US$2.65 billion). However, even where the subject is more 
modest, it has become more and more common for academics to collaborate 
across disciplines, in recognition that the research goals can only be reached 
with the benefit of multiple disciplines (Smith and Williams Jones, 2012, 
p. 200). In addition to these, some responsibility for the shift in attribution 
can also be explained by the ways in which research is funded, the ways 
academics are appraised and rewarded, and changes in mechanisms of 
appraisal (Dreyfuss, 2000, p. 1190; Biagioli and Galison, 2003, pp. 2–7; Fisk, 
2006, pp. 81–85).
These changes have been accompanied by transformations in notions 
of ‘authorship’, such that the def inition of authorship in science has come 
to encompass a wide range of contributions, and this in turn has led to 
intensif ication of attribution. As the ethical guidelines for publication 
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issued by the Royal Society of Chemistry state, ‘[t]here is no universally 
agreed definition of authorship’. Different f ields, such as chemistry, particle 
physics, astronomy, biological and medical science and ecology, it seems, 
can and do def ine authorship differently and operate their own sets of 
attribution practices (Smith and Williams-Jones, 2012, p. 200). As we will 
see, many such definitions require authorship attribution to a wide range 
of participants in the research process (many of whom will have had little 
role in structuring, phrasing or editing the f inal paper).
For example, the guidelines issued by the Royal Society of Chemistry 
further state that:
As a minimum, authors should take responsibility for a particular sec-
tion of the study. The award of authorship should balance intellectual 
contributions to the conception, design, analysis and writing of the 
study against the collection of data and other routine work. If there is 
no task that can reasonably be attributed to a particular individual, 
then that individual should not be credited with authorship. All authors 
must take public responsibility for the content of their paper. The 
multidisciplinary nature of much research can make this diff icult, 
but this may be resolved by the disclosure of individual contributions 
(1995, p. 12A).
The guidelines seem to recognise that both intellectual contributors and 
those involved in more routine work should be recognised. This no doubt 
recognises the importance of cohesive teamwork, thereby avoiding the 
development of divisions or cliques. There is no laboratory aristocracy. 
Moreover, literary notions of authorship that focus on expression are suf-
ficient, but by no means necessary. Pre-expressive intellectual contributions 
that are recognised as equally suff icient include conception, design and 
analysis. The only overarching requirement seems to be that authorship 
is linked to responsibility (Biagioli, 2000, p. 90; Dreyfuss, 2000, p. 1208; 
Fisk, 2006, p. 83; Smith and Williams-Jones, 2012). If a contributor is not 
prepared to stand by the paper, then they should not accept or permit 
attribution. The American Chemical Society guidelines, which are similar 
in their inclusiveness, equally emphasise responsibility, stating that ‘[t]he 
co-authors of a paper should be all those persons who have made significant 
scientif ic contributions to the work reported and who share responsibility 
and accountability for the results’.
Another example is provided by the Ecological Society of America’s Code 
of Ethics. This states that:
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[…] researchers will claim authorship of a paper only if they have made 
a substantial contribution. Authorship may legitimately be claimed if 
researchers
(a) conceived the ideas or experimental design;
(b) participated actively in execution of the study;
(c) analyzed and interpreted the data; or
(d) wrote the manuscript (ESA 2006, emphasis added).
The criteria suggested are alternative, so merely conceiving ideas, designing 
a study, collecting or interpreting data might do. So, as with the Royal 
Society of Chemistry, involvement in writing an article is a sufficient but not 
a necessary condition of authorship. However, in contrast to the examples 
from Chemistry, responsibility is not emphasised.
What is of interest to us is how widely some of these def initions vary 
from the def inition of authorship recognised in copyright law (Biagioli, 
2012, pp. 454, 458; Fisk, 2006, p. 82). Indeed, from the perspective of 
copyright law, the majority of co-authored scientif ic publications would 
not, if challenged, meet the legal test for co-authorship. For example, 
many of the contributions that count as authorial from the standpoint of 
science – data collection, experiment planning, project supervising, and 
so on – would not usually be considered to be ‘of the right kind’ to meet the 
legal test of ‘contribution’, because they are contributions of ‘ideas’ rather 
than to expression (see section 2 above). With copyright, authorship is a 
matter of the work, i.e. the manuscript, rather than the research project, 
and thus for copyright the focus is on the verbal expression, the choice 
and ordering of the words, rather than generating the data or ideas (Anya 
v. Wu, 2004). Moreover, copyright has nothing to say about the order in 
which authors are to be credited, a topic which is, in contrast, of some 
signif icance in many scientif ic f ields, where in some cases the f irst author 
is regarded as the primary contributor, and in others the f inal author 
listed is assumed to be the senior author (Kwok, 2005, p. 554; Baerlocher 
et al., 2007, p. 177; Tscharntke et al., 2007, p. 13; Smith and Williams-Jones, 
2012, p. 200).
This disparity between legal and scientif ic authorship is even more 
pronounced when it comes to mammoth collaborative ventures such as 
CERN’s Large Hadron Collider, the LIGO Scientific Collaboration, the ALICE 
(A Large Ion Collider Experiment) Nuclear Collaboration, the Belle Experi-
ment (based in Tsukuba, Japan) or the collider detector at Fermi National 
Accelerator Lab (Fermilab) project in Tevatron (near Batavia, Illinois). In 
these situations, most of the publications emerging from the lab include the 
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names of everyone who has put substantial work into the project, including 
those who have left within a specif ied period (LIGO, [2A], sub-para 1). That 
is, the default position is that the authorship is attributed to the complete 
author list for the project as a whole, though it is usually possible for persons 
to decline to be included (LIGO, [2A], sub-para 6; ALICE, [9.1]). The norm 
is that names are cited in alphabetical order (LIGO, [2.B], para 1; ALICE, 
[9.2]). In the ALICE guidelines each qualif ied author has to confirm that 
he or she has read the paper and agree with the contents (ALICE, section 
9). The LIGO policy recognises that ‘in keeping with the goal of the LSC to 
promote the visibility of its members in the scientif ic community at large, 
there may be cases where a limited author list is more appropriate’ (LIGO, 
[2.B] sub-para 3).
As Mario Biagioli describes, in his discussions of Fermilab policies, the 
sense of authorship at play here is ‘credit for accumulated labour’ (Biagioli, 
2000, p. 101). All scientists and technicians, including the designers of the 
machines that make the experiment, observation and analysis possible, are 
all viewed as part of a corporate team. Each must input their labour and 
expertise, usually for a minimum period of six months (though this will 
vary with the status of the participant). Like employee-shareholders, or 
employees who pay into a pension fund, when the project yields prof its in 
the form of journal publications, all participants are duly recognised. Such 
recognition is granted for publications even after the contributor quits the 
project, at least for some limited period. This is a far cry from copyright’s 
conception of authorship as requiring actual skill or labour, understood in 
terms of penmanship or expression.
Conceptual art
Our second example of discontinuity between copyright law and social 
practice is that of conceptual art, in particular that in the United States 
in the 1960s and 1970s. The conceptual art movement, if it can be called 
a movement, in many ways sought to relocate the art object away from 
individual instantiations (paintings, sculpture and so on), and to re-focus 
attention on immaterial ideas, on thought, on language, on philosophy, 
rather than on physical objects. As Le Witt explained:
When an artist uses a conceptual form of art, it means that all of the 
planning and decisions are made beforehand and the execution is a 
perfunctory affair. The idea becomes a machine that makes the art (Le 
Witt, 1967, p. 79).
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In emphasising the ‘idea’, conceptual art also challenged the disciplinary 
categories, which depend largely on form, and related ways of perception 
and evaluation. In some ways itself an elaboration of the breakthrough 
ideas of Marcel Duchamp, conceptual art both challenges the role of the 
visual, and interrogates the notion of art itself (Joseph Kosuth, quoted in 
Green, 2001, p. 7).
The range of conceptual art in this period was vast. The works of Joseph 
Kosuth (1945–), often regarded as the pioneer of the movement, for example, 
include many that comprise only text – such as the lists published in various 
newspapers, for example: III, – Communication of Ideas (1969) or VI Time 
(Art as Idea as Idea) (1969) from The Second Investigation (Green, 2001, pp. 2, 
13, 16). Other works by Kosuth include a collection of books, Fifteen People 
Present Their Favourite Book (1968), and a neon installation of the words 
‘neon electrical light English glass letters white eight’, One and Eight: A 
Description (1968) (Green, 2001, pp. 4, 11). Other conceptualists used more 
conventional forms: Alighiero Boetti/Alighiero e Boetti (1940–1994), usually 
associated with the movement Arte Povera, often used embroidery: Ordine e 
Disordine (1973), for example, comprises one hundred embroidered squares, 
each 7 x 7 inches squared, with each square divided into four, with each 
quarter containing four letters. The embroidered squares were made by 
Afghan women, each of whom chose at least some of the colours. Although 
apparently simple, such works are frequently interrogating important ques-
tions as to the relationship between art and language (where meaning is 
generated in ideas or form), the place and the role of the ‘artist’ (and the 
artist’s ‘personal touch’), the signif icance of materiality and the place of 
the object in processes of commodif ication.
In many cases, conceptual artists have operated by providing ideas in 
written form, as sets of instructions, leaving their execution or instantiation 
to others (Green, 2001, p. 10). Charles Green argues that this:
represented the elimination of a certain type of overinflated subjectivity 
signif ied by the artist’s personal touch or signature. This was a type 
of long-distance artistic collaboration – or delegation – in which the 
assistant’s work was essential to the project’s very success and integrity 
(Green, 2001, p. 10).
Green explains that the process of delegation was different for conceptual 
artists than it had been in the past, under the atelier system, when artists 
such as Paul Rubens and Jacques-Louis David had employed assistants, 
because conceptualists such as Kosuth and Boetti ‘sought the co-operation 
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of others to enable their authorship to be camouflaged so that the im-
materiality of the work would be stressed’. Importantly, the role of the 
executants was not ‘itself revalued upward in order to create another artist’ 
(Green, 2001, p. 11).
Many examples of such conceptual art involved very general notions 
(e.g. ‘a cube without a cube’, ‘straight lines in differing colors’). Some of the 
best-known examples of such practices are the ‘wall drawings’ associated 
with the American artist, Sol Le Witt (1928–2007). LeWitt’s wall drawings 
consist of general guidelines or simple diagrams by LeWitt, which are drawn 
or painted by assistants directly onto a gallery wall, then usually removed 
after the exhibition has f inished. For example, for Wall Drawing No 146, 
there is a simple description: ‘All two-part combinations of blue arcs from 
corners and sides, and blue straight, not straight and broken lines’. This is 
accompanied by two diagrams, one which divides the wall into squares, 
each containing two numbers, and the other indicating by numbers the 
types of marking to be included in the square. The wall painting was f irst 
installed in the Kunsthalle in Berne Switzerland in 1972 and LeWitt signed 
a certif icate identifying the f irst drawers as B. Blasi, E. Martin, B. Schlup, 
P. Siegenthaler, S. Widmer and Sol LeWitt. A later version appears to have 
been executed at Varese in Italy (Buskirk, 2003, pp. 50–51).
Readers who are unfamiliar with LeWitt’s work can view examples on 
the website of the Massachussetts Museum of Contemporary Art, which in 
2008 opened a twenty-f ive year Wall Drawing Retrospective. One example, 
Wall Drawing 797, was derived from the following instructions:
The f irst drafter has a black marker and makes an irregular horizontal 
line near the top of the wall. Then the second drafter tries to copy it 
(without touching it) using a red marker. The third drafter does the same, 
using a yellow marker. The fourth drafter does the same using a blue 
marker. Then the second drafter followed by the third and fourth copies 
the last line drawn until the bottom of the wall is reached’.
Evidently, a lot of discretion is left to the f irst drafter. When the work was 
f irst executed at Amherst College, the drafter chose to base the line on 
the nearby landscape (see http://www.massmoca.org/lewitt/walldrawing.
php?id=797).
Although Kimmelman reports that ‘characteristically, [LeWitt] would 
then credit assistants or others with the results’, (cf. Kosuth, as reported in 
Green, 2001, p. 22) and the MassMOCA exhibit does list the ‘initial draw-
ers’, the wall drawings are, of course, primarily known as the works of 
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LeWitt. As David Carrier has observed ‘presenting the idea for an artwork 
suff ices to get credit for making the work’ (Carrier, 1980, p. 192). Indeed, 
the use of certif icates, which had already been pioneered by the likes of 
Carl Andre and Flavin, as guarantors of authorship, and thus authenticity 
of their works (and can be traced back to Duchamp’s L.H.O.O.Q. (1919)), 
reinforced the unique place of the conceiver as artist (Alberro, 2003, p. 23). 
In contrast, in many cases the actual executants are not identif ied (for 
example, the drawers of the Varese version are not attributed in Buskirk, 
2003, pp. 50–51). According to the authorship conventions of conceptual 
art, then, it seems LeWitt’s assistants would not be regarded as co-authors 
of the wall drawings.
From the standpoint of copyright, however, the reverse would appear to 
be the case. The executants of the wall drawings would likely be treated 
as making signif icant, original contributions to expression, something 
certainly ‘akin to penmanship’ – and thus very likely to count as co-
authors. This is particularly the case where choices that determine the 
final expressive form have been left to the executants. According to Michael 
Kimmelman:
With his wall drawing, mural-sized works that sometimes took teams of 
people weeks to execute … he always gave his team wiggle room, believing 
that the input of others – their joy, boredom, frustration or whatever – 
remained part of the art (Kimmelman, 2007).
Another commentator confirms:
With these notes, LeWitt provided methods and techniques for the team 
to follow – such as, for #613, “Rectangles formed by 3 in. (8cm) wide India 
ink bands meeting at right angles” – while still allowing room for a certain 
amount of self expression (Anon, 2010, p. 127).
More surprisingly still, LeWitt himself might be described as a legal non-
author, at least in those cases where all he contributed was a very general 
plan or idea for the execution of the work. As the Court of Appeal explained 
in Nottage v. Jackson (1883), (when considering authorship of a photograph):
Certainly [the author] is not the man who simply gives the idea of a 
picture, because the proprietor may say, “Go and draw that lady with a 
dog at her feet, and in one hand holding a f lower”. He may have the idea, 
but still he is not there […] (Nottage, 1883, p. 632).
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Indeed, it is notable than many of the 105 wall drawings executed for 
MASSMoCA were completed after LeWitt’s death by students, guided 
by LeWitt’s assistants: (Anon, 2010, p.  128). In these cases it is almost 
unthinkable that copyright law would treat LeWitt as an author of the 
wall drawings, as there could be no relevant ‘collaboration’ between the 
living and the dead.
Of course, there are some that were made in his lifetime in which he 
was one of the ‘f irst drawers’, and might claim legal co-authorship on that 
account. There are also some where the details in the instructions were 
suff icient to control the detailed expression. One account explains:
LeWitt’s wall drawings were the products of the artist’s carefully con-
ceived systems of lines and colours, which could then be executed by 
others. A team of assistants that worked with the artist produced the 
drawings according to detailed diagrams and written instructions […] 
(Anon, 2010, p. 127).
Moreover, there are certain examples where LeWitt had exercised supervi-
sory control over how the other drawers executed the work. Kimmelman 
reported that ‘like many more traditional artists, he became more concerned 
in later years that his works look just the way he wished’ and thus ‘he might 
decide whether a line for which he had given the instruction “not straight” 
was suff iciently irregular without becoming wavy’. In these cases, a claim 
to co-authorship (or even sole authorship) is not out of the question. As 
Laddie J. explained in the case of Cala Homes v. Alfred McAlpine Homes 
(1995, p. 835), holding that an architect was a co-author of plans which had 
been executed by his assistants:
In my view, to have regard merely to who pushed the pen is too narrow 
a view of authorship […] It is both the words or lines and the skill and 
effort involved in creating, selecting or gathering together the detailed 
concepts, data or emotions which those words or lines have f ixed in 
some tangible form which is protected […] It is wrong to think that only 
the person who carries out the mechanical act of f ixation is the author.
This might allow us to describe some conceptual artists as authors-in-law, 
but only where they oversaw the work of the executants, correcting it where 
appropriate, and controlling the decision over when the work as expressed 
was complete. As Laddie J. emphasises, what matters for copyright is who 
authors the expression.
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Of course, works of conceptual art pose a range of problems for copyright 
law, including the identif ication of anything that can be described as a 
‘work’ in the f irst place – a problem particularly for copyright regimes 
that identify a closed enumeration of subject-matter, as is the case in 
the UK (Barron, 2002). Perhaps because revenue streams deriving from 
reproduction of such works (and from high art more generally) remain of 
relatively minor importance, compared with revenues deriving from the 
sale of unique, material artefacts, the processes of certif ication developed 
by the conceptualists have been sufficient to make a market for, and in some 
ways effectively sustain, these practices. As a consequence, the diff icult 
questions that conceptual art raises for the existence of copyright seem 
rarely to have been tested in litigation. However, when conceptual art pieces 
are realised or materialised, as with LeWitt’s wall drawings, the question 
of ‘authorship’ comes into play. Viewed from the perspective of copyright 
law, a ‘conceptual artist’ such as LeWitt would not usually be regarded as 
the author of the resulting artistic work (and certainly not the sole author). 
In contrast, copyright law would likely regard the assistants as co-authors, 
when conventionally they would not be viewed as such. The perspectives 
are not merely ‘out of sync’, but outright contradictions.
Literary editors
It might be objected that the discontinuities between copyright law’s notion 
of authorship and social practices that we have discussed so far come from 
the ‘margins’ of what copyright law was ever intended to protect (and, in 
the case of conceptual art, inevitably follows from the practices of an art 
movement that sought to reject conventional understanding, and thus 
inevitably developed in a manner that was inconsistent with the ways of 
thinking necessarily incorporated within copyright law’s concepts). While 
it might, in turn, be disputed that scientif ic writing was not at the heart of 
copyright law’s thinking, at least in its early days, when the purpose was 
described in terms of the ‘encouragement of learning’ (and, in the United 
States Constitution ‘promoting science’), we want to suggest that the same 
types of discontinuities can also be found right in the centre of copyright 
law’s heartland, literary authorship. For our third example concerns literary 
works, particularly works of f iction and the contributions of editors to what 
are usually considered single-authored works.
Literary editors, of course, are not generally regarded as ‘authors’, nor 
do they think of themselves as such. As Holman explains, an editor is 
‘an indispensable recruiter, guide, friend, confessor and co-worker with 
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writers of genius and a shaper of great literary careers’ – but not an author 
or co-author (Holman, 1978, p. 572). Editors are facilitators, midwives as-
sisting at the literary birth of each novel, but leaving no doubt as to whom 
the parent is. One of the great American editors of the mid-20th century, 
Maxwell Perkins, the literary editor at Scribners, who edited the works of 
F. Scott Fitzgerald, Thomas Wolfe and Ernest Hemingway, was clear about 
the non-authorial role of an editor:
An editor does not add to a book. At best he serves as a handmaiden to 
an author. Don’t ever get to feeling important about yourself, because an 
editor at most releases energy. He creates nothing (Perkins, in Berg, p. 6; 
quoted by Inge, 2001, p. 626).
This belief has been acknowledged judicially. In the US case of Childress v. 
Taylor, Judge Newman reasoned about the distinction between writer and 
editor, and their respective intentions regarding authorship, as follows:
[…] a writer frequently works with an editor, who makes numerous useful 
revisions to the f irst draft, some of which will consist of additions of 
copyrightable expression. Both intend their contributions to be merged 
into inseparable parts of a unitary whole, yet very few editors and even 
fewer writers would expect the editor to be accorded the status of joint 
author […] (Childress para. 38).
However, when examined more closely, literary editors have often done 
much more than merely facilitate the creation of a particular work: they have 
often contributed signif icantly to the structure, narrative, characterisation 
and text, through suggested deletions and amendments. In his important 
overview, The Myth of Solitary Genius, University of Illinois Professor of 
English, Jack Stillinger, has drawn attention to the joint and collaborative 
nature of many literary works that are often seen as works of single author-
ship. Even the most seemingly ‘romantic’ poets like John Keats (1795–1821) 
relied greatly on suggestions and alterations from editors including Rich-
ard Woodhouse (1788–1834) and John Taylor (1781–1864) (Stillinger, 1991, 
pp. 26–30). Another well-known example concerns the contribution of the 
poet, Ezra Pound (1885–1972), to the writing of T. S. Eliot’s poem The Waste 
Land (1922). Pound, through multiple suggestions, led Eliot to cut the poem 
from over one thousand lines to 434 (Stillinger, 1991, Ch. 6, esp. pp. 127–8). 
Other well-documented examples include the assistance given by Hiram 
Haydn (1907–1973), literary editor at Bob-Merrill from 1950–54, to American 
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novelist (and former student of Haydn’s) William Styron (1925–2006), which 
include multiple suggested amendments to the structure, characterisation 
and text of Styron’s f irst work, Lie Down in Darkness (Casciato, 1980).
Although Max Perkins’ relationship with authors has been described as a 
‘departure from the traditional relationship of author, editor and publisher’ 
(Litz, 1968, p. 97), a closer look at his practices is revealing. For while Perkins 
publicly denied his contribution to the authorship of the works produced by 
Scribners under his supervision, surviving documents suggest he frequently 
had a very significant involvement with the texts sent to him by his authors. 
Sometimes Perkins initiated the ideas for works, such as his suggestion to 
Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings (who had just f inished South Moon Under) that 
she write a book about ‘a child in the scrub’ (Berg, 1978, p. 212, p. 297–300) 
or to Douglas Southall Freeman that, having completed a biography of 
Robert E Lee, he write a biography of Washington (Berg, 1978, p. 181–2). 
More frequently, he received a manuscript, immersed himself in it and 
offered suggestions as to improvements. Some of these suggestions are clear 
from the various collections of letters that survive between Perkins and his 
authors, and they vary in type and extent. In some circumstances, as with 
Fitzgerald’s famous novel The Great Gatsby (1925), various manuscripts 
survive from different stages of the process leading to publication, including 
the original handwritten manuscript at Princeton University Library. In the 
case of Wolfe’s relationship with the process, signif icant insights are also 
provided from his The Story of a Novel.
In the case of Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, Fitzgerald submitted the 
manuscript and Perkins suggested changes including most importantly 
the elaboration of the James Gatz/Jay Gatsby character (Nov. 24, 1924 in 
Kuehl & Bryer, 1971, p. 82; Buccoli & Baughman, 2004, p. 27; Berg, 1978, 
p. 65). Fitzgerald reacted favourably to the suggestions and incorporated 
the ideas including one that the character use the phrase ‘old sport’, which 
Fitzgerald used a dozen times (Berg, 1978, p. 69). Moreover, Perkins rejected 
many of Fitzgerald’s suggestions as to a title, such as ‘Among the Ash-Heaps 
and Millionaires’, ‘Gold-Hatted Gatsby’, ‘The High-Bouncing Loner’, ‘On 
the Road to West Egg’, ‘Trimalchio in West Egg’, ‘Trimalchio’, ‘Gatsby’ and 
Fitzgerald’s ultimate choice, ‘Under the Red, White and Blue’ (Berg, 1978, 
pp. 62, 64, 67; Bruccoli, 1974, p. 6 n. 4, pp. 31–32).
Perkins’ involvement in the f inalisation of Tom Wolfe’s manuscripts for 
Look Homeward, Angel (1929) and Of Time and the River (1935) is reputed 
to have been much more substantial. According to Roger Shugg, ‘it is well 
known that Perkins alone made Tom Wolfe publishable by helping him 
to select from boxes and bales of manuscript the pages and sections that 
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would have coherence as a book’ (Shugg, 1968, p. 11). Scott Berg describes 
Perkins’ reaction to the 1114-page manuscript (some 330,000 words) of what 
was provisionally called ‘O Lost ’ when he f irst received it in 1928, and his 
correspondence with Wolfe. Perkins thought it needed reorganisation and 
substantial cutting, and Wolfe acknowledged this, admitting his inability to 
criticise his own writing and his desire to get advice on the ‘huge monster’ of 
a manuscript (ibid., pp. 128 ff). In this account, Perkins not only advised on 
what needed to go, but what needed to be retained (in the face of Wolfe’s er-
ratic inclinations). According to one account, the pair worked day-after-day 
until over a quarter of the book (90,000 words) was cut, including the f irst 
1377 lines, and the work reframed as seen through the memories of the boy, 
Eugene (cutting sections where Wolfe spoke directly to the reader) (Berg, 
1978, pp. 134–5). Ultimately, Perkins asked Wolfe to alter the title, approving 
instead the alternative, Look Homeward, Angel (a phrase from John Milton’s 
Lycidas) (ibid., p. 136). Subsequent scholars have gone over the same ground 
and although Perkins’ contribution is diminished, it nevertheless remains 
impressive. For example, Dr Park Bucker, from the University of South 
Carolina Sumter, who has conducted a scrupulous analysis argues that some 
of the claims as to Perkins’ contribution are exaggerated. He suggests that 
in the case of Look Homeward, Angel, Perkins: ‘… moved one major episode, 
Grant’s Homecoming, from Book II to Book I; recommended the cutting 
of 60,000 words (22% of the work); and advised Wolfe to write connecting 
passages bridging the cuts’ (Bucker, 2000, p. xvii).
In the case of Time and the River, Perkins was involved from the start. 
Following the publication of Look Homeward, Angel, Perkins suggested to 
Wolfe that he write about ‘a man’s quest for his father’ (Berg, 1978, pp. 137–8, 
163, 167). Wolfe took the suggestion seriously and spent the next four years 
writing. In 1933, Perkins called time on Wolfe, who delivered a manuscript 
of over a million words twice the length of Tolstoy’s gargantuan War and 
Peace (ibid., pp. 235–6). Importantly, Perkins identif ied that the manuscript 
contained two distinct stories, each of which needed separate treatment, 
so that one was carved off and published later (ibid., p. 236). Thereafter, 
Perkins and Wolfe worked on the novel, in Perkins’ off ice in New York, 
every evening, six days a week, for much of 1934 (ibid., 1978, p. 237). Perkins’ 
directions were often detailed (ibid., p. 237).
Perkins was thus an editor who was very close to the manuscripts of the 
authors he worked with. In some situations, Perkins’ close involvement 
in f inalising manuscripts even led to suggestions that he was in fact a co-
author. This was most notoriously the case with Tom Wolfe’s Of Time and 
the River, with one critic arguing that ‘[s]uch organizing faculty and critical 
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intelligence as have been applied to the book have come not from inside the 
artist, not from the artist’s feeling for form and esthetic integrity, but from 
the off ice of Charles Scribner’s Sons’ (De Voto, 1936, p. 3ff). Indeed, some 
were led to suggest that Wolfe left Scribners (for Edward Aswell at Harper’s) 
because of the rumours that Perkins was, in effect, not his editorial mentor, 
but a co-author (Shugg, 1968, p. 11). While Perkins asserted that ‘The book 
belongs to the author’ (Maxwell Perkins to Tom Wolfe, 16 Jan 1937, in Bruccoli 
and Bucker, 2000, pp. 235, xvii), the question that interests us is whether the 
contributions by Perkins to the various manuscripts would – or could – have 
been such as to render him a joint author in the eyes of copyright law?
First, we might ask whether an editor and a writer are collaborators for 
the purposes of copyright? The British case law indicates that collaborators 
pursue a ‘common design’. In relation to The Great Gatsby, for example, 
Arthur Walton Litz notes: ‘Perkins and Fitzgerald obviously shared the same 
vision of the f inished novel, and as the title f luctuated among a half-dozen 
alternatives they worked together to sharpen the narrative focus’ (Litz, 1968, 
pp. 104–5). Bruccoli observed that Fitzgerald ‘trusted Perkins and counted 
on him to attend to the mechanics of his prose’ (Bruccoli, 1974, p. 21).
There is some suggestion that collaboration goes further, and also requires 
joint control: it is not enough that two persons contribute towards a shared 
goal if one of them has control over which contributions are accepted and 
which rejected. Thus in Hadley v. Kemp, one member of a band was regarded 
as the songwriter because he controlled whether the contributions of the 
others accorded with his ‘vision’ (in which case they were incorporated) or 
did not (and thus were rejected). Perkins might well have sought to deny 
that an editorial relationship involved an appropriate sort of ‘collaboration’, 
arguing instead that the author was the ultimate decision-maker, and that 
this element of control meant that an editor’s involvement could not be 
described as collaboration.
Thus, for example, Perkins wrote to Fitzgerald: ‘Do not ever defer to my 
judgment’ (Wheelock, 1950, p. 30; Bucker, 2000, p. xvii) and, to Marjorie-
Kinnan Rawlings, that ‘a book must be done according to the writer’s 
conception of it as nearly as possible’ (Berg, 1978, p. 298). Nevertheless, even 
if one accepts that collaboration does require joint control, it is diff icult to 
regard an editor such as Perkins as lacking such control. Indeed, not only 
did authors typically accept his suggestions, but the publication of a work 
depended on his approval of the manuscript. The advice from Perkins that 
the author should guard his or her expressive autonomy was made in the 
face of the reality that the publisher called the shots. Elsewhere, Perkins 
recognised that authors were pliable:
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Editors aren’t much, and can’t be … They can only help a writer realise 
himself, and they can ruin him if he’s pliable. … That is why the editors 
I know shrink from tampering with a manuscript and do it only when it 
is required of them by the author (Bucker, 2000, p. xvii).
Yet, Perkins was not like those editors he describes – he did involve himself 
intimately with the manuscript. And, individually, he was soon so highly 
respected – ‘the sole and only excuse … for Fitzgerald having been as suc-
cessful as he is’ (Madeleine Boyd, quoted in Berg, 1978, pp. 133–134) – that 
it is diff icult to see that any author could regard his ‘suggestions’ as really 
optional. In the case of Wolfe, Perkins observed ‘Tom demanded help. 
He had to have it’ (Shugg, 1968, p. 11), while Wolfe explained ‘I have great 
confidence in him and I usually yield to his judgment’ (Berg, 1978, p. 134).
Second, we must consider the type and extent of the contributions. As we 
have already noted, the provision of ideas is not enough. Thus Perkins clearly 
has no claim on that account to be a co-author of Freeman’s seven-volume 
life of Washington, nor Rawlings’ Pulitzer Prize winning The Yearling. And 
even though he urged Janet Taylor Caldwell that she write a historical novel 
(Berg, p. 400), Perkins is not a co-author of her successful works on Saint 
Paul, Cicero or Pericles. Nor would merely helping to choose the title, as 
Perkins often did, be likely to render a literary editor a joint author. The 
titles – The Great Gatsby (which Perkins chose from a bunch of suggestions 
from the indecisive Fiztgerald) (Bruccoli, 1991, vii), or The Yearling (which 
Perkins selected from Rawlings’ other suggestions of The Fawn, The Flut-
ter Mill and Juniper Island (Berg, pp. 297–299) et cetera – contain too few 
creative choices to justify a co-authorship claim (cf. Newspaper Licensing 
Agency v. Meltwater, CA, holding that some newspaper headlines might be 
works of authorship).
For co-authorship in British copyright law, there must be signif icant and 
original contributions to expression. While it does not appear that Perkins 
provided any text to Fitzgerald or Wolfe (Bucker, 2000, xvii), it is clear in many 
cases that he contributed to the deletion of large passages of text, and in the 
case of Wolfe, the selection and arrangement of the manuscript. In the case 
of Fitzgerald’s works, these changes were probably not substantial enough to 
justify a claim to co-authorship under copyright’s rules. In the case of Time 
and the River, the matter is less clear. It was Perkins who identif ied that the 
manuscript contained two distinct stories, each of which needed separate 
treatment. This process of ‘selection’ and ‘arrangement’ of texts has been 
frequently recognised as relevant to the assessment of whether a work is 
original for the purposes of deciding whether copyright subsists, though has 
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been seldom discussed in the context of co-authorship disputes. Neverthe-
less, given its recognition as ‘the right kind’ of skill labour and judgment (or, in 
European terminology ‘creative choice’), there can be little doubt that these 
types of contributions (which Brucker, 2000, p. xvii, calls ‘structural skills’) 
could warrant a f inding of joint authorship under British law.
Were these contributions ‘signif icant’? Scholars of Fitzgerald, such as 
Robert Emmet Long and Matthew Bruccoli, have sought to minimise the 
importance of Perkins’ contribution. Long calls the changes prompted by 
Perkins minor especially when viewed as part of Fitzgerald’s own ‘relentless 
process of polishing’ (Long, 1979, pp. 188, 199–200). One way to assess signifi-
cance is to pay attention to what the authors said. Fitzgerald acknowledged 
the value of Perkins’s assistance to The Great Gatsby: ‘With the aid you have 
given me’, he declared, ‘I can make Gatsby perfect’ (Fitzgerald to Perkins, 
Dec 20, 1924, in Kuehl & Bryer, p. 89 and Buccoli and Baughman, p. 32; 
Turnbull, 1963, p. 172). Another way to assess signif icance is to consider 
the reaction of readers, and critics, regarded as valuable components of 
the works. In the case of The Great Gatsby, which received praise for ‘its 
structure’ Fitzgerald wrote to Perkins:
Max, it amuses me when praise comes in on the ‘structure’ of the book 
– because it was you who f ixed up the structure, not me. (Fitzgerald to 
Perkins, July 10, 1925 in Kuehl & Bryer, pp. 117–118; Buccoli & Baughman, 
p. 27; Inge, 2001, p. 626).
Bruccoli, who has closely analysed the various surviving manuscript and 
proof versions says that, in so stating, Fitzgerald gave too much credit to 
Perkins whose participation in re-writing the novel was ‘not intimate’ 
(Bruccoli, 1991, pp. x, xi). Nevertheless, it seems strange that he should 
have been so effusive, and Bruccoli admits that one possible explanation 
is that there may be a lost set of galleys on which Perkins made ‘detailed 
recommendations’ (ibid, xii).
There is no suggestion that Perkins contributed substantial text to either 
Fitzgerald or Wolfe. Other editors, however, have not been so restrained. 
One example is Saxe Commins (1892–1958), a literary editor for American 
publishing f irm Random House from 1933 to his death, who famously acted 
as editor to Eugene O’Neill, William Forster and W.H. Auden. His experi-
ences were represented in his letters and journal entries, and were collected 
and published after his death (Commins, 1978, pp. 153–169). One of his less 
glamorous assignments was to assist novelist Parker Morell (1906–1943) 
to put the f inishing touches on his biography of the American actress and 
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singer Lilian Russell (1860–1922), entitled Lillian Russell: The Era of Plush. 
The book was being pushed out by the publisher to coincide with a f ilm 
about Russell. The publisher had provided Morell with a researcher who 
had worked for eight weeks collecting materials on the actress in the New 
York Public Library. As the deadline approached, Commins was sent to 
assist Morell to whip it into shape or, as Commins wittily put it, to ‘gild 
the lily’. Unfortunately for Commins, Morell was suffering from bouts of 
dizziness, and had not even made a start on the biography. Commins set 
about agreeing a table of contents with Morell, and for a week sought to 
assist him to meet the deadline. Commins generously produced text, but 
found that the author made no further progress, or that whatever he did 
do was largely plagiarised (Commins, 1978, p.157). In his journal, Commins 
described Morell as ‘psychotic, unstable, imbecilic. He simply cannot do 
the job’ (ibid., p.155). By the f irst weekend, when Commins returned to New 
York, determined to tell his employers what was going on, six chapters out 
of 22 were complete. Apparently, Random House was uninterested in the 
details and merely wanted the novel f inished on time. Commins ended up 
returning to help Morell complete the book. In effect, Commins had written 
300 pages in two weeks. He was disgusted with himself and what he had 
to do (ibid., pp. 155, 166), and became even more worried as Morell started 
to recognise that Commins had written more of the book than he had. 
Commins wanted nothing to do with suggestions that he be co-author or 
receive half the royalties (ibid., pp. 163, 167). This was ‘a penalty, a sentence, 
an expiation, a penance – anything but my book, it must be understood’. 
Doubtless the author for copyright purpose, Commins wanted nothing to 
do with being recognised as such.
Summation
We have now highlighted a number of examples in which the norms of social 
and legal authorship point us in quite different directions. In each case there 
is a disparity between social conventions of authorship and the question of 
who counts as an author in law. Copyright law is supposed to be committed 
to the proposition that authorship is a matter of fact, and it assumes that 
authorship conventions are, generally speaking, f ixed and stable across a 
variety of social practices. With the above examples discussed and analysed, 
we can now see some important ways in which this assumption might be 
called into question. What has gone wrong? How might we explain this 
conflict? Where might we look for solutions? The remainder of the paper 
is devoted to these questions.
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Thinking about these discontinuities
Facilitating discontinuity
In thinking about the apparent differences between legal conceptions of 
authorship, and how social and cultural practices identify authorship, the 
f irst point to note is that the dichotomy between the ‘legal’ sphere and the 
‘social’ sphere is itself artif icial and problematic in a number of respects. 
Perhaps most importantly, the social sphere does not exist ‘outside law’, 
so the differences in legal and social conceptions are themselves, in some 
respects, a product of law. In other words, while the legal system identif ies 
authorship according to specific criteria, it does not prohibit social practices 
that attribute authorship in a different manner. On the other hand, in 
applying its criteria, the legal system frequently invokes social practices as 
important considerations in reaching legal conclusions about authorship. 
Both points deserve elaboration.
At first glance, it may seem odd to claim that the existence of a dichotomy 
between legal conclusions on authorship and social practices of attribution 
are themselves, in part, the result of law. On reflection, the claim is not 
strange at all. This is because the legal system requires the identif ication 
of authorship as a mechanism for achieving certain functions, most obvi-
ously as regards the initial allocation of copyright, as well as determination 
of the term of protection. However, traditionally the British and US legal 
systems have not treated the legal def inition of authorship as determining 
of attribution practices. The latter have rather been treated as questions of 
contractual agreement: a legal author (and f irst owner of copyright) can 
transact with a publisher to be named, or not to be named, on the work as 
published. Through these principles of freedom of contract, the legal system 
allows for the emergence of the discontinuities between authorship in law, 
and particular or more generalised practices of attribution. Although UK law 
has recognised a right of attribution, vested in the legal author, since 1989, it 
requires that this right be operationalised by an act of ‘assertion’, typically 
in a contract, and provides that this right can be waived, for example, in a 
contract. The effect of this is that the legal system specif ically facilitates 
not merely practices of non-attribution (as for example, of article writers in 
The Economist), but even permits agreement that others – non-legal authors 
– are attributed as authors. Social attribution of authorship to persons who 
would not be regarded as authors-in-law is itself legally facilitated.5
Perhaps the most obvious example of such legal collaboration in the gen-
eration of these discontinuities is provided by the case of ghost authorship, 
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that is the knowing, conscious writing by one person of a work that will be 
attributed to another. Often, ghost-writing is used to overcome some of the 
problems celebrities face in composing their own, ‘auto-biographies’, but the 
practice extends well beyond that f ield (Erdal, 2004), as the Saxe Commins-
Parker Merell example indicates. Another instance of such ‘ghosting’ is of 
the f irst Star Wars novel which was in fact written by Alan Dean Foster, but 
was attributed to George Lucas. Lucas would likely have had neither the time 
nor the energy to write the novel (which was published before the f ilm was 
complete and released), but the writer was happy to receive $5000 for the 
job and apparently content to have his identity concealed. Indeed, when 
asked as to whether he resented the attribution of the novel to Lucas, Foster 
is reported to have said: ‘Not at all. It was George’s story idea. I was merely 
expanding upon it. Not having my name on the cover didn’t bother me in 
the least. It would be akin to a contractor demanding to have his name on 
a Frank Lloyd Wright house’ (Pollock, 1999, p. 195).
‘Ghost writing’, however, is a good example of the way that copyright 
law is complicit in the social practice of misrepresenting authorship. This 
is not because copyright law would not recognise a ghost writer as the 
author of the work – it would. Rather, it is because it would permit the 
parties to attribute authorship to someone else. This might be possible, 
in some legal systems, by agreement as to who constitutes the author, or 
in the United States if the writer was an employee under the so-called 
‘work-for-hire’ doctrine (Lastowka, 2005, pp. 1221–1228). However, even in 
the United Kingdom, which has since 1989 recognised an author’s moral 
right of attribution, the law allows the author to agree by contract to waive 
that right. Matters are more complex in other European countries which 
do not permit waiver of the ‘droit moraux’. For example, while French law 
permits authors to consent to such misattribution, should the author change 
their mind, they will then be permitted to assert their right of attribution 
(but may have to indemnify the co-contractant).
Accommodating social practice
While copyright law thus might be said to be complicit in, or at least facilita-
tive of, these discontinuities, in other respects the law does attempt to take 
social practices seriously, and its search for factual marks of authorship is 
inevitably influenced by authorship practices outside of the legal sphere. 
Most legal systems reduce room for dispute in relation to determinations 
of authorship by operating presumptions that a person designated as the 
author on a published version of the work is in fact the author. Indeed, 
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Article 5 of the EU’s Directive on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property6 
requires Member States to recognise a presumption that where ‘his/her 
name … appear[s] on the work in the usual manner’, then the author of 
a literary or artistic work is to ‘be regarded as such, and consequently to 
be entitled to institute infringement proceedings’, in the absence of proof 
to the contrary. Implementing this, the French IP Code, Article L. 113–1 
provides: ‘Absent proof to the contrary, the status of author belongs to the 
person or persons under whose names the work has been divulged’; while 
the UK CDPA, s. 104(2) states that ‘where a name purporting to be that of the 
author appeared on copies of the work as published or on the work when it 
was made, the person whose name appeared shall be presumed, until the 
contrary is proved … (a) to be the author of the work’. Although no such 
presumption is included in the US Copyright Act, US law looks explicitly for 
‘factual indicia’ of joint authorship in terms of attribution, such as billing 
and crediting (Thomson v. Larson, 1998, at para. 32).
However, it remains the case that, when social facts about authorship 
explicitly conflict with the legal test, copyright law will likely disregard the 
social conventions. In the English case of Bamgboye v. Reed, for example, 
the High Court rejected evidence that the claimant was not co-author of 
the musical work Bouncing Flow on the basis that ‘he would not have been 
thought of as a “collaborator”, in the way that the word might normally be 
used in the industry’ – this was considered irrelevant to the legal question 
of whether he had ‘creative input into the music … ’ (Bamgboye, 2002, para. 
61). When it comes to factual questions about authorship, then, copyright 
law is selective in its appeal to social facts, at least regarding linguistic 
expectations about the use of the term ‘author’, and also the extent to which 
these expectations reflect how the parties might agree to define their roles.
Would it be desirable to align legal and social understandings of 
authorship?
Would it be (and, to the extent that it already occurs, is it) desirable for 
copyright law to ascertain legal facts about authorship from social con-
ventions? First, we might note that copyright law needs to put forward a 
conception of authorship that is relatively stable and f ixed. This is, f irst, 
because copyright is a property right and its very existence often depends 
on the identif ication of the author of a work. As Farwell L.J. put it in the 
case of Tate v. Fullbrook: ‘The Act creates a monopoly, and in such a case 
there must be certainty in the subject-matter of such monopoly in order to 
avoid injustice to the rest of the world’ (p. 832).
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In contrast, social authorship conventions are far from stable, even 
within specif ic cultural f ields. For example, looking at the case of editors, 
an interesting literature has developed about editorial principles, and the 
extent to which editors do view themselves as taking on an authorial role 
when they prepare works for publication. In our exposition of the role of 
editors above, we took it for granted that editors would be considered social 
non-authors. However, according to an approach Peter Schillingsburg calls 
the ‘aesthetic orientation’, editing is described as producing a ‘best’ text of a 
work, rather than the more traditional ‘authorial orientation’, which sees the 
editor’s role as one of constructing ‘a purified authorial text’, capturing most 
fully the author’s intentions prior to the intervention of editors or publishers. 
The aesthetic orientation challenges certain views of editorial authorship 
we took for granted, according to which ‘there is assumed to be an absolute 
distinction between author and editor – the editor is supposed to be the 
servant of the author’s intentions, not a co-writer’ (Eggert, 1990, p. 24). If the 
editor is seen as a person who produces the ‘best’ text out of a number of 
inferior versions attributed to the author, he becomes a ‘collaborator with 
the author, doing better what the originating production crew did poorly’ 
(Schillingsburg, 1996 p. 42).
Similar points might be made about the changing social conventions 
of authorship practices in the artistic, commercial and scientif ic spheres.7 
Indeed, the question of the proliferation of attribution of authorship for 
scientif ic publications became a matter of such concern that attempts were 
made to codify social norms. The most widely adopted of these is the action 
of the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (Dreyfuss, 2000; 
Fisk, 2006, p. 84). These rules state that:
Authorship should be based only on a substantial contribution to:
i) Conception and design or analysis and interpretation of data; and
ii) Drafting the article or revising it critically for important intellectual 
content; and
iii) Final approval of the version to be published.
Although widely adopted, for example, by all PLOS journals, as well as the 
Royal Society, the requirements have not gone without criticism (Kwok, 
2005, p. 554; Smith and Williams-Jones, 2012, p. 202), in part because they 
are a rather strict set of rules. Indeed, they might even deny attribution to 
some who would be regarded as authors by copyright law (for example, 
someone who wrote the article but did not conceive the project). Indeed, 
there are suggestions that the rules have had no significant impact upon the 
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rates of attribution (Baerlocher, 2009; Haeussler, 2013, p. 690). Regardless of 
their effectiveness, we draw attention to the ICMJE rules here to highlight 
the capacity for social norms to transform over time.
Second, we observe that copyright law needs a conception of authorship 
that can be applied across a great diversity of cultural f ields, which means 
that its legal framework needs to be broad enough to accommodate the vast 
differences between the various creative practices it proposes to protect. 
Although there are discontinuities between copyright law’s conception of 
authorship and the conceptions recognised in relation to conceptual art, 
scientif ic authorship or literary editing, it should be clear that these three 
‘social’ conceptions are themselves very different. When one factors in all 
sorts of other spheres which copyright law seeks to regulate – music pro-
duction, screenwriting, theatre (Gripsrud, 2014), f ilm-making (Bently and 
Biron, 2014; Lastowka, 2005, p. 1230), – one can see that discontinuities are 
inevitable. When reflecting on the possibility of the introduction of a moral 
right of attribution, these complexities led Rebecca Tushnet to observe that 
‘[l]egitimate claims for credit are simply too varied and contextual, and 
copyright law already too complex and reticulated, for an attribution right 
to be a valuable addition to copyright’s arsenal’ (Tushnet, 2007a, p. 789).
Third, it might be argued that, even though it may produce discontinui-
ties, copyright’s conception of authorship usefully limits the possibilities of 
highly fragmented ownership. In limiting the types of contributions, and 
requiring collaboration, copyright ensures the concentration of rights in few 
hands (what, elsewhere, has been referred to as ‘agglomeration’). In some 
jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, no joint author (or co-owner) 
can exploit the work without the consent of other joint authors, so multiple 
ownership raises issues of potential ‘hold ups’ (as economists might say). 
Take the example of the article in Nature with 151 attributed authors: if each 
of these were really a legal joint author, all would have to grant permission 
to publish (and if 150 had agreed, the 151st would have enormous power to 
refuse to publish or exact modif ications).
Although the ownership rules vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (see, 
e.g., Dreyfuss, 2000, p. 1207), and some copyright laws include provisions to 
resolve disagreements between joint owners, courts appear to act on a desire 
to simplify ownership by agglomerating ownership rights in as few persons 
as possible. Such a tendency leads to a high threshold for joint authorship. 
Writing about the United States, Rebecca Tushnet (Tushnet, 2007a, p. 807) 
explains that ‘an important reason that courts have adopted restrictive 
def initions of joint authorship’ lies in the implications for the exploitation 
of the copyright, namely, the potential licensing problems associated with 
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the requirement than an exclusive license be agreed by all co-authors (see 
also La France, 2001, p. 194; Lastowka, 2005, p. 1217).
Fourth, it might be said that any attempt at alignment may also be re-
garded as futile because there will always be a section of the cultural world 
that takes its function to be to interrogate the categories of contemporary 
life, including law (its concepts and practices), by actions and interventions 
that self-consciously excavate, expose and deliberately destabilise the ideas, 
assumptions and ways of thinking with which law operates. However hard 
law reformers work to locate a conception of authorship that is broad and 
f lexible enough to accommodate a wide range of social practices, there 
will be some artists who nevertheless want to expose and challenge those 
conceptions. Indeed, our example of conceptual art might be regarded as 
precisely such a case. While perhaps not focused on challenging copyright 
law’s conception of authorship, its explicit goal of eliminating the ‘overin-
flated subjectivity signif ied by the artist’s personal touch or signature’ that 
was valued in previous art movements (Green, 2001, p. 10) was inevitably 
going to produce discontinuities with a copyright law whose conception of 
‘authorship’ had emerged in historical environments where such subjectiv-
ity and personal touch was regarded as the hallmark of ‘authorship’. Even 
if copyright law could encompass many artistic practices, then, it seems 
implausible to think it could align itself with every section of the artworld.
Fifth, it might be said that these divergences are unproblematic, possibly 
even desirable. The discontinuities might be said to be unproblematic because 
copyright law provides other mechanisms to adjust the initial allocation of 
rights. The most obvious of these is contract law, as a result of which initial 
allocations of rights can be varied (as we have seen above). If copyright law 
designates one person as an author there is – in most laws at least – nothing 
to stop an arrangement whereby that copyright can be assigned to another 
(and, in the few cases where copyright law prohibits assignments, an ar-
rangement with an equivalent effect can usually be achieved). Perhaps the 
best illustration of the importance of contractual remedies to problems of 
authorship can be seen in f ilm practice: despite longstanding uncertainty 
and confusion over who should count as a f ilm author, the film industry has 
nevertheless been able to flourish through contractual provisions that ensure 
that all the necessary rights end up in a particular f ilm production company. 
Complicated questions of who is a film author as a matter of law typically only 
arise in situations of amateur production (see, for example, Wimmer v. Slater).
Moreover, it might be suggested that the non-alignment of law’s con-
ception of authorship with social practice is a by-product of the relative 
autonomy of law, an autonomy that is desirable because it creates spaces 
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that are free from prior social relations of power, especially economic 
power. Legal non-authors cannot use economic or social power to trans-
form themselves into legal authors, whereas the use of social power to gain 
attribution in science has received widespread, and almost universally 
critical, comment (Kwok; Smith and Williams-Jones, 2012, p. 205; and, 
more generally, Fisk, 2006, p. 102). Most recently, Carolin Haeussler and 
Henry Sauermann have studied attribution in relation to scientif ic works 
and concluded that: ‘contributions in the form of carrying out technical 
steps or laboratory work are more likely to be rewarded with authorship 
when made by scientists with higher hierarchical status or prior scientif ic 
accomplishment’ (Haeussler and Sauermann, 2013, p. 689). In fact, what they 
show is that attribution practices reflect power relations. For copyright law, 
authorship remains a matter of law, and such contributions would not be 
relevant for copyright law’s assessment of authorship.
Equally, with authorship being a matter of law, the socially less powerful 
should remain ‘authors’ if their contributions are in fact contributions to 
authorship: an actor can become a co-author of a play (whatever the director 
or playwright may think), a family member who contributes could become a 
joint author of the resulting work. Consider, for example, the situation in the 
United States during the 1950s when screen credit was determined not by 
formal, public legal rules but by the rules and practices of the Screen Writers 
Guild. While much that the Guild did might be thought of as beneficial to 
writers, as is well known, a series of writers – Paul Jarrico, Dalton Trumbo, 
Michael Wilson – who were blacklisted as a result of their ‘associations’ 
with Communism were not granted credit on the f ilms (The Las Vegas 
Story (1952), Roman Holiday (1954), The Friendly Persuasion (1956) to which 
they had contributed (Fisk, 2006, p. 231–245). The Screen Writers Guild was 
ineffective to resist the political pressure of the producers. In contrast, it 
seems fair to assume that judicial designation of authorship would have been 
less vulnerable to these politically-motivated exercises of economic power.
Of course, we should not overstate the social justice arguments in defence 
of the legal control of the determination of authorship. For a start, as already 
noted, these legal determinations do not stand outside power-relations, but 
are, of course, deeply immersed in complex webs of power. This means that 
when a court determines whether a contribution is original or substantial, 
its conclusions will rarely be uncontaminated by social valorisations that 
in turn reflect relations of power (Bently, 2009). Moreover, in so far as the 
intention of the parties is relevant to determining questions of joint author-
ship, as in the United States, questions of self-perception and capacity to act 
inevitably inform the actors’ capacities to form relevant intentions, however 
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substantial their contributions in fact are. Does an editor, for example, ever 
intend to become a joint author? Prevalent views of the role of the editor 
may preclude the formation of the intention to co-author.
Despite all these good reasons to be skeptical about the desirability of 
any attempt to align copyright’s conception of authorship with the varied 
ideas deployed in specif ic f ields of social practice, something important is 
at stake in this failure to align copyright’s concept of authorship with the 
understandings of authorship evinced in many – perhaps most – social 
practices. What is at stake is the credibility and legitimacy of copyright law 
itself. Copyright law relies heavily for its operation on widespread accept-
ance of its legitimacy (rather than the sporadic enforcement of its sometimes 
hefty sanctions). That legitimacy lies in the idea that copyright law promotes 
cultural f lourishing, by giving the weight of law to ideas that artistic and 
cultural activities warrant recognition, respect and reward. In turn, it is 
important that different social operators feel a reasonable correspondence 
between the social norms that underpin their practices and legal norms 
embodied in copyright law.8 For this reason, we think it is at the very least 
worth considering carefully whether the conception of authorship can be 
made more consistent with social norms.
Three proposals
We are not alone in thinking that some exploration of whether copyright 
law can be made more consistent with social norms. For example, Profes-
sor Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss from New York University, one of the most 
prominent intellectual property scholars in the United States, has proposed 
the introduction of a whole new category of ‘collaborative authorship’, while 
Professor Gregory Lastowka from Rutgers has suggested that US law regulate 
authorial attribution to give effect to social interests in ‘truthful’ attribution. 
Dreyfuss’s proposal can be seen as an attempt to make legal constructions 
more consistent with changed social practices, while Lastowka seeks to 
cabin ‘deviant’ (i.e., particularly misleading) social practices to make them 
more consonant with legal ideas of authorship. We review these in turn, 
before tentatively making our own suggestion.
Dreyfuss’s proposal for a concept of ‘collaborative work’
Dreyfuss suggests that copyright laws should recognise a new kind of 
copyright work: a ‘collaborative work’ (distinct from ‘collective works’ or 
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‘works of joint authorship’), which would arise where the parties indicated 
an intention that the work should be so treated (either in writing or through 
other actions) (Dreyfuss, 2000, p. 1222). In so proposing, Dreyfuss con-
sciously builds on some of the more open conceptions of co-authorship 
that we have referred to above, such as that operative in France and the 
Netherlands where contributions do not need to be integrated into a work 
so as to become non-distinct. But Dreyfuss’s proposal goes further than 
existing copyright regimes, conferring authorship status on ‘every par-
ticipant who has contributed to such work’, including those who created 
(non-copyrightable) ideas and facts, those who instigate, f ind funding, or 
provide resources (ibid., pp. 1220, 1222–3). Many contributions that are not 
usually counted as authorial in law would, on this proposal, count, and the 
def inition of contribution would be more expansive and accommodating 
than on current joint authorship doctrine. Her proposal would ‘give each 
author pecuniary interests in the work proportional to that party’s input’ 
(ibid., p. 1220) Building on the US rule on exploitation of jointly authored 
works (as well as some provisions found in civil law regimes), each author 
would be allowed to utilise and develop their own contribution, with an 
implied licence to use that of the other contributors (with proportionate 
obligations to remunerate those others), but their rights would be unenforce-
able unless and until all contributors were properly attributed (ibid.,p. 1221).
This proposal has a number of attractive features. It would potentially 
encourage more collaboration between parties, as individuals not usually 
accorded authorial status would be attracted by the prospect of greater 
recognition. It would also encourage would-be single authors to think 
carefully about the influences on their work, and to be clearer about the 
demarcation of creative roles, and the need to give credit and recognition 
to other contributing parties. It would work well for cases of legal non-
authorship such as scientif ic publishing, when authors contribute in ways 
not usually recognised by copyright as contributions ‘of the right kind’. 
The case of conceptual art is more diff icult, however. On the one hand, 
Dreyfuss’s proposal allows a contribution of an artist like Sol LeWitt to count 
as authorial, but this is only on the proviso that his work be considered a 
collaborative one, alongside the contributions of his assistants. Thus, it 
does nothing to harmonise legal and social conceptions of authorship in 
the artistic sphere, even if it gets around the diff iculty of conceptual artists 
being viewed as legal non-authors.
More generally, Dreyfuss’s proposal might be seen as problematic to the 
extent that it actually highlights the disparity between legal authors and 
social non-authors, providing a way not only for editors, friends and ghosts 
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to count as legal co-authors when they might conventionally not be so 
considered (it is arguable that current joint authorship standards already of-
fer this prospect), but also for broader contributions – of publishers, funders 
or even the public at large, to count as authorial. But why should we inflate 
(legal) authorship to this extent? One concern is that enabling contributions 
of ‘ideas’ to count as authorial could threaten to extend copyright protection 
precisely at a time when scholars are worrying about its ‘over-expansion’. 
Indeed, copyright law’s idea/expression dichotomy is often justif ied as 
a technique which enables courts to balance the interests of copyright 
owners against those of users, creators and the public at large, preventing 
the monopolisation of ideas and facilitating a robust public domain. When 
‘non-copyrightable ideas’ are viewed as contributions of authorship, as per 
Dreyfuss’s proposal, this balancing act becomes harder to achieve, because 
the scope of copyright infringement potentially increases. While a proposal 
which enables ‘ideas’ to count as authorial has the potential to align legal 
and social conceptions of authorship, then, we might wonder whether this 
is too high a price to pay for such alignment.
Moreover, recognition of this problem could lead us to question one of 
the potential strengths of Dreyfuss’s proposal in encouraging more col-
laborative ventures: although the proposal might encourage collaborative 
authorship in one sense, it has the potential to stif le authorship in the 
more traditional sense of building on the raw materials which copyright 
law is supposed to safeguard. In our view, this tension could be avoided if 
copyright law treated attribution rights separately from ownership rights 
(see below).
Lastowka’s proposal to strengthen attribution
Gregory Lastowka’s starting point is the US Supreme Court in Dastar 
Corporation v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp in 2003 which, at its broad-
est reading may preclude authors relying on trade mark law to prevent 
misattribution of their work as others’, and possibly others’ work as theirs. 
Lastowka is concerned that Dastar has unjustif iably removed a valuable 
legal remedy, and proposes the reversal of the decision. In contrast to Drey-
fuss, his proposal thus concerns purely questions of authorial attribution, 
and the vehicle for giving effect to these duties to attribute is trade mark law. 
Lastowka’s justif ication for so advocating is not the familiar moral rights 
theory according to which ‘authors’ have a natural or moral right to attribu-
tion in relation to their works (for the mere reason that the works are the 
products of the author’s personality). Rather, Lastowka argues that ‘accurate 
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authorial attribution benefits society because it is a type of information that 
has special social value’ (Lastowka, 2005, pp. 1176, 1180–85). Consequently, 
Lastowka proposes that trade mark law – a form of intellectual property 
which protects particular signs or marks that are used by traders to identify 
their goods/services, to indicate the origin of their goods/services, and 
distinguish them from goods/services produced by other traders – plays a 
role in ensuring that there is appropriate authorial attribution.
Lastowka’s preference for trade mark over copyright is explained not 
just by his public interest orientation, but also because he also sees US 
copyright law’s conception of authorship as out of step with that in popular 
understanding (ibid., pp. 1215–1216). As he observes:
If one believes there is a societal interest in accurate attribution, copy-
right’s scheme of authorship ordering is obviously problematic because 
the legal author controlling attribution is not the person society views 
as the author (ibid., p. 1216).
Nor would Lastowka want to make the matter one for individual authors. 
Because he is concerned with promoting ‘truth’ (ibid., pp. 1193, 1233), leaving 
policing of attribution to authors ‘has a glaring structural defect’, namely 
that authors might agree to misattribution (either because of unfair bargain-
ing, or because they willingly do so for alternative benefits) (ibid., p 1218,). 
For Lastowka, ‘attribution must be bounded to some factual and socially 
valuable truth about the identity of the true author’.
Thus, Lastowka wants to ensure that legal regulation prevents social 
practices that misattribute the ‘true author’. In his view, for example, 
ghostwriting should be actionable as a form of reverse passing off (i.e., 
misrepresentation of one person’s work as another’s) irrespective of the 
consent of the author (ibid., pp. 1218, 1233). Such actions should be able to be 
brought not just by the misattributed or unattributed author or contributor, 
but also by the public (which, as Lastowka reports, had occurred in the US 
in the 1990s when the pop duo Milli Vanilli purported to be singing on the 
album (and single) Girl You Know Its True but in fact were lip-synched the 
recording). Although Lastowka acknowledges that such regulation would 
often prove ineffective (ibid., p. 1230), his aim is that socially deceptive 
practices should be brought into line with legal norms, and those legal 
norms are to reflect ‘socially important legal truth’.
But what is less obvious is quite what are the relevant ‘truths’ in the 
sorts of situations that we have been discussing. Is the socially important 
empirical truth that a work was ‘conceived by’ Sol LeWitt, or ‘executed by’ 
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various assistants? Is not the ‘truth’ more a product of attribution practices 
than an ‘empirical reality’? Is the extent of Perkins’ role in editing Fitzgerald 
and Wolfe such as to make it deceptive to describe the latter alone as the 
authors? Unfortunately, Lastowka’s proposal offers too little guidance here 
to be of value. Moreover, the case of scientif ic authorship would be left 
entirely outside the f ield of legal regulation. This is because Lastowka takes 
the view that social interests diminish ‘in cases involving more than two or 
three authors who contribute to a single work’ (ibid., p. 1230), and contributor 
attribution no longer provides factually meaningful information about a 
product. As he explains, in ‘the case of collaborative authorship, it seems the 
justif ication for the doctrine of reverse passing off falls away’ (ibid., p. 1232). 
Yet the volume of literature concerning ‘scientific authorship’ suggests there 
are important individual and social interests at stake here (Fisk, 2006, p. 50).
A more reflexive concept of authorship for attribution
Like Dreyfuss and Lastowka, we see problems with the discontinuities 
between copyright law’s narrow conception of authorship and social prac-
tices. However, in contrast to Dreyfuss, but in common with Lastowka, we 
think there may be reasons to focus attention on attribution, with a view 
to considering whether some greater level of consistency between law and 
social practice can be achieved at least in relation to this question. Thus 
we suggest greater attention should be given to an idea raised by Rebecca 
Tushnet – ‘a special type of “attribution authorship”’ (Tushnet, 2007a, p. 807) 
– an idea we think she dismissed too quickly.
We suggest that a right of attribution – a right already recognised under 
most copyright regimes (and indeed in a number of international obliga-
tions) – could be extended to all relevant contributors to the making of a 
work (or perhaps to any intellectual endeavour). The notion of ‘contributor’ 
need not be synonymous with the notion of ‘authors’ as deployed for other 
purposes within copyright law (in particular, ascribing f irst ownership). 
This could be achieved either by recognising that ‘authorship’ has a different 
meaning when considering rights or duties of attribution, or perhaps less 
problematically by identifying the beneficiary of a right of attribution by a 
distinct term such as ‘contributor’. Indeed, it might be that rights of attribu-
tion could be removed from the copyright system altogether, and instead 
be treated as free-standing rights. Attribution itself is a feature not just of 
copyright law, but of other f ields of intellectual endeavour (Tushnet, 2007a, 
p. 794). ‘Inventors’ and ‘designers’ already receive limited attribution rights 
(Fisk, 2006, p. 70), and this proposal could also extend to them. Indeed such 
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a right of contributors to attribution could easily be developed out of notions 
of rights of personality, commonly recognised in civil law countries, but 
more embryonically being developed in the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights in its interpretation of Article 8 of the Convention 
as requiring recognition of a right in one’s own name or image.
Re-thinking attribution in terms of ‘relevant contributions’ would have a 
number of potential benefits. First, it would free the attribution right from 
the proprietary logic of copyright, and thereby permit a greater number 
of potentially qualifying contributions. Catherine Fisk has observed that 
‘over the last generation there has been a tendency to expand the number of 
people and the types of contributions that are attributed’ (Fisk, 2006, p. 101). 
These contributions could (but would not necessarily) include contribu-
tions to ideas, generating data, even building machines that help generate 
data as well as contributions to text or expression. Because recognition 
of such contributions as entitling a person to attribution would not, in 
turn, implicate questions of ownership, marketability or exploitation of 
a work, there are no policy reasons for a court or tribunal arbitrarily to 
exclude them from recognition. More positively, by allowing the broad array 
of contributions to be taken into account, copyright law can incorporate 
within its logic what matters, and what is valued, within specif ic f ields 
of endeavour. The contribution of the conceptual artist would at least be 
recognised as entitling them to attribution.
Secondly, a ‘relevant contribution’ test would allow rights of attribution 
to become more reflective of social norms. Indeed, ‘relevant’ could be ex-
pressly defined so as to take account of social norms in the particular sector. 
Rebecca Tushnet has observed that there are ‘powerful attribution norms 
throughout modern society, rather than a single norm that covers most 
situations’ (Tushnet, 2007a, p. 795). Thus, where such norms are codif ied 
textually, for example by industry agreement (as in the case, for example, 
of the Screen Writers Guild of America) (Fisk, 2006, pp. 77–81; Fisk, 2011), 
those norms would be determinative (and the resolutions of the relevant 
dispute-machinery could be given presumptive force). A similar position 
could be taken where such norms are socially developed, as for example 
with various scientif ic societies’ statements on attribution, or indeed with 
editorial practices. If individual literary editors do not wish to be attributed, 
or editorial contributions – even to structure, sequence, organisation and 
text – are not treated as relevant contributions under the relevant social 
norms at the pertinent time, then they would not be entitled to attribution. 
Of course, care would need to be taken to ensure that individual agree-
ments and social norms do not become opportunities for unfair bargaining 
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practices, but there are many circumstances in which one can imagine 
parties giving their full and informed consent to a particular billing. This 
might be because the billing has been collectively bargained, or because the 
parties agree that it represents the best way to market the cultural work.
Thirdly, deferring to social norms also raises the possibility of dif-
ferentiating between categories of relevant contributor. One could easily 
imagine a legal system differentiating between categories of contributor, 
such as between ‘principal authors’ and ‘ancillary authors’, or ‘authors’ 
and ‘contributors’. Indeed, this is precisely the solution to the problem of 
attribution in ‘scientif ic authorship’ that has been proposed by the deputy 
editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association, Dr. Drummond 
Rennie (Rennie, 1997; Rennie, 2000; Dreyfuss, 2000, p. 1190). He has sug-
gested that contributors receive credit for what they did, just as with f ilm 
credits. It also raises the possibility that contributors could be recognised 
‘collectively’. As Catherine Fisk has ably demonstrated, such norm-based 
regimes can be appraised in terms of transparency, participation, equality, 
due process, eff iciency, and substantive fairness (Fisk, 2006, pp. 73–76).
A fourth aspect of the proposed ‘contributor’s right’ would be that it 
could be formulated to take advantage of the changes to the technological 
environment within which works are now published. As Catherine Fisk has 
observed, ‘context is everything in determining when credit is due’ (Fisk, 
2006, p. 76). In contrast with copyright law’s concept of ‘authorship’, which 
needs to be a stable grounding for exclusive rights that could last over 150 
years (life of an author plus 70 years), contribution rights could be made 
to reflect current social norms. Thus the assessment of whether there is a 
‘relevant contribution’ could fall to be determined at the present time, so 
that an online publisher could be required to modify attribution of works 
for the future. Given that the costs of altering attribution information are 
relatively low, a right of attribution that can respond in this way seems 
much more feasible than it might ever have been hitherto.
Two commentators, Professors Catherine Fisk and Rebecca Tushnet, 
have anticipated and critiqued a proposal of this sort. Fisk argues that ‘a 
comprehensive and legally enforceable right of attribution … is neither 
feasible nor probably desirable’ (Fisk, 2006, p. 109). One of her concerns 
is that such a system would lack the f lexibility of ‘norm-based systems’ 
(ibid.). Therefore, she proposes a very limited intervention, restricted 
to the f ield of employment contracts. However, we are less pessimistic. 
Although the United States has not, as yet, enacted attribution rights, most 
copyright systems already include such rights as part of the system of ‘droits 
moraux’. Indeed, Article 6 Bis of the Berne Convention, Article 5 of the WIPO 
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Performers and Phonograms Treaty and Article 5 of the Beijing Treaty on 
Audiovisual Performances already require that such rights be conferred on 
authors of literary and artistic works and performers. We suggest that such 
rights should be implemented in a way which draws on and is sensitive to 
existing social norms.
Tushnet criticises the idea of a ‘right of attribution’ as one which would 
‘increase the number of line-drawing problems substantially’ (Tushnet, 
2007a, p. 807). She is, at least, partly right. If there are a greater number 
of people with attribution rights, and a greater number of contributions 
are recognised as entitling the contributor to attribution, the number of 
instances where decisions need to be made will evidently increase. But 
that does not mean that ‘problems’ will increase. Indeed, we would suggest 
that the number of ‘problems’ might well decrease for two reasons. Firstly, 
because with our suggestion, there would be greater alignment between 
legal and social norms, and thus we would anticipate that contested claims 
to attribution would be fewer. Secondly, because the right only relates to at-
tribution, so that questions of ownership are not at issue, we would envisage 
that the parties would likely be more ready to accommodate one another. By 
reducing the practical effects of authorship ascription, we would anticipate 
a corresponding reduction in the intensity of legal f ights over authorship.
Of course, many details of this proposal remain to be worked out, and it 
is beyond the scope of this chapter to offer a detailed defence and analysis. 
Rather, the purpose of this chapter has been to highlight the underlying 
discontinuity between legal and social authorship that the proposal is 
designed to address, to argue that re-aligning legal and social authorship 
norms is important for the sake of copyright law’s legitimacy, and to sug-
gest that current proposed solutions to this tension are in certain respects 
problematic. We think the proposal outlined here is a more promising 
alternative, and submit that it warrants further scholarly attention.
Notes
1. This chapter does not specifically address examples of digital collaboration. 
However, based on evidence from workshops that took place during the 
HERA project (in particular, the papers by Eva Northup and Hendrik Spilker at 
the HERA workshop on ‘Notions of and conditions for authorship and creativ-
ity in media production’, 2 November 2012, University of Bergen), our view is 
that, whilst digital collaboration makes questions about authorship pertinent 
and pressing, it does not fundamentally change the more general questions 
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considered here about authorship norms and roles. For further discussion of 
the norms of digital artistic collaboration, which relates to the example of 
conceptual art, please see the chapter in this collection by Elena Cooper.
2. Many jurisdictions give protection to a collective or composite work (such 
as an anthology) as a distinct category of work. See van Eechoud et al., 2009, 
esp. ch. 6, for detailed discussion. For reasons of space, this chapter focuses 
on copyright’s definition of joint authorship.
3. This chapter focuses on questions of joint authorship in terms of the 
specific contributions and collaborations amongst individuals to a work 
(a question that courts have been faced with when joint authorship is 
contested); however, for discussion of how EU and Dutch Courts often 
disregard these more specific questions about individual contribution when 
deciding whether a ‘work’ counts as an ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ 
for the purposes of copyright protection, please see the chapter in this col-
lection by Stef van Gompel.
4. Our focus here is largely on the written outcome of scientific research (e.g. 
journal articles) as opposed to datasets or visualisations formed as part of 
the publication process. Although we do not discuss the difficult question 
of the copyright status of these other potential ‘works’ of authorship, we 
note here that individuals who collect or manage data are often cited as 
authors of scientific research articles on the basis of their contributions to 
the former.
5. It is worth noting that many collaborative ventures such as Wikipedia rely 
on open source and open content licensing agreements, and that such col-
laborative ventures are often facilitated by authorship agreements which 
bypass questions about authorship attribution. It is beyond the scope of 
this chapter to discuss such agreements in depth, but we draw the reader’s 
attention to them as other examples of contractual agreements facilitating 
collaborative authorship, often independently of copyright law.
6. EU directives are laws which all Member States must implement in their 
national legal systems: here, we refer to the specific directive which indi-
cates that attribution ought to be recognisedrecognized as an important 
presumption in favour of authorship. However, it must be noted that, whilst 
the process of copyright harmonisation is underway between EU Member 
States, many differences still exist between different Member States with 
regards to questions of authorship and moral rights. For an overview of the 
complexity, see van Eechoud et al., 2009.
7. For an interesting example of how artistic and scientific authorship norms 
can combine in certain cases, independently of copyright law, see the 
examples of digital collaboration discussed in Elena Cooper’s contribution 
to this volume: in particular, the Renaissance Team at the National Centre 
for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA), University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign. In this example, all the different contributors to the data 
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visualisations are seen as equal players; Cooper argues that they appear 
uninfluenced by copyright norms in their conceptions of authorship.
8. For discussion of this point with regards to the relationship between 
copyright law and aesthetic judgments specifically, see the chapter in this 
volume by Erlend Lavik.
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